The Politics of Judging EU Law: A New Approach to National Courts in the Legal Integration of Europe
Publikation: Bog/antologi/afhandling/rapport › Ph.d.-afhandling › Forskning
This is done by posing new questions, for instance, the relevance of national
judges’ preferences towards EU legal order and institutions, as well as by
evaluating and reviewing the impact of political and legal institutions on their
behaviour and its consequences for policy areas. First of all, the analysis confirms the influence of judges’ evaluation of EU institutions and their national
counterparts on their self-perception as EU judges and, subsequently, in the
application of EU law. Secondly, the study shows how national institutions, like
governments and national high courts, play a prominent role in shaping national
courts’ incentives for the application of EU law, as they may use their institutional power to circumvent judges’ decisions. Finally, it reviews the strategic use of European instruments such as the CJEU precedent and its doctrines (e.g. supremacy) to overcome domestic threats when applying EU law.
To conclude, the study tries to expand the explanatory power of the middle range accounts of the role national courts played, by integrating the analytical strength of the legalist/ intergovernmentalist theories into neo-functionalism.
|Forlag||Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Inv.|
|Status||Udgivet - 2015|
Note vedr. afhandling
Jury: Marlene Wind (Univ. Copenhagen), Bruno de Witte (formerly EUI/Univ.
Maastricht), Juan Antonio Juan Antonio Mayoral Díaz-Asensio (candidate),
Adrienne Héritier (EUI/RSCAS) (Supervisor), Alec Stone-Sweet (Yale Univ.)
- Det Juridiske Fakultet