The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction

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The African continent is littered with the wreckage of imploded polities. From Guinea Bissau to Burundi, from Congo-Brazzaville to Congo-Kinshasa, from Sierra Leone to Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, failed or collapsing states confront us with an all-too-familiar litany of scourges — civil societies shot to bits by ethno-regional violence, massive flows of hapless refugees across national boundaries, widespread environmental disasters, rising rates of criminality and the utter bankruptcy of national economies.

In its most recent avatar — the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) — the former Belgian colony is not just a failed state; it is the epitome of the collapsed state, whose descent into hell has set loose a congeries of rival factions fighting proxy wars on behalf of half a dozen African states. In a sense statelessness conveys a more realistic picture of the rampant anarchy going on in many parts of the country. Carved into four semi-autonomous territorial enclaves, three of which under the sway of rebel movements, it is the most fragmented and violent battle ground in the continent. The scale of human losses are staggering. According to the International Rescue Committee since 1998 the death toll could be as high as 3 million. Meanwhile, disease, starvation and homelessness are said to have affected 16 million out of a total population of approximately 50 million. The economy is in ruins, with approximately half of the country’s mineral wealth mortgaged to Kabila’s allies (most notably Zimbabwe), the other half looted by invaders (Rwanda and Uganda) — in official UN parlance, the “uninvited” parties to the conflict.

There is no precedent for the multiplicity of external forces involved in the destruction of the state and the plundering of the country’s human, economic and environmental resources. At the time of this writing, at least six states are militarily involved, officially or unofficially: Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi on the side of the rebellion, and Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia on the side of the Kabila government in Kinshasa. Putting the pieces back together is made all the more problematic by the
extent to which chaos is being capitalized upon by the intervenors to serve their own interests. Not only is there no will among African actors to bring the crisis to an end; even though their interests may differ, they each have a stake in perpetuating the break-up of the state.

The two key players, Rwanda and Uganda, once united in a common crusade against Mobutu’s dictatorship, are now at daggers drawn over the loot in eastern Congo, in the process dragging their respective client factions into violent turf battles. Born in a suburb of Kigali (Kabuga) in August 1998, with the blessings of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie [RCD]) is presently split into two rival factions, one based in Goma, in North Kivu (the pro-Rwanda RCD-Goma, led by Adolphe Onusumba Yemba), and the other in Bunia, in the Kibali-Ituri province (the pro-Uganda RCD-Bunia, recently led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, and now by Mbusa Nyamisi). Both wings have been torn by violent struggles for leadership, confronting their external patrons with difficult choices. Also supported by Uganda, a third rebel movement led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, the Movement for the Libération of the Congo (MLC) – renamed Front de Libération du Congo (FLC), following its merger with the RCD-Bunia in January 2001 -- fought pitched battles against Laurent Kabila’s rag-tag army in the Equateur province, in the north, and now claims – quite implausibly – to control some 900,000 sq. klms, “from Zongo on the Ubangui river all the way to Kanyabayonga in North-Kivu”. ¹ Approximately half of the DRC is under the fragile control of rebel movements kept alive by substantial infusions of direct military assistance from their respective sponsors. When not fighting each other, the strategic positions, including the key localities in the border area between Rwanda and Uganda, are held by units of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) and Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF). The DRC is the only country in the continent with
a approximately half of its national territory under foreign military occupation.

As if to further complicate the task of reconstruction, foreign-linked factionalism goes far beyond the three rebel movements currently linked to Rwanda and Uganda. A plethora of loosely-knit factions have emerged in the interstices of the three-cornered struggle going on between Kinshasa, Kampala and Kigali. One group, the Mai-Mai, tactically linked to Kabila, brings together a loose assemblage of local warlords, all vehemently opposed the RCD-Goma and its Rwandan patron. Another consists of Hutu armed groups from Rwanda and Burundi, the former generally identified with the remnants of Rwanda’s militias, the interahamwe, the latter with the Burundi-based Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD). A third (and more ambivalent) faction, the Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRF), led by Muller Ruhimbika, draws its support from a small segment of the Tutsi community indigenous to South Kivu (the so-called Banyamulenge); while openly critical of the presence of the Rwandan army in the DRC, it can hardly be described as pro-Kabila. In this extraordinarily fluid, deeply fragmented environment the only glue holding together this disparate group of counter-insurgents is their common hatred of the Rwandan occupying forces and their local allies.

Laurent Kabila’s assassination, on January 16, 2001, followed by an impromptu transfer of presidential authority to his 29 year old son, Joseph, raises further questions. What hidden hand, if any, lies behind the bodyguard’s bullet remains a mystery; the least that can be said is that Kabila père had made enough enemies at home and abroad to be under risk of an attempt on his life; whether Kabila fils can avoid his father’s egregious mistakes – his utter insensitivity to the demands of the civil society, his sheer ruthlessness in dealing with his suspected opponents within and outside the army, his stubborn refusal to implement the Lusaka accords and cavalier dismissal of the UN-appointed facilitator, Sir Katumile Masire (derisively
called the “complicator”) -- and in time chart a new course towards peace and reconstruction is what remains to be seen.

What, then, accounts for the failure of the state in the DRC? Plausible though it is to detect historical continuities between the horrors of the Leopoldian system and Mobutu’s brutally exploitative dictatorship, or between the sheer oppressiveness of Belgian rule and the excesses of the successor state, in the last analysis Mobutu himself must be seen as the determining agent behind this vertiginous descent into the abyss.² What set Mobutu apart from other neo-patrimonial rulers was his unparalleled capacity to institutionalize kleptocracy at every level of the social pyramid, and his unrivaled talent in transforming personal rule into a personality cult and political clientelism into cronyism.³ Stealing was not so much a perversion of the ethos of public service as it was its raison d’etre (or raison de servir). The failure of the Zairian state was thus inscribed in the logic of a system in which money was the only political tool for rewarding loyalty, a system which set its own limitations on the capacity of the state to provide public goods, institutionalize civil service norms, and effectively mediate ethno-regional conflicts.

This said, only through the concerted efforts of the Western “troika”, the US, Belgium and France – and after the first two had secretly orchestrated the assassination of Patrice Lumumba⁴ -- could Mobutu have come to power and ruled the Congo for 32 years with such an appalling combination of brutality, cunning and manipulative perversity. Although the massive infusions of financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank contributed in no small way to satisfy Mobutu’s incessant demands for cash, once confronted with their reluctance to oblige it took all the pressures the US could bring to bear on both institutions to ensure that the aid money would keep flowing into Mobutu’s private pockets until the late 1980s.⁵ For decades reasons of state overruled the voice of
reason.

Seen through the prism of the crises of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War emerges as a watershed in the unraveling of the Mobutist state. In 1990, after accumulating arrears of $70 million, the International Monetary Fund, no longer facing Uncle Sam’s veto, suspended its loans to the country, while other donors simply cut off their assistance. Precisely when the state went into receivership, Mobutu responded to the advent of multiparty democracy by buying off opposition parties. The urgent need for cash was met by printing tons of paper money. Spiraling inflation inevitably followed, driving the economy further into the ground.

From then on the cancer rapidly spread through the entire body politic, paralyzing one sector after another. As the delivery of political rewards beyond Kinshasa became increasingly problematic, the control of the state shrank correspondingly. And when the salaries of the military could no longer be paid, the more disaffected among the troops took to the streets and went on looting sprees through the capital city, killing hundreds. If security was non-existent, so was the capacity of the state to meet external threats. As the Rwandan army crossed into eastern Congo in October 1996, preparing the ground for Kabila’s triumphant march to Kinshasa, the state had already ceased to exist.

Before turning to a more sustained discussion of the roots of the Congo disaster, it will be useful to clarify our terminology.

**ANATOMY OF DISASTER: FAILURE, COLLAPSE AND FRAGMENTATION**

Whatever construction one may place on the concept of “state collapse”, or “state failure”, the phenomenon points to very different types of disabilities, some more
crippling than others. Not all states are proceeding to the abyss in lockstep. There are basket cases (the DRC), and hobbled polities (Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire); some are slowly recovering (Rwanda), while others remain partially paralyzed (Burundi).

State failure is one thing; state collapse something else. As Jennifer Widner reminds us, “state collapse and state failure may have related origins, but they are not the same. Not all failed states in Africa collapse.” Nor do all collapsed states end up split into warring fiefdoms. Indices of failure may range from declining institutional capacities, loss of legitimacy, increasing levels of corruption in high places, sporadic civil violence and so forth. Collapse points to the utter disintegration of state institutions. What normally signals the passage from failure to collapse is the implosion of the armed forces and the spread of civil violence on a large scale. Examples include Somalia in 1993, Congo-Brazzaville in 1997, Guinea-Bissau in 1998, — and the DRC in 1996. In the latter case collapse quickly led to dismemberment when, in July 1998, the new king of the Congo — Kabila — turned against the king-makers — Rwanda and Uganda — in turn paving the way for the emergence of externally sponsored rebel movements.

Dismemberment is not new to the former Belgian Congo. The immediate parallel that comes to mind is the fragmentation of the country into four separate states immediately after independence: the Independent State of the Katanga, the Independent Mining State of South Kasai, the pro-Lumumbist government of Orientale Province and the Kinshasa regime. None of these secessions lasted very long, and by 1963 the country was well on its way to reunification — but only because of the decision made by the United States, in cooperation with the UN, to throw its weight behind the Kinshasa authorities. Cold war imperatives played a crucial role in the process of territorial fragmentation and reconstruction. This is
where the present situation differs fundamentally from the 1960s. Both in the 1960s and 1990s the break-up of the Congo state was made possible by the intervention of outside forces, but with this difference that in one case it involved the penetration of forces external to Africa, and in the other of forces indigenous to the continent. The transition from collapse to break-up is inscribed in the extreme vulnerability of the Congo arena to regional economic and strategic interests; what insures the continuation of balkanization, however, are the economic links between regional and domestic actors with the global economy.

Let us return for a moment to the conditions leading to failure and ultimately to collapse. Taking a leaf from Huntington’s observation, in 1968, that the real issue in comparative analysis is not what kind but how much government any state claims for itself, the important distinction here is not between failed and functioning polities, but how much paralysis is experienced by any given state at any given time, where in the body politic, and how far it is likely to spread from one organ to another. Where the rot can no longer be contained within a particular institutional domain and contaminates several key sectors of governance – the executive branch, the instruments of force, the banking system and the economy, thus imposing crippling handicaps on the capacity of the state to act as an effective mediator – the stage is set for collapse. At this point almost any threat to the state can become mortal.

As the history of the Congo shows, the failure of one set of institutions is not enough to explain systemic collapse. The unraveling of the armed forces in 1964-5, under the blows of the Muleliste insurrection, did not bring about the disintegration of the state. External military assistance, coupled with substantial infusions of financial aid from the US, made it possible for the state to recover, if only momentarily, from what could have been an insurmountable challenge. By the early 1990s, however, the Congo had lost its strategic significance as a client state of West, and the costs of an
external rescue operation seemed to greatly outweigh the benefits. At a time when multiparty democracy was the order of the day, bolstering Mobutu’s dictatorship had ceased to be a realistic option; by the same token, the multiplicity of opposition forces released by the National Sovereign Conference, and the continuing tug of war between the transitional institutions and the Mobutist state, raised serious questions among donors (essentially France, Belgium and the US) as to how best to assist the transition, or indeed whether any assistance, short of military intervention, could make a difference. Donors’ inaction meant a continuing deadlock over the pace and manner of the transition. As we noted in a 1993 report to USAID, “Zaire is the only country in the world to claim two Prime Ministers, two governments, two parliaments, two constitutions and two transitional constitutional acts. The phenomenon, euphemistically referred to as ‘dédoublement’, bears testimony to the total impasse currently facing the country.”

The resulting paralysis of decision-making mechanisms ushered one crisis after another. None of the seven prime ministers appointed in 1991 and 1992 proved equal to the task of restoring governmental authority. With the rate of inflation jumping from 261 per cent in 1990 to 6,800 per cent in 1994, the economy went into a tailspin. Mobutu’s insistence on printing new paper money against the advice of Prime Minister Etienne Tshisekedi led to the latter’s resignation in December 1992, and when local traders refused to accept the newly minted 5 million Zaire banknotes several units of the armed forces responded by going on looting sprees through Kinshasa and elsewhere. The most violent and extensive of a series of pillages by the army occurred in January 1993, when devastation spread to several localities of the Lower Congo area and the Kivu provinces. Faced with major ethno-regional conflicts in North Kivu and Shaba (now renamed Katanga) by 1993 the Mobutist state had lost all capacity to effectively mediate the crises. Rather than serving as an instrument in the service of the state,
the army had become a loose cannon, and at times an active participant in local insurrections. From 1991 to 1993, failure metastatized from one institutional sector to another, reducing the Zairian state to utter impotence.

Difficult though it is to pinpoint precisely at what point in time the Mobutist state qualified as a failed state, one must agree with the assessment offered by a senior US diplomat that by 1992 Zaire had all the earmarks of a shell state, amounting to little more than “the presidential vessel Kamanyola anchored safely offshore in the Zaire river, an elite praetorian guard compensated in hard currency, the remote marble city of Gbadolite, and a shriveled state superstructure nourished by diamond smuggling”\(^\text{10}\). But if failure was already patent in 1992, collapse did not materialize until late 1996, with the destruction of the Hutu refugee camps of eastern Zaire by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the emergence of Laurent-Désire Kabila as the self-proclaimed leader of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL). That it took only six months for the poorly equipped and poorly led anti-Mobutist coalition to reach the gates of Kinshasa is a more of a commentary on just how far the rot had spread within the Zairian Armed Forces (ZAF), rather than on the intrinsic strength of the ADFL.

Mobutu’s appalling performance from one crisis to the next suggests the strongest reservations about structural explanations in any attempt to account for the demise of the Zairian state. More than the carry-over of the Bula Matari syndrome\(^\text{11}\) into the post-independence years – evocative of underlying historical continuities between the ruthlessness of the Leopoldian regime and the autocratic features of the Mobutist state – Mobutu must be seen as the chief architect of disaster.

His unrelenting efforts to thwart democratic opposition forces, his highly personalized style of rulership, built partly on repression and partly on extensive patronage
networks, his scandalous squandering of the Congo’s wealth, his megalomaniac obsession with grandiose development schemes at the expense of public goods for the masses, and, as the curtain was about to fall, rendered more erratic still by his fatal illness, his pathetic sauve-qui-peut attitude in the face of the relentless march of the ADFL on Kinshasa, these were indeed critical factors in the concatenation of forces that conspired to the ultimate collapse of his Bula Matari kingdom.

Thus as one reflects on Jeffrey Herbst’s thesis, that failure is traceable to the generalized inability of African states to effectively control their hinterland, owing to the artificiality of state boundaries combined with low population densities, questions arise as to whether the weakness of the state — whether defined in terms of its ability or inability to raise taxes, to provide public services, or to effectively protect its citizens — can conceivably be treated as constant. The convenient “ceteris paribus” qualifier does not take us very far in our quest for explanation. Even where the inability of the state to “broadcast power”, to use Herbst’s terminology, is patent, as in the Mobutist state, the significance of intervening variables cannot be left out of the accounting, any more than their relative weight in the balance of forces contributing to institutional decay.

Just as we need to recognize that not all state systems are equally vulnerable, it is no less important to avoid the trap of brute functionalism. In an otherwise inspiring essay, Zartman makes surprisingly short shrift of what others have termed “critical junctures”, or decisive events, on processes of state collapse. His use of metaphors is revealing: “What is notable in these scenarios (of state collapse)” , he writes, “is the absence of clear turning points, warning signals, thresholds or pressure spots… The slippery slope, the descending spiral, and the downward trend are the mark of state collapse rather than deadlines and triggers”. The least that can be said of this curiously ahistorical construction is that it is difficult to reconcile with the evidence at
hand (not unlike trying to explain the collapse of the French monarchy without reference to the seizure of the Bastille, the Tennis Court Oath or the flight to Varenne…) Elsewhere Zartman asks, “why do state collapse?” Because, we are told, “they can no longer perform the functions required for them to pass as states”¹⁴ (not unlike explaining the death of a patient by saying that he/she could no longer perform the functions required to stay alive).

If triggering events, thresholds, or critical junctures cannot be ignored, neither can the long-term forces of decay and decomposition be dismissed out of hand as unimportant. Both need to be factored in. It is anybody’s guess how much longer the Congolese state could have lasted had it not been for the decisive blows administered by the Rwandan assault against refugee camps in October 1996; what is beyond question is that by 1996 the Congolese state was already a pushover, thoroughly undermined by its long-standing prebendal involution, declining legitimacy and the near disintegration of its armed forces. The crisis of 1996 was the triggering event that brought the state to its knees.

**THE REGIONAL CONTEXT**

State collapse is contagious. Although the seeds of failure are inseparable from failed leadership, the risks of disintegration are significantly greater where the proximity of a collapsing state threatens to contaminate its neighbor. Just as the civil war in Liberia has decisively hastened the collapse of Sierra Leone (and vice versa), the flow of refugees generated by the continuing civil strife in Sierra Leone poses a clear and present danger to Guinea; again, there are important causal links between the insurgency in Casamance (Senegal) and the near disintegration of the army in Guinea Bissau. Nowhere, however, is the contagiousness of collapse more
dramatically illustrated than in the rapid spread of ethnic violence from Rwanda to eastern Congo in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide. Of the many unanticipated consequences of the Rwanda bloodbath, none has had more profoundly destabilizing consequences than the massive exodus of over a million Hutu refugees across the border into the Kivu provinces of eastern Congo.

To properly grasp the spin-off effects of the Rwandan carnage, attention must be paid to several features common to the Great Lakes region (here meaning Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and eastern Congo). One is the absence of coincidence between ethnic and geographic maps. The presence of Tutsi and Hutu communities in Uganda, Tanzania and eastern Congo bears testimony to the arbitrariness of state boundaries. Although many came during and after the colonial era, their presence reaches back to precolonial times. It is estimated that there are approximately 10 million people speaking Kinyarwanda in the Great Lakes region, and 15 million if Kirundi (a language closely related to Kinyarwanda) is included in the total. In North Kivu alone about half of the total population of some 3.5 million were identified as Kinyarwanda-speaking in 1993, and of these about 80 per cent were Hutu and 20 per cent Tutsi. The significance of this regional ethnic configuration is best captured by Huntington’s concept of “kin country syndrome”, a situation in which ethnic fault lines tend to replicate each other across national boundaries, thus creating a deadly potential for conflict to expand and escalate.

Another major characteristic is the very high density of population and resulting pressure on land throughout the region. Rwanda claims the highest population density in the continent, with Burundi and North Kivu close behind. With an estimated 1 million people in the late 19th century, Rwanda claimed 7.6 million on the eve of the genocide, with an average of 336 inhabitants per square kilometer; the figures for North Kivu indicate nearly similar densities in the high-lying areas of the
Congo-Nile Crest. It is not a matter of coincidence if the most densely populated areas — Masisi and Rutshuru — are also where the most intractable land disputes have arisen. The comments made by one observer about Masisi hold for the entire Kivu region: “competition for access to, and control over increasingly scarce land resources is rooted in these basic demographic facts; and so do ethnic politics”.16 The contrast with the situation described by Jeffrey Herbst for most of precolonial Africa could not be greater: “In precolonial Africa, land was plentiful and populations thin on the ground… As a result there were few areas where territorial competition was the central political issue because land was plentiful… Control over territory was often not contested because it was often easier to escape from rulers than to fight them”.17 Nothing is more bitterly contested in North and South Kivu than control over land; the land issue has been, and remains to this day at the heart of ethnic violence through much of the region.

A third factor relates to the presence in all four countries of sizeable refugee populations from neighboring states. Albeit on a varying scale and at different points in time, in each country refugee-generating violence has led to violence-generating refugee flows. The process begins in Rwanda in the early sixties, when tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees sought asylum in Uganda (70,000), Burundi (60,000) and eastern Congo (22,000). A nightmarish cycle of tit-for-tat ethnic violence followed the cross-border raids of armed refugees into Rwanda, culminating with the massacre of thousands of Tutsi civilians in 1963, in turn causing a further exodus of Tutsi refugees to neighboring states. In Burundi (which, unlike Rwanda, acceded to independence under Tutsi rule) the heightening of tension caused by the presence of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda reached a boiling point in 1972, with the genocidal massacre of at least 100,000 Hutu (some say 200,000) at the hands of the all-Tutsi army, again causing the exodus of tens of thousands of Hutu refugees to Rwanda,
Tanzania and eastern Congo (South Kivu).  

But by far the most devastating illustration of the “refugees as vectors of violence” phenomenon occurred in eastern Congo in the wake of the Rwanda genocide, in 1994, when 1.2 million Hutu refugees poured across the border into North and South Kivu. Of these perhaps as many as 100,000 consisted of interahamwe militias and remnants of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR). There was no precedent in the history of the region for such a massive irruption of armed refugees into the host country, or for the seriousness of the threats they posed to their country of origin. Such exceptional circumstances brought forth an exceptional response from the Rwandan government, in the form of a surgical pre-emptive strike against the refugee camps. The destruction of the camps by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in October 1996 marks a watershed in the process of decomposition of the Mobutist state. Besides triggering the virtual disintegration of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the search and destroy operations conducted by the RPA quickly snowballed into a popular crusade against Mobutu.

Out of the dialectic that often links retribution to insurrection emerged a broadly-based “revolutionary” movement, powerfully assisted by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, and dedicated to the overthrow of Mobutu’s dictatorship: the Democratic Alliance of Forces for the Libération of the Congo (ADFL), under the nominal leadership of Laurent Désiré Kabila. On May 17, 1997, eight months after its creation, the victorious ADFL marched into Kinshasa. Its spectacular success in carrying the banner of “liberation” to the gates of Kinshasa is a commentary on the extent of disaffection generated by the Mobutist dictatorship; more to the point, it speaks volumes for the degree of institutional paralysis afflicting the apparatus of the state.
FROM INTEGRAL STATE TO SHELL STATE: THE COSTS OF SELF-CANNIBALIZATION

Intimations of the mortality of the Zairian state were felt long before its downfall. Failure, to be sure, need not be mortal. Failure is a relative concept; and so, also, are the challenges posed to a failed state. From the very beginning Mobutu’s rule was the living embodiment of a neo-patrimonial polity. The extreme personalization of authority built around the presidential palace had as its corollary a systematic effort to thwart the development of a responsive and efficient bureaucracy. At no time was an effective institutional mechanism forged for resolving conflicts among competing constituencies. The scale of the challenges posed by the end of the Cold War was more than could be handled by the “lame Leviathan”\(^20\); by the early 1990s lameness had given way to utter paralysis.

For years after Mobutu’s second coming, in November 1965, the Zairian state tried to project the image of an all-embracing, hegemonic apparatus, dedicated to transforming the institutions of the state into an engine of development. What Crawford Young calls the “integral state” was indeed the ideological hallmark of Mobutu’s autocracy\(^21\). On closer inspection, a different reality emerges. Control over the civil society, though ostensibly mediated through the ruling party, the Mouvement Populaire pour la Révolution (MPR), involved the extension of clientelistic nets to all sectors of society, including the army. As in every patrimonial state, the Mobutist state owed its stability to its capacity to “service” the networks; patronage was the indispensable lubricant of the state machinery, the primary source of loyalty of the courtiers to their patron. Eventually, however, the lubricant ran out and the Mobutist machine was brought to a near standstill. By 1975 Mobutu was faced with a catastrophic decline of his sources of revenue. Copper prices plummeted; debt
servicing increased by leaps and bounds; the megalomaniac projects destined to usher in economic prosperity — the Inga-Shaba power line, the Makulu steel mill, the Tenge-Fugurume copper mines — proved unmitigated disasters. The inability of the Mobutist state to generate a volume of rewards consistent with its clientelistic ambitions is the key element behind its rapid loss of legitimacy. Writing in 1982, Vansina came to a depressing, though entirely predictable conclusion: “Legitimacy is gone, citizens are alienated… Naked power and bribes erode the law. In turn the strongly centralized state has lost much of its effective grip, because its legal directives are ignored, except under duress or when they seem to be opportune”.

With the end of the cold war the integral state came to look more and more like a “shell state”, to borrow the words of The Economist. The erosion of state capacities increased in proportion to Mobutu’s growing inability to keep up the flow of external funding generated through external donors, leading in turn to a further shrinkage of patronage networks. The result has been to set in motion a process of involution centered around a handful of venal, rent-seeking cronies. What Crawford Young describes as “self-cannibalization” vividly captures the hollowing out of state institutions under Mobutu’s prebendal rule: eventually the point is reached where “the state consumes itself to live another day”. In Young’s eloquent description:

The decay of the public realm is marked by a cumulative deflation of the state apparatus in terms of its competence, probity and credibility. Institutions of rule lose their capacity to translate public resources into sustenance of infrastructures or valued amenities. pervasive venality surrounds most public transactions. As a consequence, the subject comes to experience rule as simple predation: the aura of the state as a powerful nurturant protector vanishes.

For a quarter of a century the Mobutist state was able to compensate for its lack of
internal legitimacy by drawing huge dividends from its international status as the staunchest ally of the US in Africa. As has been noted time and again, what one French official described as “a walking bank account in a leopard-skin cap” was first and foremost a creature of the CIA. The end of the cold war could not but sharply increase its international isolation and legitimacy deficit; bartering its anti-communist credentials for external assistance was no longer a feasible option. Just as Mobutu owed his rise to power to the penetration of East-West rivalries in the continent, in the last analysis the collapse of the Zairian state must be seen as a casualty of the cold war’s end.

TRAJECTORIES OF COLLAPSE: THRESHOLDS AND TRIGGERS

By any of the conventional yardsticks — declining institutional performance, military indiscipline and harassment of civilians, inability to collect taxes, government spending on public services, notably health and education, and what one analyst aptly refers to as “pothole and gully” index — Zaire in the early 1990s stood at the top of the list of Africa’s failed or failing states. By then three basic indicators of failure mapped out the road to collapse: (a) a sharp decline of institutional capabilities, matched by a corresponding lack of responsiveness to the demands of the citizenry for “more democracy”; (b) widespread indiscipline and looting of private property by the armed forces and the police; (c) major eruptions of civil violence, notably in Shaba (1992-3) and North Kivu (1993).

Each of the foregoing in turn draws attention to certain critical junctures or thresholds in the decomposition of the state: (a) the (dis)organization of the National Sovereign Conference (CNS), in 1991, and the rise of multiparty competition; (b) the looting sprees of the army and presidential guard in 1993, marking the virtual dissolution of
the state’s “legitimate monopoly of force”; (c) the North Kivu emergency of 1993.

THE CNS AND THE ABORTED TRANSITION TO MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY

Yielding to domestic and international pressures, in April 1990 Mobutu formally announced the advent of “political reform” and the opening of multi-party competition; a year later a Sovereign National Conference (CNS) met in Kinshasa to lay the constitutional groundwork for multiparty democracy. Bringing together some 3,400 representatives of political parties and members of the civil society, the aim was to lay the groundwork for a reconfiguration of the state, but as one observer noted “it dramatically accelerated its disintegration”.

For one thing, it made clear Mobutu’s determination to use “divide and rule” strategies to pull the rug from under feet of the main opposition forces, notably Etienne Tshisekedi’s Union pour le Progrès Social et la Démocratie (UPSD). His talent for buying off members of the opposition and bankrolling the birth of friendly factions led to a phenomenal proliferation of political parties. More than 200 parties were registered at the end of the year. Meanwhile, the volume of cash funneled into the floating of satellite parties translated into a further shrinking of public spending on social services, while seriously compromising the chances of a broad consensus among participants to the conference.

Secondly, the imperative of “divide and rule” inexorably encouraged the rise of local and regional fiefdoms and the entrenchment of pro-Mobutu forces in some provincial arenas, as in Shaba, where Karl I Bond’s Union des Fédéralistes et Républicains Indépendents (UFERI) soon emerged as the staunchest opponent of Tshisekedi’s UPDS, and South Kivu where pro-Mobutu politicians, mostly of Bembe origins, like the vehemently anti-Tutsi Governor, Célestin Anzuluni, took steps to systematically
denigrate and deny rights of citizenship to long-established communities of ethnic Tutsi – the so-called Banyamulenge. The same scenario could be seen in North Kivu where Tutsi “fifty niners” were openly branded as “foreigners” working hand in hand with FPR guerillas in neighbouring Rwanda. Under the pretense of the “géopolique” argument set forth by Mobutu’s client parties — whereby positions of authority in the provincial administration should be reserved to those originating from that province — “indigeneity” was now brandished as the key priority of provincial reconfigurations.

Thirdly, and as a result of the foregoing, competition between pro- and anti-Mobutu parties led to violent ethnic eruptions in Shaba and North Kivu. In Shaba the efforts of the pro-UFERI governor to consolidate his grip on the provincial institutions took the form of systematic pogroms against the Kasaian populations, most of the them Luba immigrants suspected of sympathies for the Kasaian-led UPDS; hundreds were killed at the hands of the UFERI jeunesse groups, while thousands fled to Luba-dominated areas of the Kasai province.

Significantly, ethnic cleansing of Luba immigrants occurred shortly after Mobutu dismissed the Kasaian-born UDPS leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, from the prime ministership, in October 1991. His tenure in office lasted exactly six days and came to an abrupt end after he insisted on controlling the Central Bank. Tshisekedi’s dismissal only increased his popularity among Luba elements, in turn prompting the UFERI blowhards to unleash a campaign of indiscriminate violence against the immigrant communities of southern Katanga. Interviewed by the author in September 1993, the UFERI governor, Gabriel Kyungu was Kumwanza, claimed that the UFERI youth groups were a “totally uncontrolled, self-recruting group”, but neglected to mention that he himself had played a key role in fanning the flames of ethnic hatred, never missing an opportunity to hold the Kasaians collectively
responsible for the sufferings of the “native Katangans”. Bill Berkeley, one of the few journalists present in the Katanga at the time, recalled that “in a series of public rallies and radio speeches the governor railed against the ‘enemy within’…the bilulu (insects in Swahili). ‘The Kasaians are foreigners’, he declared. ‘Their presence is an insult’.”

By April 1992, in the wake of systematic attacks against their homes, hundreds of Kasaians were forced to return to their province of origin, including those who were born in the Katanga.

In North and South Kivu neither ethnic Tutsi nor Banyamulenge were able to gain representation in the CNS, causing serious tensions with the self-proclaimed “native Congolese”. In May 1993 North Kivu exploded, with ethnic violence sweeping across several rural localities (of which more in a moment). As in the Katanga, by willfully encouraging ethnic confrontations as a means of controlling the forces released by the CNS Mobutu created the very conditions that accelerated the march to collapse. Not only did the apparatus of the state prove utterly incapable to mediate the competing claims of social actors; more important still, precisely when the need for a reliable, efficient constabulary force had never been more evident, the army virtually disintegrated.

**THE FAILURE OF THE SECURITY FORCES**

In the catalogue of afflictions suffered by the state none looms larger than the appalling performance of the Zairian armed forces; its “rabble” character has remained almost constant throughout the Mobutu years. What the history of Zaire demonstrates — and this is even more cruelly evident in the case of Kabila’s RDC — is the inability of the regime to make an effective use of its security forces to deal with the threat of regional, externally supported
Like the state itself the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) can best be seen as a political machine lubricated by strong doses of corruption, clientelism and ethnic favoritism. Numbering approximately 150,000 in 1993, Mobutu’s army consisted of two core units, the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) and the Garde Civile (GC), headed respectively by his brother-in-law, General Etienne Nbgale Kongo Nzimbi, and General Philemon Kpama Baramoto, both of Ngbandi origins, like Mobutu himself. Approximately half of the 62 FAZ generals came from Mobutu’s region (Equateur), and one third of these were of Mobutu’s own ethnic group (Ngbandi) and were overwhelmingly concentrated in the DSP and the GC. Recruitment into the higher ranks can best be described as a patronage operation designed to reinforce the loyalty of the officer corps to the supreme patron. Kinship played a key role in strengthening loyalty. Baramoto’s rise to the top was greatly aided by his marriage to a cousin of Mobutu’s first wife; that Nzimbi happened to be a cousin of Mobutu also helped. Merit and competence were of secondary importance to personal devotion to Mobutu. In return for their political loyalty the army high command was given a free hand to engage in lucrative commercial activities. While some were involved in smuggling operations, others sold military equipment, spare parts and military fuel on the black market; the embezzlement of the salaries intended for the troops was a standard practice among officers, a fact which goes a long way towards explaining the exactions and indiscipline of the troops.

Already in 1964-65, during the Muleliste insurrection in eastern Congo, the poor performance of the Congolese army was made painfully clear. Had it not been for the assistance proffered by South African and European mercenaries (and the bombing missions flown by Cuban exiles in the pay of the CIA) Mobutu’s
second coming, in November 1965, might not have materialized. Again, only through the timely intervention of French and Moroccan troops during the Shaba I and Shaba II insurrections, in 1977 and 1978, was the Mobutist state saved from its self-inflicted handicaps.

The danger posed by the absence of an even minimally disciplined army was dramatically revealed during the looting sprees that swept across the country from 1991 to 1993. Presumably resentful of not being paid salaries comparable to the CNS delegates, and further angered by the refusal of local traders to accept Mobutu’s worthless banknotes (locally described as monnaie de singe or billets prostate), in September 1991 bands of soldiers went on rampage in Kinshasa, stealing and killing anyone who stood in their way (in Kinshasa alone 113 persons were killed in January 1993 and 156 seriously wounded). The same scenario unfolded in Lubumbashi in October 1991, in Mbanza-Ngungu in January 1992, in Goma in December 1992, in Mbandaka in September 1992, in Kisangani, Goma and Rutshuru in January 1993, in Lisala in August 1993. In each locality millions of dollars worth of property were destroyed by rampaging soldiers. The extensive “pillages” visited upon civilians brought into sharp relief the extreme fragility of a security apparatus very largely built on ethnic clientelism, and the degree to which the absorption of financial wealth by the Mobutu clique conspired to destroy its morale and heighten its indiscipline.

By 1993 the FAZ were spinning out of control. With the prospects of Mobutu running out of cash, bitter rivalries emerged among different factions of the officer corps, notably between Mbudja and Ngbandi sub-groups, headed respectively by Generals Bumba and Babia. As the latter faction eventually gained the upper hand the security forces came increasingly under the control of the all-Ngbandi “gang of four”, Generals Mavua, Eluki, Baramoto and Nzimbi,
respectively minister of national defense, chairman of the chiefs of staff, commander of the GC and head of the DSP. By 1996 the “gang of four” had become a loose cannon, with Mobutu for all intents and purposes at the mercy of his generals.

What one observer referred to as “the ‘western’ of the Generals and the birth of factions and godfathers”, marked the unraveling of the FAZ: “Unfortunately Mobutu failed to read the message sent by the mutinous troops. The latter were simply fed up with the mafia operating within the army. The troops were paid irregularly, poorly fed, poorly led, while their commanding officers were abusively swelling the size of their units and embezzling their salaries with impunity”.\(^\text{29}\) To compensate for their unpaid salaries the officers gave their troops a blank check to ransom and loot; meanwhile the loyal clienteles built around the Ngbandi-dominated Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) proved just as adept in engaging in plunder and theft. When the time came to take on Kagame’s “refugee warriors” and their Congolese allies in the east, in October 1996, all that Mobutu could summon was a band of armed thugs masquerading as an army.

**THE KIVU EMERGENCY: 1993-1996**

Long before the attacks on the refugee camps, in October 1996, North Kivu had become a calabash of seething political and ethnic tensions, for which Mobutu bears much of the responsibility. By first favoring the Tutsi community, and more specifically the first generation of “fifty-niners”, against “native Congolese”, and then turning against them, by declaring all Banyarwanda\(^\text{30}\) foreigners and denying them the rights of citizenship, Mobutu sowed the seeds of his own
undoing.

Basically, the roots of the Kivu crisis center on land issues. These are traceable in part to the legacy of Belgian policies, in part to the critical role played by one of Mobutu’s most trusted advisers and chief of staff — a Tutsi “fifty niner” named Bisengima. The key to the situation lies in Rwanda. Land hunger in the Kivu would have never reached such critical dimensions had it not been for (a) the long-term effects of Belgian policies in “facilitating” the immigration of tens of thousands of Rwandan families to North Kivu in order to meet the labor demands of European planters, along with the designation of hundreds of thousands of acres as “vacant lands” so as to turn them into protected parklands; and (b) the crucial role played by Tutsi refugees from the Rwanda revolution (1959-62) in appropriating large tracts of land at the expense of the “indigenous” communities. This is where Bisengimana — himself, like many of his kinsmen, one of the largest landowners in the Kivu — bears considerable responsibility in heightening tensions between the Banyarwanda and native Congolese.

By 1981 the land problem and the nationality question had become both sides of the same coin. Citizenship rights meant the right to vote and the right to buy land. Until then the Banyarwanda could exercise both, thanks to a 1972 law pushed through parliament at the request of Bisengimana. By 1977 Mobutu’s favorite émigré had fallen out of grace, and anti-Banyarwanda sentiment was growing throughout the region. The nationality law of 1981 in effect withdrew citizenship rights from all Banyarwanda, including those whose roots in the Kivu went back to precolonial times. From then on citizenship only applied to “those persons who could show that one of their ancestors was a member of a tribe, or part of a tribe, established in the Congo prior to 1908”, that is when the Congo
ceased to be a “Free State” and became a Belgian colony.\textsuperscript{31} Behind the palpable ineptitude of this stipulation lay a clear intention to collectively deprive all Banyarwanda of their citizenship.

While some Banyarwanda had hoped that the nationality issue would be resolved at the CNS, this was not to be the case. The party delegations representing the interests of the “foreigners” were refused admission to the conference; the civil society delegates likewise. The “geopolitique” argument received widespread support among the majority of the participants, thus ratcheting up the ethnic temperature in eastern Congo.

The tensions over the nationality issue came to a boil in May 1993, when anti-Banyarwanda violence suddenly erupted in Masisi and Walikale (North Kivu), causing an estimated 10,000 deaths (mostly Hutu) and the displacement of some 250,000 people. Although the evidence concerning the immediate circumstances of the rioting is sketchy, certain basic facts as reasonably clear. As we had occasion to note elsewhere, “violence was directed against all Banyarwanda irrespective of their ethnic identity (Hutu or Tutsi); it was instigated by indigenous “tribes” (Hunde, Nande and Nyanga), assisted by Mai-Mai and Bangilima warriors; the killings occurred in response to a widespread campaign of civil disobedience organized by the Magrivi, a pro-Hutu mutuelle, in large part directed against indigenous traditional authorities”\textsuperscript{32} — the latter suspected of being in league with Tutsi land-owners.

Hutu-Tutsi tensions had yet to reach the point no return. For a while this surge of xenophobic violence caused the two ethnic fragments of the Banyarwanda community to develop closer ties. Some spoke of an emergent “Hutu-Tutsi coalition”. The least that can be said is that it proved extremely short-lived. Already many
young ethnic Tutsi in both North and South Kivu had gone over to the Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), and were actively engaged in the civil war next door, causing suspicions of “disloyalty” among local politicians. With the capture of power in Rwanda by the FPR, in July 1994, followed by the huge flood of Hutu refugees into North Kivu the stage was set for a major reshuffling of ethnic alliances. From then on the Hutu-Tutsi split emerged as the critical frame of reference in Kivu politics, only to be supplanted, after the destruction of the camps in 1996, by a growing polarization between “Tutsi” — the all-encompassing label designating Rwandan Tutsi, descendants of the early migrants to North Kivu, the fifty niners and the long-established Banyamulenge communities of South Kivu — and “native” elements. The turning point came on October 7, 1996, when the South Kivu governor urged all Tutsi to leave the country within a week or face “appropriate” sanctions. A week later the RPA troops unleashed the full force of their assault on the refugee camps.

**THE 1996 WATERSHED: FROM ZAIRE TO DRC**

The nemesis visited upon the refugee camps touched off tectonic shifts that would radically alter not just the political landscape eastern Congo, but the fate of the successor state. With the emergence of Kabila at the head of the ADFL the stakes were raised far beyond the immediate objective of eliminating the threats posed to Rwanda by armed refugee groups; the aim was to wrestle the Mobutist monster to the ground and make the whole of the Congo safe for Rwanda. The first was achieved with relative ease by Kagame’s troops, though at a horrendous cost in refugee lives; the second proved immensely more difficult.

Orchestrated by Kagame, assisted by troops from Rwanda, Uganda and Angola,
applauded by almost every state in the continent, the ADFL campaign against Mobutu was harnessed to a common will — to overthrow dictatorship and prepare the ground for democracy. Of the determining role played by the Rwandan army in the undoing of Mobutu there can be no doubt: “Rwanda was the Godfather of the Congolese rebellion”. Schatzberg’s statement encapsulates the central factor behind the ensuing struggle for power leading to the 1998 crisis.

There are few parallels for the popular legitimacy of a self-styled revolutionary leaders soaring and collapsing in such a brief interval. Kabila’s ineptitude in handling the demands of the civil society must be seen as one of the main reasons behind his plummeting popularity in the months following the fall of Kinshasa, on May 17, 1997. Another stemmed from his overwhelming military and political dependence on Banyamulenge and Rwandan elements.

That he would not stand as the apostle of democracy was made clear in his inaugural speech, on May 29, 1997: the CNS was ruled out as the basis for a new constitutional order; it belonged to a Mobutist past that had to be jettisoned lock, stock and barrel into the dustbin of history. So, too, were opposition political parties. The civil society fared no better. If any doubts remained about Kabila’s dictatorial dispositions, these were quickly dispelled by the arrest and incarceration of dozens of civil society leaders and journalists in the months following his inauguration. True to his paleo-Marxist nurturing, in 1999 Kabila dissolved the ADFL and established People’s Power Committees (PPC) aimed at giving power to the masses — a thinly veiled attempt to place police informants in strategic positions to have opponents arrested. Ominously, on November 14, 1999 he authorized the CPPs to carry weapons, an operation supervised by the People’s Self-Defence Force (FAP), a private militia officially said to be an extension of the army. On the eve of the millennium the DCR had all the earmarks of a police state. Summarizing the parallel
with Mobutu’s Zaire, Joseph Oleghankoy — who first rallied to and then promptly defected from the RDC-Goma — commented, “Kabila and Mobutu are like Pepsi and Coca-Cola: you can’t taste the difference”. 34

Nor could this “Mobutisme sans Mobutu” syndrome leave the international community indifferent, least of all the US. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Kinshasa in December 1997 turned out to be a near-disaster as Kabila took advantage of a press conference to come down hard on the opposition, ending his tirade with a mocking smile and a cynical “Vive la democratie!”. 35 While other donors remained equally wary of providing financial assistance, the United Nations, in the meantime, became involved in a long and inconclusive struggle with Kabila over the fate of tens of thousands of Hutu refugees allegedly killed by ADFL and Rwandan troops in the course of their exodus. The UN investigatory commission headed by Special Rapporteur Roberto Garreton ran into endless problems. Following one complication after another in March 1998, a year after it had been appointed, the Garreton commission left Kinshasa, empty-handed.

Kabila’s stonewalling could not have made clearer his utter dependence on Kigali. Whatever evidence there is about the circumstances surrounding the massacre of refugees suggests that the RPA was far more involved than the ADFL. In blocking the work of the commission Kabila was evidently taking his marching orders from Kigali.

If further proof were needed one could point to the growing influence of certain key Rwandan and Banyamulenge personalities in his entourage: Kagame’s army chief of staff, James Kabarehe; Bizima Karaha, minister of foreign affairs; Deogratias Bugera, minister of presidential affairs and former secretary general of the ADFL; and Moise Nyarugabo, his personal secretary (the last three would eventually
surface as key members of the CRD-Goma). Nor could one fail to notice the commanding presence in Kinshasa of many Tutsi-looking, Kinyarwanda-speaking elements. As anti-Tutsi feelings intensified in the capital Kabila could not be seen otherwise than as a stooge of Kagame. As 1997 drew to a close the choice he faced was either to hang on to his Rwandan protectors, and suffer an even greater loss of legitimacy, or to free himself of their embrace and face the consequences. By mid-1998 Kabila had made his choice — and the consequences proved fatal to his regime.

**THE ROAD TO HELL: THE 1998 REBELLION AND ITS AFTERMATH**

The crunch came on July 27, 1998, with Kabila’s announcement that all foreign troops would be expelled from the DRC. The next day six planeloads of Tutsi and Banyamulenge troops hurriedly flew out of Kinshasa, leaving behind hundreds of others to their own devices. Meanwhile, hundreds of Tutsi residents of Kinshasa (and not a few Tutsi-looking Africans) were massacred by what was left of Kabila’s army and angry mobs of Congolese. By yielding to the mounting anti-Tutsi sentiment, the Congo’s new king turned the king-makers into his bitterest enemies.

The sense of outrage felt by Kagame struck a responsive chord among several Congolese opposition figures whose distaste for Kabila exceeded their grievances against the Rwandans. The crisis gave them a unique opportunity to turn the tables on Kinshasa. Like Kabila in 1996, they knew that the road to Kinshasa passes through Kigali; and like Kabila they quickly realized the need for a homegrown, authentically Congolese vehicle to lend credibility to their plans. Thus came into existence in Kigali, on August 16, the CRD. By then a full-scale rebellion was already underway in eastern Congo; in Kinshasa, meanwhile, the FAC braced for a decisive
confrontation with Kagame’s troops.

In early August, with an unerring sense for the jugular, Kagame airlifted some six hundred troops from Goma to Kitona, a major military airbase about 200 kilometers west of Kinshasa, where they linked up with the local FAC garrison (then undergoing “re-education”). The key towns of Moanda and Matadi were seized almost immediately. By August 17, the huge hydroelectric dam at Inga was under rebel control. By a flick of the switch Kinshasa was plunged into darkness, and its water supply cut off. Then, precisely when Kinshasa seemed about to cave in, Angola saved the day. On August 22, an estimated 3,500-4,000 Angolan troops surged from the Cabinda enclave, and with tanks and heavy artillery attacked Kagame’s men from the rear. Fleeing the Angolan assault from the west, on August 26 Kagame’s men made a last-ditch effort to seize Kinshasa, only to concede defeat.

Despite its setback in the west, the rebellion quickly picked up momentum in the east. After the recapture of Kisangani by the Rwandan army, rebel troops struck out north and west, and, with the backing of the Ugandan army, took one town after another: Bunia, Buta, Bumba, Isoro and Aketi. With the fall of Kindu, capital of the Maniema, on October 12, the rebellion scored a major victory. Besides giving the rebels and their Rwandan allies free access to the mineral resources of the region, the path was now cleared for a further advance south towards Kasongo, Kabalo, Kabinda and the diamond-rich Kasai province.

1998: A REPLAY OF 1996?

On surface, the 1998 rebellion had all the earmarks of a replay of the 1996 anti-Mobutist insurrection. In both instances, the initiative came from Kigali, with the support of Kampala; the points of ignition, logically enough, were Goma and Bukavu,
with the Banyamulenge acting as the spearhead of the rebellion; and the insurgents had relatively little in common besides their shared aversion to the Kinshasa regime.

By 1998, however, Angola had switched sides, and this is the critical difference with 1996. The key to this decisive turnaround lies in the Angolan civil war. All too aware of the absolute necessity of retaining Kabila’s support in his fight against Jonas Savimbi’s Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (Unita), and eventually destroy their rear bases in the DRC, President Dos Santos had little hesitation in throwing his weight behind Kabila. Had he acted differently the DRC would probably no longer exist.

In 1998 as in 1996 the senior partner in the coalition became the source of enduring hatreds among the insurgents, but with different implications. The pattern of alliances stitched together from Kigali is far more fragile than was the case in 1996. In late 1998, thoroughly exasperated by Kigali’s efforts to control the RCD, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, an exile academic of Bakongo origins, decided to set up his own rebel faction – the RCD-Bunia -- and turn to Uganda for support. Equally distrustful of Rwanda’s intentions, a third rebel movement emerged in the Equateur, the Congo Liberation Movement (CLM), led by Jean-Pierre Mbemba, son of a well-known businessman and former supporter of Mobutu. Seemingly endless factional struggles have plagued each rebel movement. The most violent, in late 2000, virtually ripped apart the RCD-Bunia when a dissident faction led by Mbusa Nyamesi turned against Wemba and forced him to seek refuge in Uganda (of which more in a moment).

Not only has anti-Rwandan sentiment driven a deep wedge between the two wings of the RCD but also between their external sponsors, Rwanda and Uganda. Competition between their respective clients over access to the Congo’s mineral
wealth is one of the underlying factors behind the trial of strength between the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and the RPA over the control of Kisangani. In August 1999, following an armed confrontation between the two CRD factions over the control of the city, Rwandan and Ugandan troops jumped into the fray, and for four days fought each other tooth and nail on behalf of their respective allies, leaving some 200 soldiers and civilians dead. An even bloodier confrontation erupted in May 2000, and for much the same reasons, resulting in the death of an estimated one thousand local residents and many more wounded and homeless.

The battle for Kisangani is more than a case of external patrons reluctantly drawn into a factional struggle. More than anything else, it reflects a deadly rivalry for the rich deposits of gold, diamond and coltan of eastern Congo. Since 1996 the stakes involved in the struggle have changed dramatically. As is now becoming increasingly clear, the security imperative invoked by Kigali in 1996 is of secondary importance to the huge profits drawn by Rwanda and Uganda from the plunder of the Congo’s mineral resources. Not all of this wealth ends up lining private pockets; much of their war effort is in large part financed out of exports from eastern Congo.

Except for the Kivu, where violence has remained constant, and constantly horrendous, and the killings of tens of thousands of fleeing Hutu refugees by the RPA, the 1996 insurrection did not involve major bloodshed among Congolese. The same cannot be said of the 1998 rebellion. The cost in human lives has been, and remains without precedent. Both sides are responsible for unspeakable atrocities against civilian populations. The slaughter of Tutsi in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi (in the name of what some government-controlled media referred to as the Hamitic threat to Bantu people) has been matched by the innumerable revenge killings committed Rwandan troops against the civilian communities of North and South Kivu. A major source of violence stems from the incessant attacks launched by the
Mai-Mai militias against RPA soldiers and their CRD allies, in turn bringing devastating retaliatory strikes against civilians. Cases in point include the massacres in Kasika (South Kivu) in August 1998, when more than a thousand Congolese were killed at the hands of the RPA or Banyamulenge soldiers, and in Makobola (also in South Kivu) in January 1999, when an estimated five hundred villagers were wiped out in similar circumstances. Similar atrocities were reported in Ngenge, Kalehe, Kilambo, Lurbarika, Luberezi, Cidaho, Uvira, Shabunda, Lusenda-Lubumba, Lulingu, Butembo, and Mwenga, where in November 1999, fifteen women are said to have been buried alive after being tortured. The overall picture conveyed by the UN Special Rapporteur Roberto Garreton in his 1999 report to the Human Rights Commission is one of unmitigated horror. Between December 1998 and November 1999 some 35 cases of massacres of civilians were reported as reprisals for Mai-Mai attacks against RPA soldiers and/or their CDR allies, causing thousands of casualties, all of which were at first denied by the CDR and later acknowledged as “unfortunate mistakes”.39

THE HEMA–LENDU TRAGEDY

Just as lethal in its effects is the extension of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict to areas inhabited by populations sharing cultural affinities with Tutsi and Hutu. The most dramatic illustration of the phenomenon occurred in a remote corner of the newly created Kibali-Ituri province, near Bunia, in June 1999, when violent clashes suddenly erupted between Hema and Lendu, resulting in an estimated 10,000 people killed and over 50,000 displaced.

The Hema are pastoralists who have much in common, culturally, with the Tutsi of Rwanda and Burundi, the Banyamulenge of eastern Congo and the Hima of the Ankole district in Uganda; the Lendu, on the other hand, are settled agriculturalists.
and hunters. Despite long-standing tensions between them, the savagery that has attended recent clashes is without parallel in their history. The most recent flare-up, in January 2001, transformed the area in and around Bunia into a human abattoir. Graphic descriptions of the atrocities committed by both sides were reported in the press, one observer commenting on how the head of a young boy was hacked off and then “skewered on the tip of a spear and paraded on the back of a pick-up truck… while soldiers on the truck sang a soccer song”.\textsuperscript{40} Although the exact number of lives lost will never be known, there is general agreement that the spark that ignited the killings was a dispute over land, in Djugu, involving Hema claims over a farm owned by Lendu. Soon the conflict took on ominous proportions. According to a humanitarian source, “it has now become a conflict over power and money… The presence of various Congolese and foreign armed groups, the easy availability of weapons, the war-ravaged economy, and a rise in ‘ethnic ideology’ in the area have provided dangerous fodder for the conflict’s rapid extension and ferocity”.\textsuperscript{41} More specific circumstances also played a role, notably the decidedly pro-Hema attitude of the provincial governor, Adele Mugisha, herself a Hima from Ankole. Her ethnic sympathies seem largely responsible for her decision to authorize elements of the UPDF to back local Hema militias in their efforts to drive the Lendu from their land.

In addition to its terrible cost in human lives, the Hima-Lendu strife has had a profoundly disruptive impact on the intramural struggle going on within the CRD-Bunia. While Wamba dia Wamba cast his lot with the Lendu, his Vice-President John Tibasima (a Hema) and Prime Minister, Mbusa Nyamwesi (a Nande) both tended to support the Hema. After a violent fire fight between the rival sub-factions Wamba was hastily summoned to Kampala and urged to resign from the presidency of the movement, thus paving the way for the merger of the Nyamusi-Tibasima faction with Bemba’s MLC, now renamed Congolese Liberation Front (CLF).
Whether the Hema-Lendu peace accord brokered by the CLF in February 2001 can prevent a resurgence of ethnic killings is anybody’s guess.

Managing conflict within their respective client factions is a burden which both Kagame and Museveni have to bear, and so far neither can claim much success. The same, of course, could be said of Kabila as he vainly tried to impart some degree of internal cohesion and coordination to a congeries of semi-autonomous satellites -- Mai-Mai warlords, interahamwe bands and FDD militias – while at the same time fending off plots, real or imagined, within his own politico-military apparatus. In the end Kabila failed on both counts; whether his son can show greater adroitness in handling his father’s poisoned inheritance remains to be seen.

What is beyond dispute is that in his three and a half years in office Laurent Kabila has outdone Mobutu in bringing his country into the abyss. Measured by the familiar yardsticks of the Mobutu dictatorship – extreme personalization of power and nepotism, corruption and rent seeking, neglect of public services and indifference to the demands of the civil society – his performance is arguably even worse than that of his predecessor. Although Mobutu must bear full responsibility for ushering the collapse of the state, Kabila’s ineptitude is what precipitated its dismemberment. Where Mobutu refused to share power while resisting the break-up of the state, Kabila, it was said, “preferred sharing the country to sharing power”. 42 His early aura of legitimacy as the man who toppled Mobutu was mortgaged at the outset by his heavy dependence on his Rwandan backers, but this is not enough to explain his inability to build up the power base needed to challenge his former allies. At no time was a serious attempt made to come to terms with the opposition, give voice to the civil society, reorganize the army into a viable fighting force, reallocate the country’s resources with an eye to the crying needs of the rural sectors. His style of governance was that of a warlord, not of a statesman, reminiscent in many ways of
“the methods of leadership he practiced as a militia leader in Fizi-Baraka or while running his many Tanzanian businesses”. For all his avowed enmity to the Mobutist dictatorship, Kabila’s ramshackle regime looked like nothing so much than an institutional clone of its predecessor.

**ENTER KABILA FILS**

“Despite widespread discontent with his rule, Kabila’s regime is not threatened by internal unrest, or even a coup”. Less than a month after the publication of this assessment in an otherwise excellent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) Kabila was shot dead by one of the child soldiers (kadogo) in charge of his security. The exact circumstances of the assassination are still murky. What were the assassin’s motives? Was the hand that pulled the trigger guided by Angolans? If so, why? What is the connection between Kabila’s order to execute Masasu Nganda, one of his key lieutenants in the Katanga, on November 27, 2000, and the kadogo’s bullet? One can only venture the most tentative answers. The most plausible hypothesis points to a convergence of two separate sets of factors. The decision to eliminate Kabila most probably came from President Dos Santos of Angola or his Chief of Staff, General Jogo Baptista de Matos; according to a well informed source, the kadogo-killer, one of several involved in the assassination, was the instrument chosen by the Angolans. But compliance would not have been forthcoming had it not been for Kabila’s callous indifference to kadogo’s fate while fighting the RPA and its domestic allies. In brief, the kadogo and the Angolans had different sets of grievances, yet they both converged on the same target.

The growing frustration of the Angolans stemmed from in part from the extraordinary inefficiency of the Kabila establishment in getting its act together on the battlefield,
and in building a viable power base in Kinshasa. Nepotism and corruption was another source of disillusion. The last straw came when it suddenly dawned on Dos Santos that Kabila was working hand in hand with Unita rebels – via a group of Lebanese intermediaries based in Kinshasa – in channeling into his hands the benefits of illicit trade in diamonds. Which in turn explains the gunning down of the eleven Lebanese involved in the diamond deals, gangland-style, along with their immediate relatives, in the days immediately following Kabila’s assassination. That the order to kill the Lebanese came from Colonel Eddy Kapend, Kabila’s aide-de-camp, confirmed his pro-Angolan leanings. A Lunda from the Katanga, like General Yav Nawesh, Kapend was seen by the Angolans as their safest ally in their fight against MPLA penetration into the Katanga. Significantly, Kapend and Yav are now in jail, a move suggestive of Joseph Kabila’s determination to resist manipulation by the Angolans.

The kadogo’s unhappiness with Kabila is easy to understand: poorly trained, poorly fed and seldom paid, most of them have been used as cannon fodder against Rwanda’s crack units in the Katanga. Hundreds were killed while fighting RPA and RDC soldiers on the eastern front. Many felt outraged upon learning of the execution of their beloved “patron”, Masasu Nindaga, in November 2000, near Pweto (Katanga). Kabila’s first Chief of Staff, and former leader of the Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la Libération to Congo (MRLC), one of the four original parties that formed the ADFL, Masasu Nindaga was from the Kivu region like the vast majority of the kadogos; his father was a Mushi and his mother a Munyamulenge. His political credentials notwithstanding, his maternal ties were enough to raise doubts about his loyalty to the ADFL, and in November 1997 Kabila had him arrested; not until April 2000, after an amnesty was declared, was he released. Once again suspected of conniving with the Tutsi enemy he was arrested and executed on
November 27, 2000, on the eve of the Pweto battle, which saw the routing of Kabila’s army at the hands of the RPA and RCD troops and the flight of an estimated ten thousand kadogos into Zambia.

Although the succession leaves many important items of contention unresolved, so far the performance of Kabila fils is not nearly as negative as had been initially foreseen. No sooner was the new incumbent anointed than the strongest doubts were expressed within and outside the Congo about his ability to lead his country out of the mess inherited from his father. Commentators pointed to his youth, his lack of experience, his poor expressional skills in French, his unfamiliarity with the arcane politics of Kinshasa, all of which presumably disqualified him for the job.46 Nonetheless, six months after assuming his father’s succession his achievements, modest as they are, call for a more nuanced assessment. Where his father made a mockery of the Lusaka accords, consistently resisted calls to negotiate with the rebels and their allies, and heaped scorn on the UN-appointed facilitator, Joseph has shown himself surprisingly receptive to the implementation of the Lusaka accords. Masire has been called back to the Congo; the ban on political parties has been lifted; preparations are under way for a national dialogue; and, as a significant sign of good will, Kagame and Museveni have begun to pull back their troops. Furthermore, the impression he has made on his interlocutors during his visit to European capitals and Washington has been generally favorable. More importantly he has made every effort to distance himself from the old-guard politicians surrounding his father as well as from his Angolan allies. Once this is said, one can hardly overlook the constraints imposed by his father’s legacy on his ability to reconstruct the Congolese state.

The troubled circumstances of his rise to power throw into stark relief two obvious handicaps: his dependence on external patrons, especially Angola, and the collapse
of his army. In the absence of an army worthy of the name reliance on Angolan and Zimbabwean troops is his only option; the price to be paid is a continued abdication of his sovereignty, not only because of the limits thus placed on his strategic options, but because it provides justification for the presence of Rwandan and Ugandan troops in eastern Congo. Withdrawal is a two-way street, and so far there is no evidence that the limited pullback of Rwandan and Uganda troops will be matched by similar moves by his allies.

The kadogo factor raises other problems. Besides being a metaphor for the appalling inefficiency of the Congolese army, it could also become a synonym for further unrest. With tens of thousands of child soldiers left to their own devices, most of them thoroughly disillusioned, when not facing starvation and death, the prospect of a massive influx of kadogos back to their home provinces (North and South Kivu) and into the Mai-Mai nets is by no means to be excluded. Were the kadogo’s shift of allegiance to materialize on a substantial scale the result would be to ratchet up the threats posed to Rwanda and give Kagame further reasons for maintaining a military presence in eastern Congo. Yet security is not the only reason for the occupation of North and South Kivu. The enormous profits derived from the exploitation of the region’s mineral wealth, and the variety of interested parties on the receiving end of the line, are not the least of the obstacles in the way of the implementation of the Lusaka accords.

THE “CONTINUATION OF ECONOMICS BY OTHER MEANS”

David Keen’s twist on the Clausewitzian aphorism focuses attention to the relationship between violence and economics, between the vicious struggle going on among parties to the conflict as they try to extract maximum benefits from the
Congo’s mineral resources and the role of foreign buyers overseas.

Consider the following “incident”, one among a myriad others never reported in the media. On November 7, 2000 a group of Mai-Mai commandeered a Ugandan pick-up truck loaded with $ 70,000 worth of coltan (columbite-tantalite ore) coming from Manguredjipa, a small locality in the northeast of the DRC, near the Ugandan border. The following day a group of UPDF soldiers, accompanied by a tank, was sent to neighboring villages in hopes of recovering the loot. As they came to Kikere, where a wedding was taking place, they opened fire of the assembled crowd near the church, killing seventeen; one house nearby was set to the torch, while others were emptied of all furniture; a total of thirteen people were reported burned to death; a number of villagers, including women and children, were taken prisoners and sent to jail in Rughenda. A total of 30 people, including three Mai-Mai, were said to have been killed.48

The killings in Kikere are cruelly emblematic of what Stephen Jackson describes as “the perniciously symbiotic relationship between economic activity and violence.” As he observes, “violence provides the cover for the economic exploitation of the Kivus by elites at home and in neighboring Rwanda. In turn part of the massive economic profits underwrites the violence of the actors”.49 The “incident” also raises important questions about other foreign participants, unknown to the people of Kikere. Rwandan and Ugandan invaders would have few stakes in the conflict if it were not for the willingness of Western corporate interests to act as their business partners, or, better still, as their partners in crime.

In the complex chain of transactions and intermediaries linking the local diamonds and coltan miners to trading posts in Kisangani, Goma and Bukavu, and from Kigali and Kampala to foreign business interests in Europe and the US, the latter play a
dominant role in channeling profits into African hands. Rwanda, not exactly known for its diamond production, now has several diamond marketing agencies (comptoirs). Uganda, likewise, has exported millions of dollars worth of gems in the last few years. Museveni’s half brother, General Salim Saleh, has a major stake in the weekly shipment of gold from the Office des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto and the Société Minière et Industrielle du Kivu (Sominki). According to one eyewitness account, “in Kilo-Moto the Ugandans have kicked out all Congolese; every Tuesday and Friday a Ugandan jet lands in Durba and takes the loot to Kampala”.  

Nor are Rwanda and Uganda the worst offenders. Zimbabwe is deeply involved in much the same sort of transactions.

Particularly damning are the findings of the UN report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, made public in April 2001. Among other things, the report lays to rest once and for all the notion of security imperatives as the sole or primary reason for the presence of RPA and UPDF forces in the Congo. In a wealth of information collected in the course of an extended visit to eastern Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, the authors conclusively demonstrate the direct implication of top-ranking officers from Rwanda and Uganda in the looting of natural resources, the huge profits derived by their respective client factions in the Congo, and, last but not least, the deep involvement of western and non-western corporate interests in the export of coltan (a mineral used in the manufacturing of cellphones, computers and jet engines) and other primary commodities, including timber, ivory, gold, diamond and coffee.

Speaking of the “pivotal role of leaders” the report describes Presidents Kagame and Museveni as “the godfathers of the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict in the DRC.” It draws attention to the close ties between the Rwanda president and “the business community operating in the DRC, the army
and the structures involved in the illegal activities”. (In 18 months Rwanda is estimated to have made $250 million in profits from the export of coltan alone). As for Museveni, “when he appoints the very people who carry out criminal activities, and when his family members get away with criminal activities, it becomes overwhelming that the president has put himself in the position of accomplice”. The subaltern individual actors identified as playing a crucial role in “providing support, entertaining networks or facilitating the exploitation of natural resources” include, on the Uganda side, Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, and his wife, General James Kazini, former Chief of Staff of the UPDF, and Colonel Tikamanyire; on Rwanda’s side the names most frequently mentioned are those of Colonel James Kabarebe, former Chief of Staff of the RPA, Tibere Rujigiro, a key member of the RPF, and Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, described as a “unique case”, in part because of her uncanny ability to survive the shifting sands of factional realignments. After serving as a major business partner of the Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD), the Burundi-based Hutu rebel faction, she is now heavily involved in coltan, gold and ivory trafficking on behalf of the Rwandans and their RCD ally in Goma.

The importance of these “facilitators” cannot be overemphasized. Through their close personal contacts with the leadership of the Congolese rebellions they act as the privileged intermediaries between the local factions and their external patrons. Many are major shareholders in the companies created to siphon off mineral and timber resources. A case in point is the Victoria Group, owned by Museveni’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugabe, and his sister in law, Jovia Akandwanaho, which deals in diamonds, gold and coffee, has buyers in every major locality in the Orientale Province, and pays taxes to Bemba’s MLC. Or take the case of Trinity, described as a fictitious company and a conglomerate of various businesses owned by Salim Saleh and his wife: the “manager” of the company is none other than Ateenyi
Tibasima, second vice-president of the RCD-ML. A similar pattern emerges on the Rwandan side of the equation. Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals are both dealing in coltan; both have close ties with the RPA, and their shareholders include RPA officers as well as RCD politicians. In the words of the report, “a myriad of small companies were created and their shareholders are invariable powerful individuals in the Rwandan nomenklatura or RCD structures”.

Where the Rwanda case differs from that of Uganda is in the closer integration of its business interests with its client faction in eastern Congo, and the presence of a “financial bridge” between them and the Kigali-based Banque du Commerce, du Développement et de l’Industrie (BCDI). To quote: “This financial bridge is statutory; indeed, the RCD statute indirectly recognizes the role of Rwanda in overseeing the finances of the movement and its participation in decision-making and control/audit of finances”.

Though receiving less attention than Uganda or Rwanda, Zimbabwe’s participation in the looting is amply chronicled. Much of Mugabe’s war effort, we are told, is sustained by the profits derived from mining concessions and joint ventures with Congolese companies in which Zimbabwe receives the lion’s share. Among Zimbabwean companies doing business in the Congo pride of place goes to the state-owned Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI), run by retired military officers and party officials, and Zvinavashe Investment, a holding company owned by Maj. Gen. Vitalis Zvinavashe, the head of Zimbabwe’s military and commander of the joint southern African forces fighting in the Congo. A major source of profit for the Zimbabweans is the copper parastatal Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines), now managed by Zimbabweans; another is Société Minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), which holds a virtual monopoly of diamond extraction in the Kasai. In a barter agreement for Zimbabwe’s military support a large portion of the Gécamines’ mining rights were transferred to a Zimbabwean company, Ridgepoint,
without compensation. In a similar arrangement diamond mining concessions were transferred from MIBA to the Zimbabwean Defense Forces (ZDF), until it became apparent that the recipient did not have the required capital or technical skills to draw maximum advantage from the deal. It was at this point that the famously controversial mining start-up, Oryx Zimcom, with a $1 billion, 25-year concession in the DRC, entered into a joint venture with a Zimbabwean company, COSLEG, and MIBA, to provide the needed expertise. Here again the pattern which emerges from these transactions is one of a tight imbrication of private and corporate interests, with the major shareholders in COSLEG being none other than top-ranking Zimbabwean army men and politicians. As of July 2000 as many as 500 Zimbabwean companies were said to operate in the DRC as a result of insider deals on diamond and natural resources between Mugabe and Kabila.

Not the least significant of the findings to emerge from the UN report is the active participation of western and non-western corporate interests in the import of the Congo’s mineral wealth. Out of the sample of 34 companies importing minerals from the DRC listed in the UN report, 13 are based in Belgium, five in Germany, another five in Holland, two in Great Britain, one in Russia, one in India and another in Malaysia. Reflecting on such unprecedented plundering of the Congo’s wealth, one commentator wrote: “The Congo has become a carcass being chewed at by its elite and its neighbors. They have looted and sold its natural resources on a scale without precedent. This, with the direct or tacit complicity of pious governments and corporations around the world”. It is difficult to think of a more appropriate characterization of the wanton pillage associated with l’Afrique des comptoirs; both literally and in the figurative sense, as a process of systematic looting of economic resources, the comptoirs are indeed the driving force behind the civil war. If the presence of foreign armies in the DRC brings to mind the “soldier without
border phenomenon”, its counterpart is the smuggler, for whom borders are a necessary condition of his trade. Secret shipments of arms to the region come from many sources, some in South Africa, others from as far as Bulgaria, described by one observer as “the arms bazaar for rebels and terrorist organizations of every political, ethnic and religious persuasion… including the Hutu militia who were responsible for mass killings in Rwanda”. 58 Whereas the Bulgarian state marketing agency, Kintex, along with the country’s largest arms manufacturer, Arsenal, are reported to have sold weapons to Hutu militias, much of Kabila’s military hardware comes from Zimbabwe Defense Industries (ZDI). In short, much of the DRC has become a free-trade area for arms merchants, drug traffickers, gold and diamond smuggling, and plain thugs, transforming the region into a prime example of a criminalized economy. 59

“Victims of their own wealth” is the title of a recent Canadian newspaper article 60 on the war in the DRC. Suggestive as it is, greed is not the only force driving local factions to turn against each other; despair is the price paid by the Congolese for the greed of their neighbors. None of the huge profits extracted from the Congo are ploughed back in the local economy. The result has been the utter collapse of infrastructures and the near evaporation of social services. The school system is in a shambles, and what few schools still operate are hardly enough to meet the growing demand for education or professional training. As Roberto Garreton reported in 1999, “in Kisangani schools are open only a few days a week, while other have been closed; school enrolment has declined to alarming levels, and since students cannot be reunited with their families, some have ended up joining the army”. 61

For the younger generations of Congolese whose life chances are virtually nil, joining one Mai-Mai faction or the other offers the only hope of salvation. Especially in point here are Paul Richards’ comments on the roots of Sierra Leone’s agonies: “The new
political violence in Africa has some straightforward practical rationalities that transcend its original context... Africa faces a growing problem of youth unemployment, and war is a surprisingly viable employment option for youth with weak social support and poor educational backgrounds in regions where... clandestine trading opportunities support warlord activity." The phenomenon lies at the heart of factional violence sweeping across North and South Kivu. As Koen Vlassenroot has shown, the social marginalization of youth is the single most important underlying factor behind the proliferation of armed militias collectively referred to as Mai-Mai.

While there can be no doubt about their intense hatred of the foreign invader, their willingness to engage in factional violence must be seen as a rational option where their professional chances are almost nil. Confronted with a situation where the safety nets of the traditional society have disintegrated, and in the absence of meaningful employment alternatives, joining the Mai-Mai becomes, in Richards' words, "a surprising viable employment option". Analyzing the circumstances that led to the flowering of the militias, Vlassenroot traces their birth to the emergence of "marginalized youngsters and school drop-outs (who) formed groups of under-age combatants acting against every representative of modern political authority": whether named Kasindiens, Bangilima, Katuku, Batiri, Simba, and Mai-Mai, he writes, "these are nothing more than different names for the same phenomenon". They are the political expression of a diffuse sense of hopelessness in the face of social and economic circumstances that are totally beyond their control. For many, recourse to magic is the only source of psychic reassurance. Belief in their own invulnerability through the intercession of witch-doctors provides the clearest symbolic link to their 1964-5 Mai-Mai predecessors. Like the Mai-Mai of the Muleliste rebellion their strategies are dictated by short-term interests, and so, also, their
tactical alliances. All share the conviction that they owe their misery to the invasion of their country by foreign armies. The conditions created by the looting of the Kivu economy is what drives them to seek redemption in violence. The perverse effects of the global economy have summoned back into existence some of the most intractable forces encountered in the continent: warlordism fueled by immiseration and xenophobia.

**WHAT PATHS TO RECONSTRUCTION?**

As if driven by his desire to avoid his father’s mistakes, in six months Kabila the younger has done more to move the peace process forward than the elder in three years. Although the full implementation of the Lusaka accords is still a long way away, on several key issues substantial progress has been registered. The principle of an inter-Congolese dialogue has been accepted, along with the presence in Kinshasa of the UN-appointed facilitator Ketumile Masire. In a move that goes far beyond the terms of Lusaka Rwanda has pulled back its troops some 125 miles from its frontline position at Pweto (Katanga); Uganda has followed suit, withdrawing some 1,500 troops from Buta (Orientale Province) in the north. Meanwhile the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) has begun deploying some 3,000 peace keepers in the buffer zone separating the combatants. Further contributing to the relaxation of tension is his stated willingness to give serious attention to Rwanda’s security concerns.

Between the revival of the Lusaka accords and the reconstitution of Congolese statehood lies a huge distance, and some formidable hurdles: the restoration of a legitimate government, the reassertion of Congolese sovereignty, and the reconstruction of a disciplined and efficient military are the key issues. All three are
closely interrelated. None can be resolved without peace, yet the terms on which peace is arrived at can spell the difference between success and failure.

“In general”, writes Zartman, “restoration of stateness is dependent on reaffirmation of the precollapse state”. This is the essence of the Lusaka scenario. Ideally, it begins with a cease-fire agreement, continues with the concomitant withdrawal of all foreign troops and the deployment of UN peace keepers, moves on to the next phase, the disarmament of “negative forces” (i.e. interahamwe and Mai-Mai) and reaches its conclusion with the installation of a transition government brought into existence through an inter-Congolese dialogue. The logic of this scenario, compelling as it is, makes unduly short shrift of the realities on the ground. Despite indications to the contrary, a complete withdrawal of foreign troops is improbable as long as the strategic and economic interests at stake dictate otherwise. Neither Kinshasa nor the UN have the capacity to bring the “negative forces” under control, and as long as Kigali can legitimately claim that they pose a threat to its security their presence in the Kivu serves as a convenient pretext for “the continuation of economy by other means”. The same is true of Uganda, even though the threat posed by the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) to its security is benign compared to the Mai-Mai and interahamwe. Although Angola and Zimbabwe both derive substantial material benefits from their involvement, for Luanda strategic considerations are far more significant. In view of the rapprochement developing between Bemba’s MLC and Unita, and the latter’s continuing close ties with Rwanda, it is easy to see why Dos Santos would have second thoughts about pulling its remaining 5,000 troops out of the Congo.

Given the obstacles in the way of the full implementation of the Lusaka agreements, one must give serious consideration to the alternative path explored by Jeffrey Herbst: the decertification of the Congolese state through a redrawing of its
geographical boundaries. Concretely, this would translate into the international recognition of new territorial entities, corresponding roughly to the areas presently under the control of rebel and foreign forces. North and South Kivu would thus become a separate state, and the broad swathe of territory running from Bunia in the east to Gbadolite in the west would form another independent entity. The Congo would thus morph into three states (or possibly four if the Bunia-based RCD decided to go it alone). Whether the break-away states would provide a more appropriate formula for resolving the Congo’s woes is very doubtful, however. To begin with, none of the domestic rebel factions are willing to settle for less than the capture of power in Kinshasa; secession is simply not part of their agenda, at least for the time being. Furthermore, as far as eastern Congo is concerned, Rwanda would not be prepared to recognize the break-away state unless it had the option to exercise substantial military and economic control over the area, a situation likely to arouse the fiercest opposition not only from “native” Congolese but a great many Banyamulenge as well, who feel that they have been “instrumentalized” by Rwanda. Which points to yet another major drawback: the creation of smaller state systems does not in itself guarantee internal harmony. The shrinking of political arenas may do little more than displace the focus of conflict without enhancing the mediating capacity of the break-away state, or it may create new sources of tension between pro- and anti-secessionist forces. Herbst’s contention that “it is hard to see that the creation of smaller units is inherently bad” is not inherently wrong; in the case of the Congo, however, it is less than ideal. Not just out of reverence for the old Belgian slogan – “Congo uni, Congo fort” – but because of the potential for renewed conflict that such an arrangement would create, because of the intense rivalries likely to arise over the hoarding of the Congo’s wealth by the richest states (North and South Kivu), and because of the likelihood of continued hegemony by Rwanda and possibly
Uganda over the newly created states.

There is no magic formula for the reconstruction of a Congo state, only tentative, piecemeal measures, designed to limit the costs of anarchy and facilitate the step-by-step implementation of the Lusaka accords. For all its drawbacks, Lusaka offers the most hopeful solution; yet in order to become reality the accords will need the strongest support from the international community. Such support would have to recognize that a proper sequencing of initiatives is of crucial importance if they are to be workable, that nothing constructive can be accomplished unless a modicum of peace is achieved, that peace in turn requires a far heavier investment in the deployment of peace-keepers as well as the strongest pressures upon international and non-state actors to induce compliance with the peace-process.

There are also lessons to be learned from the past, negative and positive. After the near disintegration of the Congolese state in 1965 the recipe for reconstruction included three major ingredients, the appointment of a strongman at the helm, massive infusions of financial and technical assistance, and the reorganization of the armed forces. Although the strongman turned out to be an unmitigated disaster for the country, there is little question about Mobutu’s role in restoring stability; but as history demonstrates only too well, long-term stability requires legitimacy, and this is even more true today than in the 1960s.

The immediate priority in today’s Congo is the reconstitution of a legitimate state system within the limits of its present boundaries; only then can one envisage moving on to the next stages, i.e. the reassertion of territorial sovereignty, the creation of a viable military force, the neutralization of “negative forces”, and the expansion of political participation. Only by giving sustained attention to the organization of a broad, cross-cutting inter-Congolese dialogue, involving rebel
groups as well as representatives of the civil society, notably Churches, can a measure of transitional legitimacy be restored to what is left of the state. Key items to be discussed would include a time-table for holding multiparty elections, a transitional power-sharing agreement designed to bring “dissident” elements into the government, provisions for the disarmament of militias, the reorganization of the armed forces and citizenship rights for the Banyamulenge. None of the above are likely to lead to a broadly consensual agreement from the participants; this is where pressure from the international community could make a difference.

Basically, the international community would have to reassess the political implications of its assistance. Far more pressure than in the past must be brought to bear on the belligerents, domestic and foreign, in order to strengthen their commitment to the peace-process. Among the more urgent moves, the following should receive immediate attention: (a) a sustained effort to inform public opinion of the interests involved in the looting of the mineral wealth of the DRC, with a view to shedding light on the responsibilities of private interests in perpetuating the balkanization of the country; (b) Western corporations doing business in the DRC are part of the problem; they must become part of the solution. For this to happen efforts must be made by the home countries to develop codes of conduct consistent with the peace process, including conditions under which they may operate in the DRC; (c) international institutions, notably the World Bank and the IMF, must be persuaded to bring their financial assistance programs in line with the need for a “tough love” approach, meaning “an absolute refusal to lend and donate in the absence of the rule of law, good governance and sensible economic policy”; (d) nothing has been more detrimental to the quest for peace in the Great Lakes than the incessant discords and disagreements that have plagued Western donors, notably France and the US, on how to deal with the crisis, the time has come to
recognize that none of the above measures can succeed unless a concerted and systematic effort is made at the highest levels – the European Union, the United States and Canada – to support the peace process.

Only the wildest optimists would pretend that peace is around the corner. Deep and lasting hatreds have been sown among the people of the Congo towards foreign invaders and their domestic allies, and these will not go away any time soon. Nor will the potential for a resumption of hostilities vanish overnight. The passing of Kabila, while removing a major obstacle to peace, raises new risks and opportunities; nonetheless, most observers would agree that the opportunities seem brighter today than at any time since the fall of Mobutu. Ironically, it took Laurent Kabila’s death to resurrect the Lusaka agreement as the only roadmap for charting a new course towards peace.

2 For some Belgian historians, like Jean Stengers, the absence of memories of the Congo Free State among Congolese is sufficient proof of its negligible impact on present-day developments. But this misses the point, argues Michela Wrong in her brilliant account of Mobutu’s demise: “I, too, had been surprised by how few of these horrors… had ever been mentioned to me by Zairian friends. But it wasn’t necessary to be an expert on sexual abuse to know it was possible to be traumatized without knowing why; that, indeed, amnesia – whether individual or collective – could sometimes be the only way of dealing with horror, that human behavior could be altered forever without the cause being openly acknowledged… The spirit, once comprehensively crushed, does not recover easily. For seventy five years, from 1885 to 1960, Congo’s population had marinated in humiliation. No malevolent witch-doctor could have devised a better preparation for the coming of a second Grand Dictator”. Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living in the Congo on the Brink of Disaster (New York, 2001), 59,60. For an outstanding, painstakingly
researched treatment of the horrors of the Leopoldian system, see Adam Hochshild, *King Leopold's Ghost* (New York, 1998).

3 The man Ronald Reagan referred to as “the voice of good sense and good will” was also the self-proclaimed Guide, the Messiah, the Helmsman, the Leopard, the Sun-President, the Cock who jumps on anything that Moves. His full name, Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku wa za Banga, can be loosely translated as “the all powerful warrior who goes from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake”. See Bill Berkeley, *The Graves Are Not Yet Full* (New York 2001), 109.


5 The point is convincingly argued by Thomas Callaghy in his review of Michela Wrong’s *In The Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz*, “Life and Death in the Congo”, *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2001, 143-9.


7 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968)


9 In Kinshasa the black-market rate to the dollar reached 2.5 million in 1993; in Lubumbashi it went from 12 million to 24 million. See Bill Berkeley, op. cit. p. 113.


11 For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon see Crawford Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, 1994), 1-12.


14 Ibid., 5.

15 Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New
York, 1996), 272.


20 The phrase is borrowed from Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York, 1994) passim.


28 The history of the Banyamulenge, both extremely complex and tragic, lies outside the scope of this discussion. Suffice to note that the term has been the source of considerable confusion because it is becoming increasingly used as an omnibus label to designate all Tutsi living in North and South Kivu. It came into usage in 1976, as a result of the efforts of the late Gisaro Muhoza, a member of parliament from South Kivu, to regroup the Banyamulenge populations of the Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira zones into a single
administrative entity. Although his initiative failed, the name stuck, and by 1996 was often used by ethnic Tutsi and Congolese to designate all Tutsi residents of North and South Kivu. The Banyamulenge (literally the “people of Mulenge”) are Tutsi pastoralists who live on the high-lying plateau of the Itombwe region of South Kivu; they came to this area long before the advent of colonial rule. Estimates of their numerical importance vary widely, from 300,000 to 30,000. The consensus of opinion among scholars points to some 60,000 to 100,000 as a more reliable figure. They are socially and culturally distinct from both the long-established Tutsi of North Kivu, and the Tutsi refugees of the 1959-62 revolution in Rwanda (the so-called “fifty niners”); indeed many are the Banyamulenge who do not speak Kinyarwanda. Whereas many fifty niners joined the eastern rebellion in 1964-65, the Banyamulenge did so reluctantly, and then quickly switched sides (largely because the pro-Mulele Bafulero of South Kivu plundered their cattle during the rebellion). Despite assertions to the contrary, they did not form the bulk of the FPR fighters recruited in eastern Congo, even though a few hundred did join the FPR in the early 1990s; the bulk of the fighting force from the Congo was drawn from among the sons of fifty-niners and ethnic Tutsi from North Kivu. By 1996, however, a large number joined Kabila’s ADFL in eastern Congo; they suffered heavy casualties during the anti-Mobutist campaign and after the 1998 crisis, as shown by the inordinately large number of Banyamulenge widows in Bukavu. Today a number of Banyamulenge hold important positions in the RCD-Goma, including Bizima Karaha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, but it would be profoundly misleading to assume that they are all solidly behind the rebellion. Many share Muller Ruhimbika’s view that they have been “instrumentalized” by Kagame, in the same way that the RDC is being manipulated by Kigali to promote Rwandan interests in the Congo. For further information see Joseph Mutambo, *Les Banyamulenge* (Limete, 1997), Muller Ruhimbika, *Les Banyamulenge* (Paris 2001) and Jean-Claude Willame, *Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge* (Paris, 1997). For evidence of a precolonial presence of Banyamulenge in South Kivu, see Jean Hiernaux, “Note sur les Tutsi de l’Itombwe: la position anthropologique d’une population émigrée”, *Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société d’Anthropologie de Paris*, Tome 7, 1965, 361-379. I am grateful to Etienne Rusamira, Sanson Muziri and Muller Ruhimbika for sharing with me his excellent grasp of the Banyamulenge problem.

29 Honore N’Gbanda Nambo Ko Atumba, *Ainsi Sonne le Glas! Les Derniers Jours du Maréchal Mobutu* (Paris, 1998), 50. Also known as The Terminator for his role during the violent repression of “la marche des Chretiens” on February 16, 1992, the author served as
Mobutu’s Special Advisor on Security from 1992 to 1997, until replaced by General Nzimbi. During these years he served as Mobutu’s key intermediary with UNITA and is widely reported to have made a huge fortune in “facilitating” the sale of Angolan diamonds for Mobutu.

30 By lumping together under the same label all Tutsi sub-groups, irrespective of their date of arrival in the region, including the long-established Banyamulenge of South Kivu and those Tutsi of North Kivu whose roots went back to the early colonial and precolonial days, the 1981 nationality law had a catalytic effect on their common self-awareness as a victimized community. By stripping them of their nationality Mobutu made them potentially receptive to the appeals of the FPR in the 1990s. Technically, the term Banyarwanda also included Hutu migrants from Rwanda; in fact, however, it came to be used increasingly to designate primarily Tutsi elements.


32 Ibid., p. 12.


36 This fact will neither be forgotten nor forgiven soon by many Banyamulenge survivors, who make no secret today of their profound dislike of their Rwandan “protectors”. Interview with Clément Ngirabatware, Montreal, September 2000.

37 That Kisangani was taken by Rwandan and not Ugandan troops is an important element in the background of the subsequent confrontation between Rwanda and Uganda: the standard argument heard in Kigali is that the capture of the city by the Rwandan army entitles them and their CRD ally to proprietary rights over the city and the mineral resources of its environs. Another source of distrust between them stems from the fact that Kampala was never informed of Kagame’s decision to launch the August 1998 raid on Kitona; yet after the raid fizzled Kagame immediately turned to Museveni to request that
Ugandan tanks be sent to North Kivu. Interview with Etienne Rusamira, Montreal, December 2000.


41 IRIN report, Nov. 15, 1999. The Hema are a group of pastoralists, closely related to the Hima of Ankole, in southern Uganda, and of northern Rwanda; their cultural affinities with the Tutsi are undeniable, even though they form a group apart. The Lendu are agriculturalists and many identify with the Hutu, largely because of their anti-Hema feelings. For further details on the Hema-Lendu conflict, see “Conflit sanglant Hema-Lendu”, Justice-Plus (Bunia), June 23, 1999. On the more recent clashes, in August 2000, causing 142 deaths, see *New Vision* (Kampala), August 21, 2000.


43 Ibid., 47.

44 Ibid., 40.

45 For the views in this paragraph and the next I am indebted to Gérard Prunier; I have also drawn from Stephen Smith’s insights in “Ces enfants-soldats qui ont tué Kabila”, *Le Monde*, February 9, 2001.


Fax from *Groupe de Réflexion des Sans Voix* (Butembo), November 28, 2000.


Ibid., 41; other quotes in this paragraph are from page 39, 40, 41, 17, 18.

Ibid.,17; the next quote in this paragraph is from the same page.


COSLEG was born of a partnership between Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG) and the Congolese Compagnie Mixte d’Import-Export (COMIEX). Among the key shareholders in OSLEG are Lieutenant General Vitalis Musungwa Zvinashe, Minister of Defense, Job Whabira, former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, Onesimo Muyo, president of Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, and Isiah Rusengwe, general manager of Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation. Ibid. 34.


Note how Stephen Jackson’s describes the multiple links of the comptoirs to local and foreign interests: “In the major towns of Bukavu and Goma, commercial comptoirs form the final link in the (domestic) chain. An estimated one third of the ore is purchased, analyzed and processed here, with the remainder said to exit straight from the Kivus to Rwanda on planes for similar work there. Ahmed, a middle-aged Egyptian hydraulic engineer, runs one
of the ten or so comptoirs in Goma. Though the comptoirs have a highly international mix of financial interests behind them — Russian, German, French, Italian, Portuguese, American, Egyptian — Ahmed confirms what the town gossip most resents: that almost all comptoirs in Goma are Rwandan connected in some way, whether in terms of representation or ownership: ‘The US comptoir is protected by Rwandans, the Egyptian one is associated with Rwandans, and the German one has Rwandans employed there. You can say the same for all of them!’ Within the comptoirs large numbers of Congolese manually crush, wash, separate and grade the ore. A small laboratory permits assay of purity levels, and this in turn determines the price received by the preceding layer of intermediaries… The coltan and cassiterite are separated and packed in oil drums, ready for export and final sale on the London Metal Market… Annually the comptoir grosses about $ 4.2 million, with another three doing similar business”. Jackson, “Criminalised Economies”, 6-7.


61 Garreton, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the DCR*, 32. Elsewhere in the report Garreton informs the reader that “the Special Rapporteur took advantage of his trip from Goma to Kinshasa during his second mission to bring copies of the 1998 examination taken by the South Kivu candidates back for correction”, 40.


63 Ibid., 282.

64 Zartman, *Collapsed States*, op. cit., 268.


5, 60.

67 See ICG, *Scramble for the Congo*, op. cit., 83.

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