The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice

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The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice. / Creamer, Cosette; Godzimirska, Zuzanna.

I: Leiden Journal of International Law, Bind 30, Nr. 4, 2017, s. 947-966.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Creamer, C & Godzimirska, Z 2017, 'The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice', Leiden Journal of International Law, bind 30, nr. 4, s. 947-966. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156517000437

APA

Creamer, C., & Godzimirska, Z. (2017). The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice. Leiden Journal of International Law, 30(4), 947-966. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156517000437

Vancouver

Creamer C, Godzimirska Z. The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice. Leiden Journal of International Law. 2017;30(4):947-966. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156517000437

Author

Creamer, Cosette ; Godzimirska, Zuzanna. / The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice. I: Leiden Journal of International Law. 2017 ; Bind 30, Nr. 4. s. 947-966.

Bibtex

@article{de69fb24eb894c6b9385c44c1edf011a,
title = "The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice",
abstract = "Over the past few decades, states have granted greater independence and authority to international courts, yet still retain their ability to control who sits on the bench. This article examines how governments use their power of judicial nomination and appointment in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and assesses the relative influence of three factors on states’ vote choices for ICJ candidates: the candidates’ probability of (in)sensitivity to political considerations; their qualifications; and the role of inter-state politics. Drawing on a new dataset of candidates nominated for election to the ICJ between 1949 and 2010, we demonstrate that electing states base their initial vote choices largely on the same set of factors within both bodies that elect ICJ judges: the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council . In particular, professional experiences signaling a probability of insensitivity to political considerations reduce a candidate’s expected vote share. A candidate’s qualifications, on the other hand, do not appear to make a considerable difference in winning more votes. Finally, the amount of support during the nomination stage is highly correlated with vote share, suggesting that considerable screening occurs prior to nomination and that the number of nominations received facilitates coordination of vote choice across states.",
keywords = "Faculty of Law, International courts, independence, International Court of Justice, elections, judges",
author = "Cosette Creamer and Zuzanna Godzimirska",
year = "2017",
doi = "10.1017/S0922156517000437",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "947--966",
journal = "Leiden Journal of International Law",
issn = "0922-1565",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Job Market for Justice: Screening and selecting candidates for the International Court of Justice

AU - Creamer, Cosette

AU - Godzimirska, Zuzanna

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - Over the past few decades, states have granted greater independence and authority to international courts, yet still retain their ability to control who sits on the bench. This article examines how governments use their power of judicial nomination and appointment in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and assesses the relative influence of three factors on states’ vote choices for ICJ candidates: the candidates’ probability of (in)sensitivity to political considerations; their qualifications; and the role of inter-state politics. Drawing on a new dataset of candidates nominated for election to the ICJ between 1949 and 2010, we demonstrate that electing states base their initial vote choices largely on the same set of factors within both bodies that elect ICJ judges: the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council . In particular, professional experiences signaling a probability of insensitivity to political considerations reduce a candidate’s expected vote share. A candidate’s qualifications, on the other hand, do not appear to make a considerable difference in winning more votes. Finally, the amount of support during the nomination stage is highly correlated with vote share, suggesting that considerable screening occurs prior to nomination and that the number of nominations received facilitates coordination of vote choice across states.

AB - Over the past few decades, states have granted greater independence and authority to international courts, yet still retain their ability to control who sits on the bench. This article examines how governments use their power of judicial nomination and appointment in the context of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and assesses the relative influence of three factors on states’ vote choices for ICJ candidates: the candidates’ probability of (in)sensitivity to political considerations; their qualifications; and the role of inter-state politics. Drawing on a new dataset of candidates nominated for election to the ICJ between 1949 and 2010, we demonstrate that electing states base their initial vote choices largely on the same set of factors within both bodies that elect ICJ judges: the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council . In particular, professional experiences signaling a probability of insensitivity to political considerations reduce a candidate’s expected vote share. A candidate’s qualifications, on the other hand, do not appear to make a considerable difference in winning more votes. Finally, the amount of support during the nomination stage is highly correlated with vote share, suggesting that considerable screening occurs prior to nomination and that the number of nominations received facilitates coordination of vote choice across states.

KW - Faculty of Law

KW - International courts

KW - independence

KW - International Court of Justice

KW - elections

KW - judges

U2 - 10.1017/S0922156517000437

DO - 10.1017/S0922156517000437

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 947

EP - 966

JO - Leiden Journal of International Law

JF - Leiden Journal of International Law

SN - 0922-1565

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 179321109