The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions

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Standard

The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings : Kierkegaard on Emotions. / Rosfort, René.

I: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, Bind 26, Nr. 1, 2021, s. 241-269.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Rosfort, R 2021, 'The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions', Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, bind 26, nr. 1, s. 241-269. https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0011

APA

Rosfort, R. (2021). The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions. Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 26(1), 241-269. https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0011

Vancouver

Rosfort R. The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions. Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook. 2021;26(1):241-269. https://doi.org/10.1515/kierke-2021-0011

Author

Rosfort, René. / The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings : Kierkegaard on Emotions. I: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook. 2021 ; Bind 26, Nr. 1. s. 241-269.

Bibtex

@article{3dd2adc7066f498cb1b9166a6e845178,
title = "The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings: Kierkegaard on Emotions",
abstract = "This article argues that Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.The philosophical significance of Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s conception of emotions is not obvious. Besides the fact that Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s works are saturated with affective resonances and a dramatic intensity more akin to poetry and literature than to philosophy, the Christian foundation of his thought makes it difficult to situate his approach to emotions in the context of contemporary philosophy of emotion. This article argues that Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotion, and that the strength of his contribution is to be found in his phenomenological investigation of the ambiguity of feeling and understanding endemic to human emotional life.The article begins with a short historical and conceptual overview of two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. This overview establishes the background for the article. The second section presents and critically discusses the tendency to read Kierkegaard as a moral psychologist and thereby situating his work on emotions within the cognitive tradition. It is argued that the cognitive approach does not pay adequate attention to the phenomenological character of Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s work, and that the moral demand for emotional integrity presented in this approach misses the normative complexity at work in Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s conception of emotions. In order to develop this argument, the two following sections look at the ambiguous role of emotions in Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s work. The third section presents Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s phenomenology of ambiguity by examining the poetic character of Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s writing, arguing that the affective imagery and the dramatic figures cannot be considered secondary to his conceptual work. On the contrary, the imaginary intensity of Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s writings is central to his phenomenological investigation of the ambiguity of feeling and understanding in human emotions. The fourth section argues that this ambiguity is critical to Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s cardinal argument that to be a human self is to become oneself. In fact, the challenge of freedom is what is at stake in our emotional life. The section unfolds this argument by outlining a phenomenological taxonomy of human emotions, which in turn allows us to make sense of the affective dimension of human freedom. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard{\textquoteright}s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety. With this concept Kierkegaard brings out the affective ambiguity of human freedom. This ambiguity makes a cognitive quest for emotional integrity not only futile, but also morally dubious. Trying to educate our own and other people{\textquoteright}s emotions according to normative ideals about a good emotional life risk oppressing the emotional diversity that makes us the unique individuals that each of us is.",
author = "Ren{\'e} Rosfort",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1515/kierke-2021-0011",
language = "Dansk",
volume = "26",
pages = "241--269",
journal = "Kierkegaard Studies",
issn = "1430-5372",
publisher = "Walterde Gruyter GmbH",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Liberating Cacophony of Feelings

T2 - Kierkegaard on Emotions

AU - Rosfort, René

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.The philosophical significance of Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions is not obvious. Besides the fact that Kierkegaard’s works are saturated with affective resonances and a dramatic intensity more akin to poetry and literature than to philosophy, the Christian foundation of his thought makes it difficult to situate his approach to emotions in the context of contemporary philosophy of emotion. This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotion, and that the strength of his contribution is to be found in his phenomenological investigation of the ambiguity of feeling and understanding endemic to human emotional life.The article begins with a short historical and conceptual overview of two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. This overview establishes the background for the article. The second section presents and critically discusses the tendency to read Kierkegaard as a moral psychologist and thereby situating his work on emotions within the cognitive tradition. It is argued that the cognitive approach does not pay adequate attention to the phenomenological character of Kierkegaard’s work, and that the moral demand for emotional integrity presented in this approach misses the normative complexity at work in Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions. In order to develop this argument, the two following sections look at the ambiguous role of emotions in Kierkegaard’s work. The third section presents Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of ambiguity by examining the poetic character of Kierkegaard’s writing, arguing that the affective imagery and the dramatic figures cannot be considered secondary to his conceptual work. On the contrary, the imaginary intensity of Kierkegaard’s writings is central to his phenomenological investigation of the ambiguity of feeling and understanding in human emotions. The fourth section argues that this ambiguity is critical to Kierkegaard’s cardinal argument that to be a human self is to become oneself. In fact, the challenge of freedom is what is at stake in our emotional life. The section unfolds this argument by outlining a phenomenological taxonomy of human emotions, which in turn allows us to make sense of the affective dimension of human freedom. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety. With this concept Kierkegaard brings out the affective ambiguity of human freedom. This ambiguity makes a cognitive quest for emotional integrity not only futile, but also morally dubious. Trying to educate our own and other people’s emotions according to normative ideals about a good emotional life risk oppressing the emotional diversity that makes us the unique individuals that each of us is.

AB - This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotions. The argument proceeds in five steps. The first section starts by outlining two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. The second section then turns to a critique of two prominent approaches that read Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions as belonging to the cognitive theories. The third section presents Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of emotional ambiguity, while the fourth section attempts to outline a taxonomy of Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of emotional experience. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety as the experience of human freedom particularly with respect to the ambiguity of feeling and understanding characteristic of this fundamental affective phenomenon.The philosophical significance of Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions is not obvious. Besides the fact that Kierkegaard’s works are saturated with affective resonances and a dramatic intensity more akin to poetry and literature than to philosophy, the Christian foundation of his thought makes it difficult to situate his approach to emotions in the context of contemporary philosophy of emotion. This article argues that Kierkegaard’s account of emotions has something important to contribute to contemporary philosophy of emotion, and that the strength of his contribution is to be found in his phenomenological investigation of the ambiguity of feeling and understanding endemic to human emotional life.The article begins with a short historical and conceptual overview of two influential paradigms in contemporary philosophy of emotions: the feeling theories and the cognitive theories. This overview establishes the background for the article. The second section presents and critically discusses the tendency to read Kierkegaard as a moral psychologist and thereby situating his work on emotions within the cognitive tradition. It is argued that the cognitive approach does not pay adequate attention to the phenomenological character of Kierkegaard’s work, and that the moral demand for emotional integrity presented in this approach misses the normative complexity at work in Kierkegaard’s conception of emotions. In order to develop this argument, the two following sections look at the ambiguous role of emotions in Kierkegaard’s work. The third section presents Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of ambiguity by examining the poetic character of Kierkegaard’s writing, arguing that the affective imagery and the dramatic figures cannot be considered secondary to his conceptual work. On the contrary, the imaginary intensity of Kierkegaard’s writings is central to his phenomenological investigation of the ambiguity of feeling and understanding in human emotions. The fourth section argues that this ambiguity is critical to Kierkegaard’s cardinal argument that to be a human self is to become oneself. In fact, the challenge of freedom is what is at stake in our emotional life. The section unfolds this argument by outlining a phenomenological taxonomy of human emotions, which in turn allows us to make sense of the affective dimension of human freedom. The fifth and final section argues that Kierkegaard’s primary contribution to contemporary philosophy of emotions is to be found in his concept of anxiety. With this concept Kierkegaard brings out the affective ambiguity of human freedom. This ambiguity makes a cognitive quest for emotional integrity not only futile, but also morally dubious. Trying to educate our own and other people’s emotions according to normative ideals about a good emotional life risk oppressing the emotional diversity that makes us the unique individuals that each of us is.

U2 - 10.1515/kierke-2021-0011

DO - 10.1515/kierke-2021-0011

M3 - Tidsskriftartikel

VL - 26

SP - 241

EP - 269

JO - Kierkegaard Studies

JF - Kierkegaard Studies

SN - 1430-5372

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 258707452