IMAGE OF GOD, KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
THE THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGIES OF KARL BARTH AND WOLFHART PANNENBERG IN LIGHT OF TERTULLIAN
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THE THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGIES OF KARL BARTH
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This is not the dissertation I originally planned to write. During the project period it has changed decisively in several ways, even in terms of its overall perspective and of its aims. I set out to interpret the theological anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg in light of Tertullian, but I have changed my understanding of each of them along the way. I have come to appreciate things in all of them that I did not like before, and vice versa.

Many people have been involved in making this project possible, and I gladly acknowledge my debt of gratitude to them.

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Peter Søes
December 2018, Copenhagen
Formal Choisens
References to modern literature follow the Chicago Manual of Style (author-date). Subsequent references to the same work are simply indicated by page numbers in parentheses.

References to Tertullian and other ancient writers are made by reference to work title, chapter and verse, and the same applies to Scriptural references.

Internal cross-references to other parts of the dissertation are indicated by page number or note number marked by ‘p’ or ‘note’.

All quotations are in original language.

I have extensively stated Latin and German words in parentheses. This is, obviously, at the expense of the flow of the text, but I have prioritised precision in the difficult task of writing about Latin and German texts in English.

The present dissertation is identical to the manuscript submitted by the end of December 2018, with the exception that a number of typographical errors, grammatical errors and misspellings etc. have been corrected with permission.
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1 **Introduction**

The overall aim of this dissertation is, based on an analysis of the anthropology of Tertullian, to interprete the theological anthropologies of Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg from the perspective of Tertullian.

Thus, it is a study within the field of theological anthropology. The theme of this field is, according to Traugott Koch, indicated in that the human being is unable to understand him- or herself without reference to God,\(^1\) or, as Jan-Olav Henriksen bluntly puts it: “Theological anthropology concerns humans beings and their relationship with God,” (Henriksen 2003b, 882).\(^2\) The point of these and similar definitions is that the relation to God is essential to human beings,\(^3\) so that human nature, in the everyday sense of ‘what humans are like’ (Moritz 2015, 51), ultimately is an expression of this relation.

The key question of theological anthropology is, then, how the God-human relation can be theologically thought out (Tanner 1994, 568.573). This issue has, so Albrecht Peters and many others,\(^4\) usually been dealt with by the concept of the divine image (A. Peters 1980, 510–13).

The statements of human creation in God’s image and of human sin are Christian doctrine’s two basic anthropological statements (Pannenberg 1991, 208). The traditional main questions of theological anthropology, such as the questions of human personhood, free will, the soul-bodily relation, human uniqueness etc. (Koch 1992; Härle 2002), indicate the structure of theological anthropology’s interpretation of the two basic statements. This interpretation is carried out from the specific content and points of view (*spezifische Inhalte und Sichtweisen*, Härle 2002, 1067) of the God-human relation.

The approach from Tertullian indicates a certain perspective on this relation. It is, so Tertullian, about God’s making himself known. As creation

\(^1\) “Die theologische Lehre vom Menschen hat nur *ein* Thema: daß der Mensch sich, wahrhaft vor sich selbst, nicht ohne Gott verstehen kann und daß der Mensch das dennoch, sich selbst gründlich mißverstehend, tun kann: sich ohne Gott verstehen und folglich sich selbst verabsolutieren,” (Koch 1992, 548).

\(^2\) Cf. Tanner 1994, 569: “…the relation to God … is the basis for the distinctiveness of a theological viewpoint…”.

\(^3\) “The relation of man’s nature to God is not something which is added to an already complete, self-enclosed, isolated nature; it is essential and constitutive for man’s nature, and man cannot be understood apart from this relation,” (Berkouwer 1962, 23).

\(^4\) “The tradition has made the one phrase ‘image of God’ a comprehensive rubric under which to discuss the uniqueness of this creature [the human being]… One might wish some other notion had been given this comprehensive function, but it is too rooted in the tradition now to be displaced,” (Jenson 1999, 53). Cf. Gunton 1998, 115.
of humans happens *cum cognoscendo Deo* (*Adversus Marcionem* II,4,1), the *imago Dei* is ultimately about how the human being knows God.5

This question from Tertullian is the key question of the dissertation. As we shall see, it underlies the complex and highly contextual anthropological lines of thought in Tertullian; he wrote to deal with problems raised by competing anthropological conceptions that he believed to be based on erroneous answers to this question.

While these writings of Tertullian are difficult to systematise in a complete theological anthropology, I shall argue that the problems he addresses can be identified, and so can his attempts to solve them, at least on four specific points.

I approach Barth and Pannenberg from the problems addressed by Tertullian. This means that the question of human knowledge of God is the main question I pose to their theological anthropologies. Further, it means that I structure the study of Barth and Pannenberg after the four points from Tertullian, focusing exclusively on these and leaving out other perspectives and questions.

**Reading Modern Anthropologies from an Ancient Theologian**
Obviously, this raises a problem. Any modern reader of Tertullian (or other ancient church writers) faces a temptation to apply second-third century concepts and statements directly to contemporary theological issues and debates. This applies in particular to this dissertation’s key question, which has been debated throughout the history of theology.

Theologians of the early church most often answered the question of how humans can know God by means of anthropology. They held that the soul, due to its special proximity to the divine, provided a human capacity for

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5 In Tertullian, the term *cognoscere* and its derivatives clearly includes both propositional knowledge and ‘disposition’ (p49). Throughout the dissertation, I use term ‘knowledge of God’ in this sense, that is: knowledge is not a purely theoretical concept, as it includes the disposition of the human subject for the knowledge. It means both to ‘know something about God’ and to ‘be oriented towards God’.

In the terminology of Gilbert Ryle (*Enskat 2005; Fantl 2017*), such a concept of knowledge may be said to include both ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’. According to Rainer Enskat, this concept of knowledge runs counter to the Platonic concept as ‘true opinion’ (ἄληθες δόξα). Jeremy Fantl, on the other hand, building on John Gould, argues that a mere theoretical understanding of Plato on this point is ‘seductive’, as it fails to take into account the role of *virtue* in the Platonic concept of knowledge. In any case, Tertullian believed to be in line with Platonists as well as with Stoics, when he understood knowledge to have this practical or ‘dispositional’ component (p80).
knowledge of God. This proximity to God of the soul was expressed by the concept of *imago Dei* (Seidl 1999, 751).

Such a constitutional understanding of the soul as the *locus* of the God-human relation presupposes a substantial understanding of the soul, whether in Platonic, Aristotelian or Stoic terms. Tertullian’s physicalist understanding of substance (p64) distinguishes him in this regard from most of his contemporaries and almost all of his successors. However, his understanding of divine communication by bodily phenomena (p78) presupposes a substantial soul, just as much as does any other ancient church understanding.

In modernity, any notion of a substantial soul is highly problematised. If the human ‘I’ is interpreted in terms of a transcendental self-consciousness, as in Kant (Holzhey 1995, 40–42; Scheerer 1995, 61), it leaves, of course, no room for any theory of the soul’s substance, and even on a broader philosophical basis, the refusal of metaphysics of substance is pivotal to modern thought (Heintel 1994, 405–6). Modern attempts to reinterpret the concept of *imago Dei* (A. Peters 1980, 509-510.513), then, imply that the meaning of the concept has changed, so that it cannot bridge between ancient and modern theological anthropology.

Considerations such as these may seem simple, but they mean that direct comparison between Tertullian and his modern counterparts is excluded.

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7 Theologians of the ancient church differ with regard to the concept of *substantia* /ὑπόστασις. In all cases, however, a substantial soul means a soul that conceptually and ontologically has independent existence, in line with the notion of οὐσία in Plato and Aristotle (Halfwassen et al. 1998, 495.497.500; Seidl 2001, 294–96).


9 This applies not only to the concept of substance, but to all of the traditional *topoi* of theological anthropology, such as human uniqueness, personhood, free will, soul-bodily constitution, sin and death etc. For Tertullian, as for any theologian of ancient times, these issues concerned *natura/*φύσις. Most often, this concept was understood from Plato (as clearly in Augustine, Hager et al. 1984, 429.441), as ‘a principle of the world as an orderly structured whole, which is the operating principle of all motion’. Tertullian is closer to the Stoic concept (p48).
This it would be to ignore the changing meaning of concepts, as Tertullian’s material anthropology and, to a large extent, his conceptual apparatus are dependent upon the reception of biblical statements on Stoic terms, which characterises his entire thought.

A Problem-Oriented Approach
These remarks seem to lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to make use of an ancient anthropology in the study of modern theological anthropologies. I do not think so, and neither does Barth or Pannenberg, as evident from their extensive use of and discussion with ancient church writers.

Occasionally, I believe it possible to identify the theological concern of a particular argument or line of thought in Tertullian, and interpret modern anthropology from this on a specific point, paying sufficient attention to the changing meaning of concepts, as Pannenberg oftenly does. I do so in a few cases, utilising Tertullian’s interpretations of divine-human correspondence, of divine communication and of sin’s inexplicability as analytical tools to illuminate aspects of Barth’s and Pannenberg’s anthropologies. However, only minor parts of Barth and Pannenberg are possible to examine this way.

Still, I believe Tertullian’s understanding of the human being in response to the question of knowledge of God, is highly relevant in the study of Barth and Pannenberg. Not so much because of the specific answers he gives, but because of the questions he poses, that is: the problems his anthropology intends to solve.

At this point I am inspired by Eric Osborn. Osborn agrees with Quentin Skinner’s critique of a ‘mythology of doctrines’ that assumes ‘perennial’ answers to fundamental questions throughout the history of ideas (Skinner 1969). Such a direct taking over of answers and concepts from the past is, indeed, “foolishly and needlessly naïve” (Osborn 1981, 13).

However, he does not share Skinner’s radical skepticism regarding the relevance of past thinking. He believes it possible to understand “the history of philosophy and theology as the history of certain problems” and of

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10 Most modern theological anthropological proposals understands human nature from relationality (Mühling-Schlapkohl 2004, 260).

11 Eg. his understanding of ‘the intentions’ of early Christian interpretation of the soul-bodily human constitution as an attempt to defend the unity of the human person over against Platonic dualism (Pannenberg 1991, 211, p212). Similarly ‘intentional’ interpretations of ancient church writers are frequent in Barth as well (eg. Barth 1945, 42 on Augustine).
Introduction

attempts to solve them (15). His ‘method of problematic elucidation’ assumes no direct continuity regarding concepts or terminology when approaching ancient writers such as Tertullian. However, it allows for a possible continuity of problems in the sense that modern thought may respond to problems addressed by ancient texts.

Such problems are, of course, not ‘perennial’. They must be identified from the texts studied, even though they, obviously, have a history. With regard to the subject of this dissertation, this means that it is not \textit{a priori} given that the theological anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg can be interpreted in response to the problems addressed by Tertullian’s anthropology. But it is, at least, possible.

1.2 Approaching Tertullian

The study of Tertullian has been approached from different angles. These include a historical-critical approach, a philosophical approach, an approach from Christian doctrine and a rhetorical approach. Of these four approaches, the latter two are important in my reading of and use of Tertullian’s anthropology in this dissertation.

The \textit{historical-critical approach} common in older research in the tradition of Harnack focused on Tertullian’s biography (note 54). While this

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12 It is fundamentally an approach from the history of ideas. Osborn distinguishes between five methods: The polemical, the cultural, the doxographical, the retrospective and the one of problematic elucidation (Osborn 1981, 11–17). The latter includes the question of truth, of cultural background, of juxtaposition of words and notions, and of historical development of ideas from the four others.

13 John Kaufmann agrees with Osborn, warning against seeing earlier authors and texts as “more or less developed precursors to something which came later” (Kaufman 2009, 32).

14 Everett Ferguson distinguishes between four major directions of approach, focusing on Tertullian’s legal background, his philosophical background, his place in the history of language and semantics, and his rhetorical strategies in his argumentation (Ferguson 2009, 320). My survey differs from Ferguson’s in that I leave out the approach from history of language and semantics, and that I distinguish between the philosophical approach and the approach from Christian doctrine. Sider, writing in 1982, ascribes a prominent role to French-language research. He offers an even more differentiated survey, singling out the study of Tertullian’s use of the Bible as a special approach. He also distinguishes between different doctrinal angles within the theological study of Tertullian (Sider 1982).

15 Eusebius’ claim that Tertullian was a jurist was widely accepted and was even made the key to a ‘legalistic’ interpretation of such notions as \textit{satisfactio} and \textit{meritum} (Hallonsten 1984, 61, opposing this interpretation), with special emphasis on Tertullian’s Old Testament exegesis, not the least in \textit{Adversus Marcionem} (Harnack 1904, 292–95; Bray 1979, 18–20; Wilhite 2011, 20–21).
The philosophical approach interprets Tertullian from his philosophical background. It focuses on two closely related issues, the first being the question of to what extent Tertullian is dependent on Roman Stoicism and what role it plays in his theology. As we shall see (pp48.59.64), the most explicit occurrences of Stoic thought in Tertullian’s anthropology serves to defend Christian faith utilising Stoicism over against what Tertullian believes to be Platonic influenced heresy.

The second issue is the question of how Tertullian’s sharp rejection of philosophy corresponds to his close following of the guidelines of philosophical theory (Moreschini 2005) and his explicit commitment to Seneca (De Anima 20,1). However, most commentators on this issue focus

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16 This applies not least to the social and legal setting of Tertullian’s apologetics in Roman history (Zilling 2004) and Tertullian’s ethics as identity-making in a second-third century African context (Wilhite 2011).

17 Most commentators point to anthropology as the subject matter, in which the Stoic influence is most clear (Osborn 2003, 34; Borresen 1969, 104.107-8.112-113; Meijering 1976, 92; Fuhrer 2006, 115-116.124-125; Daniélon 1977, 212–14). Osborn argues that Tertullian’s Stoicism led him to other conclusions than the Alexandrian apologists, especially Clement (Osborn 2003, 163). Fuhrer, by contrast, diminishes the conflict between Eastern, Platonic influenced apologetics and Tertullian by pointing to a common use of Stoic notions (Fuhrer 2006, 114).

18 Even though Claudio Moreschini and others have questioned Tertullian’s anti-Platonism by pointing to his use of concepts common to second century Middle Platonism (Sider 1982, 249; Moreschini 2005).

19 The traditional proof-texts for the anti-philosophical reading of Tertullian are De Praescriptione Haereticorum 7,9, De Carne Christi 5,4 and De Anima 2,6-7; 3,1.

20 Heinrich Steiner states that while Tertullian obviously was no enemy of reason or of philosophy as such, he nonetheless believed that there was an indispensable theological contradiction between Christian faith and classical culture (Steiner 1989, 37.192-193). He presents Tertullian as defender of Christianity in terms of a better philosophy that outperforms the ancient paideia, to which he was deeply indebted (194-207.218). This means that even though Tertullian acknowledges the ‘serving function’ (Dienstfunktion, 194) of formal philosophy, he still finds the conflict between ancient philosophy and theology to be a real conflict, not merely a rhetorical one. On the contrary, Gerald Boersma presents Tertullian’s argumentation in Adversus Praxean 10 as a genuine piece of Stoic dialectics and concludes that the use of a Stoic syllogism serves to affirm Tertullian’s rational vision of theology (Boersma 2014, 496–98). A similar view is that of Jonathan Barnes, whose thoroughly Stoic understanding of De Anima emphasises the anti-Platonist character of Tertullian’s Stoicism (J. Barnes 2009).

In the same way Osborn, whose own approach is from Christian doctrine, gives a positive answer to the question of whether Tertullian was a philosopher. He was so, according to Osborn, not only in the sense that he dealt with “problems which are conceptual, verbal,
on Tertullian’s purely theoretical thought. If Tertullian, as I shall argue (pp62,72,80), understood philosophy in line with Seneca as a ‘way of living’ (Hadot 2004; Shusterman 2013, 40), then the discussion of the anti-philosophical Tertullian is to some extent based on an anachronistic concept of philosophy.

The approach from Christian doctrine attempts to understand Tertullian as a theologian. Jean Daniélou seeks to do so by systematising Tertullian’s theology in traditional categories of dogmatics (Daniélou 1977, 361–404). This makes it likely to evaluate Tertullian from the subsequent theological development, especially Augustine, and even from confessional criteria. Tertullian, however, never developed the kind of ‘system’ Daniélou ascribes to him. In my opinion, Daniélou underplays the contextual character of Tertullian’s writings, and I find it hard to avoid the feeling that Daniélou’s material does not fit the categories, according to which he arranges it.

In contrast to this and similar attempts to systematise Tertullian, Gerald Bray seeks to understand Tertullian from “the main themes which run through Tertullian’s writings, the underlying concern … which gives unity to the whole” (Bray 1979, 63). This underlying concern of Tertullian, and thus, the key to understand Tertullian as a theologian, is, so Bray, his preoccupation with sanctification. In my opinion, this is a more fruitful suggestion than that of Daniélou, because the crucial category in Bray is Tertullian’s own. Nevertheless, I doubt that it is possible to find just one issue or concept to provide unity in Tertullian’s complex and contextual body of work.

Eric Osborn’s abovementioned ‘method of problematic elucidation’ is in this respect a step forward, as it seeks to identify the particular problems, Tertullian addresses in each text. Osborn’s picture of Tertullian’s theology and set in a context,” (Osborn 1997, 332), but also in the sense that his entire theology is shaped by explicit use of Stoic concepts (Osborn 1997, 328–31). Hence, Osborn includes many insights from the philosophical approach in his own work (Osborn 2003, 37-39,63-64,139-143) and even characterises Tertullian as “a Heraclitean Stoic” (Osborn 2003, 163), stating that “the Heraclitean strain of Stoicism … was his dominant drive,” (Osborn 1995, 623).

The balanced study of Marcia Colish moves beyond the alternative between the anti-philosophical and the Stoic Tertullian. She concludes that it is “impossible to sustain the view that he [Tertullian] is primarily or exclusively a supporter, an enemy, or a transformer of Stoicism. He does all of these things simultaneously and to approximately the same degree … In all three cases he draws heavily on the thought of his Greek apologetic predecessors,” (Colish 1985b, 13).
is much more fragmented than Bray’s, because he gives up a single unifying concept, but that is the cost of taking the character of the material seriously.  

As stated, my ‘problem-oriented’ study of Barth’s and Pannenberg’s anthropologies from Tertullian owes much to Osborn. However, it has been discussed whether Osborn identifies these problems with a sufficient degree of precision (Williams 1984; Burns 1999, 300). At least in the case of *Adversus Marcionem*, he does not, in my opinion (note 92).

Therefore, in the textual analyses of *Adversus Marcionem* and *De Anima*, I endeavour a more accurate identification of the problems addressed by Tertullian using a rhetorical approach.

The rhetorical approach understands Tertullian’s writings from their dependence on, and intentional use of, classical rhetoric. Since the pioneering works of Robert Sider and Jean-Claude Fredouille (Sider 1971; Fredouille 1972), it has been an established research tradition. ‘Rhetorical Tertullian research’, thus, does not refer to any reading of Tertullian from his rhetorical means, but to readings focusing specifically on Tertullian’s use of the tradition from Cicero and Quintilian (Sider 1969, 1973, 1978).

Hence, these readings contradict the suggestion of Barnes and others that Tertullian should be understood from the rhetoric of The Second Sophistic. This discussion is not just about which rhetorical manuals or which rules of style and argument, Tertullian may have relied on, but about what rhetoric essentially is, and about its function. According to The Second Sophistic, rhetoric is ultimately a matter a performance (Whitmarsh 2005; Anderson 2007).

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21 Osborn admits that his method leads to a presentation “less concise and orderly than a general history,” likely to “appear more like a commentary than a history,” (Osborn 1981, 13).

22 The rules of this tradition regulated the use of both major sections and single paragraphs in the argumentation of a speech (Dunn 2004, 26–27). Thus, it is possible to identify passages and sections of the treatises as parts of the overall rhetorical pattern and to interpret them in light of the argumentative function, the structure of the speech prescribes for each section and each type of argument (Sider 1971, 21–22).

23 “…Fredouille had demonstrated (pp. 171-76) that Tertullian’s Christian rhetoric found its inspiration not in the Second Sophistic in which, as Barnes duly noted, he had been educated, but in the great tradition of Cicero, a tradition shaped by the exigencies of real debate on live and important issues,” (Sider 1982, 234).


25 “At its worst, by Tertullian’s day, rhetoric represented the victory of style over substance. Student of rhetoric did not practice oratory in order to prepare for careers in
Fredouille and Sider, by documenting Tertullian’s dependence on the tradition from Cicero, did not just point out which rhetoric he uses, but also what he uses it for. Cicero’s rhetoric maintained “the original forensic and deliberative purposes of rhetoric.” Whether Tertullian himself taught rhetoric before his conversion, as claimed by George Kennedy (Kennedy 1994, 260–264), is less important for the interpretation of his writings, since he did not write to please or to demonstrate his rhetorical abilities. Apologist to his fingertips he wrote to convince and persuade his readers about the truth of Christian faith. While Tertullian’s controversial and polemical treatises do not resemble Cicero’s speeches with regard to flawlessness, they share the genuineness of the persuasive purpose.

The textual analyses in this dissertation are inspired by the methodical approach of Sider. This means that I focus on genre, on the rhetorical structure of the texts according to genre, and on the conjectural method of argumentation according to the rhetorical structure of the single texts.

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26 “The original forensic and deliberative purposes of rhetoric (to plead one’s innocence and to urge the state to change its policy) were very appropriate and applicable to the Christian situation … It makes sense then to understand Christian literature as concerned with themes that were vital, relevant, topical, and useful to their very existence. The need to be persuasive was a key concern to Christian intellectuals and, through them, classical rhetoric’s traditional purpose was given a new lease on life,” (Dunn 2008, 38). Cf. Satterthwaite 1997.

27 “In every instance Tertullian wrote to win arguments. He did not describe, he advocated,” (Dunn 2004, 29).

28 Dunn emphasises the oral character he believes all of Tertullian’s writings to have and suggests that Tertullian may even have intended them be read aloud to those who could not read themselves (Dunn 2004, 27–28, 2008, 42). “…in their written form all of Tertullian’s pamphlets reflect oral oratory,” (Dunn 2013, 350).

29 Cicero’s “polished records of real forensic speeches,” (Dunn 2008, 45).

30 Similar approaches can be found in Dunn (Dunn 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008), and – while somewhat critical towards Sider – Willemien Otten (Otten 1997, 2013) and recently Wilhite (Wilhite 2013a).

31 “…it was commonly held that there were three types of oratory: forensic (for use in law courts and which sought to persuade about past events), deliberative (for use in assemblies and senates and which sought to persuade about future events) and epideictic (which by then had lost its persuasive element and which sought to praise an individual while entertaining the audience …),” (Dunn 2004, 26). Cf. Sider 1971, 13.


33 Dunn 2008, 103–5; Sider 1971, 41–42.
Choice of Material from Tertullian
I have chosen to focus on *Adversus Marcionem* II,1-10 and *De Anima* 1-22, as they are the texts that deals with anthropology most explicitly. As stated above, I believe that they both belong to the group of doctrinal/polemical writings.

Although the dating of these writings is somewhat uncertain, even with regard to their relative chronology (note 134), they are both relatively late, probably dating from around 206-208 (T. D. Barnes 1971, 55).

Nevertheless, there are very different, regarding the type of arguments, Tertullian uses. This diversity is due to the completely different apologetic contexts. Thus, my choice of material includes both the Scriptural and, as it were, doctrinal argumentation of *Adversus Marcionem* II, and the somewhat philosophical argumentation from common reason of *De Anima*.

I have chosen to include a perspective from *Adversus Praxean*, as it elaborates on and deepens *Adversus Marcionem*’s thought of an inherent humanness of God (pp51-54). I could, in addition, have included a full analysis of the brief apologetic treatise *De Testimonio Animae*, to which I frequently refer. I have chosen not to do so, as I do not think its argumentation differs decisively from that of *De Anima*.

1.3 Approaching Barth’s Theological Anthropology
According to George Hunsinger, any anthropological approach to the question of knowledge of God is a lapse back in the Liberal Protestantism, Barth sought to overcome.\(^{34}\) Barth believes, so Hunsinger, that doctrinal beliefs are “thought to be justified … primarily because they are suitably grounded in revelation as normatively attested in scripture,” (Hunsinger 1991, 281).

This means that Barth’s anthropology is about the objective reality of humanity’s participation in Christ, and faith is, in this regard, the purely receptive human acknowledgement of this doctrinal truth, ‘grounded’ in revelation.\(^{35}\)

‘Grounding’, then, means that the content of divine revelation cannot be argued for, but must be taken for a given. Consequently, it presents itself as questions, and theological understanding is to answer these questions by

\(^{34}\) “Only if theological assertions could be shown to display a different logic – one not grounded in anthropological premises – could the force of Feuerbach’s objection be met,” (Hunsinger 1991, 35).

\(^{35}\) “…humanity … is conceived as objectively self-involved in Jesus Christ in a manner at once hidden and revealed … Faith is … the acknowledgment of a mysterious incorporation already objectively accomplished on humanity’s behalf,” (Hunsinger 1991, 37).
stating “the necessary and sufficient condition for the possibility of the occurrence of a given actuality,” (57).

As the content of revelation is events (‘occurrences’ of ‘actualities’), it is ultimately grounded in God’s freedom. Theology’s task is to present the conditions for these events, and uncover the pattern of revealed actualities. In this manner, the entire theology is ‘grounded’. Hunsinger even suggests that “to some extent, ‘revelation’ might be thought to occupy the logical space filled by ‘sensory experience’ in foundationalist epistemologies,” (281). In this way, Barth’s theology overcomes the problems of modernity by excluding the role of the human subject.

If Hunsinger is right, then the question of knowledge of God cannot be an anthropological question, as this knowledge is to be ‘justified’ by an objective revelatory event, in which human being is purely receptive.

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36 “Since no necessity precedes the freedom of God’s will, all actualities ultimately find their possibility (however variously) as grounded in that freedom,” (Hunsinger 1991, 58).

37 “‘Grounding’ is meant to indicate that aspect of the intellectus fidei which thinks about relations of necessity, possibility, and actuality. Revelation itself is thought to put the question of these relations to us, and the act of theological understanding is precisely the act of taking up that question and attempting to answer it … This question often dominates the pattern of argumentation in the Church Dogmatics. A certain actuality is taken as a given (usually on the basis of Holy Scripture). The question is then posed about what makes this actuality possible,” (Hunsinger 1991, 57).

38 Hunsinger acknowledges that “Barth’s theology incorporates aspects of the correspondence theory of truth,” that is: that the truth of human knowledge of God implies a corresponding of this knowledge to the external and objective reality of God’s being (Hunsinger 1991, 281). Thus, he presents a Barth, in whom different ‘motifs’ relates to each other, so that the notions of truth as correspondence and as coherence (the motifs of realism rationalism, 226) safeguards the notion of truth as singular event against the arbitrariness that would otherwise be the consequence of Barth’s actualism and particularism. This even leads Hunsinger to affirm the language of “scripture … as the norma normans non normata”.

39 Even though the hiddenness of revelation (Hunsinger 1991, 79–81) makes knowledge of God so different from other human knowledge that the question of mutual coherence doesn’t make sense (282).

40 Benjamin Myers summarises the understanding of Barth, of which Hunsinger is a prominent exponent: “…[o]ne of the dominant trends in contemporary English-language Barth studies is to view Barth’s thought as a project that overcame the problems of modernity by returning to the roots of classical dogma; thus Barth becomes the champion of a renewed (because more deeply traditional) evangelical orthodoxy, while the problems and questions of the nineteenth century are passed over as obsolete,” (Myers 2009, 632).
However, in my opinion, this cannot be the case, since human subjectivity to Barth is involved in the very event (Geschehen) of revelation.\textsuperscript{41} From human perspective, knowledge of God cannot be distinguished formally or technically from other human knowledge, but is, so Barth, human participation (Teilnahme) in God’s revelatory act.\textsuperscript{42}

What is ‘grounded’, according to Barth, is the genuine human freedom (echte menschliche Freiheit, Barth 1938, 796), begründet in the freedom of God’s word. Human partaking in divine revelation means, then, in turn, that a particular human ethos of recognition (Anerkennung) is established.\textsuperscript{43}

This emphasis on the human subject is accentuated in much continental Barth research,\textsuperscript{44} for example in Georg Pfleiderer’s work. According to Pfleiderer, the Barthian theology does not\textsuperscript{45} reflect any attempt to overcome the neuzeitliche objections to Christian faith, neither in the form of an external criterion of validation, nor in any inner consensus or coherence.

On the contrary, so Pfleiderer, Barth’s very concept of God implies that divine sovereignty as ultimately expressed in the doctrine of election is seen in close connection with a Neo-Kantian transcendental philosophical idea of

\textsuperscript{41} “Wir reden aber von der Offenbarung dieses Geschehens in der Höhe, und also von unserer Teilnahme daran. Wir reden von menschlicher Gotteserkenntnis auf Grund dieser Offenbarung und also auch von einem Geschehen, das sich seiner Art und Technik nach nicht von dem unterscheidet, was wir auch sonst Erkennen, menschliches Erkennen nennen,” (Barth 1940, 203).

\textsuperscript{42} “...the human act of interpreting Scripture is in itself an ingredient in the divine self-communication,” (Vanhoozer 2008, 53).

\textsuperscript{43} “In dieser echten menschlichen Freiheit unter dem Wort stehen wir selbst, bittend und dankend und so diese Wirklichkeit anerkennend, wie sie erkannt sein will,” (Barth 1938, 796).

\textsuperscript{44} Often in response to the so-called Munich School, associated, among others, with Trutz Rendtorff, Falk Wagner and Friedrich W. Graf. Stefan Holtmann has provided an excellent introduction to these – far from unanimous – interpretations of Barth (Holtmann 2007). Despite their diversity, they have a shared concern in taking seriously the critique of Rendtorff (Rendtorff 1972; Rendtorff et al. 1975), according to which Barth’s theology is, ultimately, an expression in theological language of a modern concept of the autonomous subject: “Barth leistet ... die dogmatische Legitimation für den Eintritt der neuzeitlichen Autonomie ins Zentrum von Theologie und Kirche selbst,” (Rendtorff 1972, 179). Barth interpretations along these lines tend to emphasise Barth’s continuity with liberal theology, above all with W. Hermann: “Auch im Rekurs auf Bibel und Reformation bleibe es der Theologe aus der Schülergeneration Wilhelm Herrmanns und Ernst Troeltschs, der seine Wendung zur dialektischen Theologie vor dem Hintergrund der von jenen ermessenen Problemkonstellation vollzieh,’ (Holtmann 2007, 107).

\textsuperscript{45} Neither in the early Barth, which is the primary field of study in his 2000 work on Barth’s practical theology, nor in Die kirchliche Dogmatik, from which he comments on the doctrine of election as a ‘test case’ (Stichprobe, Pfleiderer 2000, 428).

This sovereign freedom of God must be understood dialectically: Barth’s focus on divine subjectivity has as its true concern in establishing a particular human subjectivity of action (*Handlungssubjektivität*). As social subjectivity, it has its place in a new community (*Gemeinschaft*), that is: the church.\(^{46}\)

True human subjectivity, so Pfleiderer, corresponds to God’s radical freedom in the fundamental character of action. Only from this, an upheaval (*Aufhebung*) of the ontological difference between human and divine is possible.\(^{47}\) So, the doctrine of election, which in Barth is the ultimate expression of God’s being in absolute freedom, presents no answer to modern objections against Christian faith. It is not important as directing principle for theology or for human knowledge of God (436-437) but it is crucial for the subjectivity of action it establishes (360-361).

This dissertation’s study of Barth’s theological anthropology is inspired by Pfleiderer in that I focus on how human subjectivity, according to Barth, is established as ‘subsequent subjectivity’ (*der Mensch als sekundäres, nachfolgendes Subjekt*, Barth 1940, 203) to God’s subjectivity by the act of divine revelation.

However, I differ from Pfleiderer in that I do not think this leads to any relativisation of the material content of Barth’s dogmatics. The abovementioned *ethos* of *Anerkennung*, which is the very content of human subjectivity in the ‘subsequent’ correspondence to the freedom of God, is, as Barth emphasises, bound to ‘the uniqueness of the events that makes up the

\(^{46}\) In the end Barth’s theology is, then, a thoroughgoing practical theology, and even a “highly contextual and strategic ‘practical theology’,” (Myers 2009, 635). It is ultimately a ‘performative act of church establishing’ (*performative Akt einer Gemeindegründung*, Pfleiderer 2000, 327), as Pfleiderer characterises the early Barth. Hence, the concepts of ‘theoretical’ theology are to be interpreted as the practical action of ‘participation’: “Der spezifischen Logik dieses performativen Aktes entspricht es, daß der theoretische Akt des Begreifens der Theorie eo ipso als praktischer Akt der ‘Teilnahme’ gedeutet wird,” (328). Consequently, Barth’s theology must be understood not from what it says, but from what is does, that is: not from its material, dogmatic content, but from the community, it establishes. While this community is characterised as counter-modern (*Gegenmoderne*), it is nevertheless dialectically established on modern premises, and Pfleiderer, consequently, presents Barth’s theology as ‘radical-modern counter-modern’(*radikal-modernen Gegenmoderne*, 22).

\(^{47}\) “Im Handlungscharakter der Erwählung selbst also soll der Widerspruch zwischen der exklusiven Selbsttätigkeit Gottes und der Selbsttätigkeit des Menschen, zwischen dem ontologischen Wesen der Erwählung und dem Erwählsein des Menschen und ihrem bewu ßten und handlungspraktischen Lebensvollzug, aufgehoben sein,” (Pfleiderer 2000, 436).
content of the Word’ (*in der Einzelheit der Ereignisse, die ... [den] Inhalt [des Wortes] bilden*, Barth 1938, 796).

This means that the ‘subjectivity of freedom’, in which the human being knows God, in Barth is linked exclusively to the historical event character of revelation and to the particular events, to which the entire dogmatics testify.

**Choice of Material from Barth**

I have chosen to focus on the theological anthropology of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*. This means that my main texts are III,1-2, although I include material from the other volumes, especially I,1, II,1-2 and III,3. When I comment on earlier texts, I do so in order to understand the text of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*, not to make the development*\(^{48}\)* of Barth’s theology a theme of the dissertation. The same applies, when I occasionally refer to later texts.

*Die kirchliche Dogmatik* is a particular type of material; it is, as says the title, written from within the Christian church, as the church’s self-examination (*Selbstprüfung*, Barth 1932, 4). For an immediate consideration this seems far from Tertullian’s apologetic concern. If, as I argue (pp36.56), Tertullian in the texts, from which I approach the study of Barth and Pannenberg, writes as a member of the Carthage church for readers within the same church, their formal perspectives are not without points of contact. However, this only makes the differences in style even more striking. Barth endeavours a *schulmäßige Theologie* (Barth 1932, 293), and although not wishing to make theology an all-encompassing system, it is nevertheless crucial for him to understand theological anthropology within the entire dogmatics.

This does not exclude the possibility of studying Barth’s anthropology from other perspectives than the perspective of faith. However, my choice of material from Barth and the limited scope of the dissertation makes me restrict the perspective to *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*, rather than making the

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\(^{48}\) There are many diachronic studies of the historical genesis Barth’s theology, the earliest being the influential work of von Balthasar (Balthasar 1951). This study attempts to interpret Barth from two crucial novelties, namely the rejection of Liberal Theology’s synthesis of culture and theology (the second edition of *Der Römerbrief* from 1922, Barth 2010), and the change from dialectical theology to a theology of *analogy fidei* (the book on Anselm, Barth 1931). Bruce McCormack opposes von Balthasar (McCormack 1995) and, thus, any division of Barth’s work into a ‘dialectical’ and an ‘orthodox’ phase. However, he does so by posing a developmental perspective on the historical genesis of Barth’s theology. While I occasionally include observations of this sort from McCormack and others, I do so for the sole reason of clarifying the interpretation of the text of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*. 
relation between Barth’s theological anthropology and non-theological anthropologies\textsuperscript{49} an independent theme.

1.4 Approaching Pannenberg’s Theological Anthropology

In 1972, already having contributed to the field of theological anthropology,\textsuperscript{50} Pannenberg describes his anthropological concern as the ‘exposure of the anthropological basis for the discussion of the question of God’ (Freilegung der anthropologischen Basis für die Erörterung der Gottesfrage, Pannenberg 1972a, 5).

Further, in the large 1983 volume on anthropology,\textsuperscript{51} he states that ‘Christian theology in modernity must acquire its basis in general anthropological studies’ (die christliche Theologie [muß] in der Neuzeit ihre Grundlegung auf dem Boden allgemeiner anthropologischer Untersuchungen gewinnen, Pannenberg 1983, 15).

Formulations such as these might give the impression that Pannenberg endeavours an anthropological foundation for theology. This is the Pannenberg-understanding of Christoph Schwöbel, who argues that “[a]t a number of crucial points the validity of this Christological conception rests on the justifiability of its anthropological presuppositions,” (Schwöbel 2005, 131). Pannenberg’s fundamental anthropology is, so Schwöbel, not only an attempt to address “the general task of elucidating the anthropological

\textsuperscript{49} This would in particular imply a thorough examination of Barth’s relation to the personalism of Martin Buber. Many such studies has been presented (Becker 1986; Brinkschmidt 2000; Askani 2008; McInroy 2011; Leiner 2012), not the least since the 2005 publication of Des Menschen Menschlichkeit (Mikkelsen 2010, 96–107). I this dissertation, I only comment on Barth’s dependence on Buber on a principle level from the perspective of Tertullian (pp128-130).

A different approach is that of Daniel J. Price (Price 2002), who attempts to align Die kirchliche Dogmatik III with the object relations psychology of W. Ronald D. Fairbairn by direct comparison. However, the basis of the structural similarities between Barth and Fairbairn remains unclear, and so does the question of, how they can be evaluated (Hart 2003).

\textsuperscript{50} The 1962 Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Pannenberg 1972c), originally a series of lectures that work through aspects of contemporary scientific anthropology.

\textsuperscript{51} Introduced as fundamentaltheologische Anthropologie (Pannenberg 1983, 21), which unlike dogmatic anthropology argues not from dogmatic presuppositions (Gegebenheiten und Voraussetzungen), but from the phenomena of human life (Phänomenen des Menschseins) as investigated by the sciences.
foundation for Christian truth-claims,” (132) but also provides “the foundational principles for his exposition of Christian faith.”

If Schwöbel is right, then Pannenberg’s anthropology is about providing an epistemological foundation for Christian faith independently of revelation, that is: a kind of natural theology that can refute the objections of modernity.

In my opinion, however, Pannenberg’s mentioning of theology’s Grundlegung must be understood differently. He refers it to the fact that theology and religion are in danger of being reduced to anthropology by becoming human postulates and imaginations, that is: the danger that the Feuerbachian critique of religion turns out to be right:


This danger does not face theology from outside, from atheism, but from within, from theology itself, as an anthropocentric clutching of theology (die Gefahr einer anthropozentrischen Umklammerung der Theologie).

The theology of Barth has, so Pannenberg, exactly by refusing to deal with the religious thematic on anthropological grounds made theology dependent on anthropological assumptions.

Gunther Wenz emphasises this understanding of Pannenberg’s anthropological concern, stating that the unfolding of the anthropological basis of the idea of God is about overcoming the limit of religious anthropocentrics (die Schranke religiöser Anthropozentrik, Wenz 2003, 59) rather than overcoming the Feuerbachian critique in itself.

The decisive factor of Wenz’s interpretation of Pannenberg on this point is that he understands the role of anthropology in theology’s dealing with

52 Colin Gunton interprets Pannenberg in a similar way, characterising his fundamental anthropology as “a Parmenidean quest … for spirit rather than for being,” (Gunton 1988, 410).

religious truth claims as due to the fact that divine revelation is mediated by human reality. If this is the case, then the rejection of the anthropological issue, as in Barth, will lead to an unconscious distortion of the content of Christian faith.

This means that the anthropological concern, and even the decisive importance of this concern, is determined by Christian doctrine rather than imposed on theology from modern thought or from an apologetic context.

Theologically, the anthropological rooting of the idea of God is an expression of the ‘creatureliness of the human being’ (Ausdruck des Geschöpfseins des Menschen, Axt-Piscalar 2015, 235). Therefore, so Pannenberg, there can be no inseparable contradiction between anthropology and theology (Waap 2008, 359–60).

Friederike Nüssel, who interprets Pannenberg’s anthropology along the same lines, point to his overall understanding of the ‘truth of Christian doctrine as the theme of systematic theology’ (Nüssel 2015a, 61; Pannenberg 1988c, 11–18). This understanding excludes, so Nüssel, that anthropology can have the ‘foundational’ task to ensure the truth of Christian faith, as it were, prior to dogmatics itself. Exactly therefore, she argues, does Systematische Theologie not contain any prolegomenon: the question of theological truth is not settled by an anthropological ‘foundation’, as in Liberal Protestantism (Neuprotestantismus, 63), but is the very theme of dogmatics itself.

This dissertation’s study of Pannenberg’s theological anthropology is inspired by the abovementioned understanding of Wenz, Axt-Piscalar, Nüssel and others, common in German Pannenberg reception. This means that I focus on Pannenberg’s doctrinal reasons for – and doctrinal use of – fundamental anthropology with regard to the question of human knowledge of God, rather than the anthropological notion of God in itself. Further, it means that I focus particularly on how Systematische Theologie incorporates the fundamental anthropological line of thought from the volume on anthropology from 1983.

**Choice of Material from Pannenberg**

I have chosen to focus on the theological anthropology of Systematische Theologie. This means that §§8-9 (Pannenberg 1991, 203–364) has a crucial place in the dissertation, especially with regard to the interpretation of the material content of Pannenberg’s theological anthropology from points 2-4 of my reading of Tertullian.

However, my interest in the question of how the dogmatic incorporation of fundamental anthropology unfolds the truth of Christian faith and, thus, human knowledge of God, leads me to include both Anthropologie from
1983 and *Systematische Theologie* I in my choice of material, although the scope of the dissertation, of course, makes it impossible to deal with the these works in detail.

When I occasionally refer to earlier or later works of Pannenberg, it is in order to contribute to the interpretation of the theological anthropology of *Systematische Theologie*, rather than to make these texts the subject of independent examination. Pannenberg’s entire theological production is, to my judgement, characterised by an unusual continuity in perspective and even in content. Therefore, such references to elucidate the interpretation of the main texts do not cause particular problems.

*Systematische Theologie* is Pannenberg’s *magnum opus*, in which he presents his theology in its most coherent and completed form. He engages in almost every chapter of the work in numerous discussions with the entire history of theology and with dialogue partners from throughout its breadth. I refer to these discussions only, where I find it important for the interpretation of Pannenberg’s own understanding, and especially when he takes position regarding his primary discussion partner, Karl Barth.

**1.5 Outline of the Dissertation**
The dissertation has a simple structure. After this introduction, it consists of three sections on Tertullian, Barth and Pannenberg, respectively, followed by a brief concluding section. Each of the three main sections begins with an overview of the section’s content and ends with a concluding summary.
2 Addressed by God in Creation. The Anthropology of Tertullian

The overall aim of this section is to study Tertullian’s theological anthropology as expressed in *Adversus Marcionem* II,1-10 and *De Anima* 1-22, and, so, to provide a basis for the following sections’ interpretations of Barth and Pannenberg. The section consists of four chapters: a brief chapter on Tertullian and his writings in their historical setting, two chapters on each of the two main texts, and a concluding summary.

In the first chapter (2.1) I introduce Tertullian in his historical context based on the information available in his extant writings. I focus in particular on, whether it is likely on historical grounds to assume that he wrote the two main texts of my for Christian readers within the Carthage church. Therefore, I address the question of whether there were literates enough in this church to make the writing and publication for this intended audience meaningful. Further, I argue that Tertullian’s turn to Montanism did not have a character that makes unlikely the assumption that he wrote for non-Montanist Carthage Christians.

In the second chapter (2.2) I investigate the anthropology of *Adversus Marcionem* II,1-10, based on a rhetorical reading of the text. I argue that Tertullian’s main hypothesis is that God, by the creation of humans, makes himself universally known, and that this communicative act is essential for his divinity.

Further, I study Tertullian’s understanding of the creation of the human being. This particular creative act is from God’s side mediated by his speaking of the law and establishes a universal God-human relation. Tertullian understands this relation as human correspondence to God and as conditional for human knowledge of God. I argue that Tertullian utilises the concept of *imago Dei* in response to the question of how the anthropology of the Christian faith can account for the conditions for human knowledge of God. By this concept, he interprets human nature in terms of both human independence from God and human proximity to God.

Finally, I argue that Tertullian by his doctrine of the Trinity, which he elaborates much further in *Adversus Praxeans* than in *Adversus Marcionem*, understands God’s making himself known from a teleology of his triune being in terms of an inherent humanness of God.

In the third chapter (2.3) I investigate the anthropology of *De Anima* 1-22, based on a rhetorical reading of the text. I argue that Tertullian understands the main hypothesis, that the soul is ‘born and created’, as opposed to the dualist view of his Platonising opponents. These seem to have understood the soul as a divine element of human constitution, ontologically different from the body.

Further, I study Tertullian’s concrete unfolding of his main hypothesis, namely that the soul is corporeal and uncompounded. I argue that he states the soul’s corporeality in order to prove false the dualism he refuses. This is
crucial for him, as he understands the God-human relation as God’s bodily mediated impact on the soul. He believes God to communicate and to move the human soul by sensation, understanding and emotion, that is: by exactly the phenomena, he finds the alleged dualism of his opponents unable to account for.

Then I argue that he states that the soul is uncompounded, because he understands it as the responsible and determining factor of human constitution. This understanding would be impossible, if the soul were composite, since such a soul would itself be determined by its different parts. In that case, so Tertullian, both human freedom and human responsibility would be excluded.

Finally, I argue that it follows from the four so-called ‘confirmatio paragraphs’ of the text studied that Tertullian believes that Christian faith, in order to be true, must be in accordance with an anthropology able to describe phenomena of human life in a plausible, non-reductionist way, and, further, must be able to provide a doctrinal interpretation of this anthropology.

In the fourth chapter (2.4) I summarise the section’s reading of Tertullian’s anthropology. This concluding summary provides the basis for my use of Tertullian in the study of Barth and Pannenberg.

2.1 The Life and Writings of Tertullian
Christel Butterweck states, what has become scholarly consensus regarding the sources to our knowledge of the life of Tertullian: “Ober Tertullians Leben wissen wir nur, was sich aus seinen 31 erhaltenen Schriften erschließen läßt,” (Butterweck 2002, 93).

So, the source material is less than one could wish for, especially on acceptance of the restrictive approach of Barnes, according to whom a

54 In any case, the source material is less than it was thought to be a generation ago. While still to be found in lexica (Moreschini 2005) and in broader presentations, almost every scholar has left the traditional picture of Tertullian’s life, drawn on the basis of Jerome and Eusebius: By the end of the fourth century Jerome described Tertullian as a man “of keen and vehement character” (acris et vehementis ingenii, De Viris Illustris 53), dated his work to the reign of Severus (193-211) and Caracella (211-217) and mentioned some of the treatises. In addition, Jerome stated that Tertullian was son of a Carthaginian proconsular centurion, that he was ordained presbyter in Carthage and that he towards the end of his long life broke with the catholic church and turned to Montanism because of envy against the Roman clergy. Eusebius mentions that Tertullian before his conversion was educated in Roman law (τερτυλιανός τοὺς Ῥωμαίων νόμους ἡκριβωκώς, Historia Ecclesiae 2.2.4), and that he was famous in Rome. This is the traditional picture of Tertullian’s biography, to which Augustine’s mentioning of ‘the Tertullianists’ (Tertullianistae a Tertulliano, De Haeresibus ad Quodvultdeus 86) added that he before
biographical sketch that claims to be a faithful representation “can not go beyond a few bold outlines,” (T. D. Barnes 1971, 59).

Born and raised pagan (De Paenitentia 1,1), Tertullian converted to Christianity as an adult, and married a Christian wife (Ad Uxorem, Barnes 1971, 137). Assuming that he died shortly after his last extant work, his life may have ended just over the age 40, but this is not certain.

He was, undoubtedly, part of the Carthaginian elite, as evident from the rhetorical education, to which his writings testify (Dunn 2004, 25). While his death broke definitively not only with catholic Christianity, but with the Montanist church as well and founded his own sect.

In modern times the traditional picture was generally accepted on the authority of Adolf v. Harnack (Harnack 1904, 292–95) and repeated in influential scholarship (Quasten 1950, 246–47). It was first challenged by the 1971 work of Timothy Barnes, who point by point demonstrated the uncertain assumptions, upon which the traditional picture of was based, and in particular the unreliability of Jerome and Eusebius as sources (T. D. Barnes 1971, 3–29). Since then a growing, and today almost unanimous, scholarly consensus has agreed with Barnes on these points (Fredouille 1972; Bray 1979; Rankin 1995; Osborn 2003).

Gerald Bray makes a similar point: “Tertullian himself never dwelt on autobiographical details, and there is remarkably little which can be deduced with certainty from his writings, despite long and acrimonious controversies, many of them quite fruitless … In the end all we can really say about Tertullian’s life is that we know virtually nothing about it, and whatever mark he may have left on his own time and society has escaped the notice of posterity.” (Bray 1979, 8–9, cf. Wright 2000, 1027–29; Ferguson 2009, 313–14; Wilhite 2011, 1–3.17–24.35). Ian Balfour, by contrast, finds it possible to conclude in detail on Tertullian’s religious beliefs prior to his conversion (Balfour 2006). Henrike Zilling even believes it possible to confirm some of the information in Eusebius. She argues that Tertullian, if not an educated jurist, may have practised in Rome as a legal representative (als Advokat, als lehrender und schreibender Privatmann, Zilling 2004, 36). On this point, she differs from the conclusions of David Rankin (Rankin 1997b).

Barnes suggests a date of birth around 170 (T. D. Barnes 1971, 58)

According to Barnes under circumstances hardly discernible from the writings: “…that Tertullian has left an account of the true stages of his conversion must be doubted,” (T. D. Barnes 1971, 247).

The suggestion of Barnes (T. D. Barnes 1971, 59).

In an anthropological reading of Tertullian informed by postcolonial categories, David Wilhite has interpreted the Carthaginian socio-economic and cultural elite at the turn of the second-third century as a ‘new elite’ (Wilhite 2011, 114-119. 131-145). Tertullian’s critique of the social class, from which he originates, and which he addresses directly (De Pallio 1,1), can then be understood as a critique for abandoning their original identity as Africans in favour of an opportunist Romanisation. African identity represents, in this type of argumentation, an original, unspoiled humanness over against the degenerate, greedy Roman identity in a way that corresponds to his anthropological concept of an original and morally superior human nature. Dariusz Karłowicz speaks with a telling anachronism of Tertullian’s idea of the noble savage and continues: “In
expensive, such rhetorical training was important for achieving or maintaining status in the increased social mobility of the Severian dynasty.\footnote{60} It seems reasonable, then, to assume that he was wealthy enough to spend his time writing and probably to function as a catechist\footnote{61} in Carthage.

From his literacy, his rhetorical skills and his financial potentials we may conclude that he belonged to a minority in the Carthage church, whose majority was without status or rank and with only limited financial capacity (Wilhite 2011, 114). However, this need not to have been a very small minority. As his writings show, the church included other members of the elite,\footnote{62} even Roman officials and soldiers (Ad Scapulam 4-5, De Corona Militis). The Carthage church was in many regards a socially mixed congregation,\footnote{63} and Tertullian’s warnings against wealth, expensive clothing and luxury (The Cultu Feminarum, De Patientia) also assume that some of his fellow Christians were economically well-off.

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Tertullian this idea certainly corresponds with the concept of a universal, foundational, unwritten, and universal natural law passed on to every human being through Adam and Eve, who received it before the fall…,” (Karłowicz 2017, 21).

\footnote{60} “His skill as a trained orator and his education indicated in his writings seem sufficient to surmise that Tertullian came from or rose to a high level of status or class,” (Wilhite 2011, 114).

\footnote{61} I think Bjarne Skard has made a convincing case on this point (Skard 1947, 14). In turn, it means that a number of those treatises often referred to as ‘pastoral’ are more likely to be understood as catechetical manuscripts (note 72).


\footnote{63} In addition to the specific features of Carthage church life in that can be known from Tertullian, the very fact that he wrote in Latin testifies to the shift from Greek to Latin as church language. This shift indicates that Christianity in Carthage had expanded from its original setting in the Jewish, Greek-speaking social environment, into broader parts of the socially mixed Carthaginian culture, as Tertullian’s own conversion exemplifies.

This does not rule out that there may have been a considerable Jewish population in Carthage, that a significant part of the Carthage church may have been of Jewish origin and that Tertullian’s polemics against Judaism may be the result of discussions with contemporary Jews (note 82). Stéphanie Binder’s study makes this likely, as she presents a multifarious evidence for a vividly contact between Jews and Christians in Carthage, even though she, herself, believes that “Tertullian himself may not have known any Jews personally, and Jews almost certainly did not read Tertullian’s works,” (Binder 2010, 223). In my opinion, the fact that Carthage Christians, according to Apologeticum 9,13, complied with the Apostolic Decree (Act. 15:20) makes it likely that Tertullian was fully aware that the Carthage church included a considerable group of Jewish origin and that there was significant contact between Carthage Jews and Christians.
This is important for the question of, whom Tertullian addresses by *De Anima* and *Adversus Marcionem*. I argue (pp36.56) that ‘the intended reader’ of both treaties is a Christian member of the Carthage church. Rather than seeking to convince followers of Hermogenes or Marcion to enter or re-enter the catholic church, Tertullian in these treatises addresses fellow local church members, whom he believes to be attracted by Hermogenian or Marcionite teaching.

This understanding of the intended addressees of these treatises presupposes, of course, a significant number of literates in the Carthage church; otherwise the publication would hardly have been meaningful.

While any estimate of the size of the catholic community at the time of Tertullian is highly uncertain, as is any attempt to calculate the population

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64 In Tertullian the term *catholica ecclesia* refers to apostolic Christianity over against the Gnostics (*De Praescriptione Haereticorum* 26,9-10) and Marcion (*Adversus Marcionem* IV,4,3). Thus, it is part of Tertullian’s efforts to establish his own understanding as a ‘pure’ or even ‘orthodox’ Christian identity, cf. below note 138. However, Tertullian’s treatises clearly reflect a situation in Carthage, where both Marcionites and Gnostics are organised in their own congregations, distinct from ‘the catholic church’. Here, and throughout this section, I use the term ‘catholic’ in this meaning.

65 Geoffrey Dunn suggests a number of 2300 Christians in Carthage around A.D. 200 (Dunn 2004, 5, 2017, 255), based on Stark’s ‘crude estimate’ of 0.35 as the general percentage of the Christian population in the empire (Stark 1996, 7).

However, this ‘method’, which is simply to multiply Stark’s estimated percentage with a guess on the number of Carthage’s population, is highly uncertain. Not only is the size of Carthage at the time impossible to establish with sufficient precision, as Dunn himself makes clear. Even more, Stark’s 0.35 % is no more than a qualified proposal. William Tabbernee’s suggestion of “a Christian population of 300-400 members organized in five or six house churches” (Tabbernee 2001, 381) is based on the same ‘method’, utilising the calculations of Keith Hopkins (Hopkins 1998). The striking difference between Dunn and Tabbernee indicates, I believe, the arbitrariness of attempts to decide on the size of a local church in this way.

Moreover, even if we knew the size of Carthage’s population, and even if Stark’s proposal is somewhat near the truth, calculations such as those of Dunn and Tabbernee require that the Christian population was evenly spread throughout the Empire. There is, however, no reason to assume this. Quite the contrary, Christianity was essentially an urban phenomenon, even so that the relative number of Christians were higher, the larger the town or city was (Stark 1996, 134). If around 15 % of the entire population lived in towns or cities (Hopkins 1998, 207), and Christianity was concentrated among those 15 %, then Stark’s estimate would have to be six times higher and probably even more for a city of the size of Carthage. During the Severian dynasty, Carthage enjoyed particularly sympathetic attention from the Roman central administration and flourished economically and culturally (Ferguson 2009, 314), Septimus Severus being the first Roman Emperor of African origin. Carthage was clearly “the second city of the West” (Bray 1979, 33), recognised for its famous schools and for its economically significant trade. Further, not even among the large cities were the Christians evenly spread (Hopkins
of Carthage, at least nothing speaks against the church having a size and socioeconomic profile, which makes it reasonable to believe that Tertullian primarily wrote for Christian readers in his own context.

This understanding is challenged by Barnes, not on the basis of the number of literate Christians in Carthage, but because he believes that the Montanism of Tertullian towards the end of his life made him give up the hope of persuading those, who rejected the ‘New Prophecy’ (T. D. Barnes 1971, 135.142).

However, I do not think Tertullian’s turn towards Montanism ever had the character of schism, as was assumed by earlier research, Barnes included.

1998, 202–3), and it seems likely that there were relatively more Christians in cities with a large Jewish community, such as Carthage.

The point is, as far as I can see, that while estimates such as Stark’s may tell something about the spread of Christianity in the entire population, they are of no use in esteeming the size of a local church. Dunn’s guess may be close to the truth, or it may be a significant underestimation. Tabbernee’s suggestion is, in my opinion, far too low, and exemplifies how misleading such calculation-based estimates can be. At least some half a century later, the Carthage church must have had a considerable larger size, as Cyprian (d. 258) mentions no fewer than 71 bishops in Africa Proconsularis and Numidia (Epistulae 72,1,1; Laato 1998, 23). This, I believe, makes it almost impossible that the church at the time of Tertullian should have had consisted of no more than few hundred members.

66 ‘Nova prophetia’ is Tertullian’s term for the Montanism, to which he turned in his last years of writing. It is evident in at least twelve of the works that have come down to us. Barnes emphasises this turn and defines eight ideas or expressions as distinctively Montanist (T. D. Barnes 1971, 43–44). From these, he identifies the group of Montanist writings and singles out four, in which the inclination to dialogue with catholic Christians is particularly low. Consequently, he considers these four treatises to be the latest. Other works he considers to be “tingled only slightly with Montanism,” because “at no point in these long tracts does Tertullian’s argument ever depend on premises or assumptions that would be acceptable to none but a Montanist,” (T. D. Barnes 1971, 45). De Anima and Adversus Marcionem are among these ‘slightly’ Montanist works, but even though the rhetoric against ‘the psychics’ (psychici) definitely is harder in Adversus Praxeum, the same applies, as far as I can see, here: nowhere is the argumentation based on premises particularly Montanist, and nowhere are catholic Christians as such identified as ‘psychics’.

67 Although Barnes does not find the Montanist writings less orthodox than the pre-Montanist, the assumption that Montanism in Carthage was a competing, schismatic community, a kind of counter-church, lies in the very criteria, by which he identifies the Montanist works and distinguishes between more and less extreme degrees of Montanism. This applies especially to his fourth and eighth criteria (T. D. Barnes 1971, 43–44). However, this is against historical probability: “Tertullian appears to have been a leading member of the ‘catholic’ church in Carthage. He was probably one or the seniores laici (‘lay’ rather than ‘ordained’ elders) and perhaps the patron of one of the house-churches at Carthage whose members were interested in and influenced by the New
David Rankin points to the fact that Tertullian never asks anyone to leave the catholic church and join his own group, nor does he, even when criticising specific catholic bishops, ever challenge the notion of a catholic hierarchy as such. The conclusion must be that Tertullian never left the catholic church, and that we have no reason to believe that he was considered to do so, or considered himself to do so, at any time of his life (Osborn 2003, 177). His harsh words of critique against named bishops are part of his polemical style, not an attempt to promote his own competing church or group. In the words of David Wilhite: “The past half-century of scholarly investigation into the life of Tertullian has formed an overwhelming consensus that Tertullian was not a Montanist schismatic,” (Wilhite 2013b, 46).

Nothing, then, speaks against the assumption that the intended addressees of the late and clearly Montanist treatises, on which I focus in this dissertation, are Tertullian’s fellow catholic church members in Carthage.

The Writings of Tertullian
If Tertullian’s turn to Montanism was less dramatic than assumed by Barnes, then, of course, it questions some of his conclusions regarding the chronology of Tertullian’s writings (Dunn 2004, 8–9). That, however, does not challenge the overall picture that all of Tertullian’s writings are composed within a period of less than two decades, presumably from 196-212.

68 “…Tertullian never left the Catholic church, but rather continued his fight for a more vigorous and disciplined Christian discipleship from within the Catholic church itself … the so-called ‘Psychici’, whom Tertullian so maligns, are not to be identified with the Catholic church and its hierarchy in toto, but rather with a particular element within that church,” (Rankin 1995, 28).

69 Bray points to an additional argument: Given the widespread reading of his writings in the western church centuries after his death, it is hard to imagine that there ever was any serious doubt about his attachment to the church (Bray 2010, 65).

70 “We should not assume that a schismatic Prophetic community was formed apart from the catholics in Carthage. Tertullian the catholic Christian remained catholic in his thinking, and the Prophecy in Asia Minor had been entirely orthodox theologically and was forced from the churches in that area … Tertullian’s unquestionably Montanist treatises, albeit recognisable by allusions to the revelations of the Paraclete, still tell of doctrines and practices essentially the same as those in his undeniably catholic writings. Tertullian the Montanist was Tertullian the Montanist catholic,” (Trevett 1996, 68–69).

71 Though the relative chronology of the works defined by Barnes as Montanist is more uncertain than in his own presentation, there is no doubt that they are among the late writings of Tertullian. This can be shown from other criteria (T. D. Barnes 1971, 32–41),
However, if Barnes’s doctrinal criterion is left out, chronology does hardly provide any possible way to arrange Tertullian’s writings according to their content. Bray suggests a thematically arranging that lists the writings in four categories, namely philosophical, evangelistic (apologetic), doctrinal/polemical and pastoral\textsuperscript{72} treatises (Bray 2010, 67–70). While I find the distinction between apologetic, doctrinal and pastoral (catechetical) writings clarifying and helpful, I doubt that it is appropriate to single out a philosophical group of treatises.\textsuperscript{73}

So, I suggest modifying Bray’s four-group arranging of the writings into just three groups. \textit{De Anima} and \textit{Adversus Marcionem}, the two works I analyse parts of in this dissertation, then belong to the same group of a total number of nine doctrinal/polemical writings.\textsuperscript{74}

\subsection*{2.2 The Anthropology of \textit{Adversus Marcionem} II,1-10}
\textit{Adversus Marcionem} I-V is Tertullian’s largest, most elaborate and most thoroughly worked out book. This, in itself, indicates how serious the Marcionite threat was in the eyes of Tertullian.

However, it is difficult to decide the exact character of this threat. The growth of the Marcionite church was rapid and widespread from the middle of the second century (Evans 1972, xii), and Tertullian mentions that

\textsuperscript{72} Bray subdivides the seventeen pastoral treatises into four groups, based on their subjects. In light of the hypothesis that these smaller treatises originally were worked out as manuscripts for Tertullian’s classes of catechumens (Skard 1947, 14), they may be named \textit{catechetical} rather than \textit{pastoral}.

\textsuperscript{73} Bray assigns only \textit{De Anima} and \textit{De Testimonio Animae} to the ‘philosophical’ group. However, \textit{De Testimonio Animae} is, in my opinion, clearly apologetic, as it addresses non-Christians in the same way as does \textit{Ad Nationes} and \textit{Apologeticum}. The question is, then, whether \textit{De Anima} is a doctrinal/polemic work of fundamentally the same kind as e.g. \textit{Adversus Hermogenem}, with which it has much in common (\textit{De Anima} 1,1; 3,4), or whether it constitutes its own philosophical genre within Tertullian’s body of work, as Bray suggests in line with Jan H. Waszink (Waszink 1947, 7*) and Gunner af Hallström, who among others refers to Bainvel and de Cruz Pontes (Hallström 1986, 72–73).

\textsuperscript{74} Within this group, \textit{Adversus Marcionem} according to its content relates to \textit{De Carne Christi} and \textit{De Resurrectione Carnis}, and includes material from \textit{Adversus Iudaeos}. \textit{De Anima} argues against the same type of thinking as the anti-Gnostic \textit{De Praescriptione Haereticorum}, \textit{Adversus Hermogenem} and \textit{Adversus Valentinianos}, as Tertullian believes both Hermogenes and the Valentinian gnosis to express a kind of heresy of fundamentally Platonic origin. So, both \textit{Adversus Marcionem} and \textit{De Anima}, belong to subgroups of writings, whereas \textit{Adversus Praxean} is the only treatise of its kind. In it, Tertullian polemically develops his doctrine of the Trinity against a named opponent, who in the treatise is presented as a modalist monarchianist.
“Marcionites make churches as wasps make nests,”75 but it is hardly possible to estimate the number of Marcionites or Marcionite congregations in the province of Roman Africa at the turn of the second-third century. Even more hypothetical is any attempt to decide to what extent Marcionite influence affected Christians within the catholic church.

There is, however, scholarly consensus that Adversus Marcionem does not address convinced Marcionites but Marcionite influence on catholic Christians,76 who in the eyes of Tertullian were threatened by heresy.77 Tertullian wrote to defend systematically78 what he believed was apostolic Christian faith. He attempted to answer some of the theological dilemmas, Marcion’s teaching had raised (Lieu 2015, 55), and at the same time to criticise some of the consequences of Marcion’s theology.

As Marcion had been dead for almost half a century at the time of writing, the direct addressing of him is, of course, a rhetorical construction.79 So is, I believe, the direct addressing of his followers.80 While the possibility that Tertullian may have been involved in public oral disputes with Marcionites cannot be excluded (Lieu 2015, 54), the anonymous second person singular of the text is not an existing but an ideally modelled (idealtypischer, Lukas 2015, 21) contemporary Marcionite.

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75 “Faciunt favos et vespae, faciunt ecclesias et Marcionitae,” (IV,5,3).
76 Judith Lieu argues that Tertullian’s “intended audience was not the committed Marcionites of his own day but members of his own community,” that is: the Carthage church. Volker Lukas speaks in broader terms of “die eigentlichen Rezipienten” as the members of the ordinary church (Angehörigen der Großkirche, Lukas 2015, 22), that is: including catholic Christians outside Roman Africa.
77 Prior to the writing of De Carne Christi and Adversus Marcionem, Tertullian refers to Marcionite faith as just one of many heresies, and he presents it as a Stoic misconception of Christian faith (De Praescriptione Haereticorum 7.3, 30.1). In De Carne Christi, on the contrary, Marcion is not just one among the heretics but represents the ultimate heresy (1,2; 2,2). In Adversus Marcionem Tertullian has obviously deepened his understanding of Marcion’s teaching: he no longer presents him as a Stoic but as a follower of Epicurus (I,25,3-5; II,16,2; IV,15,3; V,19,7). While historically hard to sustain (Lieu 2015, 64.330), this point illustrates Tertullian’s ultimate critique of Marcion’s God. It is fundamental to the Epicurean notion of gods that they do not interact with humans, neither through creation or human destiny nor through moral or religious guidance or demands. The radical discontinuity between humans and Marcion’s ‘higher God’, then, makes Tertullian understand the latter as an Epicurean God.
78 Another emphasis in Osborn, who holds that Adversus Marcionem, due to Marcion’s systematic way of arguing, “…presents a theology which is more systematic than most apologetic writing,” (Osborn 1995, 631).
79 E.g. II,29,4.
80 E.g. II,2,2.
Dunn’s distinction (Dunn 2008, 40–43) between real readers, imagined readers and intended readers is clarifying in this regard. The imagined reader, “to whom the text itself is addressed,” is a concept similar to Wolfgang Iser’s ‘fictitious reader’, and is in the case of Adversus Marcionem the addressed, fictional Marcionite. The intended reader, on the other hand, for whom “the work [was] actually written”, and “whom Tertullian wanted to persuade”, is a fellow member of the Carthage church.

Adversus Marcionem consists of five books. The first book is a long argumentation to disprove the existence of Marcion’s ‘higher God’ of the gospel, while the second addresses the goodness and justice of the Old Testament Creator, seeking to prove that God’s justice is fully consistent with his goodness. The third attempts to demonstrate that Jesus is the Old Testament messiah, while the fourth and fifth discuss Marcion’s canon in detail.

And to Gerald Prince’s concept of the ‘narratee’ (de Bruyn 2012, 105). Confusingly Dunn seems to equate his own ‘imagined reader’ with the concept of ‘implied reader’, at least in his references to Vernon Robbins and Alan Culpepper.

The relation between Adversus Iudaeos 9-14 and Adversus Marcionem III has been much debated (Inowlocki 2010, 104). It follows from an immediate reading that they are two versions of the same line of thought, using the same arguments and the same scriptural quotations (Skarsaune 1996, 431). The question is, then, whether Tertullian included a revised part of Adversus Iudaeos 9-14 in Adversus Marcionem, or whether Adversus Iudaeos 9-14 is a later pseudopigraphous writing based on Adversus Marcionem III, added to the possible genuine Adversus Iudaeos 1-8 by an unknown editor. The last suggestion was accepted by Emil Kroymann and underlies the text of CCSL (Dekkers 1954, 1364). The view was, however, challenged by Gösta Säflund and Hermann Tränkle, and their arguments were carried on by Barnes (T. D. Barnes 1971, 53.107). In recent times, Dunn has on rhetorical grounds argued that Adversus Iudaeos 9-14 is an original part of the work and prior to Adversus Marcionem III (Dunn 2008, 173.177–178), and his work has been widely accepted (Lieu 2015, 54).

This debate is, of course, important for the historical question of the possible contacts and even public disputes between Jews and Christians in Carthage at the turn of the second-third century (Dunn 2008, 15–24.53–57, cf. note 63). But it is no less significant for the interpretation of Adversus Marcionem. It implies that a major and substantial part of Tertullian’s argumentation against Marcion originally is shaped against Jewish readings of Old Testament prophecy. This probably means that Tertullian, despite Marcion’s anti-Jewish polemic, recognises a fundamental similarity between the Marcionite and the Jewish understanding of the prophets with regard to the concepts of God and messiah. This same understanding, so Tertullian, leads the Jews to reject Jesus as Christ, and leads Marcion to the conclusion that Christ could not have been sent by the Old Testament God (Adversus Marcionem III,7,1-8). Tertullian’s answer to both is that they overlook that the prophets have predicted a double coming (adventus) of Christ, the first in humility, the second in glory.
The Rhetorical Structure of *Adversus Marcionem* II

Sider has demonstrated that *Adversus Marcionem* I rhetorically is structured from the pattern of classical rhetoric according to Cicero and Quintilian. I,1-3 is, so Sider, the clearest example in Tertullian of how he “follow the rhetorical expectations,” and the argumentation in the main section of the book is carefully arranged in accordance with Quintilian (Sider 1971, 49–54).

Regarding the outline of *Adversus Marcionem* II, on the other hand, Sider believes it to be determined by the Marcionite critique, Tertullian opposes, and of his “need to review the Old Testament as a preparation for his central discussion in Book IV.” Therefore, Sider a priori rejects that *Adversus Marcionem* II should reflect any rhetorical pattern at all. Consequently, no analysis of the structure of *Adversus Marcionem* II have been conducted, neither by Sider, nor by any of his successors in the tradition of rhetorical Tertullian research.

However, I am not convinced by his arguments at this point. *Adversus Marcionem* II is no review of the entire Old Testament, as it actually focuses mainly on texts and concepts from the first chapters of Genesis, referring in addition to some Psalms, some quotations from Isaiah and a few other texts. Further, the structure can hardly be determined by Marcionite critique. That would imply that Tertullian shaped the book to meet a certain version of this critique. If so, it would have to be a Marcionite writing other than Marcion’s *Antitheses*, which Tertullian explicitly says, has not structured *Adversus Marcionem* II (29,1), and which he possibly did not even read prior to the writing (Lieu 2015, 53.85; Mahé 1975, 93). However, there is no historical evidence for written presentations of Marcionite belief other than *Antitheses*,

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83 The *exordium*, the *narratio* and the *propositio* follow each other subsequently and are formally distinguished. Conventional topics of epideitic literature are used to establish ethos etc. (Sider 1971, 29–30).

84 Sider describes the rhetorical structure as “based on the *stasislehre*” and states that the book “direct[s] itself to the three traditional questions of that theory, *quid sit, an sit, quale sit*,” (Sider 1971, 49).

85 “…there can, in these circumstances, be no question of a systematic rhetorical pattern controlling the argument…” (Sider 1971, 81).

86 And other than Marcion’s canon, with which Tertullian deals in the Fourth and Fifth Book, not in the Second.

87 Lukas argues for the opposite view (Lukas 2015, 15), as he understands ch. 28 as a set of ‘counter-Antitheses’ (*Gegenanithesen*, cf. les ‘Contre-Antithèses’, Braun 1990, 167). However, even if this suggestion of Lukas is correct, and even if the content of *Antitheses* may to some extent be reconstructed from ch. 28, there is a big difference between the issues dealt with in this chapter and in the entire book. Thus, *Adversus Marcionem* II cannot be structured from *Antitheses*, as one would expect from Sider’s hypothesis.
and even if such a writing existed, it is hard to see why Tertullian would structure his work after it, leaving Antitheses out.

Moreover, Tertullian in 29,1 states that his book is about the relation between the Creator’s goodness (bonitas) and justice (iustitia). This distinction does not stem from Marcion or from Marcionite critique; it is clearly Tertullian’s own.\(^{88}\)

If this is the case, the structure of the argument is not controlled by those factors, Sider assumes. Tertullian, then, was perfectly free to arrange the work the way he wanted, and given that his purpose was to refute the accusation of the Creator’s being cruel (saevus, 27,8), one would expect him to do it in the form of written piece of forensic rhetoric, a controversia (Dunn 2008, 36–40).

I suggest that exactly what he did. Ch. 1 is, thus, to be understood as the exordium, in which Tertullian utilises conventional rhetorical figures such as epichrasis\(^{89}\) to set the intended reader “in a receptive mood by an immediate appeal to considerations of an ethical and emotional character,” (Sider 1971, 21). Ch. 2-3 is the narratio,\(^{90}\) which presents Marcion’s heresy as transgression against God, traces it back to Adam’s transgression and focuses it as denial of God’s goodness.

Ch. 4 is the propositio, which according to Quintilian is a ‘demonstration of the main question’ (ostendenda quaestio principalis, Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria IV,4,1, Russell 2001, 292). The main part of the book, in which Tertullian presents his argumentation, is structured in three large sections. The first (5-10) argues that the Creator’s goodness is displayed in his creation of the human being in his own image. The second (11-19) argues that the Creator’s justice is consistent with, and even necessarily follows from, his goodness. The third (20-28)\(^{91}\) deals with a number of objections, allegedly from either Marcion or Marcionites. The book concludes with a brief

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88 “There is no indication whatsoever that Tertullian argues against a Marcionite distinction between a good god and a just god. It is quite clearly Tertullian himself who brings up the topic of divine justice,” (Löhr 2002, 139). This seems to be a critique of Osborn (Osborn 1995, 632), and to my judgement a convincing critique.

89 Such as the characterisation of Marcion as Ponticus (1,1) or the mentioning of his falsehood (mendacium). Cf. Sider 1971, 29.

90 “…a narration of the events out of which the situation had arisen,” (Sider 1971, 21). Cf. Cicero, who defines the narratio as “an explanation of acts that have been done, or of acts as if they have been done,” (narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio, Cicero, De Inventione I,19,27, Hubbell 1949, 54).

91 Unlike René Braun, I think ch. 28 is belongs to the third main section rather than to the closing paragraph (Péroraison, Braun 1990, 14–16).
peroratio, an “emotional appeal to the sympathies of the audience,” (Sider 1971, 22).

The propositio is crucial in this context, as I use the rhetorical analysis to uncover the central problem of the text (p16). According to the rhetorical structure of Adversus Marcionem II, this problem is stated in the opening words of 4,1: That “God’s goodness made provision of the human being for the sake of God to be known” (...cum cognoscendo Deo hominem prospexisset bonitas Dei ipsius).

Thus, the problem Tertullian deals with in Adversus Marcionem II is fundamentally the question of how God can be known, and especially how the creation of the human being follows from God’s intention to make himself known. Consequently, this is the crucial question for the imago Dei anthropology developed by Tertullian in ch. 5-10. He did not write to present a particular doctrine or to comment on or interpret a particular Scriptural text, but to solve the problem of how the human being can know God.

Given that Adversus Marcionem II’s genre is that of a forensic speech, specifically a controversia, Tertullian’s argumentation must be understood from the so-called conjectural method (Sider 1971, 41–42; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria VII,2,1-57, Russell 2002, 184–216). This implies that the author puts forward a hypothesis and subsequently defends it by a series of arguments linked to a number of distinct rhetorical topics such as cause, intention, place and time. Formally, then, the text of Adversus Marcionem II is made up of hypotheses that Tertullian defends, and in the process deals with objections of the imagined reader and rejects them.

92 While I agree with Osborn that Tertullian must be understood from the problem the text intends to solve, I disagree with him on what the fundamental problem of Adversus Marcionem is. Osborn believes it is the problem of dualism (Osborn 2003, 88, 1995, 624.631-632).

93 Sider has shown that Tertullian’s argumentation is shaped by the conjectural method, even when he argues from Scripture (Sider 1971, 63–73), as in Adversus Marcionem II.

94 Ideally, following Quintilian, such arguments should be presented in two separate sections, the confirmatio, which argues in favour of the speaker’s claim, that is: the presented hypothesis, followed by the reprehensio, which argues against the opponent’s claim. In practise, however, these were interwoven and inseparable, as they usually are in Tertullian (Sider 1971, 21–22). This is also the case in Adversus Marcionem II, as reprehensio arguments are presented throughout the main part of argumentation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the first two argumentative sections (5-10 and 11-19) are fundamentally confirmatio sections, whereas the third (20-28) is a reprehensio. This means that Adversus Marcionem II is closer to Quintilian’s rhetorical pattern than most other writings of Tertullian.
God’s Goodness and God’s Law

The main hypothesis is put forward in the *propositio*: That the human being’s creation in the image of God is a sign of God’s goodness and an expression of God’s original intention to make himself known.

Tertullian defends this hypothesis by claiming that the human being is attributed a particular dignity that corresponds to the goodness of original creation: “Quis denique dignus incolere Dei opera quam ipsius imago et similitudo?” (4,3).

This special human dignity is due to the special way God acts in creating human beings. Creation in the divine image is mediated, namely by God’s communication of his law. This means that the original giving of the law is part of the original creation. It is not imposed later on as means for human growth (p45) or as a response to human sin.

At this point of the argument, Tertullian rejects three presumed objections of the imagined Marcionite reader, the first of which is that the law contradicts the goodness of God. Quite the contrary, states Tertullian, the giving of the law, in the Gen. 2:16-17 commandment, and even the possible judgement of those held responsible by God (4,6), is the highest expression of divine goodness. God’s addressing of the human being by the law is precisely the fundamental difference between humans and animals and, thus, the reason for human superiority over the rest of creation (4,5), as Tertullian states with allusion to Ps. 8:6.

The reason that this particular form of divine creation, mediated by God’s communication of his law, can give rise to such dignity is that it establishes human freedom. By the law, the human being has a free choice to obey or not, and this choice is, so Tertullian, conditional for human dignity (4,5-6).

Tertullian clarifies his understanding of human freedom by his refutation (*reprehensio*) of the second presumed objection of the imagined Marcionite reader. The objection, stated in 5,1-2 and developed further in 6,1 and 7,1, is that if the Creator possessed goodness, foreknowledge and power, then he ought to have prevented the human being’s fall into sin.

Rhetorically, Tertullian’s argument has character of *remotio criminis*, that is: he argues that the human being – not God – is the only responsible for sin: “…videamus et hominis condicionem, ne per illam potius evenerit quod per deum evenire non potuit,” (5,5).

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95 “Sed … legem, quam in controversias torques, bonitas erogavit,” (4,5).
96 As explicitly stated (II 5,7; 6,8; 7,1-2.4).
97 This rhetorical figure is described in detail by Cicero (Cicero, *De Inventione* II,29,86-90, Hubbell 1949, 252–56) as the third of four possible ways to justify an act (Sider 1971, 18–19.75; Cicero, *De Inventione* II,24,71, Hubbell 1949, 236). As Tertullian sets out to defend God, he obviously cannot use the second and the fourth of these patterns of
God created the human being as free, with free will and power to act (liberum et sui arbitrii et suae potestatis invenio hominem a Deo institutum), and exactly this is the clearest demonstration of God’s image and likeness (imaginem et similitudinem Dei) in the human being.

To be created in the divine image is, then, to correspond to the form of God (ad formam Dei spondens, 5,6) in a unique way. Human freedom is in this regard a sign, as the image of God is signified (signatus est) by free will and power to act. In this perspective, the law does not only establish human freedom and dignity in relative independence from God’s rule. It subsequently confirms it, as God by his law holds the human being responsible: “Hunc statum eius confirmavit etiam ipsa lex tunc a Deo posita,” (5,6).

The reason that God created the human being with the freedom and dignity of his own image is, according to Tertullian, to be found in God’s being. He states so by his refusal of the third presumed objection of the imagined Marcionite reader, namely that if God knew in advance of the sinful human misuse of freedom, he ought to have created the human being differently (6,1).

Tertullian’s response reaches back to the main hypothesis of God’s making himself known. He had to be known (oportebat Deum cognosci, 6,2), states Tertullian, indicating necessity. Consequently, since God can be known only in freedom, the human creature must have this freedom.

Tertullian does not explain why freedom is a necessary condition for knowledge God, but simply states that it is the only way, in which it is worthy (dignus). He seems to assume as obvious that the one to know God must, to some degree, correspond to God.

The answer to the presumed objection is, then, that God could not have created the human being without freedom, as a creature not free would not have corresponded to him, and, consequently, could not have known him.

‘assumptive defence’ (iuridicialis assumptiva), namely to present an accusation or to beg for pardon. This means that he has two possibilities: the first is comparatio, the justification of an act with reference to its worthy purpose. In this case it would be to state that the human fall into sin was due to an imperfection in the original creation, which, however, serves a higher purpose. This is line of thought is one of Irenaeus’ ways of dealing with the question (p45). Although Sider believes so (Sider 1971, 81), there is, as far as I can see, no indication that Tertullian should be interpreted this way. He states that sin is the responsibility of the human being alone, which means that it is ultimately inexplicable (p45).

98 Similarly, Tertullian states that it is necessary for a good God, not to remain hidden, and even more necessary, the better he is: “...quibus utique necessarius, qua deus, et quidem quo melior necessario latere non debuit,” (I,17,4).
To be created does not in itself imply such correspondence.\textsuperscript{99} Hence, human goodness is not simply by nature (\textit{natura}, 6,4), when nature is taken in the broad sense of the essence of everything created. It is by institution (\textit{institutio}).

By the term \textit{institutio} Tertullian refers to the particular creation of the human being with the specific human kind of nature (\textit{quoddammodo natura}). What distinguishes \textit{institutio} from creation in general is that God, by communicating his law, presents the human being to both good and evil. Thus, he establishes the human freedom in relative independence from God, that is: a divine-human correspondence in terms of freedom, conditional for human knowledge of God. This correspondence is formal (5,6) and presupposes the God-human qualitative difference of being (6,4, cf. note 99). Although this correspondence of freedom makes sin possible, it is necessary because of the necessity of God’s making himself known.

To know God implies, however, to correspond to God in yet another way, in terms of goodness, that is: that the human being gains his or her own subjective goodness from God: “Ut ergo bonum iam suum haberet homo, emancipatum sibi a Deo,” (6,5). This happens as the human being freely adheres to goodness (6,6), sustained and ruled (\textit{substrueretur, regeretur}, 9,8) by God. Thus, it presupposes a God-human similarity (\textit{quod ... cum Deo adfine est}), as basis of a correspondence of goodness between God and his human creature.

This ‘double correspondence’ is, so Tertullian, the essential content of human nature\textsuperscript{100} and the meaning of the doctrine of the divine image. It is established by God in the act of \textit{institutio}, both in terms of freedom and in terms of goodness, by the same law: “In hoc et lex constituta est,” (6,7). Hence, the law does not exclude but approve human freedom (\textit{non excludens sed probans libertatem}).

\textsuperscript{99} Otherwise the animals would also correspond to God, as well as all of creation, since they are created too (4,4). But they do not, as the human being does not by mere creation, because creation means to have a beginning (\textit{habens initium}, 6,4). Therefore, \textit{institutio} cannot just mean the act of creation (\textit{Schöpfungsakt}, Lukas 2016, 225), but must mean the special creation of the human being.

\textsuperscript{100} It is not possible, according to Tertullian, to exist in the first correspondence only, that is: without any ‘goodness’. As every human soul has the same origin in God’s breath and the same ‘original goodness’ (\textit{bonus prius}), there is some good in the worst people and some bad in the best people (\textit{De Anima} 41,3), as the goodness of the ‘second correspondence’ co-exists with the ‘alien nature’ of sin (p46). A human soul not reflecting divine goodness at all would be a soul, to whom God neither relates nor communicates, that is: a hypothetical abstraction. In the context of \textit{De Anima} I refer to this as a ‘pre-natural’ soul (p79).
One can ask if Tertullian only speaks of original creation and of an original divine-human correspondence, lost in the state of sin. Such an Augustinian interpretation of Tertullian is, of course, anachronistic (Steenberg 2008a, 108), but, even more, it must be rejected from Tertullian’s reference to what is found in ‘the Creator’s later laws’ (in posteris legibus Creatoris, 5,7). This is clearly the Mosaic law, as the allusion to Deut. 30:15 shows. This means that Tertullian presupposes a fundamental unity between the original law of creation in Gen. 2:16-17 and the Mosaic law with regard to how God continuously uses his law to create and confirm human freedom and goodness.

A question, Tertullian neither raises nor answers at this point, is how this communication of the law can be universal. Strictly speaking, his argument only applies to the Jews, who received and knew the Mosaic Law, and Adam, who received the original law.

However, Tertullian, of course, does not believe the imago Dei to be limited to those, who have knowledge of these written laws. Quite the contrary, he has a precise concept of natural law (lex naturalis), presented as early as in Adversus Iudeaeos 2,6-7. Every single human being knows, so Tertullian, God’s primordial law (primordialis dei lex). This unwritten (non scriptam) law was known in a natural way (intellegebatur naturaliter) and observed (custodiebatur) by the Fathers long before the giving of the Mosaic law (Inowlocki 2010, 103–6), the latter being only a temporary form of the original law.

Thus, God speaks to every human being in his or her conscience: “Nullum maleficium sine formidine est, quia nec sine conscientia sui,” IV,17,12, cf. II,25,1. Contrary to the Marcionite concept of an unknown God, Tertullian believes that God ultimately proves (probatur, I,10,4) his divinity in that he always and everywhere has made himself known to everyone, and done so by creating the human being in his own image.

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101 So Osborn: “Mankind’s likeness to God, which dominates Tertullian’s ethics, was lost by Adam’s sin and is restored by grace,” (Osborn 2003, 164). On Tertullian and original sin, cf. pp46.71.

102 Barnes suggests a date of summer 197 (T. D. Barnes 1971, 55), accepting the authenticity of Adversus Iudeaeos. Dunn, who on rhetorical grounds confirms both the integrity and the authenticity of the treatise (note 82), suggests that “a date of about 195 or 196 seems likely,” (Dunn 2008, 178).

God’s Substance and Sin
The human nature that corresponds to God in a double way is, so Tertullian, a substantial reality. He even speaks of the soul as ‘God’s substance’ (substantia sua, II,5,1), and states that this must be understood from the soul’s origin (per animae ... censum) from God. The unique substance of the human soul fits properly (accomodata, 6,3) the soul’s state (status) as God’s breath (adflatus Dei).

The soul’s substantiality means that it is real. Further, it means that it is directly discernible from the freedom of choice, in which it is manifest: Tertullian’s frequent references to freedom and choice (libertas et arbitrium) in 5-10 are about what he regards to be a present and evident phenomenon.

As such, it can be interpreted theologically, and ch. 9 provides such an interpretation in terms of the soul’s quality (qualitas animae). Formally, Tertullian once again responds to a presumed objection of the imagined reader (9,1.7), namely the objection that it by definition is impossible that God’s substance could fall into sin.

Tertullian answers by introducing a distinction between spirit (spiritus) and breath (adflatus). The soul is the breath of God, but not the Spirit of God, and although it belongs to (accidit, 9,2) the Spirit, it is nevertheless inferior (adflatum minorem spiritu esse).

The quality of the soul in proportion to God’s quality, then, corresponds to the duality of similarity and dissimilarity expressed in the concept of imago Dei: The soul is an image of the Spirit (imago ... spiritus flatus, 9,3) and since God is Spirit (Jn. 4:24) the human soul is the image of God.

Thus, the ‘double correspondence’, which indicates the God-human relation, and the soul’s substance, as interpreted in terms of quality (the breath of God), are essentially two sides of the same matter.

In this context Tertullian stresses the dissimilarity between image and reality (veritas), refusing the presumed objection that since God is incapable of sin, then the human being created in his image equally ought to be so. While the soul reflects God with regard to rationality, it does not do so regard to divine power (vis, 9,4) or sinlessness.

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104 "...the possession of substantia ... differentiates realities or existent things from fictions," (Stead 1963, 61).

105 Tertullian is in line with Stoic thought at this point, as he believes that the human soul’s freedom from the causation of the outer world presupposes that the soul is equally substantial as is the world (Baltzly 2014; Annas 1994, 100–102). Hence, Tertullian implicitly rejects a Platonic concept of soul, in which the freedom of the soul is guaranteed by its non-substantiality, that is: in its participation in the intelligible world of νοῦς (Warnach 1972, 1067–68).
The human soul is ‘from God’, but that does not mean that it is ‘God’ or divine. Consequently, human sin is not due to the soul’s proximity to God, but to its relative independence from him in freedom and choice (9,8), and God is not to be held responsible for sin or even from the judgement he brings on the human being because of sin (9,9).

This means that sin is made possible by human freedom, which, however, provides no explanation of sin. The fact that human freedom implies inferiority vis-à-vis God’s Spirit is important for Tertullian’s anti-Marcionite argument regarding why God cannot be accused of sin, but it does not explain sin in itself.

Sin is, so Tertullian, an act of the human will, that is: the human arbitrium (5,5). In all of the 20 occurrences of arbitrium in 5-7 the term designates a freedom of decision so free that its result is arbitrary, even to human nature. The term voluntas, on the other hand, can denote the voluntary approval of the divine goodness of the law, which characterises the ‘correspondence of goodness’, and which is included in the concept of natura (6,5). Sin is, in this meaning of the terms, an act of arbitrium, not of voluntas, which means that it remains fundamentally inexplicable.

At this point he differs from Irenaeus, or at least from a particular line of thought in Irenaeus, namely the perspective of transformation and growth, according to which sin, ultimately, is due to the imperfection of human finitude.

Sin plays only a minor role in the soteriological perspective of growth, which focuses on the incarnation as prototype of transcendent life, where human finitude is to be transformed into perfection.

106 “…non omne quod Dei erit Deus habebitur,” (9,6).
107 The rhetorical figure of remotio criminis, cf. note 97.
108 Neither can sin, according to Tertullian, be explained from its diabolic origin. He refers to the Devil as ‘the author of evils and of sin and guilt’ (auctor malorum quidem peccati et culpae, II,14,2). He believes the Devil to be a fallen angel and states that the accusation against God (deferendus de Deo, 10,1), by which he turned himself into God’s opponent, was the very act of tempting the first humans to sin. This ‘original evil’ of the Devil is, however, not the cause of sin and provides no explanation for it, as the human being, who was tempted and sinned, was stronger than the Devil: “Nam etsi angelus qui seduxit, sed liber et suae potestatis qui seductus est, sed imago et similitudo Dei fortior angelo, sed adflatus Dei generosior spiritu materiali quo angelii constiterunt,” (8,2). Sin is – even with regard to the Devil’s temptation – entirely an act of human arbitrium.
109 Irenaeus’ interpretation of Genesis and of salvation history contains two different perspectives or lines of thought, the ‘perspective of recapitulation’ and the ‘perspective of transformation and growth’ (Jacobsen 2002, 91–95). According to Jacobsen, these perspectives are supplementary rather than mutual exclusive.
However, Irenaeus does mention sin, even in this perspective. He points to human ‘knowledge of good and evil’ (*agnitio boni et mali*, *Adversus Haereses* IV, 38, 4, cf. Gen. 3, 22), which he refers to the mortality and corruptibility that initially was a necessary condition for the creaturely growth. Similarly, he states that the human being in Paradise was easily led astray by the deceiver because of his imperfect, childish insight (*Epideiksis* 12, MacKenzie 2002, 4). So, sin is, in this perspective of Irenaeus, at least partly explained, as it is referred to a natural condition of human existence. Against that, Tertullian states that sin remains fundamentally inexplicable as an act of free will.\textsuperscript{110}

Despite its inexplicability sin is, so Tertullian, a universal reality, as Adam passed on the transgression to his descendants (*generi suo tradidit*, 2, 6). According to Osborn, this means that human nature was corrupted in the fall.\textsuperscript{111}

If that were the case, the entire argumentation of Tertullian would be pointless. Human nature’s correspondence to God could not condition God’s universal making himself known, if it were lost in Paradise. However, as far as I can see, nothing in Tertullian indicates such a ‘corruption’ or ‘loss’ of human nature. Tertullian was no Augustinian, and as we shall see (p71), his ‘concept of original sin’ implies no distortion of human nature, but the introduction of an alien, corrupt substance (*corruptibilitas substantiae humanae*, 16, 4), that is: a ‘second nature’ (*natura altera*, *De Anima* 16, 7) within the human being, alongside with the original nature.

Tertullian understands this sinful ‘second nature’ as equally substantial as the original nature. It is, he believes, a persistent relation to the Devil within the human person that gives rise to a lifelong struggle between the two natures. The first nature of God-human relation in correspondence of freedom and of goodness, however, is neither lost nor corrupted, but is, so Tertullian, an experienced reality of human life, even outside Paradise.

\textsuperscript{110} “He [Tertullian] agreed [with Irenaeus] that the possibility of man’s sinning derived from his inferior status as a creature, but he did not connect this with a Platonic doctrine of perfection. Adam was not only good by nature at his creation, but he was also perfect and under no compulsion, however indirect, to commit sin. His disobedience in the garden was entirely an act of free will ... The incarnation of Christ broke this entail of sin not merely in ontological terms (i.e. Jesus was the Second Adam, the perfect man), but in juridical ones as well,” (Bray 1979, 88).

\textsuperscript{111} “As well as affirming a concept of original sin, he [Tertullian] vigorously defended freedom of will and thereby claimed a twofold origin for sin. Sin comes from a soul which is corrupt but responsible,” (Osborn 2003, 164).
Human Nature and Knowledge of God
This first nature is crucial for Tertullian’s understanding of how God ought to make himself known: first by nature, then by doctrine. By incorporating the concept of *natura*, this understanding of God’s communicative act differs from the Marcionite concept of revelation:

“Nos definimus Deum primo natura cognoscendum, dehinc doctrina recognoscendum, natura ex operibus, doctrina ex praedicationibus,” (I,18,2)

In *Adversus Marcionem* I, Tertullian uses the terms *revelare* and *revelatio* technically, designating Marcion’s concept of revelation. This is, so Tertullian, an unmediated revelatory act that does not include neither creation nor human nature, as it happens *only* in Christ (2,3; 8,1; 15,1; 19,1). Consequently, Marcion’s God is prior to the revelation in Christ a ‘god unknown’ (*ignotus deus*, 9,1-6, Meijering 1976, 90–91).

This, however, is impossible in the eyes of Tertullian. He accuses it for being a subjectivistic idea (*per humanam coniecturam*, 18,3). A god cannot be unknown (9,1); his making himself known is essential to his divinity, and the Creator’s universal communication is, therefore, the ultimate proof that he is God (p43).

In this communicative act, God makes himself known ‘by himself’ (*per semetipsum*, 18,3), states Tertullian. His terminology concerning divine communication is diverse, but his most frequent term is *testimonium* (10,4), which includes both communication ‘by nature’ (13,1) and ‘by doctrine’ (II,19,4). Thus, he emphasises the unity of Christ’s *testimonium*

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112 The 20 occurrences of the terms in *Adversus Marcionem* I all refer specifically to Marcion’s concept. While Tertullian can use the terms designating Montanist prophecy (*De Anima* 9,3), divine guidance in dreams (47,2) and even revelatory dreams in pagan context (46,9), he is remarkably reluctant to use the terms about his own notion of how God makes himself known.

113 I know of no other sources than Tertullian for Marcion’s concept of revelation. However, I think that the technical way, in which Tertullian uses the terms *revelare* and *revelation* in *Adversus Marcionem* I, and his reluctance to use these terms about his own understanding of divine communication, makes it likely that Marcion actually held a concept of revelation close to what Tertullian opposes.

114 “...nego Deum alias cognosci posse quam per semetipsum,” (I,18,3).

115 He speaks of ‘that by which the human being learns to know God’ (*per quod homo deum didicit*, I,12,2), ‘what is learned from God’ (*quod a deo discitur*, *De Anima* 2,7; cf. 15,3), and – regarding the communication ‘by doctrine’ – of a divinely determined ‘rule’ (*regula*, 3,1, cf. *ad fidem*, 16,1).

116 Referring to the Biblical text (*Scripturae Creatoris*), cf. *De Anima* 51,7 referring to spectacular, miraculous occurrences.
in Scripture and the *testimonium*, with which the whole world is inscribed, and which is read by the conscience of every human being.\textsuperscript{117}

The universal *testimonium* (I,10,2-3) is the universal communication of the law, intrinsic to the *institutio*, by which God creates the human being (II,6,3-5). This means that divine communication happens everywhere, as it is constitutive of the ‘first nature’ (p42). In turn, this means that human nature testifies to God, which in itself is divine communication.

*Testimonium* is, thus, both the creative communication, by which God establishes the human person as *natura*, and the subsequent communication, by which God makes himself known to the same human person.

Tertullian’s concept of human nature (*natura*, 6,5; 11,2), clearly goes beyond the concept of φύσις in Plato and Aristotle, as it includes a substantial notion of God’s continuous communication establishing a divine-human relation.

Julia Annas synthesises a wide range of differing Stoic interpretations of *natura* in that “human nature is what is natural for developing rational beings,” (Annas 1993, 172–74). Although Tertullian did not accept the Stoic dichotomy between reason and passion,\textsuperscript{118} it is possible to understand his concept of *natura* from the Stoic one. Formally, it is shaped from the Stoic categories\textsuperscript{119} of substance, quality, disposition and relative disposition (Colish 1985a, 55–56; Brunschwig 2003, 227–32):

Human substance (ὑποκείμενον, *substantia*, 5,1.6; 6,3; 8,3 et al.) is the substance of the soul, which characterises the soul as existing, and which is discernible in human freedom.

Human quality (ποιόν, *qualitas*, 9,1.7) is the soul’s being God’s breath (*adflatus*) as distinct from and inferior to God’s Spirit, but superior to everything else, including angels (8,2; 9,7).

\textsuperscript{117} Accusing Marcion for erasing Christ’s testimony to the Creator from the gospel, that is: from his canon, Tertullian states: “Nam etsi hoc quoque testimonium Christi in Creatorem Marcion de euangelio eradere ausus est, sed ipse mundus inscriptus est et omni a conscientia legitur,” (II,17,1).

\textsuperscript{118} Annas 1994, 113–15. While Tertullian clearly approves rationality, which plays a crucial role in his description of the human being (II,4,5; 9,4), his notion of rationality in *De Anima* differs, as we shall see (p72), from Stoic as well as from Platonic understandings, in that he believes that passions can be rational (16,4-6). A similar understanding of rationality based on equally Christological reasons can be found in II, 29,4. Cf. 16,2-3.6.

\textsuperscript{119} While the categories probably go back to Chrysippus (Brunschwig 2003, 228), “…a full-fledged theory of the categories is attested only by the late authorities, Plotinus and Simplicius,” which “points to the conclusion that the systematization of these categories is post-Chrysippean,” (Gould 1971, 107).
Human disposition (πώς ἔχον, dispositus esse, 6,4) is goodness (bonitas). This goodness applies to human nature, not because of mere createdness, which humans share with everything else except God, but because of the special creation of the human being, the intitutio (6,4), that establishes human knowledge of God. This knowledge is intrinsic to human nature as disposition, which means that human nature is good, as it is signified in upright (ad recte, 8,1) walking, and that humans are oriented towards the good and towards God.

Human relative disposition is not designated in Tertullian by any particular term corresponding to the Stoic ‘πρός τί πως ἔχον’, but there can hardly be any doubt that it is the God-human relation of the divine image. Tertullian interprets this relation by metaphors from the family sphere, as does Simplicius in his authoritative description of the fourth category:

He speaks of the soul as ‘kindred to God’ (cum Deo adfine est, 9,8), of human familiarity to God (familiaritas Dei, 2,2) and, rendering Gen. 2:7, of ‘God’s familiar hand’ (familiaris manus, 4,4) in creation of the human being.

On Stoic premises, relative disposition is constitutive of the very concept of natura. Similarly, the God-human relation is in Tertullian an intrinsic part of human nature.

It is this inherent relation of human nature, Tertullian refers to as imago et similitudo [Dei]. Following the definition of 9,3, the imago Dei is the soul’s qualitas as the breath of the Spirit of God. The term, thus, indicates both proximity to and distance from God (p44), equating the ‘double correspondence’ (p42) of divine-human dissimilarity and similarity.

Tertullian compares the imago with the relation between a wind (ventus, 9,2) and a breeze (aura) derived from this wind. As the breeze images the wind in relative independence from it, so does the human being image God. Truth (veritas), however, is a property of reality, not of the image, that is: of

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121 Simplicius states, against Aristotle, that a father ceases to be father, when his son dies: “…διό καὶ μηδεμίῳ γινομένης περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς, γένοιτ’ ἂν οὐκέτι πατὴρ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀποθανόντος,” (Arim 2004, 133). Cf. Adversus Praxean 10,3, where Tertullian explicitly agrees with Simplicius on this point.
122 As are all of the four categories: “None is accidental; all must be present in a given reality if that reality is to be grasped in all its individuality … None of the four Stoic categories can be removed from an individual being without that being ceasing to be itself,” (Colish 1985a, 55–56).
123 This double notion is frequent in Adversus Marcionem (II,4,3-4; 5,1.5; 6,2-3; 8.2; 10,3; III,10,1; IV,21,12; 22.5, 38,3; V,6,11; 7,3; 8,1; 18,9; 19,3), but rarely used outside it (De Baptismo 5,7, De Praescriptione Haereticorum 29,5, De Carne Christi 16,3, Adversus Valentinanos 24,2, De Resurrectione Carnis 30,5, Adversus Praxean 5,5,7; 12,1.4).
124 “Imago ergo spiritus adflatus,” (9,3).
God, not of the human being (9,4-5). Therefore, human nature in its independence from God cannot guarantee true knowledge of God. This is the distance of the concept of *imago Dei*.

However, when human freedom of decision (*sententiae libertas*, 9,8) is sustained (*substrueretur*) and ruled (*regeretur*) by God, then a kind of nature (*quoddammodo natura*, 6,5) is established, which makes true human knowledge of God possible. This is the proximity of the concept of *imago Dei*.

Being human, in this sense, is a particular mode of existence that involves a voluntary recognition of God’s rule. Tertullian believes that it is a universal reality – and, thus, that human knowledge is a universal reality – even in spite of the persistent contradiction of sin and the Devil, because God continuously communicates to every single human soul. This dynamic aspect of relative disposition is crucial for Tertullian’s concept of human nature.

As sin contradicts the knowledge of God, it is the cause of false knowledge of God (2,5-7), that is: of heresy. Heretics such as Marcion, therefore, have to demolish truth to be able to build their lies.\(^{125}\) That, however, is only possible, if they, because God’s communication is intrinsic to human nature, know the truth they demolish.

This truth is an epistemological truth. While it is, of course, anachronistic to speak of a ‘correspondence theory of truth’ (David 2016) in Tertullian, his concept of truth concerns human knowledge, which he considers to be true insofar it is in accordance with an external reality (*secundum veritatem esse*, 9,3). Human knowledge is in this regard purely receptive, as it is inferior to divine truth, the power (*vis*, 9,5) of which it lacks.

This is in line with the Stoic\(^{126}\) criterion for truth, which according to Chrysippus is ‘cognitive impression’ (*φαντασία καταληπτική*, Baltzly 2014), that is: an impression that comes from and is in exact accordance with an existing reality. Epistemological truth is without motion (*non habens motum*, 9,5), which means that it cannot in itself guarantee the ethical standard of the human subject. In this sense it is theoretical.

As we shall see (p80), the notion of Christian truth in *De Anima* differs in this regard from that of *Adversus Marcionem* II, as it implies ability to describe concrete phenomena of human life and interpret them in a way that enables Christians to act according to the truth.

\(^{125}\) “Non enim poterat aedificare mendacium sine demolitione veritatis,” (1,1).

\(^{126}\) This does not mean that Tertullian has adopted a Stoic theory of truth as opposed to another ancient theory. The Stoic theory does not differ much from Plato and Aristotle on this point (David 2016).
The Image of God and Christ
Tertullian’s use of the concept of *imago Dei* in 4-10, including the detailed presentation of ch. 9, is anthropological. The divine image is about human nature with regard to relative disposition. This assumes a translation of LXX’s *κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ* (Gen. 1:26-27) as ‘as the image of God’.

However, when Tertullian interprets the very act of creation, he presupposes a different translation, ‘according to the image of God’ (pp108.192), indicating that the image is the prototype of human creation rather than a description of human nature. The divine image is, then, Christ, the Son, according to whom the human being is created, and only because the human being is created according to him, who is himself the image, human nature can be the image:

“They are created in the image of God, for He, the Son, is the image of the Father, and only by means of the Son and because of Him, human nature can be the image:

“Creatoris est imago – ille enim Christum sermonem suum intuens hominem futurum, *Faciamus*, inquit, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum,” (V,8,1).

Tertullian develops this further in the context of the doctrine of the Trinity in *Adversus Praxean*, where he explains the plural form of Gen. 1:26 as a reference to God’s triune being:

“Immo, quia iam adhaeret illi Filius seconda persona, sermo ipsius et tertia, Spiritus in sermone, ideo pluraliter pronuntiavit ‘faciamus’ et ‘nostram’ et ‘nobis’,” (12,3),

and, hence, continues to ask in whose likeness, God created the human being (*quibus faciebat similem*). The answer is the Son, who was in fact to take on humanness (*Filius quidem qui erat induiturus hominem*, 12,3), thereby becoming the ‘more certain and truer human’ (*homo futurus certior et verior*, 12,4).

In the wider context of 11-26, his concern is to prove from Scripture the fundamental terminology of the Trinity established in 1-10, namely that

127 According to Jacob Jervell, this prototypical exegesis of Gen. 1:26 underlies Tertullian’s interpretation of the Christ hymn in Phillippians: “Betreffs Phil 2,6 verstand eine Reihe von altchristlichen Theologen die Aussage ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων als Parallele zu dem Christusbekenntnis εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ, 2 Kor 4, 4; Kol 1, 15. So z.B. Tertullian....” (Jervell 1960, 203). Jervell refers to Friedrich Loofs, stating that “Tertullian setzt Phil 2, 6 direkt in Verbindung mit Gen 1, 26f. und 2, 7. Wir haben nach Tertullian mit einer Aussage von der Göttlichkeit Christi zu tun.” According to Loofs, this is proven by *De resurrectione carnis* 6,4 (Loofs 1927, 44).


129 “…scripturae omnes et demonstrationem et distinctionem trinitatis ostendent,” (11,4). The doctrine of the Trinity in Tertullian is, fundamentally, to state a substantial unity between the radically transcendent Father and the radically immanent λόγος. Such statement of unity is, so Tertullian, only possible on basis of Scripture, that is: The words
God’s being is a threefold (trinitas, 2,4; 3,1; 4,1; 8,7) unity (unitas, 2,4; 3,5; 4,1; 8,5; 12,6-7) but differ according to the mystery of economy (oikonomiae sacramentum, 2,4, cf. 2,1; 3,1; 8,7; 9,3). The plural form of Gen. 1:26 confirms, so Tertullian, that the Son is the second person (secunda pesona, 12,3, cf. 6,1) and the Spirit the third (tertia [persona], cf. 11,7).

The basis of this exegesis is clearly an interpretation of the entire account of creation from Logos Christology, as Christ is presented as the divine word (sermo, 12,5), who is the mediator of creation.130 This mediating role applies, of course, to all of creation,131 but it is not specified, and, in my opinion, it is not possible on the basis of Adversus Praxean alone to decide, what exactly Tertullian believes Christ to have contributed to creation as its mediator.132 Except in one particular case, of the Paraclete (quemadmodum etiam Paracletus docet, 8,5). He carries it out by means of a Christological interpretation of the Jewish concept of divine wisdom, an interpretation, he has from Paul (McGowan 2013, 7–12).

Oskar Skarsaune comments on Adversus Praxean 8,5’s reference to the words of the Paraclete: “The implication must be that he [Tertullian] found these metaphors in Scripture. All three are used of Wisdom in the Old Testament and the Apocrypha: Wisdom is a tree (the tree of life), Prov 3:18; God is Wisdom’s source, Bar 3:12; it is an effluence (apaugasma) of God the eternal light, Wis 7:26. In Sir 24 all three metaphors occur in one Wisdom text: Wisdom is light, v. 32; it is a tree of Paradise, vv. 12ff; it is a Paradise river, vv. 25ff,” (Skarsaune 1996, 433, cf. Poirier 1999). The fact that these metaphors are Scriptural, and that they reflect a very broad tradition for wisdom-Christological interpretation of these passages, including the Apostolic Fathers, as well as Tertullian’s immediate predecessors among the second-century apologists (Tatian, Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus), as Skarsaune demonstrates, makes, in my opinion, any interpretation of the reference to the Paraclete as a reference to a Montanist oracle (McGowan 2007, 445–49) unlikely.

130 “…in sermone Christo adsistente et administrante, Deus voluit fieri et Deus fecit,” (12,5).

131 Tertullian mentions that worldly, physical light (mundialis lux, 12,5) was created through him (per illum), who was himself the true light that gives light to the human being (vera lux quae illuminat hominem).

132 Adversus Praxean 5,1-4 comments on Jn. 1:1-2, stating that Christ is the divine λόγος, as he has also been called by the Greeks ([h]anc Graeci λόγον dicunt, 5,3). According to Tertullian, the common translation of λόγος is sermo, but he argues that a more appropriate translation in Jn. 1:1 would be ratio, based on a detailed interpretation of the Son’s transition from the Father’s co-eternal reason (ratio, 5,2) to the Father’s outspoken discourse (sermo, 5,3), that is: to ‘the Son, who was indeed to take on humanness’ (Filius quidem qui erat induiturus hominem, 12,3).

Tertullian holds that this transistion of λόγος from ratio to sermo took place in the initial ‘fiat lux’ (7,1), and λόγος could therefore not have been sermo ‘in the beginning’. However, he states that it makes no difference in reality, (5,4). He explicitly rejects that
the transition from ratio to sermo affects the Son’s essence in terms of substantia (cf. 7,5-9). God’s ratio was nothing but his sermo, which he had in himself and in his ratio (proinde eum cum ipsa et in ipsa ratione intra semetipsum habebat), that is: sermo is ratio spoken out, whereas as ratio is sermo not yet uttered.

Tertullian may here presuppose the Stoic distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (logos inherent in God) and λόγος προφόρικος (outgoing divine logos), (Gregersen 2010, 433). If so, it emphasises that it is as mediator of creation, Christ is said to be God’s word. However, this is already evident from the Old Testament wisdom texts, to which Tertullian refers in 7,1.3 (Prov. 8:22. Ps. 33:6), and the Stoic distinction does not clarify in what this mediatory role in creation consists. Neither does Adversus Praxean, as far as I can see.

In Apologeticum, on the other hand, Tertullian some ten years earlier (T. D. Barnes 1971, 55) commented on the Stoic concept of λόγος, stating that λόγος as sermo and ratio is the craftsman of the universe ([a]pud vestros quoque sapientes λόγον, id est sermonem atque rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis, 21,10).

Here, λόγος as sermo, ratio and power (virtus 21,11) is ascribed to the Son. As λόγος, then, God’s Son is both the inherent governing reason of the cosmos and the immanent perfecting power (virtus praesit perficienti) of the universe, that is: both the structural pattern of logic and the power to be in everything that exists.

It is easy to see that Tertullian at this point ascribes to the same second divine person two aspects that later theology has distributed to the Son and the Spirit respectively. Here as everywhere he understands the Spirit/The Paraclete in the same λόγος-wisdom-reason-category as the Son (Adversus Praxean 7,3-5.8). The point is, however, that the λόγος-category establishes a divine immanence in terms of an inherent reason in the universe.

Stoic theology may be seen as an attempt to overcome the radical transcendence of a Platonic concept of God, whether in the form of a straightforward identification of God and cosmos or in a more subtle understanding of God as a world-immanent formative principle, according to which the world is structured (Algra 2003, 167–68). Tertullian’s approach is not simply to adopt a Stoic concept of God, but to ascribe a divine transcendence of Platonic type to the Father and a divine immanence of Stoic type to the Son (and the Spirit), cf. Adversus Marcionem II,27,6-7.

The crucial claim of the doctrine of the Trinity is, so Tertullian, that there is a substantial unity between the radically transcendent Father, and the radically immanent Son. The Father is the invisible, inaccessible ‘God of the philosophers’ (philosophorum deo, Adversus Marcionem II,27,6), that is: approximately a Platonic God, whereas the Son, who in incarnation was ‘in himself mixing human being and God’ (miscente in semetipso hominem et deum), is the immanent ratio of the cosmos, the λόγος, that is: approximately a Stoic God.

What his doctrine of the Trinity does in this regard is stating a substantial unity between God as radically transcendent and radically immanent. Neither the Stoics, denying divine transcendence, nor the Platonists, denying divine immanence and, thus, the very possibility of the incarnation, are, so Tertullian, able to solve the problem, his doctrine of the Trinity addresses, namely how the transcendent God could make himself known to his creature. Tertullian claims to solve the problem by stating that the immanent Son is of the transcendent Father’s substantia (Adversus Praxean 4,1; 6,3; 7,4-9; 8,5; 9,2; 12,6-7), and the inherent teleology of the Trinity depends on this crucial claim.
namely the creation of the human being, where the mediation is specified as prototypical: the human being is created according to the divine image, who is Christ.

This means that humanness was a distinct reality in God’s triune being prior to creation. According to Tertullian, the Son eternally emanates from the Father as his προβολή (8,1-7), and this emanation has a purpose: it is for the sake of God’s acts in creation and salvation, as Tertullian states with reference to Prov. 8:22.25 (a Domino in opera et vias eius, 7,3), that is: with the divine economy, in particular with creation, as goal or purpose.

Tertullian does not unfold this in detail, so it may be wise not to draw far reaching conclusions regarding his concept of God. Nevertheless he speaks, at least in this particular text, of a teleology of the very constitution of the Trinity. Further, this purpose of God’s triune being includes the incarnation, if the prototypical character of the ‘creation according to Christ’ is due to the fact that he was to become human, as 12,3 states.

According to 14,3 it was impossible that he Father could become visible, as Scripture testifies to his invisibility. The Son, on the contrary, was able to do, what the Father could not, namely to become visible and seen by humans because of his ‘derived mode of being’ (pro modulo derivationis).

Adversus Marcionem II expresses the same thought: God was not able to get close to humans (humanos congressus inire, 27,1) or to take on human sense and emotion (humanos et sensus et affectus suscipere), as that would mean to temper the power of his majesty with humility (uim maiestatis ... humilitate temperare).

The Son could and did, what was unworthy (indignus) to the Father, and in him, God ‘conformed’ himself to humanness (Deum conformasse semetipsum humanitati, 27,2) for the sake of human salvation.

If so, then the inherent humanness of God, to which the doctrine of the Trinity and the concept of imago Dei testify, is about God making himself known. God is, so to speak, structured to make himself known in creation and incarnation; he had to be known (opertebat Deum cognosci, II,6,2), as it follows with necessity (necessarius, I,17,4, cf. above note 98) from his being.

According to II,4,1, human existence originates from this making-himself-known-ness of God. So, in Tertullian, the answer to the question of human knowledge of God has to be anthropological.

133 Even though the Son from the beginning was capable of human incarnation, Tertullian holds the Old Testament theophanies to be the Son’s ‘learning’. He was, so to speak, practising on the incarnation in advance (27,4).
2.3 The Anthropology of De Anima 1-22

De Anima\textsuperscript{134} belongs to the controversy with a Platonising understanding of creation, which in Tertullian is associated with Hermogenes.\textsuperscript{135} It is Tertullian’s latest contribution to this discussion, at least of the writings that have come down to us.

Hermogenes is, however, not the primary target of De Anima’s critique. Tertullian clearly regards him as belonging to a larger group, to which he usually refers simply by the term heretics (haeretici). In some cases it is possible to identify the theological positions of these opponents,\textsuperscript{136} but most often one gets the impression that he refers to a diverse and complex group, defined by their disagreement with Tertullian’s own understanding of the soul as born and created.\textsuperscript{137}

Obviously, it is part of Tertullian’s rhetorical strategy to construct a dichotomy between on the one hand his opponents, the heretics, and on the other hand the ‘we’, the first person plural that speaks throughout De Anima

\textsuperscript{134} Barnes suggests to date De Anima to 206/7 (T. D. Barnes 1971, 47.55). While the accuracy of this date is dependent on his understanding of Tertullian’s turn to Montanism as punctual and schismatic (p33), 55,4’s reference to Perpetua’s martyrdom proves a relatively late date, as Perpetua suffered martyrdom in March 203 (T. D. Barnes 1971, 34; Bremmer 2003). As De Resurrectione Carnis 2,13; 45,4 refers to De Anima, it antedates De Resurrectione, which, in turn, is mentioned in Adversus Marcionem V,10,1. This means that De Anima is earlier than at least the final version of Adversus Marcionem. If De Anima 21,6 is taken as a reference to Adversus Marcionem (Waszink 1947, 295), then the first version of that work antedates De Anima. Barnes finds such a long compositorial history of Adversus Marcionem unlikely (T. D. Barnes 1971, 255–56), and believes De Anima 21,6, must refer to something else (T. D. Barnes 1971, 40). The point is difficult to decide on.

\textsuperscript{135} Besides Adversus Hermogenem, the group of anti-Hermogenes writings counts the lost De Censu Animae, to which De Anima frequently refers (Waszink 1947, *7). In this treatise, Tertullian claims to have demonstrated that soul has its origin not from matter but from God’s breath (1,1). He has also, according to 11,1-2, made the distinction between spiritus and (ad)flatus, which is developed further here and in Adversus Marcionem (p44).

Besides De Censu Animae, and is somewhat connected with the polemics against Platonic inspired gnosis in De Praescriptione Haereticorum and Adversus Valentinianos. The lost De Fato (De Anima 20,5) and perhaps even De Paradiso (De Anima 55,5) may have belonged to the same group of treatises, but that, of course, is impossible to know.

\textsuperscript{136} Such as those heretics (haereticos, 11,3), who introduce in the soul a spiritual seed (spiritale semen) from mother Sophia, unknown to the Creator. This, obviously, is a Gnostic anthropology of Valentinian type (Waszink 1947, 196, cf. Adversus Valentinianos 25,1, Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses I,7,1).

\textsuperscript{137} “Et natam … docemus et factam [animam],” (4,1).
representing catholic Christianity.\textsuperscript{138} In this way, Tertullian’s rhetoric assumes a fundamental consensus among his opponents that they would hardly have accepted themselves. Consequently, Valentinian Gnosis, which Tertullian finds ridiculous\textsuperscript{139} and not worth reasoning with, is made equal with the philosophically and theologically self-assured Hermogenes.

It is, however, more than rhetorical strategy. Tertullian’s central claim, which he seeks to substantiate throughout \textit{De Anima}, is that all of the heretics are dependent on the philosophers (3,1) and, above all, on Plato (17,1; 18,1.4; 23,5-6; 24,12). Therefore, he rhetorically constructs yet another dichotomy, namely between philosophers (\textit{philosophi}) and Christians (\textit{Christiani}),\textsuperscript{140} that is: between the philosophers’ many far-reaching and contradictory questions and answers (2,6), and the simple and certain Christian faith (2,7).

The question, then, is whom he seeks to persuade, that is: who the intended reader of \textit{De Anima} is. It can hardly be convinced followers of Hermogenes, Valentinians, Marcionites or any other of the groups and teachers mentioned. Tertullian cannot have expected his assertion that the mutually disagreeing and very different understandings, he deals with, fundamentally are the same heresy, to be persuasive to a convinced disciple of any of these.

This indicates that the intended reader is a fellow member of the Carthage church. Still, it cannot be just any Carthage Christian, since the reading of \textit{De Anima} requires not only literacy but also sufficient knowledge of the writings of philosophy, medical science etc., to which Tertullian refers. If, however, the intended reader is an educated Carthage Christian, it is easy to imagine him attracted to the doctrine of Hermogenes. While it is difficult to know what kind of relation Hermogenes and his followers had to the catholic

\textsuperscript{138} David Reis, drawing on the concepts of Karen L. King and Michael A. Williams, interprets the argumentation of \textit{De Anima} as Tertullian’s attempt to establish a ‘pure’ or even ‘orthodox’ Christian identity by dissociating his own view of the soul from the alternative Christian understandings, which he classifies and marginalises as syncretistic or ‘hybrid’ and, thus, marks out as heretical (Reis 2009, 588). He points to Dunn’s observations (Dunn 2006) on Tertullian’s rhetorical strategies for defining orthodoxy and concludes that “\textit{De anima} tends to classify many diverse thinkers (e.g. Menander, Apelles, Marcion, Valentinus, Carpocrates) together under the category ‘gnostic’”, so that Tertullian may establish himself as orthodox. Cf. Nasrallah 2003, 114.

\textsuperscript{139} Consequently, in \textit{Adversus Valentinianos} Tertullian’s strategy was “to mock the Valentinians,” not “to reason with them,” (Osborn 2003, 192).

\textsuperscript{140} The term \textit{Christiani} about the speaking first person plural is used 10 times in \textit{De Anima} (1,5; 2,7; 3,3; 6,6; 15,3; 26,1; 45,1; 55,3; 57,2), in all cases as opposed to the philosophers/Plato.
church, it is a fact that he mainly appealed to the intellectual elite (Greschat 1999, 154–57).

Tertullian may have found some of his fellow Carthage Christians attracted to Hermogenes and believed this to be a serious threat. This explains the many pages, he spends writing against Hermogenes. The fact that the threat especially concerned the educated and philosophically minded, may, then, be the reason why De Anima addresses far more philosophical positions in much more detail than Tertullian usually does.

To meet such a reader Tertullian makes up the contrast between ‘the philosophers’ and the Christians, whose faith is in accordance with common sense (2,1). At the same time, however, he presents his own Christian anthropology in philosophical terms and expects his intended reader to be able to follow him. His purpose is to convince this reader that the understanding of the human soul indicated by term ‘born and created’ (4,1) is credible, both from Scripture and from experienced human life.

The imagined reader, on the other hand, is the second person singular, to whom De Anima is formally addressed. He is neither follower of Hermogenes, nor philosopher, nor Gnostic, but a ‘most curious spectator’ (inspector curiosissimus, 10,5). The argumentation of De Anima, thus, formally presents itself to an outside-standing interested observer, who examines the evidence. In other words: a member of a jury. While the lengthy De Anima, of course, was never delivered orally or intended to be read aloud to illiterates, this point indicates that the genre is that of a forensic speech.

141 Tertullian is the most important source to our knowledge of his contemporary (Adversus Hermogenem 1,2) Hermogenes, and a problematic one: “Alles, was wir über die Person des Hermogenes und seine Lebensumstände wissen, verdanken wir ausschließlich der uns erhaltenen Erwiderung Tertullians, der natürlich ein großes Interesse daran hatte, seinen Gegner in dem schlechtesten Licht erscheinen zu lassen,” (Greschat 1999, 150).

142 Tertullian’s rhetorical strategy in Adversus Hermogenem is, then, to present his own work as an uncovering of Hermogenes’ pseudo-intellectualism, writing to those who do not yet understand (non intellegentes, 3,2) his argumentation, so that they may know that his other arguments need only to be understood to be refuted (intellegi quam reuinci).

143 The frequent polemics against ‘the philosophers’ (philosophi) is found throughout De Anima. In all cases, the term is used negatively, denoting what Tertullian takes leave of (except 14,5). He carefully omits the term when quoting or referring to philosophers in support of his own case, speaking instead of ‘Stoics’ or simply the philosophers name. In a rhetorically sophisticated way he even invokes Plato twice (10,1; 16,1), but in these cases he is, of course, not characterised as ‘philosopher’.

144 At least in the case of De Anima, this suggestion of Dunn (Dunn 2004, 28) seems unlikely.
This genre was first suggested by Barnes (T. D. Barnes 1971, 206–8) on the basis of the rhetorical structure, and Laura Nasrallah has argued for an understanding along the same lines (Nasrallah 2003, 112; Reis 2009, 581). This view challenges the widely accepted scholarly perception that De Anima is philosophical discourse (Waszink 1947, 7*), a position agreed on even by Sider. In my opinion, the fact that the imagined reader is pictured as an ideal member of a jury, is a strong argument in favour of Barnes’s suggestion, and I believe that the following reading of De Anima 1-22 confirms that De Anima’s genre is that of a forensic speech.

The Rhetorical Structure of De Anima

Like Adversus Marcionem II, then, De Anima follows the structure of a forensic speech according to Cicero and Quintillian, as it consists of exordium, narratio, propositio, confirmatio, reprehensio, amplificatio and peroratio (Sider 1971, 21–22; T. D. Barnes 1971, 206–8; Dunn 2004, 27).

Ch. 1-3 is clearly marked as the exordium in the text. It prepares the intended reader by an initial appeal to ethical (ethos) or emotional (pathos) consideration (Sider 1971, 21). The contrast between the wise Socrates (sapientissimus Socrates, 1,5) and the wisdom of the school of heaven (sapientia de schola caeli, 1,6), whose superiority is demonstrated not only by the overcoming of demons, but by its positive impact regarding goodness (bonus) and modesty (pudor), functions as such a preparation to set the reader “in a receptive mood,” (p38).

Ch. 4 is clearly a propositio, as it is a demonstration of the main question of the entire treatise (ostendenda quaestio principalis, Quintilian, p38). De Anima, thus, is about the soul’s status: “Post definitionem census [animae]

145 Cf. the views of Bray, Hallström and others (cf. note 73). Julian Barnes agrees on this understanding, as he believes De Anima to be a contribution to the philosophical group of works “entitled, in Greek or in Latin, On the Soul,” to which Tertullian refers in 13,3, and concludes that “Tertullian in fact produced something which may reasonably be described as a Christian De anima,” (J. Barnes 2009, 448–49).

146 Sider never conducted any rhetorical analysis of De Anima, but characterised ch. 4-22 as “a more or less philosophical discourse” in which “the rhetorical function of the definition appears to be minimal” (Sider 1971, 103). Neither Dunn, nor any other of Sider’s successors, has analysed De Anima rhetorically.

147 The amplificatio was not a necessary part of the speech (T. D. Barnes 1971, 207).

148 “Ceteris hinc exordium inducam,” (3,4).

149 This means that he has changed the order of propositio and narratio compared to Cicero and Quintillian. Such ‘flexibility’ is frequent in Tertullian (Sider 1971, 22). Barnes seems to believe that 4-5 is a narratio embedded in a propositio (T. D. Barnes 1971, 207, n3 and n4). He does not, however, refer to other examples of such a highly unusual construction in Tertullian or elsewhere, and the suggestion seems unlikely to me.
quaestione status patitur,” (4,1), that is: that it is born and created, as opposed to the view of Plato. Unlike *Adversus Marcionem* II, in which Tertullian’s main purpose is to prove human knowledge of God possible from the continuity of divine-human correspondence, *De Anima* emphasises the discontinuity.

The narratio should according to Quintillian (*Institutio Oratoria* IV,4,1, Russell 2001, 218) list the facts, “the events out of which the situation had arisen,” (Sider 1971, 21). In ch. 5 Tertullian is fairly free in his interpretation of this; the ‘facts’ he presents, are that Plato and the Platonists\(^{150}\) have denied that the soul is corporeal (5,1), whereas the Stoics have confirmed and proved it (5,2-6). Thus, the Stoics almost (*paene*, 5,2) agree with the speaking first person plural, and the Stoic arguments recorded in 5,3-6 are arguments that Tertullian evaluates throughout *De Anima*. That does not make Tertullian a professed Stoic; in fact, the Stoics only *nearly* teach the same as he does, according to 5.2. The important point is, however, that this kind of narratio suggests a philosophical argumentation in the main part of the book, and, thus, that the *exordium*’s dichotomy between philosophers and Christians does not mean that the only evidence to be presented is Scriptural quotations.

The main part, in which Tertullian presents his argumentation, is structured in two large sections. The first (6-9) argues that the soul is corporeal. The second (10-22) argues that the soul is uncompounded and, thus, the guiding principle (*principale*, 15,1) of the human being. The main part consist of confirmatio and reprehensio paragraphs arranged in a carefully ordered pattern where arguments of each type are stated in turn corresponding to their character as either Christian arguments or arguments from reason.

In the long amplificatio of 23-57 (T. D. Barnes 1971, 207), Tertullian once again gives a fairly free interpretation of the rhetorical category.\(^{151}\) It consists of two major sections, of which the first (23-41) is about the soul’s origin and the second (43-57) about death and the soul’s status in the intermediate state. The amplificatio is loosely organised compared to 6-22, bringing together a very diverse material under the two main themes, and with several digressions. Ch. 58, marked as peroratio (*in clausula*, 58,1) is very brief and

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\(^{150}\) Platonists taken in a very broad sense as those, who agree with Plato in that the soul is not corporeal. Tertullian’s list includes Eubulus, Critolaus, Xenocrates and Aristotle. The mentioning of Critolaus is probably due to a misunderstanding from Tertullian’s side (Waszink 1947, 126).

leaves a rather abrupt impression, as it solely summarises the content of the second major section of the amplificatio.

**Philosophy and the School of Heaven**

The contrast between philosophy and Christian faith presented in 1-3 is not a rejection of reason. It is a scathing critique of a particular philosophy, associated with Plato, but not strictly limited to the school of Platonism. The critique concerns the content of this philosophy, not philosophy as genre or philosophical thinking as such. According to Tertullian, ‘the philosophers’ believe to have their knowledge from sacred texts (*ex sacris litteris*, 2,3). These texts, however, he rejects on the basis on his own sacred texts, namely the books of the prophets (*prophetae*, 2,3.4).

Had this been Tertullian’s only criterion for critique, there would have been no reason to write more than the first four chapters. Tertullian’s case for a ‘Christian’ or theological anthropology would be a question of choosing between different sacred text, that is: about appealing to an external authority. This reading of 1-3 underlies the so-called ‘anti-philosophical’ understanding of Tertullian. 152

Tertullian, however, has a second criterion, which makes his evaluation of philosophy much more complex. This criterion is anthropological arguments from common reason. Prerequisite for this criterion is that Christian truth about the soul is accessible not only from Scripture, 153 but from human nature (*natura*, 2,1) as well. In human nature, God has given much truth (*plerasuggeruntur*) through the common sense (*quasi de publico sensu*), with which he has dignified the soul (*quo animam deus dotare dignatus est*).

To a reader of *Adversus Marcionem* II, this understanding of God’s universal communication addressing the human being in and by the human soul, is, at first glance, not surprising. But there is a striking difference: In *Adversus Marcionem* II, Tertullian argues against the view of the imagined Marcionite reader that the soul is radically different from and totally separated from God. God’s universal addressing of the human soul is, then, what establishes human nature, and on this basis Tertullian states the God-human correspondence (p42).

In *De Anima* on the other hand, Tertullian opposes the view that the soul 154 is a divine element of human constitution. God’s universal communication

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153 And in prophetic manifestations such as the one mentioned in 9,4.
154 Or the spirit as a distinct element in a tripartite human constitution, which participates directly in God, as Hermogenes seems to have claimed (11,2, p69).
to the soul, then, is what through common sense demonstrates that the soul is not divine.

‘The philosophers’, so Tertullian, have this source of knowledge, even though they have distorted its content in philosophical systems (2,2). Therefore, they contradict each other, not just because their countless opinions are mutually exclusive, so that they appear like wine mixed with water (3,2), but even more because they actually sometimes happen to know and speak the truth. The truth can by chance be found among ‘the philosophers’, as a ship by chance can find the harbour during storm, or as one can happen to find the door in darkness (2,1). Further, Tertullian believes that they were literary influenced by the prophets (2,4), even though they have perverted this truth making it an argument for untruth and falsehood.

Thus, the philosophy of Plato and others is not simply false. It is a mixture of truth and falsehood. The truth stems from the ‘common sense’, which is discernible in concrete observations and experiences of the soul and confirmed by Scripture. The falsehood, however, perverts this truth in the abstract synthesising, which characterises philosophy as opposed to its sister (soror, 2,6), the medical science. Therefore, Tertullian respects physicians much more than philosophers.

Of the double dichotomy constructed by Tertullian in 1-3 between heretics and the speaking first person plural and between philosophers and Christians, the latter is the more fundamental. Heretics, so Tertullian, reject Christian understanding of the soul because they have been taught by ‘the philosophers’, who are their patriarchs (patriarchae haereticorum, 3,1).

De Anima, then, must be understood as an attempt to move the discussion from the immediate polemics against the heretics, to whom the intended reader was attracted, to the underlying philosophical controversy. As such, Tertullian’s fundamental accusation against ‘the philosophers’ is that they reject what is evident to everyone by neglecting concrete observations and experienced phenomena of human life in favour of speculative and reductionist anthropology.  

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155 This ‘loan theory’ assumes that wherever there are striking parallels between sayings of Scripture and ancient Greek writers, it is due to literary influence. The philosophers are indebted to the prophets, and first of all, to Moses/the Pentateuch. Tertullian, here and in Apologeticum 47,2, agrees with this theory, which was widely accepted among the second century apologists and goes back to Jewish apologetics of the second century BC (Skarsaune 2001, 152–54).

156 Especially Soranus, e.g. 6,6-7; 8,3; 44,2 (Waszink 1947, *23-38).

157 This is why Tertullian accuses the Platonic physician Hicesius to be a traitor both to nature and to his own profession (“…et naturae et artis suae praevaricator,” De Anima 25,2).
The kind of argumentation one would expect in response to such an accusation, would be descriptions of those phenomena, ‘the philosophers’ are said to have neglected, and theological interpretations of these phenomena from Scripture, as Tertullian claims that Scripture confirms common reason on this point. This is, I think, quite an accurate description of the content of De Anima.

In addition to this main focus, the exordium contains another critique that is linked to the critique of reductionism, namely critique of ethical shortcoming. Tertullian mentions Socrates as the most prominent example of knowledge of the truth among philosophers, that is: “the truth which the philosophers grab at and which Christians possess.”

Socrates, however, did not live according to the truth, he knew. Tertullian mentions that he before his death was more concerned about his own honour and reputation than about his convictions (1,4). The superiority of the wisdom of the school of Heaven (1,6) vis-à-vis ‘the philosophers’, then, applies in two ways: firstly, Christians have a fuller knowledge of truth (2,5-6). Secondly, Christians unlike ‘the philosophers’ live according to the ethical standards of their knowledge of truth.

The Corporeality of the Soul
The main part of De Anima is the sections of proof (6-22). As in Adversus Marcionem II, Tertullian’s argumentation is structured from the conjectural method (p39, Sider 1971, 41–42), sustaining theses by series of arguments. 6-9 defends the thesis that the human soul is corporeal, while 10-22 defends that it is uniform and uncompounded. In both cases, Tertullian believes to prove his key issue, namely that the soul is born and created, which he in turn finds crucial for the truth of Christian faith.

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159 This corresponds to his reference to Socrates’ praise of promiscuity (Apologeticum 39,12; 46,10), and the frequent accusation that he did not take the full consequence of his recognition that the Homerian gods did not exist, since he invoked a demon (De Anima 1,4, 25,8; 39,3, Apologeticum 22,1) and before his death ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Aesculapius (Apologeticum 46,5).

160 Tertullian makes this difference between ‘Christians’ and ‘philosophers’ very explicit in Apologeticum 46,2, saying that non-believers hold the Christian faith to be a kind of philosophy, teaching innocence, justice, patience, sobriety and chastity. The non-Christian philosophers, he states, do not live in accordance with the virtues, they theoretically affirm, whereas Christians, by contrast, do so (46,8-18).
The two series of arguments are carefully arranged according to the rhetorical categories of *confirmatio* and *reprehensio*.

161 *Confirmatio* (Cicero, *De Inventione* I,24,34-35, Hubbell 1949, 68–72) and *reprehensio* (Cicero, *De Inventione* I,42,78-79, Hubbell 1949, 122–24) were originally separate parts of a forensic speech, presenting evidence and counter-evidence to prove the speakers case and to refute the opponent’s arguments. Already in the late Cicero, the two are combined to a larger single section of proof (Cicero, *De Partitione* 8,27, Rackham 1942, 330–32), and in Severian times they had in practise become “interwoven and inseparable” (Sider 1971, 21–22), as is the case everywhere in Tertullian.

In *De Anima* 6-22, both series of arguments follow a pattern, in which an initial paragraph of *reprehensio* is followed by one of *confirmatio*, then another one of *reprehensio* and finally one of *confirmatio*. Thus, the repeated pattern consist of four parts, where each *confirmatio* confirms what has been defended in the previous *reprehensio*. The only differences are that in 10-22 that the two *reprehensiones* are expanded so that each of them contains three paragraphs, and that a brief, initial *confirmatio* is added to present the sub-thesis and a final *confirmatio* is included to summarise the whole section.

Schematically it can be arranged as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetorical Type</th>
<th>Paragraphs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reprehensio</td>
<td>6,1-9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confirmatio</td>
<td>7,1-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reprehensio</td>
<td>8,1-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confirmatio</td>
<td>9,1-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confirmatio</td>
<td>10,1</td>
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<td>Reprehensio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confirmatio</td>
<td>16,1-7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reprehensio</td>
<td>17,1-14</td>
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<td>18,1-13</td>
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<td>19,1-9</td>
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- *reprehensio* 6,1-9: rejection: the soul’s incorporeality in Plato and the Platonists
- *confirmatio* 7,1-4: the soul’s corporeality in Scripture
- *reprehensio* 8,1-5: rejection: the soul’s invisibility as proof of its incorporeality
- *confirmatio* 9,1-8: the soul’s shape, colour and extension in Montanist prophecy
- *confirmatio* 10,1: the soul is simple and uniform in substance
- *reprehensio* 10,2-11,6: rejection: separation of *spiritus* from the soul
- 12,1-13,6: rejection: separation of *mens* from the soul
- 14,1-15,6: rejection: what philosophers understand as parts of the soul are indeed powers (*efficacia*) and faculties (*opera*) of the simple and indivisible soul.
- *confirmatio* 16,1-7: the distinction between a rational element (*rationale*) and an irrational element (*inrationale*) in the soul is confirmed and explained in light of Christ and of God
- *reprehensio* 17,1-14: rejection: Platonic denial of the reliability of the senses
- 18,1-13: rejection: separation of intellectual understanding from sensation
- 19,1-9: rejection: that the intellect is induced at a certain time during childhood and, thus, separable from the soul.
The underlying motif of 6-9 is the question of truth (veritas, 6,1). Tertullian was, of course, perfectly aware that his affirmation of the Stoic thesis of the soul’s corporeality was widely unaccepted and unacceptable in Christian tradition (...salva [corporalitati] animali quam et ipsam pauci receperunt, De Resurrectione Carnis 33,10). Hence, one can wonder, why he claimed it so emphatically. It did certainly not win him friends among the intellectual elite in the Carthage church, neither those who were attracted to Hermogenes, nor those who were not.

No doubt, he was convinced by Stoic physicalism (Brunschwig 2003, 210; Annas 1994, 37–43; Colish 1985a, 27), as he frequently points to (6,7, cf. 5,2). As in Adversus Marcionem II’s arguments for the substantiality of the soul, he understood corporeality as prerequisite the soul’s very reality and for the discernibility of its freedom of choice (p44).

In the context of De Anima, however, Tertullian not only affirms these points, but adopts them in a particular argumentation about Christian truth. If an immaterial soul is the source of truth, then truth as such becomes ahistorical and unrelated to the concrete world, the world of the senses. According to Tertullian, such a concept of truth distorts faith in the incarnation, as it falsifies the testimony of the apostles, who perceived Christ by their senses (17,14, 1 Jn. 1:1), and it destroys even the natural order (naturae ordo, 17,11) and makes God’s providence blind, denying the special human status and position in creation. The reference to God’s entrusting humans with dominion over the universe by means of the senses renders Gen. 1:28. This dominion is, so Tertullian, evident in arts, business, politics, commerce, medicine etc.

Hence, to state the corporeality of the soul is not just part of a general attempt to throw suspicion on Plato, but a necessary condition for Christian truth, regarding creation as well as incarnation.

Tertullian’s first reprehensio argument is from motion: If the soul were immaterial, it could not cause the body to move, and neither could it be

<table>
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<tr>
<th>confirmatio</th>
<th>20,1-21,7</th>
<th>the soul’s properties are all natural to its uniform substance, but they are variously developed in each human and, thus, due to change</th>
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<td>22,1-2</td>
<td>concluding definition of the soul. A list of its qualities</td>
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162 Further developed in 17,2, where Tertullian mentions that Plato, in Timaios, judges sense impressions as irrational (inrationales) and attaches them to opinion (opinio). The term opinio must here be taken as opposite of knowledge.

163 “…non istis [sensis] universa conditio subministratur?” (17,11).

164 Cf. Ps. 8:7-9.
moved from without (6,3). However, as Tertullian bluntly states, the soul has in fact impact on the body, as it causes bodily motions such as walking, touching, seeing, speaking etc. Radical dualism, claiming that soul and body are ontologically separate, leads, then, to a reductionism unable to explain the everyday human experience of being the subject of one’s own actions.

Similarly, Tertullian rejects the Platonic claim that the soul is affected by immaterial things only (6,4) and nourished through wisdom alone. He invokes medical science (Soranos), stating that when the soul is weak, it will be strengthened by food. Despite the reference to Soranos, Tertullian’s arguments are commonsensical and pretend to affirm ordinary human experience, providing counterevidence to what he understands as philosophical abstraction.

The first confirmatio argument is from Scripture, as the Gospel affirms the soul’s corporeality (corporalitas animae in ipso evangelio relucebit, 7,1). Taking the parable of Lazarus and the rich man literally (7,2; Lk. 16:20-31), he argues that the soul’s joys or sufferings in the intermediary state require that bodily qualities are ascribed to the soul, such as the Lucan text does (7,1). In the same way Christ’s descent into Hell (7,3) shows, so that souls must have some sort of physical character; otherwise they would simply be nothing.

The second reprehensio refutes a presumed objection namely that the soul’s invisibility proves its incorporeality. Tertullian answers that invisibility is not a quality of an object unseen, but of the viewer’s inability to recognise the object visually. In principle, the soul is visible. Its general invisibility to humans (invisibilitas carni, 8,5), stems from human condition and cannot prove an ontological status different from that of the body.

The concluding confirmatio defends the fundamental visibility of the soul by referring to the vision of a female Montanist prophet, who claim to have seen a soul in its bodily shape, and who has described its colour etc. It was shaped in human figure (forma per omnia humana, 9,4), which Tertullian explains by a strikingly materialistic interpretation of Gen. 2:7: All human souls have their origin in God’s breath that was initially blown into Adam, on that occasion taking the shape of the body it filled (9,7).

In 6-9, Tertullian obviously uses different kinds of arguments. In the two reprehensio paragraphs, he invokes Stoic philosophers and arguments (6,3).
6,7), he refers to Soranos for support (6,6; 8,3), he brings in observations from human pregnancy and birth (6,8), from the common experiences of seeing and walking (6,3) and having the mood lifted by a meal (6,6), and from the animal world (8,4-5). In the confirmatio paragraphs, by contrast, he argues from Scripture (7,2-4; 9,7.8), presenting interpretation as well as simple proof texting, and from Montanist vision (9,4).

Hallström distinguishes between three main types of arguments: Arguments from reason, biblical arguments and Montanist arguments (Hallström 1986, 75–76). He believes that the arguments are simply added on to each other to have the largest possible effect, as if Tertullian thought that he would be more persuasive, the more arguments he could present. Thus, he collected arguments wherever he could find them, and used them in a basically eclectic way.

In my judgement, however, Hallström fails to take into account the rhetorical context, in which the single arguments are presented. They are not listed among each other accidentally, but are carefully arranged according to the rhetorical structure of reprehensio and confirmatio paragraphs. Thus, in order to refute Plato, Tertullian employs philosophical and commonsensical arguments from reason, whereas he argues from Scripture and from prophetic vision to confirm Christian faith.

I suggest, then, an overall distinction between ‘Christian arguments’ and ‘arguments from common reason’, the latter including both philosophical arguments and arguments from everyday human experience and from common sense.

The reprehensio paragraph of ch. 6, thus, attempts to prove the incredibility of Platonic soul-body dualism with regard to the human phenomenon of motion. Dualism is reductionist and false, because it has to neglect the immediate human experiences of being the subject of one’s own bodily actions and of being mentally strengthened by physical food. The theory of the corporeal soul, by contrast, is credible, as it can account for the

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169 Waszink’s unique and almost invaluable contribution, which traces possible sources of single argument’s and lines of thought throughout De Anima, presupposes a similar understanding (Waszink 1947, 33*-35*). So does Nasrallah: “…Tertullian uses Stoic epistemology and Platonic concepts when these serve his purposes. He also trumps them, however, by claiming that he is not a philosopher, but a Christian working out ideas based in revelation. At times borrowing from several philosophical traditions, and at times rejecting them entirely, Tertullian authorizes his theories with a wide variety of evidence, including experience, medical texts, women’s bodies, and Christian legends,” (Nasrallah 2003, 129).
phenomenon of motion, that is: both that the soul moves the body in bodily actions, and that the soul is moved from outside.

The arguments of this reprehensio are from common reason, not from Scripture. The confirmatio paragraph of ch. 7, on the other hand, uses Christian arguments attempting to prove that the theory of the corporeal soul is in accordance with Christian doctrine.

Similarly, the reprehensio of ch. 8 argues that the Platonic argument from the invisible soul requires an understanding of invisibility that common human experience must judge incredible. A corporeal understanding of the soul, by contrast, is valid (validius 8,3), as it can account for the invisible soul by a better concept of invisibility, and is therefore to be preferred.

The Christian arguments of the confirmatio of ch. 9 attempt to demonstrate the soul’s corporeality and fundamental visibility in accordance with Christian teaching, as does ch. 7.

Further, ch. 9 interprets the soul’s corporeality doctrinally from its origin in God’s breath. This interpretation does not affect the credibility of the theory of the corporeal soul; this credibility relies on ability to account for the phenomena that the Platonic alternative has to neglect.\textsuperscript{170}

However, it affects the credibility of Christianity, according to Tertullian. He clearly thinks it is in favour of Christian doctrine that it is able to interpret, what is otherwise inexplicable.\textsuperscript{171}

Thus, it follows from the kind of arguments Tertullian uses in the reprehensio paragraphs that he believes Platonic dualism to be proven reductionist by arguments from common reason, that is: on universal premises.

Further, it follows from the confirmatio paragraphs that he believes that Christian faith, in order to be true, must be in accordance with an anthropology able to describe phenomena of human life in a plausible, non-reductionist way, and that Christian faith’s ability to interpret these phenomena is in favour of its credibility.

The brief section 6-9 may, then, be said to express both an understanding of truth and a rhetorical structuring of the arguments corresponding to this understanding. As we shall see, Tertullian carries on the rhetorical structure

\textsuperscript{170} Tertullian does not, in the context \textit{De Anima}, appeal to Scripture as an external authority that once and for all can settle the controversy, such as he does in \textit{Adversus Hermogenem} 19-40: “Sed et ad originale instrumentum Moysi prouocabo…” (19,1).

\textsuperscript{171} Not even Soranos, to whom Tertullian is very sympathetic, is, according to \textit{De Anima} 6,6, able to explain the soul’s corporeality without robbing it for its immortality. Tertullian thinks considers Soranos’ argument to be obviously false, due to the fact that ‘not all has been given to believe in Christians’ [faith]’ (\textit{n}on enim omnium est credere quod Christianorum est).
in 10-22 with only one modification: because the two reprehensiones are expanded so that they each consist of three paragraphs, each paragraph incorporates the very statement that Scripture is in accordance with the anthropology defended from common reason. Since there are two such three-paragraph reprehensiones, there are a total of six statements of Scripture’s accordance (11,2-6; 13,3; 15,4; 17,13; 18,12; 19,9). This modification, however, does not change the underlying understanding of truth, as it does not affect the function of the different types of arguments.

A crucial question concerning Tertullian’s concept of truth is, then, why Christian faith has to be in accordance with a particular anthropology to be true. It can either be because Stoic anthropology is true in the fundamental sense that it makes up the very criterion for truth, the truth of Christian doctrine included. Or it can be because Tertullian believes the presented argumentation from common reason to be part of God’s universal communication.

As far as I can see, it is not possible to decide on this on the basis of 6-9. However, as we shall see (p74), the way Tertullian believes God to communicate by human sensation and understanding, ascribed to the soul in 17-18, makes it clear that Tertullian understands the uniform soul as God’s way of making himself known.

The Uniform Soul as Guiding Principle of Human Constitution

10-22 argues that the soul is simple and uniform according to its substance: “Pertinet ad statum fidei simplicem animam determinare secundum Platonem, id est uniformem, dumtaxat substantiae nomine,” (10,1). The three reprehensio paragraphs of 10-15 oppose three ways to distinguish between different elements of the soul and, thus, to separate the spirit (10,2-11,1), the mind (12,1-13,2) or any other faculty (14,1-15,3) from the soul.

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172 10,2-11,6; 12,1-13,6; 14,1-15,6 and 17,1-14; 18,1-13; 19,1-9, cf. note161.
173 It is fully explained on purely rhetorical grounds, as the inserting of six separate confirmatio paragraphs obviously would make the text unnecessarily abrupt.
174 The reference to Plato in favour of the soul’s simplicity and uniformity is highly surprising and provocative. If understood as a reference to Republic IV, it requires, of course, that anima is taken as a rendering of λογιστικόν, not of ψυχή (Waszink 1947, 183). However, nowhere else in De Anima does Tertullian associate Plato with a uniform understanding of the soul, but explicitly with a bipartite understanding (Plato bifariam partitur animam, 16,1, cf. 14,2), including the single occurrence of a reference to Republic’s distinction between the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (16,3). In my judgement, therefore, the seeming affirmation of Plato in 10,1 is not for real, but is a merely rhetorical effect to catch the reader’s attention. This is clearly the case in 16,1, where Tertullian states his agreement with Plato on the soul’s bipartite nature, only to make immediate reservations that, obviously, makes the affirmation of Plato meaningless.
According to Tertullian, Hermogenes claimed that the spirit (spiritus) is a distinct element of human constitution, which unlike the soul (anima) participates directly in God (11,2, Greschat 1999, 240–43). Hermogenes relied on a particular exegesis of Gen. 2:7, which in turn was dependent on a consequent ontological dualism. According to this exegesis, the soul and the body are both parts of the material world. As initially created from dust, the body is purely material, but by God’s breathing his Spirit into Adam’s nostrils (Gen. 2:7), the soul was created as a ‘point of contact’ that allowed the Spirit to inhabit the human being in the form of human spirit. The result is a tripartite anthropology, in which body, soul and spirit make up human constitution. This exegesis was certainly no peculiarity of Hermogenes, as it was widely accepted among Jewish as well as Christian interpreters (Greschat 1999, 245–56).

According to Hermogenes, all the higher human qualities and faculties, in particular immortality, belonged to the spirit, not to the soul (Waszink 1956, 8). Strictly speaking, the divine element in the human being, was the spirit, not the soul.

One may wonder, why Tertullian in this paragraph does not oppose the underlying ontological and cosmological dualism, as he does in Adversus Hermogenem. This dualism is an attempt to carry on a Platonic concern on Christian premises (Greschat 1999, 241; Waszink 1956, 9) and was undoubtedly recognised as such by Tertullian. Even more, one may wonder why Tertullian chooses to address a specific argumentation from Aristotle, which seems unlikely to have been of importance to Hermogenes or to any other contemporary Christian proponent of tripartite anthropology.

In any case, this is what he does. Aristotle argued to distinguish between soul (anima) and spirit (spiritus). The soul is what causes life in every living being. The soul cannot, however, be the cause of breath, since some living animals do not breathe, as they have no lungs. Breath, then, has to be caused by a distinct substance in humans and breathing animals, that is: the spirit (10,2.5). Tertullian challenges both that it should be possible to decide with certainty that some animals do not breathe, and that it should be possible to decide anything about human soul from the anatomy of gnats and ants (10,3).

175 Although Christian interpreters, of course, found this exegesis confirmed in New Testament texts such as 1 Thess. 5:23. The advocates of a tripartite anthropology from an interpretation of Gen. 2:7 similar to that of Hermogenes were not limited to Gnostics and Gnosticising groups, but included Irenaeus (Jacobsen 2002, 95–104).

176 “Tertullian was perfectly aware that Hermogenes’ doctrine of matter was based on the Platonic doctrine, that is: on the interpretation of the Timaeus in Middle Platonism,” (Waszink 1955, 130).

177 Philosopí (10,5) refers to Aristotle (Waszink 1947, 186).
For humans, to live (vivere) is to breathe (spirare) and both are functions of the uniform soul (11,1). Hence, the soul is not a spirit.\(^\text{178}\)

The confirmatio of 11,2-6 states Scripture’s accordance with the view defended. Spirit is, in the Bible, something that addresses and enters the human being from without (Reis 2009, 584–85), whether in prophetic ecstasy (11,4-5) or in demon possession (11,5). What God has endowed the human being in creation, on the other hand, is breath (flatus), not spirit (spiritus). Hermogenes’ exegesis of Gen. 2:7 is false, exactly because he fails to make this distinction (p44).

The second view rejected is that mind (animus, mens, νοῦς) form a distinct part of human constitution. Tertullian opposes this view using Aristotle:\(^\text{179}\) the soul is superior to the mind, as the mind is nothing but one of the soul’s properties. This, so Tertullian, is evident from common language (13,1-2). The confirmatio of 13,3 states the same from biblical formulations.

The third reprehensio paragraph opposes more generally attempts to understand the soul as composed of separate elements. A number of such theories are summarised and rejected (14,2), and Tertullian once more refers to Aristotle in favour of the view that the soul is uniform, and that its different powers, capabilities and actions are capacities (ingenia, 14,3) of the soul rather than distinct parts (partes animae).

The reason that Tertullian so strongly emphasises the uniformity of the soul is that it is prerequisite for the soul as the guiding principle (ἡγεμονικόν,\(^\text{180}\) 15,1, principale, 15,1-4) of human being. Were the soul not uniform, it would not be principale, and consequently it would simply not exist.\(^\text{181}\) Tertullian seems to assume that a composite soul would be determined by its different parts, and, hence, could not itself be the

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\(^\text{178}\) The soul may only inaccurately be called spirit: “non status nomine, sed actus, nec substantiae titulo, sed opera, quia spirat, non quia spiritus proprie est” (11,1), that is: not with reference to the soul’s substance, but because it causes life and thereby breathing.

\(^\text{179}\) Tertullian agrees with Aristotle in the critique of Axanagoras (12,2-3), but at the same time he criticises him for not consequently realising the unity of soul and mind. To do so, Aristotle would have to admit that the mind is susceptible of emotion (passibilis, 12,5), just as the soul is.

\(^\text{180}\) According to Waszink, Tertullian is in ch. 15 almost exclusively dependent on Soranos (Waszink 1947, 219–21). While this may be correct concerning the details, the term ἡγεμονικόν designating the highest level of living and thinking (gradus vitalis et sapientialis) clearly points to the use of the term in Stoic psychology on a broader basis (Colish 1985a, 27–28). The point is that the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν is the human being’s λόγος, which permeates, makes alive and rules the entire human being. It is, thus, not only a distinct, ruling part of the soul that controls other parts of the soul, such as the λογιστικόν of Plato’s Republic.

\(^\text{181}\) “Denique qui negant principale, ipsam prius animam nihil censuerunt,” (15,1).
determining factor of human constitution. Thus, the very concept of human freedom would be excluded, if the soul were not the guiding principle.

The minor digression of 15,3b-4 states that Scripture is in accordance with the understanding of the soul as human principale, demonstrated from biblical references to the heart as the living and directive centre of the human person.

The confirmatio paragraph of 16,1-7 attempts to defend what ‘belongs to faith’ (ad fidem pertinens, 16,1). The reference to Plato is only seemingly an agreement (note 174). Tertullian endorses Plato’s distinction between rational and irrational, but states that the distinction does not apply to the soul’s nature, and that it is not to be understood the way Plato did.

What is left of Plato’s distinction, then, is only the human experience of being a divided subject. This, Tertullian surely confirms. The division, however, does not stem from the soul being composite of two elements, as in Plato, but from a ‘second nature’ (natura altera, posterior et adultera, 16,7) existing in the human being together with the uniform soul. This second, sinful nature is later (posterius, 16,1) than the original one, and has its origin not in God, but in the Devil (cf. p46). Thus, it is inferior to the rational nature, of which God is the author (auctor naturae, De Anima 16,2, Osborn 2003, 164).

Even though the irrational and sinful does not belong to the soul’s nature, it appears ‘like natural’ (ad instar … naturalitatis, 16,1), because it ever since the beginning has grown into and together with the original nature. Like Adversus Marcionem II (p46), De Anima understands sin, not in terms of a ‘loss’ of an original nature, but in terms of an invasion of a second, corrupt nature, so that the human being permanently is related to both God and the Devil.

Thus, the confirmatio not only states Scripture’s accordance with the fundamental human experience of being divided as a subject, but also attempts to demonstrate Christian doctrine’s ability to explain this experience.

The Platonic distinction between rational and irrational is, says Tertullian, ultimately a distinction between reason and passion, between the rational soul and the animal soul (16,3). At this point he is undoubtedly correct regarding Middle Platonism (Dillon 1977, 102. 174-175. 211-214. 292-293). As for the Stoics, they, of course, did not relate the dichotomy between reason and passion to a Platonic ontological hierarchy of being, but rather to

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182 “…et esse principale in anima, quod intentio divina conveniat, id est vim sapientialem atque vitalem (quod enim sapit, vividum est), et in eo thesauro corporis haberi, ad quem deus respicit…” (De Anima 15,4).

183 “…quod Plato bifariam partitur animam, per rationale et irrationale,” (16,1).
moral theory (Annas 1994, 106-108, 113-120). Still, they fundamentally agreed that the crucial distinction is between reason and emotion.

Tertullian may have been sympathetic to this distinction, at least in the Stoic variant (Osborn 2003, 34-35). In that sense his approval of the rationalis/inrationalis-dichotomy is not only a matter of surprising and provocative rhetoric. Further, he could expect full agreement from Middle Platonists as well as from Stoics when stating that God is rationis auctor, and that reason fundamentally is a thing of God (res dei ratio, De Paenitentia 1,2).

Nevertheless, De Anima introduces an understanding of rationality that breaks completely with the dichotomy between reason and passion in that it includes passio in ratio. He does so from a Christological criterion (propter ea quae in Christo, 16,3). In the incarnate Christ, the rational (rationalis, 16,4), the irate (indignativus) and the desiring (concupiscentivus) were equally present and equally flowing from the rational (in domino rationaliter decucurrisse, 16,5). So, the Platonic λογιστικόν, θυμικόν and ἑπιθυμητικόν were in Christ one, uniform rationality. Similarly, the passionate wrath and the passionate mercy of God are purely rational. If so, to be ‘rational’ is ultimately an ethical category.

This does not mean that any wrath or any desire is rational or good, as the Devil may impose sinful passion on the human being. It does mean, however, that the fundamental dichotomy is not between reason and passion, but between good and evil, that is: between God and the Devil.

Neither in Platonism, nor in Stoicism is rationality about pure theoretical knowledge. In both cases, it has a strong ethical component (Dillon 1977, 43-45; Schofield 2003, 244). The recognition of the soul’s participation in divine λόγος involved, to Platonists as well as to Stoics, a certain way of living, and Tertullian clearly agrees on that. However, the Christological criterion of Christ as the prototypical example of the soul’s rationality leads to an understanding of ethics that differs from both Platonism and Stoicism in that emotions are morally qualified.

Ultimately, this is a question of the concept of truth. The Platonic notion is about a truth accessible to the soul qua its belonging to the ideal or the divine. Tertullian’s notion, by contrast, is about a truth accessible in historical human life, in which the soul is moved in passion and sensation. The crucial concern is, thus, not liberation from sensation and passion, but

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184 The wrath of the ‘sons of wrath by nature’ (Eph. 2:3) is Tertullian’s example of a passion that does not stem from the soul’s rational nature, originating from God, but from the ‘second nature’, induced by the Devil (…ex illa quam diabolus induxit, 16,7).

185 “Et sentire enim pati est, quia pati sentire est. Proinde et sapere sentire est et moveri sentire est. Ita totum pati est,” (12,4).
the origin of these, that is: whether the one moving the soul in sensation and passion is God or the Devil (16,1.7).

This leads Tertullian to the last *reprehensio*, in which two of the three paragraphs deals with sensation. 17,1-14 opposes the Platonic denial of the senses’ reliability, whereas 18,1-13 opposes the separation of understanding from sensation.

The Platonists rejects the credibility (*fides*, 17,2) of the senses, arguing that sense illusions sometimes occur. Tertullian’s detailed argumentation draws on Epicurus and Lucretius, stating that these illusions are caused by the medium of sensation, such as light, air and water, rather than by the senses themselves (17,2-10). Hence, Tertullian argues that except when external causes interfere, human sensation has access to what the sensed object is in reality (*quam sit in rebus*, 17,5).

The theory of sensation, Tertullian hereby defends, is that the human soul is the subject of both sensation and understanding (*opinio*) of the object sensed. The truth (*veritas*, 17,10) of human knowledge is, thus, totally dependent on the senses and on the reliability of sensation.

This includes human knowledge of God. If the senses were unreliable, it would falsify the testimony of the apostles, who perceived Christ by their senses (17,14, 1. Jn. 1:1). No knowledge of God, then, could come from the incarnation.

Even Christ’s own knowledge of God was conditioned by sensation, as he heard the Father’s voice etc. (17,13). As in ch. 16, Christ is the prototypical example of human knowledge of God. The human soul does not recognise divine truth by introspection, but by being moved from outside, from God, in sensation as well as in emotion.

This does not apply only to God’s communication of truth in and by the incarnation. God’s communication is universal in the natural order (*naturae ordo*, 17,11), that is: in his providential entrusting humans with dominion over the universe (pp40.64). The unique human position in creation, which according to Tertullian is evident, is simply an expression of human nature. The very concept of *natura* prerequisites the reliability of the senses, since God’s communication to the human being through sensation is intrinsic to human nature (p42). This created human nature of the senses (*oculorum et aurium et manuum sensus natura*, 17,14) is exactly what is evident in Christ’s nature (*eius [Christi] ... natura*).

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187 “*Ita et sensus ex anima est et opinio ex sensu et anima totum*,” (17,5)
188 “...tot artes, tot ingenia, tot studia negotia officia commercia remedia consilia solacia victus cultus ornatus, quae omnia totum vitae saporem condierunt,” (17,11).
Christian faith has to be in accordance (p67) with the confirmation of the reliability of sensation that follows from the theory of the uniform soul. Not because Stoic anthropology makes up the ultimate criterion for truth, but because this theory, so Tertullian, is able to account for exactly those phenomena, by which God communicates truth (p79). In this regard, it is superior to the reductionist Platonic alternative.

The question of the truth of Christian faith is, therefore, an anthropological question in the sense that the soul’s nature from God’s creative communication is constituted as uniform, corporeal and dependent on the senses.

Plato, by contrast, states that the fullest thinking (supersapere, 18,2) is by mind (mens) alone, without interference from the senses. Thus, he introduces powers of the soul (vires animae, 18,3), by which the intellect grasps the invisible, incorporeal, super-worldly, divine and eternal ideas. This is the reason for the heretics’ Platonic distinction between a sentient soul (anima) and an intellectual soul (animus, 18,5).

Tertullian opposes such a distinction, arguing that the intellect is nothing but the soul’s function (suggestus) and work (structus), and, thus, entirely inherent in the soul. The Platonic distinction is therefore false. It does nothing but ascribe to anima the perception of objects visible and to animus the perception of objects invisible (18,6). This, however, is nothing more than a difference in the objects perceived, and even on Platonic premises one would not be able to conclude from the superiority of the spiritual object to the superiority of intellectual perception (18,11).

However, Tertullian disagrees with the entire concept of a superior ideal world (18,12). All knowledge involves both sensation and understanding, and the two are, thus, inseparable and both carried out by the uniform soul (18,6). Sensation is simply understanding of the thing sensed, and understanding sensation of the thing understood. They are mutually interdependent aspects of one, single phenomenon, and any distinction between them is, thus, artificial (18,11).

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189 In fact, Tertullian does not perceive his own theory of sensation as fully identical with the Stoic theory (17,4).

190 This underlies, so Tertullian, the teaching of the Gnostics, and especially of the Valentinians, about different classes of humans possessing different kinds of soul by which they are able to grasp different levels of truth (18,4-5). I rely on Waszink for this interpretation of this difficult verse (Waszink 1947, 254.258-261).

191 “Non enim et sentire intellegere est et intellegere sentire est? Aut quid erit sensus, nisi eius rei quae sentitur intellectus? Quid erit intellectus, nisi eius rei quae intellegitur sensus?” (18,7).
The *confirmatio* of 18,12 states, referring to Rom. 1:20, that God has made known the invisible things of his being (*invisibilia ... eius*) from the visible creation, so that the invisible is known by the visible (*invisibilia per visibilia noscuntur*).

This means, so Tertullian, that Scripture is in accordance with the theory of sensation and understanding defended. Further – and more important regarding Tertullian’s concept of truth – it means that the unity of sensation and understanding in human perception ultimately is God’s communication and, thus, the necessary condition for true human knowledge of God.

The last paragraph of the final *reprehensio* opposes the view that soul and intellect must be separate, since the intellect is not present in the human being from beginning of life, but is induced during childhood. Tertullian answers by a refutation of Aristotle, who holds that trees are living without thinking (*vivere nec tamen sapere*, 19,2), that is: that the intellect belongs to the human, reasonable soul, not to the nutritive soul of plants. The underlying premise seems to be that if trees can have soul without thinking, this applies as well to children or at least to newborns.

Tertullian answers surprisingly by challenging the premise. Trees, he argues, are living and thinking by the same property (*vivendi quam sapiendi proprietate*, 19,4), as they demonstrate both intelligence (*sapientia*, 19,6) and knowledge (*scientia*), and so does a child from the very moment of birth (19,7-8). Intelligence, then, is an inherent faculty of the uniform soul, as are emotion (16) sensation (17-18) and memory (24,3). The soul is, with all its faculties, present from the beginning of human life, that is: from

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192 Tertullian does not specify, who holds the view, he opposes, but he is probably referring to a Stoic source reproduced in Soranos (Waszink 1947, 268). If so, it can hardly have played any role in Hermogenes or any other of the opponents, to whom Tertullian’s intended reader was attracted. That raises the question, why Tertullian included his refutation of it. I assume he did so, because it allowed him to present his argument against Aristotle (19,2-8). While the Aristotelian distinction between the vegetative, nutritive soul of plants, the animal soul and the reasonable, human soul (Ross and Ackrill 1995, 135–37) is unlikely to have received any more attention from Hermogenes than did the Stoic view on the introduction of soul during childhood, Tertullian’s argument against Aristotle is highly relevant and rhetorically impressive, as opposed to Hermogenes or any other proponent of tripartite anthropology: If intellect (*intellectus*) is ascribed even to plants, it can hardly be superior to human soul, which the plants lack.

193 “After this we should expect the conclusion that, though trees may be devoid of reason, this fact has no consequences for the human soul, as this is a *privata res* and cannot possibly be put on a level with plants; instead of this Tertullian chooses the more sensational method of demonstrating that trees are able to think,” (Waszink 1947, 270–71).
conception. Like 25,3, where Tertullian invokes women, who have given birth, to testify that the child is alive and thus has soul during pregnancy, 19,9 makes the same point regarding newborns. This leads Tertullian to a brief confirmatio stating Scripture’s accordance with the view that even babies are not without intellect.

The underlying concern is, of course, not one of developmental psychology of children. Tertullian’s refutation of Aristotle attempts, once again, to disprove the separation of the rational animus from the sentient and/or nutritive anima, which he holds to be the heretic’s ultimate legacy from Plato (18,1.4). Thus, Tertullian’s making intelligence equal to sensation as faculties of the uniform soul serves to oppose cosmological dualism. Thereby he points the search for Christian truth to the visible, material world of the senses, in and by which God communicates, cf. 23,5-6.

The conclusive confirmatio paragraph of 20,1-21,7 deals with the variance of humankind. The question is, how there can be such a variety among humans (20,3), if every soul is uniform and stems from God’s initial breath. Human soul was first introduced in Adam, from which all other souls have subsequently derived (animae naturam ... quam deus in Adam contulit et matricem omnium fecit, 20,6). If the variety were due to the soul’s uniform substance (as species substantiae unius), then it ought to have been present in Adam, the original source of human nature (fons naturae).

Tertullian, by contrast, states that the variety is caused by various external circumstances such as the nature of the environment (regionis natura, 20,3), food, physical health, education and experience etc. (20,4). In addition to

194 Where the soul derived from Adam’s soul (ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta, 19,6) begins to exist in the woman’s womb (genitalibus feminae foveis commendata). Cf. further Tertullian’s presentation of his traducianistic understanding of the origin of the soul (27,1-9). According to Dennis Billy, “Tertullian developed his distinct doctrine of material traducianism in order to refute the Valentinian doctrine of the pre-existence of souls and its threefold caste system of spiritual, psychic, and material human beings,” (Billy 1989, 23). Billy states that “[b]oth of these doctrines are rooted in a radical Gnostic dualism, which Tertullian correctly saw as going counter to orthodox church teaching.” While I am not convinced of the explicit anti-Valentinianism suggested by Billy, the anti-dualistic concern is, as far as I can see, right to the point.

195 “Mirum satis, ut infantia naturaliter animosa sit non habens animum et naturaliter affectiosa sit non habens intellectum,” (19,9).

196 “Because the soul possesses the capacity to attain knowledge through both its intellectual faculties (spirit and mind) and the sense impressions, the events of the world must be affirmed as real,” (Reis 2009, 586).

197 “Et hic itaque concludimus omnia...” (20,1). To this paragraph is added a final confirmatio (22,1-2), which summarises the argumentation of 6-22 by a simple list of those properties of the soul, Tertullian believes to have proven.
these factors, he mentions ‘the powers’ (*postestates*), that is: God and the Devil.\(^{198}\)

In the narrow context of 20,4b-5 it seems, as if God and the Devil were simply factors alongside with other external factors, influencing, as it were, human life at the same level. That, however, cannot be the case, as it is clear from the fact that ch. 21’s interpretation of how these factors affect human development focuses entirely on the influence from God and from the Devil.

However, Tertullian does not address the obvious question of how the effect of the accidental factors of 20,3-4 (*accidentibus*, 20,4) relates to the ‘powers’. If physical environment, food, health, education etc. were made irrelevant by the overwhelming powers of God and the Devil, there would have been no reason to mention them at all.

The most reasonable explanation, I believe, is that Tertullian holds the factors mentioned in 20,3-4 to be means of God and the Devil, in and by which they influence the human being.\(^{199}\) The variance of human kind is due to this influence. It is, thus, not different kinds of nature (*non species [naturae]*, 20,6), but different forms of the one, original substance and nature (*sortes naturae et substantiae unius*).

From the moment the soul comes into existence (*ex quo ipsa censetur*, 20,1), it develops in unity with the body in embryonic state (37,2-4), childhood and puberty (38). Throughout this process, which ultimately is the entire course of life, the soul keeps and develops all its properties and faculties of emotion, sensation and intelligence. These are, thus, intrinsic to the one, uniform nature, but capable of having different expressions according to the circumstances, that is: the external and accidental means, by which God and the Devil interact with the human being. This explains, so Tertullian, both the variance between different people and the variance in the course of individual development.

The argument of 21,1-7 opposes the Valentinian distinction between different human classes (the *pneumatici*, the *psychici* and the *hylici*) based

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\(^{198}\) “...deus dominus et diabolus aemulus,” (20,5). They are ‘the powers’ according to the speaking first person plural (*secundum nos*), but Tertullian mentions that they in common opinion (*secundum communem opinionem*) are providence, fate, necessity, fortune and free will. It is difficult to decide from where Tertullian has this list of five powers (Waszink 1947, 287–89), since the treatise *De Fato*, to which he refers, hasn’t come down to us.

\(^{199}\) When 21,5 elaborates the saying of Jesus (Lk. 6:43) stating that the bad tree does not bear good fruit, unless some good branch is grafted upon it (*[n]on dabit ... arbor mala bonos fructus, si non inseratur*), this ‘grafting’ (of God, cf. Rom 11:23; Waszink 1947, 294) means God’s affecting on the human being. This clearly happens, so Tertullian, in the physical world and by physical sensation and emotion, by which God moves the soul (pp73.79).
on the doctrine of the threefold human nature. Tertullian emphasises that the spiritual (spiritale, 21,2) in Adam was not initially inherent in him, but came from God afterwards (postea obvenit), as the spiritual force (spiritalis vis) made him prophecy. Neither was sin part of the original nature (pp46.71), as it was no more natural (naturalis, 21,3) than it was material (materialis), and, thus, the Valentinian distinction is unfounded.

Laura Nasrallah states from 11,4 that the relation between God’s Spirit and the human being is accidental. She concludes that Tertullian “draws upon the common philosophical distinction between what is essential and what is accidental: an accidens is by definition secondary or not naturally a part of the essence of a thing.” (Nasrallah 2003, 58).

If 11,4 were our only source for Tertullian’s understanding of human nature in regard to human relation to God, Nasrallah’s proposal might have been convincing. Tertullian’s concept of natura would, then, have concerned what the human being essentially is, and the relation to God would have been accidental, as it would not be intrinsic to human nature.

As we have seen, however, Tertullian was certainly no Aristotelian, and his concept of natura is much more in line with the Stoic claim that relative disposition is belongs to nature (p49) than with the distinction between substantial and accidental. While the ecstasy of 11,4 (=the amentia of 21,2) may be called accidens, as may the external factors that influence human development (20,4; 21,7), such as food, environment etc., the human relation to God or to the Holy Spirit may certainly not.

Precisely because the relation to God is intrinsic to human nature, it is natural for the human soul to be moved by God in sensation, emotion and understanding. Therefore, Tertullian explicitly states that being subject to change (demutabile debere, 21,4) is natural (naturalis). This natural changeability or passibility is the reason for the variety of humankind, and also for the very possibility of the human fall into sin.

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200 Tertullian understands Adam’s God-caused sleep (Gen. 2:21) as ecstasy (amentia, 21,2), and Adam’s saying quoted from Gen. 2:23-24 as prophecy of Christ and the church, cf. Adversus Marcionem II,4,5; Eph. 5,31-32.

201 “Tertullian thus maintains that Adam in his ecstasy prophesied about Christ and the church, but that this prophecy is due to an accidens of the Holy Spirit – which he also calls ecstasis – that is set in apposition to sancti spiritus vis – a power of the Holy Spirit, which is an operatrix prophetiae,” (Nasrallah 2003, 58).

202 21,5’s remark, that even a good tree will bear bad fruit, if it is so cultivated ([non arbor] bona malos [fructus] dabit, si non colatur…), obviously refers to the Devil’s influence on the human being, possible by the same natural human changeability that allows for God’s influence.
If one imagines the human soul before (ante) the entrance of both God and the Devil, as does Tertullian in 11,6, it is a simple and uniform breathing substance. But this is clearly hypothetical, and Tertullian, of course, does not associate this ‘pre-natural’ state with the word *natura*. The ‘natural’ for the human being is to be in the relation to God, in which God communicates and moves the human soul by means of the material world.

This means that the soul’s possibility for change as well as its ability to act (40,3) is conditioned by the body. The accidental factors (20,3-4) are all bodily mediated, as are sensation and understanding (18,6-7). *By nature* the human soul, as the guiding principle of human constitution, is ultimately dependent on the body, as the very relation to God is bodily mediated, both in creation and in salvation.

With this concept of nature, Tertullian believes to have defended an understanding of the human soul that can account for human knowledge of God. Exactly because the soul is not divine but subject to change and dependent on bodily sensation and emotion, its relation to God can be intrinsic. It is not self-reliant, but God-reliant, and its reliance on God is mediated through the concrete phenomena of emotion, sensation and understanding, that is: through the material world. Tertullian’s concept of *natura* is, thus, fundamentally interwoven with his concept of divine communication.

Tertullian believes that Platonic dualism leads to an insoluble problem about correlation between the ontologically separate body and soul, that is: how the soul can be the cause of bodily actions (p65) and how the soul can gain knowledge, if the senses are ultimately unreliable (p73). Common reason, therefore, must judge Platonism to be reductionist and false.

The truth of Christian faith, by contrast, depends on Scripture’s accordance with the non-reductionist anthropology of the corporeal and uniform soul, as this anthropology can describe the phenomena of emotion, sensation and understanding in a plausible way.

Further, the truth of Christian faith depends, so Tertullian, on Christian doctrine’s ability to explain this anthropology. Ultimately, this doctrinal...
explanation is the soul’s origin in God’s breath (Gen. 2:7). It explains the
soul’s beginning in time (4,1; 19,4), its corporeality (9,6-8), its uniformity
(11,2), and, further, that it is the cause of life and breathing (10,7-9; 11,2-3),
that it is rational and, thus, morally qualified in both reason and passion
(16,1), and that it is present in the human being from the very beginning
(19,2). Fundamentally, the soul’s origin in God’s breath, thus, expresses its
reliance on God for life and for knowledge. Hence, it conditions the
possibility of true human knowledge of God.

As in *Adversus Marcionem* II (p50) the truth of human knowledge implies
an ‘epistemological’ or ‘theoretical’ concept of truth. Truth is knowledge
that corresponds to external reality. This is clear from the forensic rhetoric
of *De Anima*, presenting evidence to the imagined reader, the *inspector
curiosissimus* (10,5, p57). Further, it is clear from the argumentation itself,
for example when the *veritas* of the senses is that they correspond to the
object sensed (17,4-5.14). As knowledge is ‘understanding sensation’ (18,7),
true knowledge surely implies this ‘correspondence’ concept of truth.

In addition to that, however, true knowledge in *De Anima* includes an
ethical component. The soul is rational (*rationalis*, 16,1) because of its origin
in God’s breath. Knowledge of God is the rational soul’s correspondence to
God’s rationality, but this rationality is far from being purely theoretical. It
concerns not only reason, but emotions as well (16,4-6). Further, the primary
goal of the influence from the power of divine grace (*vis divinae gratia*, 21,6)
is not to provide theoretical knowledge, but to change human behaviour.

Similarly, the Christian superiority vis-à-vis ‘the philosophers’ is not only
about the content of Christian doctrine, but also about ethics. The wisdom
that philosophy by its very name is said to love, is not a theoretical
knowledge, but a way of life (Hadot 2004, 172-175. 229-231). Christian
superiority, then, is that Christians actually live according to the truth,
whereas ‘the philosophers’ teach a wisdom, they according to Tertullian do
not follow (p62).

The Christian truth, Tertullian attempts to validate on anthropological
grounds in *De Anima*, proves its case by its ability to account for phenomena,
which Tertullian believes the Platonist alternative has to neglect, especially
phenomena of soul-bodily correlation.

The truth of Christian interpretation of these phenomena is, however, not
only that it is plausible and consistent with common reason and everyday
language, but that it enables the believer to cope with his or her own
experienced reality and to act according to the interpretation. It is precisely
the lack of such an illumination of experienced reality that makes dualism
reductionist and counter-natural – and, thus, untrue (17,11).
2.4 Concluding Summary of Tertullian’s Anthropology

This section’s reading of Adversus Marcionem II,1-10 and De Anima 1-22 has shown that Tertullian’s anthropology is complex and contextual. Both regarding what kind of arguments he uses, and regarding what he uses them for, his texts are shaped after the anthropological conceptions he opposes, and the theological implication, he believes these conceptions to have.

Writing for readers attracted to Marcionite rejection of any God-human correspondence prior to the revelation in Christ he argues from Scripture, stating that human nature as interpreted by the concept of *imago Dei* is universally related to God, the Creator.

Writing, on the other hand, for readers attracted to the elitist synthesis of Platonising dualism and Christian faith, associated with Hermogenes, he argues from philosophy, medical science, history etc. to prove false the alleged dualism of ‘the philosophers’. Against their beliefs that the human soul (or the human spirit, p69) is a divine element of human constitution, he emphasises the soul’s inferiority to God and its dependence on God’s impact from outside the human sphere.

Tertullian’s work is contextual to an immense degree. He seems unconcerned of leaving questions unanswered, if he doesn’t find them relevant for the polemic context, and it is neither possible, nor appropriate with regard to the character of his texts, to systematise his anthropological contribution into a complete, doctrinal ‘theological anthropology’.

However, the textual analyses of the two previous chapters have demonstrated four distinct points:

Firstly, it has become clear that anthropology in both cases – and in both contexts – fundamentally is about human knowledge of God. The main hypothesis of *Adversus Marcionem* II is that God demonstrates his goodness and divinity by making himself universally known, and does so by creating human beings (p39). Similarly, *De Anima*’s insistence on the reliability of the senses is ultimately about bodily and sensory mediated knowledge of God (p73). The concrete, material interpretation of human nature is shaped by the understanding of divine communication, which at the same time is the reason for (p39), an integral part of (p40) and the subsequent confirmation of (p41) the God-human correspondence, in which the human being knows God.

The first conclusion of this section is, then, that anthropology in Tertullian thematises the question of human knowledge of God in terms of divine communication.

Secondly, Tertullian’s alternative to Marcion’s concept of revelation is that God makes himself known ‘first by nature, then by doctrine’ (p47). *Adversus Marcionem* II unfolds the concept of *natura* by the concept of
imago Dei (p44). Thereby, Tertullian states that the ‘relative disposition’ of the God-human relation is essential to human nature (p49). This is due to the particular way, humans are created, the institutio (p42), which – unlike creation in general – includes God’s speaking of his law in the very creative act. By his law, God universally establishes the God-human correspondence to God, in which humans exist, that is: the ‘double correspondence’ of freedom and goodness (p42). This equates the duality of distance and proximity in the concept of the imago Dei (p50).

The second conclusion is, then, that the divine image in Tertullian is a concept, by which he interprets human nature theologically, thereby seeking to account doctrinally for the conditions for human knowledge of God.

Thirdly, Tertullian states the corporeality of the soul to defend the view that human knowledge, including the knowledge of God, is bodily mediated (p73). Human understanding is closely associated with the physical phenomenon of sensation (p74), by which God influences and ‘moves’ the soul (p78). Even the Devil influences humans by physical means (p77), so the ‘second nature’ of sin is no less physical than the original human nature (p71). The question of truth, then, belongs to the physical world of the senses. It is not ahistorical, as ‘the philosophers’ believes (p64), and knowledge is not a matter of introspection (p73).

Further, Tertullian states that the soul is uncompounded to defend the view that the human person is subject of his or her own actions (p65). He believes this to be commonsensical, and his opponents’ alleged denial of it to be proof of their reductionism. If, however, the soul were composite, it would be determined by its different elements, and could not be the principale of the soul-bodily human constitution, that is: the responsible and determining factor of the human person (p70). If so, human freedom and responsibility would be illusory, according to Tertullian.

Tertullian’s views on these points are clearly shaped after his doctrinal concerns. They are, however, not stated as mere assertions or justified simply by references to Scripture (note 170). As he believes God to communicate by concrete phenomena of experienced human life, he finds it necessary to demonstrate Christian faith’s accordance with an anthropology that can account for these phenomena (p79).

His charge against the reductionism of his opponents is twofold. Firstly, they are, so Tertullian, not able properly to explain human responsibility or ordinary phenomena of human life, such as emotion (p72), sensation (p73) and understanding (p74). Secondly, he do not, themselves, live according to truth (pp62.80), not even the truth they know, although the distort it by abstract synthesising (p61). Thus, the inability of the ‘the philosophers’ to live up to their own ideals (p72), proves their reductionism, whereas
Christians’ ability to do so is a strong argument in favour of the truth of Christian faith. This means that Scripture and Christian doctrine, according to Tertullian, not just inform the reader of an otherwise hidden truth. Knowledge of God includes a mode of existence according to this knowledge (p80).

The third conclusion is, then, that Tertullian holds that Christian faith, in order to be considered true, must appear to be in accordance with an anthropology that can account for the phenomena, by which God influences the human person, and even for the Devil’s influence in human sin. In Tertullian, this anthropology is about the corporeality of the soul in the soul-bodily unity of the human person, and about the soul’s primacy in human constitution. It itself, Tertullian believes this anthropology to be available from common reason, but he finds it confirmed by Scripture and in the life of Christian believers.

Fourthly, Tertullian interprets the divine act of creating humans by a prototypical understanding of the divine image. Humans can only be the image because they are created according to him, who himself is the image (p51), that is: Christ. So, human nature is originally modelled after Christ’s future humanness (p51).

This means that the humanness of the incarnation has been an inherent reality of God’s triune being from the beginning (note 132). According to Tertullian, the divine sonship of Christ implies an ‘ability for immanence’ that characterises the Second (and the Third) person of the Trinity, but not the First. Hence, the Son could do, what was impossible for the Father, namely become visible and take on human sense and emotion for the sake of human salvation (p54).

The fourth conclusion is, then, that human nature must be understood from an inherent humanness of the Trinity. Tertullian speaks – although this line of thought is uncommon in his writings – of both creation and incarnation as following with necessity from this humanness of God, indicating a teleology of the divine triune being.

The Contribution of Tertullian

Tertullian’s anthropology has not played any crucial role in historical theology, neither in the ancient and mediaeval church, nor in modern times.\(^{205}\)

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\(^{205}\) One can hardly speak of a history of reception, as its primary role has been as negative background for the scholastic rejection of traducianism in favour of creatianism (T. Peters 2001). Creatianism became, by the authority of Aquinas, the dominant view in mediaeval times, but even in Aquinas, Tertullian’s anthropology is rarely mentioned, and perhaps even misunderstood (Pasnau 2002, 120-123.421).
Further, his substantial understanding of the soul\textsuperscript{206} seems to cause insurmountable problems for any attempt to utilise him in approach to modern theological anthropologies. From the viewpoint of modern theological anthropology many aspects of Tertullian’s material anthropology seem unfamiliar and foreign.

However, the case is different, if one focuses on the theological problems he attempts to solve by his anthropology. It is such a problem-oriented study, I carry out in the following sections, based on the four points stated above.

To study the anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg from Tertullian means, then, firstly to examine them as attempts to thematise the fundamental problem of human knowledge of God.

Secondly, it means to examine them from the question of their ability to account doctrinally for the anthropological conditions for human knowledge of God. In both Barth and Pannenberg, this is about their understanding of and use of the concept of \textit{imago Dei}.

Thirdly, it means to study their material shaping of theological anthropology in order to understand God’s impact on the human person and in order to understand sin. This regards in particular whether the theological understanding of God’s impact and of sin is consistent with a non-reductionist anthropology, that is: an anthropology that does not neglect evident phenomena of experienced human life. In both Barth and Pannenberg, this question is thematised in their understanding of the human person as soul and body.

Fourthly, it means to study their understandings of human nature from the thought of an inherent humanness of the Trinity. A point of particular interest in this regard is their response to the question of whether creation and incarnation follow with necessity from God’s being.

\textsuperscript{206} Tertullian shares this substantial notion with the entire ancient church, even though his material understanding of substance makes him appear as an \textit{Einzelgänger}. This, however, has not made him more acceptable to Barth and Pannenberg. In fact, their primary concern in references to his anthropology is to reject the soul’s substantiality and immortality (Barth 1948, 697; Pannenberg 1991, 211-213, 254), which in Barth’s case even implies an interpretation of Tertullian as in line with Plato (Barth 1948, 183).
3 Eternally Elected in Christ. The Theological Anthropology of Barth

The overall aim of this section is to conduct a problem-oriented study of Barth’s theological anthropology from the four main points of my reading of the anthropology of Tertullian. The section consists of five chapters: a chapter on each of the four points and a brief concluding summary.

In the first chapter (3.1) I investigate how Barth’s theological anthropology can be understood in response to the question of human knowledge of God. I argue that Barth’s concept of revelation implies that God, by his revelatory act, establishes a certain human mode of existence as his own counterpart and partner. This is, so Barth, a ‘subsequent subjectivity’ in relation to God’s subjectivity, characterised by a particular *ethos* of recognition of God’s self-witness in terms of freedom and lordship. Barth unfolds this understanding of humanness on Christological grounds as faith’s self-understanding of being summoned by God’s word and of responding in gratitude. This implies that the entire creation, and human nature in particular, from the perspective of faith appears to have a specific purpose, namely the God-human covenantal relation.

In the second chapter (3.2) I investigate Barth’s concept of analogy in response to the second point of my summary of Tertullian: that theological anthropology must be able to account doctrinally for the conditions for human knowledge of God. My particular angle of approach is the question of, how the humanness revealed in Christ can be universal, if it is accessible only in faith’s self-reflection.

I use Tertullian’s concept of ‘double correspondence’ to interpret Barth’s concept of analogy. Based on this I argue that his analogous interpretation of created human relationality from 1945 is in line with his earlier concept of revelation. By applying the concept of analogy on the relational human subjectivity, he confirms and unfolds the understanding of human existence as ‘subsequent subjectivity’. This is, so Barth, essentially the content of the concept of the *imago Dei*.

In the third chapter (3.3) I examine, how Barth materially understands human constitution in terms of a unity between body and soul that implies the soul’s rule and the body’s service. Barth’s understanding is shaped from faith’s experience of being addressed by God as a rational being. From the perspective of Tertullian I argue that his conception of human constitution appears intellectualistic, as its focus on reason leaves little room for other human experiences such as emotion, sensation and desire in how God encounters the human being.

Further, I examine Barth’s understanding of humanness as relational *Ich-Du*-encounter, recognisable from the person of Jesus and from faith’s perspective only. Sin – as a contradiction of fundamental humanness – is
likewise recognisable only in faith. This even applies to the ultimate evil (*Das Nichtige*), which faith knows as the evil that Christ has defeated.

In the fourth chapter (3.4) I interpret Barth’s doctrine of election from Tertullian’s Trinitarian understanding of an inherent humanness of God. From 1940 onwards, Barth understands divine freedom as a Christologically determined freedom in which God has bound himself to his human partner. Election is, then, the divine act of self-determination that refers ‘the humanness of God’ to his being. I argue that this is true, even though there is a – perhaps intended – inconclusiveness in Barth regarding the relation between divine self-determination and God’s triune being.

In the fifth chapter (3.5) I summarise the section’s reading of Barth’s theological anthropology from the perspective of Tertullian. This summary provides the basis for the dissertation’s final conclusions on the theological anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg.

### 3.1 ‘Subsequent Subjectivity’ and Creation

Tertullian’s anthropology is essentially about how the human being can know God. To read Barth’s anthropology from Tertullian is, then, to read it as thematising this problem.

In Barth, this is about the self-understanding of faith, that is: about how the human being, who is addressed by God’s word, understands his or her own subjectivity as involved in the very event (*Geschehen*) of revelation:


Human subjectivity as ‘secondary, subsequent subject’ is, thus, incorporated in the Trinitarian self-revelation, by which God grants the human being knowledge of himself (*Erkenntnis Gottes*). From human perspective, this knowledge cannot be distinguished formally or technically from other knowledge, but it is, so Barth, human participation (*Teilnahme*) in God’s revelatory act.207

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207 “Wir reden also nicht nur von einem Geschehen, das sich in der Höhe, im Geheimnis der göttlichen Trinität, abspielt. Wir reden auch von diesem Geschehen, und das eben ist die Kraft alles Redens von der Erkenntnis Gottes, daß wir dabei auch und zuerst von diesem Geschehen reden. Wir reden aber von der *Offenbarung* dieses Geschehens in der Höhe, und also von unserer *Teilnahme* daran. Wir reden von *menschlicher* Gotteserkennnis auf Grund dieser Offenbarung und also auch von einem Geschehen, das sich seiner Art und Technik nach nicht von dem unterscheidet, was wir auch sonst Erkennen, menschliches Erkennen nennen,” (Barth 1940, 203).
Even though revelation is solely an act of God, it presupposes a certain reciprocity, a human *Gegenüber*. Not in terms of formal, created condition for revelation, but established by revelation itself:

“Durch Gott selbst in der Gnade seiner Offenbarung muß es geschehen, daß unser Bekenntnis zu Gottes Verborgenheit und also der Lobpreis unseres Dankes zu einem Lobpreis *Gottes* und also zum Anfang unserer *Erkenntnis* Gottes wird. Eben dies ist es aber, was durch Gott selbst in der Gnade seiner Offenbarung tatsächlich geschieht. Und indem es geschieht, wird unser Anschauen des unanschaulichen, unser Begreifen des unbegreiflichen Gottes, unserem Unvermögen zum Trotz, durch Gottes eigenes Vermögen ein echtes Anschauen und Begreifen: dessen ganze Wahrheit *Gottes* Wahrheit ist und das nun doch und gerade so, durch das Vermögen seines Gegenstandes, ein wahres Anschauen und Begreifen ist,” (Barth 1940, 222–23).

**Creation and Covenant**

In the paragraph entitled *Schöpfung und Bund* (§41), Barth responds to the question of how this particular human subjectivity, at the same time presupposed and established by revelation, relates to created humanness. He does so by an exposition of the first two chapters of Genesis, structured by the double phrase that ‘creation is the external basis of the covenant’ (*äußere Grund des Bundes*) and ‘the covenant is the internal basis of creation’ (*innere Grund der Schöpfung*).

The overall point is that creation and covenant, from the perspective of faith, mutually condition each other, so that the doctrine of creation appears closely interrelated with soteriology (Webster 2000a, 98). This means that creation, so Barth, has a purpose, a *Ziel*, namely the covenantal God-human relation that became historical reality in Jesus Christ.

Creation is the ‘technical making possible’ (*technische Ermöglichung*, Barth 1945, 107) of the historical covenant, by ‘making room’ for it, and by providing the human subject, who is to become God’s partner (*das Subjekt, das in dieser Geschichte Gottes Partner sein ... sollte*).

In this context, Barth uses the Thomist distinction of nature and grace (*Natur und Gnade*). The terminology acknowledges a continuity between created human nature and divine grace. However, he emphasises that this continuity is established solely from God’s side. It is not intrinsic to human

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208 That is: not in terms of an *Anknüpfungspunkt für das Wort Gottes* (Barth 1932, 251, pp104.112).

209 “So ist der Bund das *Ziel* der Schöpfung, die Schöpfung der Weg zum Bunde,” (Barth 1945, 106).

210 “…der Natur, der sich Gottes Gnade in dieser Geschichte annehmen und zuwenden sollte,” (Barth 1945, 107). This is undoubtedly a reference to the 1934 debate with Emil Brunner (pp104.112) and his essay of that name (Brunner 1934).
nature, and no teleology or natural theology can, thus, be derived from an analysis of human nature.\footnote{211} In a ‘von-oben-perspective’, on the other hand, that is: in faith’s perspective on grounds of the biblical text, Barth has no reservations speaking of a teleology of creation (Teleologie der Schöpfung) with explicit reference to the concept of nature: “Gerade durch seine ganze Natur ist das Geschöpf ... für diesen Bund bestimmt und disponiert,” (106).\footnote{212}

The doctrine of creation is not about cosmology or worldview,\footnote{213} but concerns the human being in cosmos.\footnote{214} The non-human creature is in this regard preliminary (vorläufig, 203), a theatre (Schauplatz) and an instrument

\footnote{211} “Es [das Geschöpf] ist sich selber so wenig Ziel und Zweck, wie es sich selber Grund und Anfang ist. Es gibt keine dem Dasein und Sosein des Geschöpf's immanente Bestimmung, keine mit seiner Erschaffung aufgerichtete und ihm zu eigen gemachte selbständige Teleologie des Geschöpf's. Seine Bestimmung liegt ganz in dem, was sein Schöpfer als sein Fürsprecher und Fürsorger mit ihm beabsichtigt,” (Barth 1945, 103).

\footnote{212} This teleological perspective of Barth’s doctrine of creation makes it appear with a distinctive and intentional anthropocentric focus: “Die theologische Lehre vom Geschöpf ist ... praktisch Anthropologie: die Lehre vom Menschen,” (Barth 1948, 2). Die kirchliche Dogmatik III,2, entitled das Geschöpf, simply presents four chapters on the human being. While not leaving the non-human world out of sight, Barth deals with it from a particular human point of view: “Eben als erstes Werk Gottes steht aber die Schöpfung – wieder nach dem Zeugnis von Schrift und Bekenntnis – in einer Reihe, in einem unauflösbaren sachlichen Zusammenhang mit Gottes weiteren Werken. Und diese sind ... die Taten Gottes zur Begründung, Erhaltung und Durchführung des Gnadenbundes, zu dessen Partner er den Menschen bestimmt und berufen hat.” (Barth 1945, 46).

Consequently, he emphasises that creation in the Bible is a theme only in relation to the God-human covenant: “Die vom Wort Gottes eröffnete Erkenntnis ist die Erkenntnis der Schöpfung in ihrer unaufloslichen Verbindung mit dem Bund und also die Erkenntnis des Himmels und der Erde als des Kosmos des mit Gott verbündeten Menschen,” (Barth 1948, 11).

\footnote{213} “…eleven years after the Barmen Declaration, Barth continues to confront natural theology on territory that throughout long stretches of theological history has been considered the ‘home’ of diverse variants of such natural theology,” (Thomas 2013, 44). Barth makes five points in this regard (Barth 1948, 6–10), including that the Christian kerygma is not about the world’s constitution: “Er [der Glaube] glaubt an Gott in dessen Verhältnis zu dem unter dem Himmel auf der Erde existierenden Menschen; er glaubt nicht an diese und jene Beschaffenheit des Himmels und der Erde,” (7).

\footnote{214} That is: the human being as rooted in external physical and biological reality, not an extra-worldly humanness: “Mit dem Menschen im Kosmos haben wir es zu tun und also gewiß nicht mit dem Menschen, der vor Gott allein, dem Gott allein zugewendet wäre: nicht mit einem Kosmos, der nur im Menschen, der vielleicht nach der Lehre des radikalen Idealismus als Außenwelt gar nicht wirklich, sondern nur die Erscheinungswelt des menschlichen Geistes wäre,” (Barth 1948, 2).
Eternally Elected in Christ. The Theological Anthropology of Barth

(\textit{Werkzeug}) for God’s covenantal relation with his human partner.\footnote{This perspective is in particular prominent in the large section on creation as external basis of the covenant (Barth 1945, 104–259), based on Gen. 1:1-2:4a. Barth comments on v26: “Alles Vorangehende war Vorbereitung und Vorbild \textit{dieser} Entscheidung. Ist sie selbst ihrer Natur nach vorläufig, weist sie über sich selbst hinaus auf weitere Entscheidungen Gottes in seinem Handeln \textit{auf} diesem Schauplatz, \textit{mit} diesem Werkzeug, \textit{an} diesem Gegenstand, im Vollzug des Bundes mit diesem Partner, so ist es doch eben \textit{dieses} Vorläufige: der Mensch auf dem Boden und im Raum, der Mensch in der Mitte aller anderen Kreatur, was in jenen weiteren Entscheidungen vorausgesetzt ist. Es bezieht sich die Vollendung der Schöpfung als das Werk der Ruhe Gottes am siebenten Tage, die Errichtung des Bundes, für die die Schöpfung den äußeren Grund zu legen hatte,” (Barth 1945, 203).} While animals live by the Spirit of God (p124), they still just belong to ‘the rest of creature’ (\textit{übrige Kreatur}, 206), distinct from God, but not his counterpart: “[J]etzt erst und in ihm [dem Menschen] ist wirklich ein Anderes, nämlich ein Zweites Gott gegenüber auf den geschöpflichen Plan getreten,” (206).

According to Barth, creation is, then, ultimately about God’s decision to encounter and relate to, what is distinct from himself. This divine relating presupposes a created counterpart, who – as \textit{sekundäre, nachfolgende Subjekt} – is able to relate personally to God. This ability is not intrinsic to human nature, but is established by God’s revelatory act.

In Tertullian, the God-human relation established by divine communication (God’s speaking of the law), belongs to the concept of human nature (p49). The particular creation of the human being (the \textit{institutio}, p42) gives rise to a particular kind of nature (p50), of which God’s communication is constitutive. According to Tertullian, this ‘relative disposition’ is essentially the meaning of the concept of the \textit{imago Dei}.

In Barth, by contrast, divine communication is not intrinsic to created human nature, but happens in the event of revelation. Nonetheless, revelation relates, so Barth, to created human existence, in a way that it does not relate to the animals or the rest of the created world.

It is so, because the covenantal God-human relation is analogously expressed in created human life, so that the relationality of God’s triune being and the relationality of the God-human covenant are reflected and repeated in a human relationality. Hence, God establishes human capability to become his \textit{Gegenüber} by addressing the \textit{Gegenüber} of created human life:

“So ist das \textit{tertium comparationis}, die \textit{Analogie} zwischen Gott und Mensch sehr schlicht die \textit{Existenz im Gegenüber von Ich und Du},” (207).
Barth specifies that the human Gegenüber ultimately is the relation between man and woman.\textsuperscript{216} The paragraph on covenant as the inner foundation of creation (259-377), unfolds this analogous createdness much further, interpreting the Adam-Eve relation of Gen. 2 as an analogous reflection of God’s eternal decision to enter into covenantal relation with his creature. This eternal election is, so Barth, constitutive of creation. The mode of existence implied in the man-woman-relation is, consequently, a created anticipation (Vorwegnahme) of the covenant, so that the human being is ‘formally prepared’ for God’s grace:

“Eben diesem Modus muß seine eigene Existenz entsprechen, soll sie für Gott gut, brauchbar, verhandlungsfähig sein. Sie muß in sich selber eine Vorwegnahme, ein Vorbild – der Begriff des Bildes ist zur Erklärung der Sache tatsächlich auch hier unvermeidlich – dessen sein, was die Gestalt der Beziehung Gottes zu ihm im künftigen Bunde zwischen beiden sein wird. Er muß kraft seiner Natur für die Gnade formal vorbereitet sein,” (Barth 1945, 331).

This means that the teleological understanding of creation points beyond itself, anticipating salvation. Outside the creation account, Barth finds the same perspective of ‘anticipated eschatology’ in the Song of Songs.\textsuperscript{217} In both cases the author preconditions another covenant (ein anderer Bund), which, though almost unrecognisable in historical reality, is made a reality in Christ, states Barth referring to Eph. 5:25 (Barth 1945, 367–70).

### Creation as an Act of the Trinity
The doctrine of creation is, then, fundamentally about how Christians believe God to fulfil his decision to enter into covenant with his human creature. It is, thus, essentially about the Creator, not about the act of creation or about the creature.\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{216} “Es wird sich also dies, daß er [der Mensch] als Mann und Frau geschaffen ist und existiert, nicht nur als Abbild und Nachbild seines Schöpfers als solchen, sondern zugleich als Vorbild der Geschichte des Bundes und des Heils erweisen, die sich zwischen ihm und seinem Schöpfer ereignen wird,” (Barth 1945, 209)

\textsuperscript{217} “[I]n dem (nicht umsonst gerade ihm, dem von so viel antizipierter Eschatologie umgebenen) König Salomo zugeschriebenen ‘Lied der Lieder’,” (Barth 1945, 358).

\textsuperscript{218} “…dem Dichter der Schöpfungssage sowohl wie dem jener Liebeslieder ein anderer – ebenfalls geschändeter und befleckter, in der geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit ebenfalls fast nicht wiederzuerkennender und nun doch von rechtsweisen geschlossener, besiegelter, bestehender und gültiger Bund (und damit die Notwendigkeit, seiner Verwirklichung entgegenzueilen!) vor Augen stand,” (Barth 1945, 359).

\textsuperscript{219} Therefore, the doctrine of creation has the same revelational the source as has the entire Christian theology. No analyses of human existence or of the world’s order can lead to knowledge of creation; this would, says Barth, turn the church’s confession into a notion of God in form of the postulate of a weltüberlegenen Prinzip implied in a Weltanschauung (Barth 1945, 11). From this, Barth decides on how theological
Consequently, any claim of theological anthropology – as well as any claim about non-divine reality at all – is a statement of faith (ein Glaubenssatz)²²⁰ that can never be more than a hypothesis apart from its substantiation (Begründung) in God’s self-witness (Selbstzeugnis, 4). This ‘substantiation’ involves the human subject in the Christian confession to God as Creator, that is: as ‘subsequent subject’.

God’s self-witness is Trinitarian, as is the very act of creating.²²¹ This means that God can be known as Creator only from the God-human unity revealed in the person of Jesus Christ. That the Son of God became one with human nature, demonstrates to faith that human nature is created as different from God, that is: as his counterpart, distinct from him.

Therefore, so Barth, the existence of God’s creature is for faith not just an appearance (ein Schein):

“Eben der offenen Tatsache der in der Person Jesu Christi vollzogenen Einheit Gottes mit dem Menschen entnehmen wir zunächst sehr einfach dies: Gott ist wirklich nicht allein. Er lebt sein göttliches Leben nicht nur in seinem eigenen Raum. Es gibt vielmehr einen Weltraum, in welchem er über ein von ihm selbst

anthropology must approach non-theological anthropologies. He distinguishes between “spekulative Theorie vom Menschen” (Barth 1948, 23–25) and “[die Anthropologie] der exakten Wissenschaft vom Menschen”, which is he human being as “Gegenstand der physiologischen und biologischen, der psychologischen und soziologischen Wissenschaft,” (25). Speculative theories of the human being are, so Barth, a fundamental contradiction of theology, as they are human attempts to provide overall anthropological understanding by imposing an external criterion on all other knowledge, theology included: “Anthropologie, die im Zusammenhang der Dogmatik gewiß nur ein Kapitel unter anderen ist, ist in den Überzeugungen, im Mythus, in der Philosophie, in der Wissenschaft außerhalb der Theologie so etwas wie die Grundwissenschaft, von der her alles sonstige Wissen mindestens sein Kriterium empfängt, die vielleicht sogar alles andere Wissen in sich zu schließen beansprucht.” (23).

The anthropologies of exact science, on the other hand, are not hostile to the Christian confession as long as they do not become “axiomatisch, dogmatisch, spekulativ” (26-27) by treating their hypotheses as axioms and, thus, as revealed dogmas. This kind of anthropology is, then, according to Barth, able to provide insights of value, though he does not point to any way to interpret these insights theologically.

²²⁰ “Die Lehre von der Schöpfung ist nicht weniger als der ganze übrige Inhalt des christlichen Bekenntnisses Glaubensartikel, d. h. die Wiedergabe einer Erkenntnis, die kein Mensch jemals sich selbst verschafft hat noch verschaffen wird – die ihm weder angeboren noch auf dem Wege der Wahrnehmung und des verknüpfenden Denkens zugänglich ist – für die er kein Organ und keine Fähigkeit besitzt, sondern die er ganz allein im Glauben faktisch vollziehen kann,” (Barth 1945, 1–2). Even the knowledge that the world exists as distinct from God is a matter of faith (3-5).

²²¹ “Die Schöpfung ist das erste in der Reihe der Werke des dreieinigen Gottes und damit der Anfang aller von Gott selbst verschiedenen Dinge,” (Barth 1945, 44).
verschiedenes Wesen: über den Menschen Herr ist und damit von dessen Wirklichkeit Beweis gibt,” (26).

Further, the confession to the triune Creator means that faith must regard humanness and human history as a reality within God’s Trinitarian being. Faith even believes, says Barth, that created history pre-exists in God’s life as Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the sense that the ‘the non-solitariness of God’ (die Nicht-Einsamkeit Gottes, 204, p108) by his eternal election prefigures contingent human history to become salvation history:

“…indem Gott die kreatürliche Geschichte als die von ihm beschlossene Heilsgeschichte begründet und beherrscht, ist ihm auch die Wirklichkeit der Geschichte nicht von Haus aus fremd, präexistiert sie doch vor allem Verlauf der kreatürlichen Geschichte ursprünglich in seinem eigenen Leben als Vater, Sohn und Heiliger Geist und sogar kontingent-historisch in seinem im Blick auf diese kreatürliche Geschichte gefaßten ewigen Ratschluß, in seiner Gnadenwahl als dem ewigen Anfang aller seiner Wege und Werke,” (14).

True Humanness and ‘Phenomena of the Human’
That faith in this way perceives contingent human history as salvation history determined by God’s eternal election, means freedom (150). This is, so Barth, the very content of the ‘subsequent subjectivity’ established by God’s subjectivity. As such, it cannot mean that divine freedom rules out human freedom, but means God’s enabling humans to see their history as a real history and to take up a position in relation to it as subjects, not just as objects.

Faith, then, acknowledges that God makes created human subjectivity possible by speaking his Word. To be human is, in this perspective, essentially to be summoned to hear God’s Word:


This Aufgerufensein implies, so Barth, the free human response, which is gratefully to acknowledge the divine act of creation as benefit (Wohltat). A more precise and material definition (eine genauere und sachlichere Bestimmung, 198) of humanness, then, is that it is a being in gratitude:

222 “Es kann aber auch die göttliche Freiheit die menschliche nicht etwa zerstören und aufheben: ist es doch vielmehr gerade jene, die diese allezeit und in jeder Hinsicht nach sich und mit sich zieht,” (Barth 1938, 796).

223 Barth comments on Gen. 1:14-15 that God created the sun, the moon and the stars for the sake of human freedom: “Sie ermöglichen es ihm, seine Geschichte als Geschichte zu überblicken, in ihr Stellung zu nehmen und also nicht nur ihr Objekt, sondern auch ihr Subjekt … zu sein,” (Barth 1945, 176).

This true humanness is the determination of the human being as created in God’s image. As such, it is in Scripture both the content of God’s eternal election and the human being’s eschatological destiny. Hence, knowledge of God is a reality within this existence in Aufgerufensein and Danken.

As a revealed truth, acknowledged by faith, this understanding of ‘true humanness’ is no interpretation of experienced human life, but rather faith’s key to interpret experienced human life. 224 Such interpretation must be carried out in light of the only place, where true humanness is historical reality, namely in the real human being (der wirkliche Mensch), Jesus Christ.

This means that Christology must be the criterion for assessing non-theological anthropologies. So, on a purely Christological basis Barth makes six points (79-82) that he understands as minimal requirements (Mindestforderungen, Minimalforderungen, 83-84), theology must make in critical evaluation of other anthropological approaches.225

All six points are about Jesus in his relation to God, that is: Jesus as the human in whom God is present and in whom the identity of God in his historical action in covenant and salvation is recognisable. On the assumption that there is a fundamental similarity between Jesus and every other human being, Barth then concludes that to be human fundamentally means to be for God (für Gott, 81-82.86). This is so, because God by eternal election has bound himself to the human being thus binding the human being to himself.

Barth is careful to emphasise that this does not mean that Christology and anthropology are simply identical (82). Christology is to anthropology

224 Experienced human life is what is examined by non-theological anthropological approaches, that is: what Barth refers to as ‘the phenomena of the human’ (das Phänomene des Menschlichen, Barth 1948, 82). As genuinely human, these phenomena are not hostile to theological anthropology, and Barth claims that it is in principle possible to interpret them theologically. In practise, however, he is sceptical regarding the value of the insights of these anthropologies, and his scepticism is due to the fact that they claim to be able to draw conclusions regarding the real human being: “Es könnte ja sein, daß wir das, auf was diese anderen Auffassungen hinweisen, zwar als das wahre Wesen des wirklichen Menschen nicht gelten lassen können, daß wir aber Phänomene des Menschlichen (des auf unserem, dem theologischen, Weg zu erforschenden Menschlichen!) doch auch in dem wahrnehmen können und dann auch müssen, auf was wir durch jene anderen Auffassungen hingewiesen werden,” (86).

225 In the second subsection of §44, Barth examines four contemporary anthropological approaches (naturalism, idealism, existentialism and theism, Barth 1948, 91–157) and concludes from the six points that that none of these approaches can be said to uncover the true human being as they claim to do.
nothing more than a foundation (*Grundlegung*). However, if Jesus shares *our* humanness, and if his being the Son of God is constitutive of *his* humanness, then the relation to God belongs essentially to humanness as such:

“…ist es für das menschliche Wesen in ihm konstitutiv, daß er der Sohn Gottes und als solcher Mensch ist, dann ist das eben der Inbegriff aller Minimalforderungen, die wir an die Anschauung und den Begriff des wirklichen Menschen zu stellen haben: daß ohne Gott auch er nicht zu sehen und zu begreifen ist,” (84).

From faith’s perspective, this is so because of God’s eternal election of Jesus Christ, and by human participation in him. Further, faith acknowledges that this paradigmatic humanness belongs essentially to his being, and, consequently, that to be human ultimately means to be a fellow human of Jesus:

“Die theologische Anthropologie darf … nicht so zerstreut sein, um alle möglichen und unmöglichen Begründungen ihrer These statt zunächst einmal eben diesen einfachsten Grundverhalten geltend zu machen: daß jeder Mensch als solcher der Mitmenschen Jesu ist,” (159).

According to Barth, the Christological criterion confirms that humanness fundamentally is to be summoned by God’s Word and to participate in the deliverance from evil that Jesus from eternity was destined to carry out. Thus, the fulfilment of God’s elective will and the human being’s participation in it, is not just the teleological goal of creation, but its very basis. This points back to the first sub-volume on creation, in which Barth can speak of creation as a *necessity,* that is: a necessary actualisation of

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226 “Die biblische Botschaft … redet tatsächlich von dem, der nicht erst a posteriori, sondern a priori, von Haus aus, eines jeden Menschen Nachbar, Genosse und Bruder ist,” (Barth 1948, 159–60).


228 “Es ist der Mensch als solcher, indem er der Mitmensch des Menschen Jesus ist, zum vornherein dazu bestimmt, an der in diesem einen Menschen schon geschehenen Bewahrung vor dem Argen teil zu haben, zum vornherein dazu bestimmt, in der Gemeinschaft des Kampfes gegen den Feind alles geschöpflichen Seins, in der Geschichte des Sieges über diesen Feind zu stehen, zum vornherein dazu bestimmt, zum Leibe des Hauptes zu gehören, in welchem sich der Triumph des Schöpfers zugunsten seines Geschöpfes schon vollzogen hat,” (Barth 1948, 174).

229 This does not mean – as in Tertullian (p54) – that ‘making-himself-knownness’ belongs essentially to divinity, so that God’s economical acts of creation and incarnation follows with necessity. In that case, Barth would be included in his own accusation against Hegel for making God his own prisoner (p151). From faith’s perspective, however, that is: from the knowledge of God implied in the mode of existence of
God’s eternal triune love. Hence, Barth even speaks of Christ as the real basis of creation (der echte Realgrund der Schöpfung):


Ultimately, then, faith must understand the human being as from God (von Gott, ein von Gott abhängiges Sein, Barth 1948, 167). Human godlessness is an ontological impossibility:

“[Der Mensch] ist von Gott auch dann erreicht und betroffen, wenn er sich der ontologischen Unmöglichkeit, der Gottlosigkeit, schuldig macht.” (169).

In this context Barth introduces the notion of sin as ontologische Unmöglichkeit (174) that he develops further in 1950 in the §50-concept of das Nichtige (p132). The point is to state that sin essentially is a negation of true humanness and, thus, a rejection of the inner purpose of human life as God’s creature. The real human being is, therefore, by creation ultimately unable to sin.230 This can, however, only be said of the humanness revealed in Jesus, that is: on basis of the Christological particularity as opposed to what Barth refers to as der Mensch in abstracto (174-175), for whom sin is natural an even necessary.231

The term ‘human being in abstracto’ corresponds to the above-mentioned ‘phenomenon of the human’ (86-88), that is: knowledge of the human being from phenomena that are always ambiguous and unable to reveal the real human being. Only to faith, and only in light of the humanness of Jesus Christ, these phenomena are recognisable as ‘symptoms’ of the real human being; in and by themselves they are mute.232

Thus, theological anthropology in the sense of faith’s understanding of the human existence, in which knowledge of God is a reality, presupposes

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231 “Vom Menschen in abstracto müßten wir vielmehr ohne weiteres sagen, daß ihm der Sündenfall geradezu ontologisch notwendig sei,” (Barth 1948, 174–75).

232 “Die Phänomene als solche aber sind stumm. Sie sind als solche noch keine Symptome,” (Barth 1948, 91).
Christology. Knowledge of the human and knowledge of the divine are, then, mutually interdependent:

“‘Nicht ohne Gott’ will sagen: daß Erkenntnis des Menschen als solche die Erkenntnis Gottes in sich schließt und nach sich zieht – und wiederum: daß Erkenntnis des Menschen nur von der Erkenntnis Gottes her möglich ist und zustande kommt,” (84).

‘Subsequent Subjectivity’ in Light of Tertullian

As we have seen (p49), Tertullian argues that knowledge of God and even relation to God is intrinsic and essential to human nature, established by the divine act of institutio (p42). In this communicative act, God makes himself known ‘by himself’ (per semetipsum, Adversus Marcionem I,18,3, p47).

This means that human knowledge is universal, and that God’s communication happens ‘first by nature, then by doctrine’ (p47), so that the Creator’s testimonium in Christ addresses humans, who already know him.

Barth’s theological anthropology differs from Tertullian’s by interpreting human existence exclusively from the perspective of faith. From this perspective, the humanness revealed in Jesus is, so Barth, universal because of every human being’s participation in him.

The Christian confession to the triune Creator implies, so Barth, human recognition (Anerkennung, Barth 1945, 34) of God’s self-witness and, hence, recognition that humans are fundamentally rooted in God’s triune being. This ethos of recognition is a particular form of human subjectivity, established from God’s side as divine freedom ‘draws human freedom to and after itself’ ([menschliche Freiheit] nach sich und mit sich zieht, Barth 1938, 796, quoted above, note 222). As such, faith must understand human subjectivity as subsequent to God’s subjectivity.

This interpretation of humanness is fundamentally about knowledge of God; humans know God only as God makes himself known in that he, by revelation, utilises the created Gegenüber-relation of human Ich-Du-existence to establish the divine-human Gegenüber.

Barth’s theological anthropology, thus, has the character of faith’s reflection (Nachdenken), responding to the question of what the knowledge of God, which is a reality for the believer, presupposes. It is faith’s self-examination regarding its own presuppositions, and as such in itself an expression of the ethos of ‘subsequent subjectivity’.

It consists in a particular mode of existence, characterised by a gratitude that interprets creation as divine benefit (Wohltat) and as fundamental ‘Yes’ of God, the Creator (Barth 1945, 382–90).

Barth, thus, differs fundamentally from the Marcionite perception of creation, Tertullian opposes by his understanding of divine communication
as reality that affects created human nature. As a statement of faith (ein Glaubenssatz), he is able to maintain both the universality of the humanness revealed in Jesus and the fundamental goodness of creation.

Nevertheless, this statement of faith – made from the perspective of faith’s interpretation of faith itself – obviously may be suspected for a mere human postulate, that is: for being subjectivistic in the sense, Tertullian accuses Marcion’s concept of revelation to be (Adversus Marcionem I,18,3, p47).

As the following chapter argues, Barth’s understanding of revelation by the concept of analogy may be interpreted as a way to address the conditions for human knowledge of God in a way that accounts for this question.

### 3.2 Conditions for Human Knowledge of God: Analogy

As we have seen (p82), Tertullian holds that theological anthropology in order to be considered credible, must be able to account doctrinally for the conditions for human knowledge of God. In the context of the anti-Marcionite controversy, he suggests to do so by the concept of imago Dei (p44).

I have suggested to conceptualise Tertullian’s interpretation in terms of a ‘double correspondence’ between God and the human being (p42). It consists, firstly, of a formal (ad formam Dei spondens, Adversus Marcionem II,5,6, p41) correspondence of freedom, independence and dissimilarity, and, secondly, of an ethical correspondence of goodness, proximity and similarity, in which the human being is sustained and ruled by God. This ‘double correspondence’ is, so Tertullian, intrinsic to human nature.

Both the ‘correspondence of freedom’ and the ‘correspondence of goodness’ are established by God in creation by his communicative act of speaking his law, that is: the institutio (p42).

The ‘correspondence of dissimilarity’ (freedom) presupposes and confirms a qualitative difference of divine being and human being, a difference that humans share with all other creatures that have a beginning in time (habens initium, II,6,4, note 99). The ‘correspondence of similarity’ (goodness), on the other hand, overcomes in a certain sense this qualitative difference, not by eliminating it, but by making the ‘relative disposition’ of God-human relation (p49) intrinsic to the specific human kind of nature (II,6,5, p42).

The following interpretation of Barth’s concept of analogy attempts to apply these categories from Tertullian’s concept of ‘double correspondence’ to Barth.

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233 Substrueretur, regeretur, Adversus Marcionem II,9,8, cf. p42.
This approach requires that knowledge of God in Barth – as in Tertullian – may be seen as presupposing a divine-human correspondence that holds together similarity and dissimilarity.

This is in line with Barth’s own presentation of the concept in §27. Here, he states that although he finds the very concept of analogy burdened (belastet) by its use in natural theology, it is unavoidable, because it means partial correspondence between different entities:

“‘Analogie’ bedeutet im Unterschied zu Gleichheit und Ungleichheit: Ähnlichkeit d. h. teilweise und darum die Gleichheit wie die Ungleichheit begrenzende Entsprechung und Übereinstimmung zwischen zwei oder mehreren verschiedenen Größen … Es ist uns … durch den Gegenstand – Gottes Wahrhaftigkeit in seiner Offenbarung als Grund der Wahrhaftigkeit unserer Erkenntnis Gottes – keine andere Wahl gelassen, als zunächst nach diesem Begriff zu greifen,” (Barth 1940, 254).

Barth’s concern here, in 1940, is “[die] Wahrhaftigkeit unserer Erkenntnis Gottes,” and this concern is the prominent motif throughout the 1932- and 1940-presentations of the concept of analogy by the notion of analogy of faith (analogia fidei).

What Barth refers to as Gleichheit, Ähnlichkeit, Entsprechung and Übereinstimmung equates, in terms of Tertullian’s concept, the ‘correspondence of goodness’. The God-human analogy, established by revelation and acknowledged by faith, is in this perspective basis (Grund) of human knowledge of God.

From 1945 onwards Barth’s perspective has obviously changed. He includes, from this time on, the notion of analogy of relation (analogia relationis).

By this, he links the analogy of faith, which occurs when the human being hears the word of God, with the analogy between certain relations. These are the inner-divine relation and the God-human relation on the one hand and the created relation between man and woman on the other.

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234 Who assumes that the one to know God must, to some degree, correspond to God (p41).
235 Of which the relation between the sexes, so Barth, is ‘the original form’, pp110.122.
236 And Kontinuität (Barth 1994, 464, p100), Gottförmerigkeit (Barth 1932, 252, p102), Offenheit and Bereitschaft für Gott (Barth 1940, 73.141-193, p104) and Bündnisfähigkeit (Barth 1945, 268, p112).
237 Die kirchliche Dogmatik III,1-3, §41 (Schöpfung und Bund), §45 (Der Mensch in seiner Bestimmung zu Gottes Bundesgenossen) and partly §49 (Gott der Vater als Herr seines Geschöpfs, especially Barth 1950, 114–17).
I suggest to understand Barth’s use of the created human Ich-Du-relationality as equivalent to Tertullian’s ‘correspondence of freedom’. In itself, this correspondence is formal and abstract, confirming the divine-human difference, to which I have referred as ‘pre-natural’ (pp42.79), and insufficient for the divine establishing of the God-human relation of human nature. Nonetheless, the ‘correspondence of freedom’ implies that it is the created human subjectivity – rather than an external, imputed subjectivity – that performs the ‘goodness’, which characterises the God-human relation.

This approach from Tertullian leads me to decide on the question of, whether the 1945 Barth by incorporating created relationality in the concept of analogy has left 1932’s and 1940’s narrow focus on faith’s self-examining knowledge of God in favour of a wider, anthropological use of the concept. I argue that this is not the case. What has happened is that Barth has included the relationality of human existence in his concept of revelation. This does not, as I far as I can see, imply any essential change in his overall concept of revelation from the early volumes of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*. However, it unfolds this concept in a way that meets the second point of my interpretation of Tertullian’s anthropology, namely that theological anthropology must be able to account doctrinally for the conditions for human knowledge of God (p115).

To carry out this interpretation I have structured this chapter chronologically and included a work prior to the publication of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*, namely the small *Der heilige Geist und das christliche Leben* from 1929 (Barth 1994a).

**Barth’s 1929 Notion of Analogy**

Barth points to Augustine, who, he states, has a certain advantage compared to Liberal Protestantism represented by Ernst Troeltsch. Augustine knew, says Barth, that the Holy Spirit is not to be identified with the human soul:

“Augustin hat gewußt, was spätere idealistische Theologen nicht mehr recht wußten, daß Gottes Leben darum, weil er in der Bibel auch Geist, heiliger Geist, genannt wird, nicht identisch ist mit dem, was wir als unser eigenes geschaffenes Geistes- oder Seelenleben kennen … Das tönt anders und besser, als wenn am Ende einer langen und betrüblichen Entwicklung Troeltsch sich nicht scheut, den heiligen

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238 *Die kirchliche Dogmatik* III,1-3, §41 (Schöpfung und Bund), §45 (Der Mensch in seiner Bestimmung zu Gottes Bundesgenossen) and partly §49 (Gott der Vater als Herr seines Geschöpfes, especially Barth 1950, 114–17).

239 McCormack points to *Der heilige Geist und das christliche Leben* as background for the later notion of analogia fidei and suggests several possible explanations for the difference between the “friendly manner”, in which Barth in 1929 deals with the question of analogia entis, and the “rhetorical pyroteenics of the preface to Church Dogmatics I/1,” (McCormack 2011a, 102–4).

Still, Barth finds that there is a problem in Augustine, namely that he sought a continuity between the Holy Spirit and the human, created spirit (the soul). By this, Augustine understood God as originally indwelling the soul, a forgotten reality that grace makes it possible to remember:


In this *anamnesis* concept of salvation Barth finds a notion of grace totally different from that of the Reformation (463). It identifies God with the object of the deepest longings of the human heart and does so, because it lacks the sharp edge of the genuine thought of creation (*die Schärfe des wirklichen Schöpfungsgedankens*), that is: the difference between Creator and creature.240 In this way the Platonic tendency in Augustinian soteriology, according to Barth, corresponds Augustine’s concept of continuity between the Creator’s Spirit and the created soul, which Barth understands as an equally Platonic tendency in the Augustinian doctrine of creation. Barth himself, by contrast, wants to avoid both of these tendencies by stressing the discontinuity between God and the human being, he finds implicit in the Creator-creature-relation:


What Barth here refers to as *Diskontinuität*241 is, in terms of my conceptualisation of Tertullian, the divine-human difference of being (p97, note 99). The question is, then, how God can be knowable to the human being, if there is an absolute divine-human discontinuity. Barth’s answer is simply that the continuity, by which God truly can be known, lies not in the

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240 Barth finds the qualitative difference between God’s being and human being both presupposed and attested in the event of revelation. Where this difference is blurred, the very concept of salvation changes into ‘Erinnerung’, that is: realisation of inherent human capabilities. Barth explicitly states that this is the consequence of any idealism, including Kantian transcendental philosophy (Barth 1994a, 463).

241 Cf. *Unähnlichkeit* (Barth 1932, 252, p102).
human being but in God’s, the Creator’s, relation (Verhalten) to his human creature:


This continuity, which equates the ‘correspondence of similarity’ in Tertullian, means in Barth that the knowability of God in revelation is a ‘second wonder’, and that ‘the true analogia entis’ is established not in and by creation, but in and by God’s free gift of love, that is: by the revelation, in which the human being is given the ability to hear and understand the Word of God.242

The difference from Tertullian is, then, that he understands God’s communication as belonging to the special creation of the human being (the institutio, by which God establishes the particular human kind of natura). Barth would disagree. The way Barth distinguishes between creation and revelation does not allow for such an understanding. Hence, revelation has to be a ‘second wonder’ to Barth, by which the Creator subsequently enters into relation with his creature, and thus, establishes the analogy.

To Tertullian, on the other hand, Barth’s notion of ‘the creature in itself’ (das Geschöpf als solche), that is: a created being seen apart from the Creator, would be purely hypothetical (pp42.79.168).243 Consequently, Barth’s sharp alternative between dem Geschöpf als solchem and dem Schöpfer in seinem Verhalten zum Geschöpf would hardly be meaningful to Tertullian.

Barth does not here, in 1929, speak of an analogy of faith, but the problem his 1932- and 1940-notion of analogia fidei attempts to solve is precisely, how the human being, by means of God’s revelation, is able to know and understand the same revelation.

By this understanding, Barth rejects what he understands as a Platonic motif in Augustine, similar to De Anima’s rejection of the essentially Platonic anthropology of Hermogenes. Barth’s (and Tertullian’s) ultimately soteriological concern regards the concept of truth corresponds, opposing the understanding of truth as belonging to the divine sphere of the soul, accessible by ἀνάμνησις (introspection, p73).

I have argued (p79) that this hypothetical Geschöpf als solche to Tertullian would mean the soul Adam had after the infusion of the breath of God (Gen. 2:7), but before God’s addressing of him by the original law (Gen. 2:16-17).
Barth’s Notion of Analogia Fidei

The prominent role of the concept of analogy in the prolegomena volumes of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik* is clear, already from the preface to the first subvolume. Here, Barth presents his entire dogmatic project as an opposition to the doctrine of *analogia entis*.244

This statement is not primarily directed against Aquinas or 20th century Roman Catholicism, eg. Erich Przywara, but against a certain underlying pattern of thought in Liberal Protestantism,245 here referred to as [die] *Linie Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann*. The point is that this line of thought shares the premise of the *analogia entis* with Roman Catholicism and, thus, leads to the ruin (*Verderben*) of Protestant theology and church. To Barth there is at this point no middle way between true Protestant theology and Liberal Protestantism.246

Barth confirms the human ‘conformity to God’ (*Gottförmigkeit*) as the condition for the very possibility for human beings to hear the Word of God. Furthermore, he explicitly links this conformity with God’s creation of the human being in his own image: “‘Gottförmigkeit’ nannten wir die Möglichkeit des Vernehmens des Wortes Gottes. Das sagt ja auch der Begriff der *imago Dei,*” (Barth 1932, 252). He warns, however, that this speaking of conformity is only a hair’s breadth from the doctrine of *analogia entis* and continues:

“Wir verstehen die hier in der Tat zu behauptende Analogie, Ähnlichkeit oder Gleichförmigkeit zwischen Gott und Mensch gerade nicht als *analogia entis*, d. h. nicht als eine überschaubare und durchschaubare, vom Standpunkt eines Schauenden aus in einer Synthese als Analogie zu verstehende Analogie. Nicht ein *Sein*, das das Geschöpf mit dem Schöpfer bei aller Unähnlichkeit gemeinsam haben soll, sondern das keiner bloßen Theorie zugängliche *Tun*, die menschliche

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244 He does so very emphatically, stating that he holds the *analogia entis* to be the invention of Antichrist and the decisive reason not to become a Roman Catholic: “[Ich] denke, daß man ihretwegen nicht katholisch werden kann,” (Barth 1932, vii–ix). To explain the harsh rhetoric, McCormack points to Barth’s former Göttingen colleague, Georg Wobbermin, who had claimed that the ‘dialectical theology of Karl Barth’ had led two named theologians to convert to Roman Catholicism. Barth’s response is to emphasise that from his point of view it is Liberal Protestantism, and in particular Troeltsch, whom he mentions in his 1932 ‘open letter’ to Wobbermin, that shares a certain premise with Roman Catholicism, and that dialectical theology is precisely the refusal of this premise (McCormack 2011a, 104–8).

245 (McCormack 2011a, 91.107). Barth’s representation of Aquinas’ notion of *analogia entis* is questionable (Fleinert-Jensen 1987, 51), but this is of less importance, when the real opponent is contemporary Liberalism.

246 “…deshalb kann ich hier nur Nein sagen,” (Barth 1932, viii).
Entscheidung ist im Glauben in aller Unähnlichkeit ähnlich der Entscheidung der Gnade Gottes,” (252).

What he rejects is the notion of a being, which creature and Creator have in common; the true conformity lies only in the similarity between the human decision in faith and God’s decision in grace. This is what Barth by the terminology of Rom. 12:6 refers to as ‘the analogy of faith’ (analogia fidei, 257). This particular analogy does not negate the discontinuity between God and the human being but presupposes it, in that it ‘transcends it and brackets it’.

In terms of Tertullian’s concept, this equates the overcoming of the divine-human-difference carried out by the ‘correspondence of similarity’ (p97): From God’s side and under the condition of the human incapacity, God establishes the conformity (Gottförmigkeit, d. h. ein Angepaßtsein des Menschen an das Wort Gottes) in the reality of faith (der Wirklichkeit des Glaubens):


Barth emphasises that he does not deny human subjectivity: “Der Mensch ist Subjekt des Glaubens. Nicht Gott, sondern der Mensch glaubt,”(258). But he understands human subjectivity in faith’s relation to God as dialectically conditioned by God’s subjectivity in his free grace, so that “bei jenem Subjektsein des Menschen bleibt, und gerade dieses, gerade das Ich des Menschen als solches, nur noch von dem Du des Subjekt des Gott her ist.” The analogous counterpart to God’s gracious decision for the human being is not an autonomous subjectivity but a human subjectivity in the covenantal relation to God as free Lord.

Only in this relation, then, can there be similarity and correspondence between the word of God and human words, that is: human knowledge of God. This excludes creaturely given and therefore already existent analogies:


Barth considers this to be obvious: “Man sollte denken, es wäre nichts einfacher und selbstverständlicher als die[se] Einsicht.” Natural theology’s attempt to achieve knowledge of God on the basis of an assumed similarity
of being between God and human cannot, however, be dealt with once and for all, but seems, says Barth, to be recurring in ever new forms (93). Even though there may be several reasons in favour of natural theology, reasons that can be discussed on exegetical grounds (93-142), its ultimate attractiveness lies, according to Barth, in the human readiness (Bereitschaft) or openness (Offenheit) for God.

That such a readiness exists is evident from the fact that God’s self-revelation at all takes place. God’s revelation and, hence, God’s readiness for the human being, presupposes this human readiness (142-144). It is, however, impossible from the mere recognition of God’s readiness to know one’s own readiness for God, that is: to know oneself as one in need of God’s gracious revelation. This is why natural theology’s attempts to establish a knowledge of God on the basis of human readiness for God necessarily must fail. It doesn’t take into account the deepest consequence of the original and permanent (dauernd) sinful state, namely that the sinner hides his objective need:

“Es liegt ja die tiefste und eigentliche Bedürftigkeit des Menschen für das Wunder der Gnade nicht darin, daß er sie objektiv nötig hat, und daß er es objektiv nötig hat, daß sie ihm als Gnade zuteil werde – sondern darin, daß er in der Lage ist, sich selbst diese seine Bedürftigkeit zu verdecken und zu verbergen: vor sich selbst und dann – wenn auch lügnerisch – auch vor Gott nicht dieser Bedürftige, sondern ein reicher Mann zu sein, der auch ohne Gottes Gnade sein, oder der sich diese auch selbst zusprechen kann,” (144).

The Christological Criterion
If, however, the sinner constantly hides his need for God, then the question arises, where the human readiness for God at all becomes knowable. In 1932 Barth answered this question with reference to Emil Brunner’s Gott und Mensch (Brunner 1930) in a way that occasioned the 1934 debate between Barth und Brunner (McGrath 2013, 113-121.127-131). Barth rejects the existence of any point of contact for the Word of God (Anknüpfungspunkt für das Wort Gottes, Barth 1932, 251), such as Brunner had claimed the relics (Restbestände) of the image of God in the human being to be. By contrast, Barth stresses faith as the only place, where the point of contact is real, and where it is possible to know God.247 Human openness to God is here clearly an external reality.

In 1940, Barth’s perspective has shifted. At this point of time he states, what he did not in 1932, namely that human God-readiness and God-openness is visible in the true human being, that is, in Jesus Christ. Not that

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247 “Dieser Anknüpfungspunkt ist also nicht außerhalb des Glaubens, sondern nur im Glauben wirklich,” (Barth 1932, 251).
Barth has adopted Brunner’s 1930 and 1934 appeal to a ‘formal’ imago Dei understood as the relics of the status originalis in the created human being. Furthermore, Barth explicitly states that no human, not even a Christian,\textsuperscript{248} can ‘find himself in himself’. Only Jesus Christ is “die Erkennbarkeit Gottes von uns her, wie er die Gnade Gottes selber ist und also auch Gottes Erkennbarkeit von Gott her,” (Barth 1940, 167). Therefore, the human readiness for God accessible in Jesus Christ is the only God-openness for humans to recognise.

However, faith’s assurance of this openness is at this point of time, in 1940, not an assurance of a completely external reality. It involves the individual human being through the participation in Christ,\textsuperscript{249} a participation mediated by the Holy Spirit (175-177). Even though human participation in him can be thought and spoken of only hypothetically,\textsuperscript{250} faith in it is assured from the fact that it is the historical fulfilment of God’s eternal, gracious election (174-175). This election of every single human being in Jesus Christ (p144) means that his openness to God is also a subjective reality of the individual, though hidden and recognisable only in him.

Thus, Barth, from 1940 onwards, emphasises a historical fulfilled human mode of existence, in which the human openness for God is a reality, in that Jesus is Mensch für Gott (p93). In terms of Tertullian’s concept, this is an equivalent to the human nature of both the correspondence of freedom and of goodness.

With this Christological way of knowing God Barth claims to take serious that knowledge of God has to be mediated by God himself,\textsuperscript{251} and has its origin (Ursprung) in the Father’s and the Son’s mutual knowing of each other in the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{252} This also applies to knowledge of God’s hiddenness. If the only way to know God is through God, then any attempt

\textsuperscript{248} “[D]er christliche Mensch sollte der Letzte sein, der nun gerade daran festhalten wollte, sich selbst in sich selbst zu finden,” (Barth 1940, 167).

\textsuperscript{249} “In ihm gilt es nicht nur für Gott selbst, nicht nur zwischen dem Vater und dem Sohne, in ihm gilt es für den Menschen, für uns: Gott ist erkennbar. Denn in ihm ist der Mensch bereit für Gott,” (Barth 1940, 169).

\textsuperscript{250} “…von unserer Beziehung zu ihm, der in der Höhe ist, von unserer Teilhabe an ihm … [kann es] nur hypothetisch gedacht und geredet werden,” (Barth 1940, 174).

\textsuperscript{251} “Gott wird durch Gott erkannt,” (Barth 1940, 202).

\textsuperscript{252} “Daß es [menschlicher Gotteserkenntnis] Gott nicht nur zum Gegenstand, sondern auch zum Ursprung hat, daß sein primäres, eigentliches Subjekt der Vater ist, der den Sohn, der Sohn, der den Vater erkennt im Heiligen Geiste,” (Barth 1940, 203).
to understand his hiddenness by human views and concepts (*Anschauungen und Begriffe*) is mistaken.\(^{253}\)

God establishes this analogy by revelation’s restoring to their proper use (*ihr eigentlicher Gebrauch*) the words of the analogy, with which the human being speaks of God, and thus by making himself their true object:

“Gott muß sich uns in der Gnade seiner Offenbarung zum Gegenstande gemacht und damit unserem auf die kreatürlichen Gegenstände gerichteten Erkennen Wahrheit, die Wahrheit der Ähnlichkeit mit ihm verliehen haben,” (260).

Barth offers several examples of this restoring of words in the *analogia fidei* of revelation, such as the words ‘father’, ‘son’, ‘arm’, ‘mouth’ and ‘ear’, of which the proper use consists in that they point beyond themselves in referring to what they as mere human views and concepts cannot mean.\(^{254}\)

This is a further elaboration on what Barth earlier described as revelations ‘conquering’ of the language, by which it comes to speech:

“…nicht weil diese Dinge [the concepts and imagery of human speech about the Trinity] sich an sich und von sich aus dazu eignet, aber weil sie sich dazu eigneten, als Bilder der Trinität, als Mittel der Sprache von der Trinität angeeignet, sozusagen erobern zu werden…,” (Barth 1932, 360).\(^{255}\)

If, however, the content of revelation is determined solely by revelation itself, one may ask whether this is a circular line of thought.

Barth affirms that he in his presentation describes a circle.\(^{256}\) He claims, however, that there are both bad and good circles and that faith must assume...

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\(^{253}\) This leads Barth to deny that God’s hiddenness can be understood within the framework of general theories of knowledge (*allgemeiner Erkenntnistheorien*), whether Platonic or Kantian (Barth 1940, 205–6). Knowledge of the hiddenness of God is an article of faith (206), which retrieves its content from the Bible (207-215), and therefore is only understandable in the analogy of faith.

\(^{254}\) “At its root, Barth’s *analogia fidei* rests upon the understanding that creaturely media that have, in themselves, no capacity to be adequate bearers of revelation are made to be so by the use God makes of them in revelation. The context is a reflection on the relation of human language to God’s speech in revelation. Human language, Barth says, is language created by humans for speaking of the things and persons of their experience. As such, it has no capacity in itself to be the vehicle of God’s speech. But in that God takes it up and makes use of it in revealing himself, it is ‘qualified’ to be God’s Word,” (McCormack 2011a, 98).

\(^{255}\) Jüngel points to that this ‘conquering’ leads to a ‘gain of language’, namely that God as God comes to the language by which the revelation event takes place: “Wo solche ‘Eroberung’ der Sprache durch die Offenbarung für die Offenbarung Ereignis wird, kommt er zu einem Sprachgewinn. Er besteht darin, daß Gott als Gott zur Sprache kommt,” (Jüngel 1967, 22).

\(^{256}\) “Man könnte sagen, daß dies ja darin sichtbar geworden sei, daß wir mit diesen drei Gedankengängen offenkundig und zugestandenermaßen einen Kreis beschrieben haben,” (Barth 1940, 276).
that *analogia fidei* represents a *cirkulus veritatis Dei* (Barth 1940, 276–84). Thus, he makes a statement about theology as to principle: knowledge of God cannot avoid the circle, since God cannot be known from common reason.

This does not mean that the inner rationality of the knowledge of God cannot be examined, as is the case in §26 and §27, but that its truth claims cannot be approached on external grounds:

> “Wenn unsere dauernde Berufung auf Gottes Gnade und Offenbarung … jedenfalls für uns subjektiv kein Spiel mit Worten und auch kein Operieren mit einem systematischen Deus ex machina war … dann können wir es ja gar nicht anders haben wollen, als daß wir uns jener Frage gegenüber in der Tat nicht selber schützen können. Könnten wir es, was hätten wir dann getan, wenn wir unsere ganzen Überlegungen unter die Leitbegriffe der Offenbarung und der Gnade stellten?” (278-279).

Knowledge of God is then, a matter of faith’s reflection (*Nachdenken*) and self-examination. Faith will, however, not treat itself as an unquestionable presupposition (*als eine fraglos gegebene Voraussetzung*). It will always be a faith under temptation (*Anfechtung*). Thus, faith must, says Barth, regard its temptation as God’s work,\(^{257}\) since the final securing and insecuring (*Sicherung und Entsicherung*) of thoughts about God not are acts humans can perform (279). Even the question of belief, and whether believers truly know God, is too radical and shocking (*radikal und erschütternd*) for humans.

Still, faith must – from the perspective of faith itself – be under temptation to avoid being a mere intellectual presupposition. This is why God graciously tempts the human being and destroys faith, just to rebuild it with himself as both subject and object:


Barth’s emphasis on Christ as the *topos* of theological anthropology does not eliminate ‘the infinite qualitative difference’ (*der unendliche qualitative Unterschied*, Barth 1942, 641) between human and divine. It is rather faith’s testifying to the single place in human reality, where the God-human relation is fulfilled in spite of the difference, and where the continuity between Creator and creature, thus, lies open.

While Christology functions as criterion for the analogous likeness between God and human being, Barth emphasises the *Unterschied* with unprecedented strength in 1940 and 1942, stating that God in the act of

\(^{257}\) “Die Anfechtung ist ja genau so wie der Trost (und vom Trost gar nicht zu trennen) ein göttliches Werk,” (Barth 1940, 280)
creation is self-conditioning, whereas the human being is absolutely grounded von außen.\textsuperscript{258}

For this reason, the Christological shaping of the analogia fidei must be understood in continuity with the 1932-use of the concept. It is essentially an unfolding of the doctrine of revelation from the perspective of faith.

As such, it is faith’s doctrinal accounting for the conditions for knowledge of God, and it addresses the question of universal humanness. Human subjectivity, dialectically established in correspondence to God’s freedom, is accessible and discernible in Jesus Christ. Hence, from the perspective of the ‘circular reasoning faith’ it is universal, because of all other human beings’ participation in him.

Even though Barth, prior to 1945, can speak of revelation’s including of created human language (by ‘restoring’ and ‘conquering’, p106), he still does not unfold how revelation (the analogia fidei) relates to created human nature.

In terms of Tertullian’s concept, Barth – at this point of time – interprets human existence from the divine-human difference and from the correspondence of similarity.

**Barth’s Notion of Analogia Relationis in Creation**

From 1945 onwards, Barth broadens his use of the concept of analogy by the inclusion of the ‘analogy of relation’. He introduces this anthropological use of the concept in the context of his exegesis of Gen. 1:26-31, that is: in his interpretation of the imago Dei. The ‘image’, so Barth, is ‘not a dignity inherent in the human being’ (\textit{nicht eine dem Menschen immanente Würde}, Barth 1945, 223), but ‘God’s intention and action in creating the human being’ ([\textit{Gottes} Absicht und Tat in der Erschaffung des Menschen]).

Corresponding to this intentional interpretation of the imago Dei, Barth argues to understand the \textit{bet} of the Hebrew בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים as \textit{bet normae} rather than as \textit{bet essentia} (pp51.192): “Nicht zum Bilde, sondern … entsprechend dem Bilde Gottes ist der Mensch geschaffen,” (222).

Barth emphasises ‘the non-solitariness of God’ (die Nicht-Einsamkeit Gottes, 204). On basis of the plural form in Gen. 1:26 he states that there is in the divine being a plurality and a community that makes it likely to understand the ‘let us’ as an expression of an unanimous decision of this

\textsuperscript{258} “Es ist ja die göttliche causa im Unterschied zur geschöpflichen, die schlechterdings in sich selbst begründete, sich selbst setzende und bedingende, sich selbst kausierende causa ... So ist Gott Subjekt, so causa. Und eben darum gibt es nichts, worin ihm das kreatürliche Subjekt gleich wäre. Denn es ist die geschöpfliche causa, die ebenso schlechterdings von außen und also gerade nicht in und durch sich selbst begründete causa,” (Barth 1950, 116).
inner-divine relation. God’s decision to create the human being as his own partner (203) confirms his inner essence (seinem inneren Wesen) as a plurality in unity.\textsuperscript{259} The imago Dei, then, indicates an original, prototypical reality (Urbild), existing within the Godhead, and the creation of the human being according to God’s likeness means the analogous human correspondence to this reality:

“‘In unserem Urbild’ heißt: geschaffen als ein Wesen, das darin seinen Grund und seine Möglichkeit hat, daß in ‘uns’, d. h. im Bereich und Wesen Gottes selbst ein göttliches und also in sich selbst begründetes Urbild existiert, dem jenes Wesen entsprechen, das jenes Wesen also in seiner ganzen Abbildlichkeit und also Andersartigkeit legitimieren, das seine Existenz rechtfertigen kann und durch das es, wenn ihm Existenz gegeben wird, in der Tat legitimiert und gerechtfertigt sein wird,” (Barth 1945, 205).

Further, this means that the ‘image’ is the purpose and goal, for which the human being is created, and, thus, expresses the same teleological perspective as the entire §41 (p88). Even though Barth is reluctant to accept the explicit Trinitarian understanding of the plural of Gen. 1:26\textsuperscript{260} with the direct identification of ‘the image’ and the second person of the Trinity,\textsuperscript{261} imago Dei indicates the humanness that pre-existed in God prior to creation and was revealed in Jesus Christ, the true human being (p118).

This interpretation presupposes that the humanness eternally inherent in God has a concrete form.\textsuperscript{262} Barth emphasises that it is a divine Du, who is summoned by a divine Ich:

“Wie sich das anrufende Ich in Gottes Wesen zu dem von ihm angerufenen göttlichen Du verhält, so verhält sich Gott zu dem von ihm geschaffenen Menschen, so verhält sich in der menschlichen Existenz selbst das Ich zum Du, der Mann zur Frau,” (220).

\textsuperscript{259} “…weil er [Gott] wohl Einer aber eben darum nicht nur Eines ist, darum kann er Schöpfer werden und also ein Gegenüber haben außer sich selbst, ohne mit seinem inneren Wesen in Widerspruch zu geraten: vielmehr in Bestätigung, in Verherrlichung seines inneren Wesens,” (Barth 1945, 205).

\textsuperscript{260} Barth rejects that the plural form of Gen. 1:26 is a pluralis majestatis: “Die Annahme, daß die Sage mit einer realen Pluralität im göttlichen Wesen gerechnet hat und daß auch die priesterliche Redaktion, in deren Fassung sie uns Gen. 1 vorliegt, das nicht verweisen wollte, ist unumgänglich,” (Barth 1945, 215). He is more sympathetic to the Trinitarian exegesis of the ancient church ([die altkirchliche Exegese]). While the text in itself, so Barth, makes no explicit Trinitarian claim, it includes a reference to the one God’s non-solitariness, and, hence, an inner-divine differentiation in terms of the relation between an Ich and a Du. Therefore, he finds the Trinitarian understanding of the ancient church to do more justice to the text than does the modern alternatives.

\textsuperscript{261} Cf. Tertullian (p51) and many other ancient church writers.

\textsuperscript{262} An abstract relationality could hardly be said to be identical with the humanness revealed in Jesus (McCormack 2011a, 135–39).
Thus, he anticipates §45’s presentation of the humanness of Jesus as *Sein für Gott* (Barth 1948, 242–64) and the ‘definition of the true human being’ as ‘being summoned’ (*Aufgerufensein*, p92). This essentially Christological definition of humanness is, then, clearly in line with the 1940- and 1942-use of the concept of analogy.

Unlike the earlier volumes, however, Barth now claims that the relation, in which the inner-divine *imago Dei* exists, corresponds analogously to a relation of created human life. This analogy between relations is the content of Barth’s notion of *analogia relationis*: “So ist das tertium comparationis, die *Analogie* zwischen Gott und Mensch sehr schlicht die Existenz im Gegenüber von *Ich* und *Du*, (Barth 1945, 207).

In terms of the concept of Tertullian, the created human *Ich-Du*-existence equates the correspondence of freedom. To be an *Ich*, encountering a *Du*, is in Barth’s view a qualification of subjectivity (p126). Thus, the implications of the *analogia relationis* is that the human subjectivity of revelation is identical with created human subjectivity, or rather: that faith holds them to be identical.

Barth is at this point, and in his working out of the notion of analogy of relation, inspired by Bonhoeffer. Unlike Bonhoeffer, however, Barth understands the Gen. 1:27-saying of sexual differentiation, ‘male and female he created them’, as a grammatical apposition to the statement of creation in the image of God. Sexual differentiation, then, expresses analogously the human correspondent to the inner-divine relation:


Barth understands the created relation between man and woman as the original form (*Urgestalt, Urform*) of all human relationality, both in the human-God relation and in other human relations. The man-woman relation is a copy and an imitation (*Abbild und Nachbild*) of the Creator’s inner relationality, and a prototype (*Vorbild*) of the covenantal relationship between Creator and creature fulfilled in salvation history (209).

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263 “Das ist die eigentümliche Würde, die dem Geschlechtsverhältnis hier zugeschrieben wird. Indem es rein geschöpflich, indem es dem Menschen mit dem Tiere gemeinsam ist, ist es als einziges reales Prinzip der Unterscheidung und Beziehung, als die Urgestalt, in der der Mensch Gott gegenübersteht und als die Urform alles Verkehrs von Mensch zu Mensch das Humane und damit auch das geschöpfliche Ebenbild Gottes. Der Mensch kann und wird auf alle Fälle vor Gott und unter seinesgleichen nur darin Mensch sein, daß er Mann ist im Verhältnis zur Frau und Frau im Verhältnis zum Mann,” (Barth 1945, 209).
Still, Barth emphasises the ontological difference between God and the human being. Despite the personal Ich-Du-relation to God, humans in the analogy of relation remains creature: “Sie ist Abbildlichkeit und nicht Urbildlichkeit, Nachbildlichkeit und nicht Vorbildlichkeit,” (212), and precisely in this creaturely inferiority the human being is dependent on God’s blessing and intervention from outside. Therefore, human existence is essentially a being in hope, a hope that relies on the promise (Verheißung) contained in the created human relation as prototype of the covenantal relation to God. Humans exist, says Barth, only in this specific differentiation, that is: in the duality of the sexual differentiation:

“…wir [können] nicht Mensch sagen ..., ohne entweder Mann oder Frau und ohne zugleich Mann und Frau sagen zu müssen. Der Mensch existiert in dieser Differenzierung, in dieser Zweiheit,” (Barth 1948, 344).

The implications of this concern, of course, not only sexual love and marriage (346-349), but the soteriological promise inherent in sexual differentiation, a promise Barth sees unfolded in Scripture’s use of marriage as a metaphor for the Yahweh-Israel covenant and for the relation between Christ and the church (358-384, cf. p90).

The crucial point is, however, that this typological exegesis presupposes that the defining Ich-Du-relationality of created human life anticipates human determination (Bestimmung), that is: the covenant. In this sense the human being is ‘capable of covenant’ (bündnisfähig, 267-268):


This, however, is the determination, not the natural reality of the human being. The analogia relationis is forward-looking in its character. It specifies the teleological perspective of Barth’s anthropology in that created co-humanness as covenant partner of fellow humans points toward redeemed humanness as covenant partner of God:


It is clearly important to Barth to safeguard himself from the understanding that the establishing of the divine-human correspondence is within the
capability of human nature, that is: what he in 1929 termed as das Geschöpf als solche (Barth 1994, 464, p101). Human Ich-Du-relationality is the instrument of God’s revelation, not the foundation for it.

The question is, however, if Barth by interpreting this instrument as created Verheißung nonetheless introduces a ‘formal’ imago Dei as Anknüpfungspunkt für das Wort Gottes in a way similar to that of Brunner. According to Brunner’s 1951 comment on the anthropology of Die kirchliche Dogmatik, he does so, and Regin Prenter suggests a similar understanding (Prenter 1950, 219–22, 1955, 304, 1977, 12–17).

However, according to Barth, divine-human correspondence is established solely in the revelatory use, God makes of human relationality. Hence, it is not consistent with Barth to understand this relationality as a ‘point of contact’ that logically precedes and conditions revelation. Quite the contrary, revelation’s instrumental use of created human relationality, presupposes that revelation itself is logically and ontologically prior to human relationality.

Faith must hold, then, that creation has its inner basis in the covenant, that is: that creation has its sole ground in God’s eternal decision to enter into relation with what is different from himself.

Brunner’s and Prenter’s explicitly Lutheran critiques of Barth – as well as their partial agreement with him! – both assume that relationality is “human nature ‘surviving’ in spite of sin” (Brunner 1951, 125), and that human Bündnislfähigkeit, thus, precedes revelation. To Barth, however, God’s gracious revelation is the cause of his creation of the human being. Therefore, even after 1945 he maintains that the human subjectivity, by which the human being is capable for the covenantal relation to God, is established in and by revelation.

This means that Barth does not, despite the shift in emphasis and perspective, take leave of the notion of analogia fidei and the corresponding understanding of human conformity to God (Gottförmigkeit). This conformity is still a reality only recognisable by faith.

Faith holds that the universal human relationality is a created Verheißung, which analogously prepares the human being for covenant. However, faith does not hold this on grounds of any analysis of human relationality, but in its confession to the triune God as Creator (p91). Thus, faith must presuppose God’s intentional will to reveal himself, since the creation and the existence

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264 Brunner commented on this point: “Do we now really mean the same thing? At least we have come a great deal closer to one another,” (Brunner 1951, 124). To Brunner, ‘the new Barth’ is the result of Barth’s inclusion of insights in human relationality provided by F. Ebner, M. Buber, F. Gogarten and himself (Brunner 1951, 123–125.128.131).
of every human being has its inner basis in God’s decision to enter into covenant.

Revelation is still, then, in the 1929 terminology, a ‘second wonder’, even though it in 1945 and 1948 has become clear (from the 1942 revision of the doctrine of election) that it is only within the chronology of salvation history, revelation can be said to be ‘second’. Logically and ontologically, revelation is prior to creation.

**Universal Humanness – a Theological Postulate?**

If universal humanness is established by revelation, then the very concept of analogy is still a circular reasoning in faith (p107), the truth claims of which cannot be approached on any faith-external basis. The notion of analogia relationis does not break this circle.

According to Barth, this is no postulate. He distinguishes between the doctrine of creation as a statement of faith (articulus fidei, Barth 1945, 22) and as a postulate, the latter being a mere claim – from logical necessities – that ‘it has to be so’. On grounds of the Christian confession to Jesus Christ, the doctrine of creation and the universal humanness revealed in him is not postulate, but knowledge (Wissen). In this sense, Barth clearly attempts to overcome the subjectivism of philosophical or religious assumptions and postulates as foundation for theological anthropology:

"Seine Offenbarung und der Glaube an ihn vermittelt uns auch in Sachen der Schöpfung die eine, wahre, klare und gewisse Erkenntnis, neben der es wohl Vermutungen, Hypothesen und Postulate, wohl die Aufstellungen frommer Weltanschauungen gibt, aber keine andere Erkenntnis," (25).

However, it is only possible to conclude with Barth that the humanness revealed in Jesus is Erkenntnis rather than Postulat, if one initially accepts his claim that statements of faith is to be distinguished from postulates.

This, I believe, can be formulated as a question of, whether Barth’s understanding of theology as faith’s self-examination (p96) ultimately is the simple substitution of the philosophical and/or religious postulates of Liberal Protestantism for a theological statement. If so, it is hard to see, how such...

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265 "Welche logischen Notwendigkeiten sprechen dafür, daß es so sein muß, daß es unvermeidlich ist, zu postulieren, daß es so sei?" (Barth 1945, 23).

266 This understanding of faith’s perspective from the confession to the triune Creator underlies the Barth interpretation of George Lindbeck, who argues that a theology in line with Barth essentially is about inner-theological matters or intra-textual biblical interpretation, that is: the ‘grammar’ of the church’s credential language. Building on Hans W. Frei, Lindbeck understands Barth’s doctrine of revelation as “an analysis ... of the logic of performative utterances,” (Lindbeck 1986, 368). According to Frei, Barth “tends ... toward a sort of literary or conceptual-analytical reading of the biblical text,”
a substitution can prevent subjectivism. This is essentially Pannenberg’s critique (p165), which emphasises that it is impossible to avoid that the reference to a particular humanly and historically mediated revelation event ends up as a mere postulate.

However, as I have argued (p20) Barth does not understand his theology as ‘grounded’ on the foundation of a subjective claim. He affirms that ‘faith’s reflection on faith’ is a circular line of thought (p107), but understands it as an affirmation of the particular human mode of existence in response to God’s freedom in revelation, that is: the ‘subsequent subjectivity’.

What happens by the notion of the analogy of relation is that Barth broadens the perspective from the particular revelation event to human relationality. Not by breaking the circle, but by including created co-humanness in the circle, that is: by applying his understanding of revelation on created humanness.

In terms of Tertullian’s concept, this means that Barth from the perspective of the correspondence of similarity, that is: from the perspective of faith, affirms the universality of the first correspondence. In other words: faith affirms a universal human dignity, a universal ‘Yes!’ of the Creator (p96), and a universal human responsible subjectivity.

But this can only be affirmed from the perspective of faith. This means that Barth’s theology of 1945 and 1948, as far as I can see, makes no claim to modify the concept of revelation from the earlier volumes. Revelation expresses God’s radical freedom, to which the Bible testifies as the revelation of divine ‘lordship’. The 1932 unfolding of the doctrine of the Trinity is explicitly grounded in this concept of revelation (Barth 1932, 311–15), so that it articulates God’s self-reliance and subjectivity in terms of the inner-Trinitarian relations.

As grounded in revelation the analogy of relation does not change this concept, but applies it on created humanness in a way similar to how Barth earlier applied it on human language. At that time, Barth spoke of revelation’s *Eroberung* (Barth 1932, 360) and *wieder Zuführung zum eigentlichen Gebrauch* (Barth 1940, 259) of human language by the *analogia*...
fidei. Here, in 1945 and 1948, revelation by the analogia relationis utilises created human relationality as human counterpart to the inner-divine relation.

Jüngel points to the ‘gain of language’ (Jüngel 1967, 22) that the analogous utilising of human language causes. Similarly, the analogous use of created co-humanness in revelation causes a ‘gain of relationality’. This ‘gain’ implies a surplus of meaning, so that created human nature is brought to speak of human determination (Bestimmung) as God’s covenant partners, even though this determination does not belong to human nature in itself. In this sense, the analogy of relation is “eine Sprachform des Glaubens,” (Jüngel 1962).

Further, it also implies that the human being is established as a ‘subsequent subject’ in correspondence to God exactly by utilising the created human subjectivity of the Ich-Du-existence. God’s human partner is, then, not an alien humanness, but precisely the created human being, who by the revelation event is incorporated in the God-human relation. Therefore, the ‘gain of relationality’ is not only a surplus of meaning, but even more a surplus of subjectivity.

This being the case, Barth’s anthropology suggests a certain way to account doctrinally for the conditions for human knowledge of God, affirming Tertullian’s claim that the one to know God must correspond to God (p41). The analogy of relation conceptualises how God in revelation establishes this correspondence, using created human relationality. This correspondence is, so Barth, the very content of the concept of imago Dei.

The universality of created humanness does not, however, lead Barth to Tertullian’s conclusion that the knowledge of God is universal (Adversus Marcionem I,10,4, p43), because the universal making-himself-known is essential to God’s being (p54). According to Barth, humanness is universal, only because of universal human participation in Christ (p96) and universal election in him (144).

In light of Tertullian, this is due to Barth’s concept of revelation. Revelation is, so Barth, chronologically subsequent to creation, but logically and ontologically prior to it. In both cases, it is to be distinguished from it, and it is by this distinction, Barth most decisively differs from Tertullian’s way to understand human nature from the question of knowledge of God. In Tertullian, God’s communicative act is included in the creation of the human being, and, thus, the relation to God belongs to the particular human kind of

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268 The ‘gain of relationality’ is my term, not Barth’s or Jüngel’s.
natura. So, according to Tertullian, *sind wir von Natur Gottes Bundesgenossen*, or, as he puts it: The soul is by nature Christian.\(^{269}\)

Against this background, sin to Tertullian appears as a fundamentally inexplicable tragedy, an invasive ‘second’ nature (p71), which in every single human person suppresses and contradicts the created reality from the very beginning of life (*De Testimonio Animae* 1,7) and leads to eternal perdition for those, who are not released by grace through baptism. Sin, so Tertullian, is in the strict sense unnatural and inhuman, as it runs counter to human nature.

As we shall see, Barth likewise understands sin as inhumanity, not only in that it contradicts human determination, but even more in that it contradicts human nature (p130). However, Barth does not develop his doctrine of sin on basis of his understanding of created human nature, not even as its negation. Since human nature is revealed only in Jesus, who is the true human being, the only way to understand sin is from Christology.

Before turning to that, however, I shall go a little further into the question of, how the human ‘subsequent subjectivity’ in Barth corresponds to the soul-bodily human constitution.

### 3.3 The Human Being as Unity of Soul and Body

As we have seen, Tertullian defends the unity of human constitution by stating the soul’s corporeality, and the mutual affecting each other of body and soul. He believes such unity to be necessary for the bodily mediated influence of God (and the Devil) on the human person (p77).

According to Tertullian, this unity is, however, an ordered unity, as the soul is the subject of bodily actions and, thus, the *principale* of human constitution (p70), that is: the guiding principle of the human subject held responsible by God. He understands this primacy of the soul in terms of a Platonic distinction between *rationalis* and *inrationalis*, but breaks with the Platonic (and Stoic) dichotomy in that he includes *passio* in *ratio* (p72). In doing so, he presents the primacy of the soul as an ethical matter, which is about whether God or the Devil affects the soul. Hence, the duality of original human nature and sin as ‘alien nature’ is for Tertullian the key to understand the human experience of being a divided person.

Unlike Tertullian, Barth is not explicit about what dogmatic concern he intends §46’s presentation\(^{270}\) of the human soul-bodily constitution to carry out. Moreover, he emphasises his own difference from ‘the anthropology of

\(^{269}\) *Apologeticum* 17,6, speaking of the testimony of the naturally Christian soul (*testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae*).

\(^{270}\) “Der Mensch als Seele und Leib,” (Barth 1948, 391–524).
ancient Christian dogmatics’ in that he turns to the question of human 
constitution (Beschaffenheit) only after having dealt with the human being 
(das menschliche Sein an sich und als solches, Barth 1948, 391):

“Die Anthropologie der alten christlichen Dogmatik pflegte ohne diese 
Grundlegung sofort mit dem Problem einzusetzen, an das wir nun erst 
herankommen: mit dem Problem der Beschaffenheit jenes Seins, mit dem Problem 
des menschlichen Daseins und Soseins,” (Barth 1948, 391).

The human being is essentially a being for God (Sein für Gott), that is: to be 
summoned to hear God’s word and to respond in gratitude (p93). Thus, he 
warns to make human constitution the basis of theological anthropology, as 
he finds has been the case in the tradition from which he dissociates himself. 
This tradition has, so Barth, generally taken over the concept of soul as well 
as the understanding of the soul-bodily relation from classical metaphysics, 
primarily from Aristotle, but with influence from Plato (456-458). This has 
led to a dualistic understanding of human constitution with strong emphasis 
on the soul at the expense of the body. Moreover, it has led theology to focus 
on what the human being is, rather than who the human being is.

This raises the question of, why Barth takes the trouble of giving such a 
detailed and comprehensive presentation of human constitution, if his 
theological concern is solely dependent on the God-human relation. Initially, 
he simply states that he attempts to reach a ‘Christian understanding of the 
matter’, as if it were included just because it belongs to the curriculum of 
dogmatics.

It may be so that Barth has no other intention than this; the text of §46 
does not explicitly, as far as I can see, make it possible to conclude otherwise. 
However, in light of Barth’s understanding of human subjectivity as 
established by revelation’s addressing of the human person, the crucial step 
of his argument is that he understands the human soul-bodily unity as an

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271 “Wir werden also umsichtig vorgehen müssen, wenn wir uns einerseits von den 
mannigfachen Belastungen der hier in Frage kommenden nichttheologischen 
Fragestellungen und Theorien frei halten und andererseits nun doch auch hier von einem 
tragfähigen, biblisch-exegetischen Grund her wirklich sehen und denken und also 
Erkenntnis, und zwar christliche Erkenntnis, auch in dieser Sache gewinnen wollen,” 
(Barth 1948, 392).

272 And, thus, makes it possible to address the human self-experience of ‘inner and outer 
experiences’ (inneren und äußeren Erfahrungen, Barth 1948, 424), testified to in such 
pairs of concepts as “‘Der Mensch als Geist und als stofflicher Organismus’, ‘der 
vernünftige und der sinnliche’ [Mensch], ‘der innere und der äußere’ [Mensch], ‘der 
unsichtbare und der sichtbare’ [Mensch], ‘der unbegreifliche und der begreifliche’ 
[Mensch], ‘der intelligible und der empirische’ [Mensch], sogar ‘der himmlische und der 
irdische’ Mensch…” (392-393). Barth chooses ‘Der Mensch als Seele und Leib’ because 
it is closest to the language of Scripture.
‘ordered totality’ (*eine geordnete Ganzheit*), in which the soul rules and the body serves. This rule (*Regieren*) of the soul can be known from God’s summoning of the human being as a rational being, that is: from the ‘definition of the true human being’ (*der Definition des wirklichen Menschen*, 180, pp. 92.94). Thus, it is precisely this working out of the human constitution as ‘ordered’ that makes possible the particular human ‘mode of existence’ of ‘subsequent subjectivity’, in which faith’s knowledge of God is a reality.

The ‘ordered totality’ is, so Barth, revealed in the unity and totality (*Einheit und Ganzheit*) of Jesus Christ, the ‘complete human being’ (*Jesus, der ganze Mensch*, 391-414). As distinct aspects of the one living person, soul and body cannot exist without each other or be reduced to one another, as is the case in materialism as well as in spiritualism. Barth concludes that materialism leads to subjectlessness, while spiritualism on the other hand leads to objectlessness. The main issue is, however, not to demonstrate the inner contradictions of materialistic or spiritualistic monism, but to argue that they both make it impossible to see the real human being:

“Unser Argument gegen ihn besteht schlicht darin, daß man den wirklichen Menschen auch in seiner Konzeption nicht zu sehen bekommt,” (459).

From the perspective of faith, this is, so Barth, about the New Testament witness to the relation between soul and body in *Jesus*. Barth emphasises the unity to an eminent degree; Jesus is ‘embodied soul and besouled body’. From the perspective of faith, then, any ontological dualism is ruled out by the unity of his person. By this Christological emphasis on unity, Barth believes to modify the notions of soul and body in accordance with the theological inquiry (*die theologische Fragestellung*, 393).

Further, he mentions a large number of biblical references (395-399) to show that the two factors (*Momente*) of Jesus’ person never contradicted each other, and that he, exactly by this unique personal unity, is the true human being (*wahrer Mensch*):

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273 In both of these variants of monism, so Barth, the unity of human constitution is made the basis of a reductionist response to the ontological dualism of classical metaphysics. This is the case regardless of whether it is a materialist monism (Barth 1948, 458–68) or an idealistic, spiritualistic monism (Barth 1948, 468–70). Materialist monism considers the soul as a mere epiphenomenon, whereas spiritualistic monism tends to deny the body ontological reality to the same extent as the soul (470).

274 “Wenn der Materialismus den Menschen mit seiner Leugnung der Seele subjektlos macht, so macht ihn der Spiritualismus mit seiner Leugnung des Leibes objektlos. Auf so etwas wie eine neue und nun erst recht fatale Aufspaltung des Menschen laufen also beide hinaus, obwohl die Meinung hier wie dort monistisch, obwohl ihrer beider beachtenswerte Absicht gerade auf den Aufweis der Einheit der menschlichen Wirklichkeit gerichtet ist,” (Barth 1948, 470).

It is beyond the aims of this dissertation to examine Barth’s exegesis in detail. However, I doubt that the soul-body-language is suitable to grasp the New Testament picture of Jesus, even in the way Barth tries to do, that is: by making the personal unity of soul and body the crucial point. While clearly aware of the New Testament texts’ inadequacy as sources to the inner life of Jesus, Barth still draws quite far-reaching conclusions claiming that “[g]erade so hat das Neue Testament offenbar bewußt und wirksam auf den einen und ganzen Menschen Jesus hingewiesen. Gerade in diesem nach beiden Seiten allein wichtigen Daß wird er sichtbar,” (398).

This has implications for the character that Jesus’ humanness can be believed to have. According to Barth, the difference between Jesus and other humans is the tension-free unity of soul and body, he believes to find in the New Testament witness to him (502). Humans other than Jesus know only of the duality of soul and body in the tension between the two. Jesus, by contrast, experienced no such tension, which means that the unity of his person is emphasised so strongly in the New Testament that the differentiation is easily missed (Cortez 2008, 332):

“So ist er [Jesus] Mensch als Seele und Leib. Eben die in ihm stattfindende Erhöhung des Fleisches, des seelisch-leiblichen Menschen bedeutet nun aber eine in ihm vollzogene Ordnung des Verhältnisses dieser beiden Momente menschlichen Seins. Ein Gegeneinander dieser beiden kommt nicht in Frage. Daß die Seele gegen den Leib, der Leib gegen die Seele ist, das ist ja nicht nur im Fall des Triumphs des Leibes über die Seele, sondern auch im Fall siegreichen – oder vermeintlich

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275 I doubt that Cortez is right in stating that “Barth’s argument … does not revolve around particular (proof) texts that might support his point” but “builds on the way ‘the overall shape and pattern of the text’ portrays Jesus,” (Cortez 2008, 331). Actually, Barth lists numerous proof texts. However, the conclusions he draws from them are in my opinion not obviously convincing.

276 “…ein vollständiges und vor allem: ein irgendwie konkret charakteristisches Bild wird uns doch auch von dieser Seite nicht geboten,” (Barth 1948, 397).

Barth’s point is that true humanness is a fundamental unity, in which a necessary distinction between soul and body must be made. They are not to be understood as different substances, but as distinct factors (Momente)\textsuperscript{278} that together form a certain structure or order (Ordnung), by which the human person is constituted. Any dualism, whether it appears as the body’s libertine emancipation from the soul or as the soul’s ascetic suppression of the body, is basically carnal (fleischlich), that is: sinful, a lack of Logos (406-407; 489-499). It is, says Barth, exactly this sinfulness/carnality that provides the tensions and contradictions, by which any other person than Jesus experiences the mind-body-difference.

Barth’s conclusion is clear: The besouled body is simply the living body (421), and the living human being exists only in the soul-bodily structure. The soul is simply the life of a self-contained bodily being.\textsuperscript{279} However, the Christological grounds, Barth presents as his reasons to state the fundamental unity of soul and body, in my judgment call for critical response, even beyond the abovementioned exegetical reservations concerning Barth’s use of the New Testament texts. Barth eagerly emphasises that Jesus in his person experienced no tension between the mental will, consciousness, decisions etc. of the soul and bodily desires. Such tensions are, so Barth, ultimately expressions of the absence of God’s Spirit and lack of true humanness.

However, it is in my opinion a question, whether such a Jesus can be truly human in any other sense than as the definition of true humanness. According to Barth, every person except Jesus experiences the contradictory tension between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’, which characterises sinful human life ‘according to the flesh’ (die Art des Fleisches, 407). If this tension is totally foreign to Jesus, one must ask whether he can be ‘in the likeness of sinful flesh’ (Rom. 8:3), and if not, whether he can be said to be in solidarity with

\textsuperscript{278} “Wir unterscheiden in dem einen Menschen nicht zwei Substanzen, wohl aber zwei Momente seiner geschöpflichen Wirklichkeit, weil das Belebende und das Belebte, die Seele und der Leib also, im Menschen sich in dieser Weise voneinander abheben, in dieser Weise voneinander verschieden sind,” (Barth 1948, 478).

\textsuperscript{279} “Seele ist Leben, selbständiges Leben, das selbständige Leben eines Körperwesens. Leben heißt allgemein: Aktuosität, Eigenbewegung, Eigentätigkeit, Eigengestaltung. Selbständiges Leben ist da, wo diese Eigenbewegung, Eigentätigkeit, Eigengestaltung nicht nur die Fortsetzung und Teilerscheinung eines allgemeinen Lebensprozesses bedeutet, sondern wo ein bestimmtes Subjekt lebendig ist ... Seele ist Leben. Was leblos ist, das ist auch seelenlos,” (Barth 1948, 449).
humans at all.\textsuperscript{280} This is why Jürgen Moltmann says that Barth at this point seems to follow Schleiermacher’s Christology with its thesis of a perfectly dominant God-consciousness\textsuperscript{281} rather than the Christology of the New Testament.

**The Soul’s Rule and the Body’s Service**

Moltmann’s critique of Barth is closely tied to a more fundamental critique of the soul’s leading role in the structure of human constitution in Barth’s anthropology. Soul and body are not just a unity, but an ordered unity in which Barth emphasises the soul’s primacy. Despite his refusal of the ontological soul-body distinction of classical metaphysics (456-458) he wants to maintain the relation between the soul’s rule (Regieren) and the body’s service (Dienen):

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

Faith’s reason to hold the soul’s primacy is, thus, that God addresses humans as rational beings:

\begin{quote}
“Indem Gott den Menschen anredet, behandelt er ihn nämlich als ein Wesen, das sich selber regieren und das sich selber dienen kann. Eben darin behandelt er ihn als Vernunftwesen. Eben darin wird also sichtbar, daß er als Vernunftwesen geschaffen ist,” (509).
\end{quote}

This particular understanding of the human being as Vernunftwesen excludes, however, any human self-interpretation as ‘pure soul’ or ‘pure thinking’, since God’s summoning takes place in the physical world of the body (509-510). Likewise, it excludes any self-interpretation as ‘pure body’,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[280] This is the point of Marc Cortez: “Such a description of Jesus’ life unfortunately neglects the occasional references to the real tensions that are occasionally seen in his life – e.g. Gethsemane (Mt. 26:37ff.). Barth may have been better served by using his emphasis on Jesus’ solidarity with human persons in taking up human ‘flesh’ with its contradictions and tensions (CD III/2, pp. 335–40; cf. also CD IV/1, pp. 171–5, 216) to argue that inner tension and conflict is a real aspect of our present earthly state even though the biblical emphasis on the unity of the whole person points in the direction of a redeemed life where harmony between these two aspects of the person is the goal,” (Cortez 2008, 331).
\end{footnotes}
that is: pure sensation and desire, as the body is determined by the soul (510-511). Most important, however, it implies that the human being must understand him- or herself as a single subject:

“Versteht sich der Mensch in seinem durch Gott begründeten und geordneten Verhältnis zu Gott, dann kann er sich im Blick auf die zwei Momente seines Wesens, Seele und Leib, auf keinen Fall als ein doppeltes, auf jeden Fall nur als ein einfaches, als Seele mit seinem Leib, als Leib mit seiner Seele identisches Subjekt verstehen,” (511).

Thus, the anthropological understanding of human constitution is ultimately a matter of God use of the ordered unity of soul and body in revelation. God’s revealing act utilises the rational nature (Vernunftnatur) of the human being to establish a human subject – and a human self-interpretation as subject – in encounter with God, as his creature and as his Gegenüber.

Therefore, Barth holds that faith must affirm the soul’s primacy in terms of a ‘ruling’ soul and a ‘serving’ body.\textsuperscript{282} According to Moltmann, this implies that Barth’s incorporates the dualism of classical metaphysics,\textsuperscript{283} and that that he by doing so is exponent of a tendency in the entire Western theology, Tertullian included.\textsuperscript{284}

However, while Tertullian clearly affirms the soul’s primacy, and does so in order to maintain human subjectivity, he differs more from Barth than Moltmann believes. His understanding of rationality raises a question about Barth’s concept of reason (Vernunft).

Tertullian’s understanding of rationality breaks, as we saw, completely with the dichotomy between reason and passion in that he on Christological

\textsuperscript{282} Barth interprets this as an analogous anticipation (Vorwegnahme, Barth 1948, 513) of the determination of creation, namely divine ruling and human service. It even images the eschatological relation between Christ and the church in an analogues way, as well as the inter-human relation between man and woman, which is the ‘original form’ (Urgestalt, Barth 1945, 209, pp98.110) of the encounter that defines human nature.

\textsuperscript{283} Barth’s understanding of human constitution as ruling soul and serving body is, so Moltmann, “[w]as Barth als hierarchisches Verhältnis von Seele und Leib mit platonischen Begriffen zum Ausdruck bringt,” (Moltmann 1985, 257). Moltmann seems to assume, though, that the influence on Barth from classical metaphysics is Aristotelian, despite the Platonic concepts: “Barth folgt in seiner darstellung … den antiken Metaphysikern, in besonders Aristoteles,” (258-259). In any case, he believes that this turns Barth’s entire theology into a ‘theological doctrine of sovereignty’(eine theologische Souveränitätslehre, 258), in which the Father’s inner-Trinitarian reign over the obeying Son legitimates an extra-Trinitarian understanding of God’s rule over the world, of Christ’s rule over the church and of man’s rule over woman. This is so, because Barth’s understanding of the soul’s primacy in human constitution means that it is ‘ordered’ (geordnet) according to a dualistic and hierarchic conception of reality that necessarily leads to suppression and sexism.

grounds includes passio in ratio (De Anima 16,3-5, p72). Correspondingly, the rational soul is rational in emotion, in sensation and even in desire (concupiscientia). Rationality is, then, ultimately a matter of ethics, that is: a matter of a human mode of existence accessible in historical human life as God moves the soul in emotion and sensation as well as in understanding (p78).

Barth specifies his concept of reason, stating that he by the word Vernunft does not refer to a mere ability to think, but to the comprehensive sense of the Latin ratio or the Greek λόγος as ‘meaningful order’ (sinnhafte Ordnung, Barth 1948, 503). This means, so Barth, that the body has full participation (Anteil) in human rationality.

However, I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that Barth is closer to the understanding of human reason as ‘ability to think’ (Denkvermögen) than he claims to be. Describing how the soul’s rule over the body takes place, he explicitly states that it is by ‘thinking and willing’, and even that this thinking and willing is the fulfilling of the human act of living:

“Indem er denkt und will, indem er also den menschlichen Lebensakt vollzieht, behandelt er seinen Bereich, nämlich seinen Leib, als sein Dominium, verfügt er über seinen Leib, gebraucht er ihn, schreitet er über ihn hinaus, um ihm voranzugehen,” (509).

This seems to leave very little room for emotion and sensation, or even passion and desire, in Barth’s concept of rationality, and, thus, of true humanness. If this is the case, then the tension-free picture of Jesus, whose bodily needs and desires have no impact on his soul, may owe more to an underlying dualism of reason and passion, similar to the one Tertullian rejects in Plato (De Anima 16), than Barth believes.

From the perspective of Tertullian, Barth’s interpretation of human constitution is ‘intellectualistic’, as his understanding of the soul’s primacy does not include experiences of passio such as hunger and appetite (De Anima 6,7; 16,4; 24,6, p72), sexual desire (concupiscentia, 27,5) etc.

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285 “Wir interpretieren und verwenden ihn hier nach Maßgabe des umfassenden lateinischen Begriffs ratio und des griechischen Begriffs λόγος und also als ‘sinnhafte Ordnung’ und meinen, wenn wir den Menschen ein Vernunftwesen nennen, dies, daß es seiner Natur eigentümlich ist, in sinnhafter Ordnung beider Momente Seele und Leib und so vernnehmendes und tätiges Wesen zu sein,” (Barth 1948, 503).

286 “Sein Leib ist der von ihm in der Absicht eines bestimmten, ihm als solches bewußten Sprechens, Handelns und Leidens gebrauchte und regierte, der ihm in der Ausführung dieser Absicht dienende Leib. Er ist seelischer, d. h. er ist von jenem Bewußtsein erfüllter Leib, während wir seine Seele offenbar nicht gut eine leibliche, d. h. eine von den Bedürfnissen und Wünschen seines Leibeslebens erfüllte Seele nennen könnten,” (Barth 1948, 408).
The fundamental human experience of being divided, interpreted by Barth in terms of a duality of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’, of soul and body (Barth 1948, 392-393.424), is in this perspective rather a matter of ethics.

**God’s Spirit in Creation**

The human self-interpretation in faith as being *Vernunftwesen* (p121) implies, so Barth, belief in the Spirit as ‘superior, determining and limiting basis’ of human life. The Spirit causes life:

> “Der Mensch ist, indem er Geist hat. Daß er Geist hat, bedeutet aber: daß er als Seele seines Leibes von Gott begründet, konstituiert und erhalten wird. Das ist, in kürzester Formel, die anthropologische Grunderkenntnis, mit der wir hier einzusetzen haben,” (402),

and Barth even suggests to define the Holy Spirit as ‘God’s impact on his creation’:


Faith’s affirming of the ‘ordered unity’ of soul and body is, then, an affirmation that human existence is structured and established by the Spirit of God, just as the Spirit establishes the human being as partner in God’s covenant of grace and, thus, as human subject (als menschliches Subjekt, 429).

Human constitution, in this perspective, is ultimately a matter of God’s establishing of the human subject, to whom he relates, and who knows him. There is, so Barth, no direct way to such knowledge of God from an analysis of soul and body, but God’s revelatory use of human constitution by his addressing of the human being as *Vernunftwesen* shows that the God-human covenant is the very purpose of creation. Faith affirms that human nature is designed for God, though this is not discernible from other perspectives than that of faith.

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288 “Er [der Geist] gehört zu ihr [dem Menschen], sofern er ihr überlegener, ihr sie bestimmender und begrenzender Grund ist,” (Barth 1948, 426).

289 This means that even animals ‘have Spirit’ (Barth 1948, 473–74), which logically follows from the Spirit being God’s quickening impact on creation. It is, however, not possible to know how the animal has spirit, that is: what it means to the animal to be ‘the soul of a body through the Spirit’ (durch den Geist die Seele eines Leibes zu sein).
The Fellow-Humanness of the Ich-Du-Encounter

As we have seen (p115), Barth’s notion of ‘analogy of relation’ is about how God uses human relationality to make himself known, that is: about how God’s self-revelation takes place. Already in 1945 Barth emphasised that the relationality inherent in God’s triune being has the concrete form of a divine Du, summoned by a divine Ich (Barth 1945, 220).

In 1948 Barth unfolds this from the humanness revealed in Jesus Christ. He is, so Barth, criterion for the basic form (Grundform) of human creatureliness (Barth 1948, 269). His humanness is materially (sachlich) simply his fellow-humanness (Mitmenschlichkeit).

This fellow-humanness is being. Jesus’ ‘being for others’ (das Seins Jesu für den Mitmenschen) has ‘ontological character’. Ultimately, it is therefore not just a sign of God’s divinity or will, but a repetition (Wiederholung) of God himself:

“Die Humanität Jesu ist nicht nur die Wiederholung und Nachbildung seiner Divinität, nicht nur die des ihn regierenden Willens Gottes, sondern die Wiederholung und Nachbildung Gottes selber: nicht mehr und nicht weniger. Sie ist das Bild Gottes, die imago Dei,” (261).

Barth is careful to state that this ‘original correspondence and similarity’ (Urentsprechung, Urähnlichkeit) concerns God’s being only indirectly. Jesus’ ‘being for others’ is no direct ontological statement about God’s essence. Still, the material necessity (sachliche Notwendigkeit) of Jesus’ ontological Mitmenschlichkeit relies on God’s intentional wisdom to state and to maintain his essence in his work and in his relation to his work, that is: to reveal himself as he is:

“…so beruht … die sachliche Notwendigkeit des Seins des Menschen Jesus für den Mitmenschen … auf dem Geheimnis des Sinnes und der Weisheit Gottes, der sein Wesen auch in seinem Werk und in seinem Verhältnis zu seinem Werk zu behaupten und zu bewähren weiß,” (263).

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290 §45 under the heading “Der Mensch in seiner Bestimmung zu Gottes Bundesgenossen,” (Barth 1948, 242–391).
291 “Daß Jesu Menschlichkeit durchgehend, von Haus aus und real Mitmenschlichkeit ist, das schließt in sich, daß er im umfassendsten, radikalsten Sinn der Mensch ist, der für die Anderen ist,” (Barth 1948, 252).
293 Referring to the limitation implicit in the term ‘image’ he states: “Indem die Menschlichkeit Jesu Gottes Bild ist, ist darüber entschieden, daß sie mit Gott nur indirekt, nicht direkt identisch ist,” (Barth 1948, 261).
As rooted in the inner-Trinitarian relation, the fellow-humanness of Jesus is concrete. It is essentially encounter (Begegnung). Correspondingly, it is the concrete human encounter, which is utilised by God in his revelatory summoning of the human being to become his covenant-partner. Barth stresses equally emphatic as in 1945 that the human capability for covenant (Bündnisfähigkeit) lies solely in God’s graceful initiative (Barth 1948, 267, cf. Barth 1945, 207, p89).

This initiative of God is salvation. Hence, there is, says Barth, a similarity between the humanness of Jesus, revealed in salvation, and the basic form of humanness (Grundform der Menschlichkeit), which is a present reality in human life, at least as striving (Streben, 265), even though the contradiction of sin makes the striving hopeless (aussichtslos).

Barth can even speak of this as human nature:

“Seine Freiheit besteht vielmehr von Haus aus darin, diesen Anderen zu meinen und zu suchen: nicht um sein Sklave oder sein Tyrann, wohl aber um sein Gefährte, sein Geselle, sein Kamerad, sein Genosse, sein Gehilfe zu sein, und damit der Andere ihm dasselbe wieder sei. Indem wir das Menschlichkeit nennen ... müssen wir eben das auch des Menschen Natur nennen. Des Menschen Natur ist er selbst. Er selbst ist aber das, was er in seinem freien Herzen ist. In seinem freien Herzen ist er aber das, was er im Geheimnis der Begegnung mit dem Mitmenschen, in welcher ihm dieser willkommen, in welcher er gerne mit ihm zusammen ist,” (329).

He presents the relationality of encounter revealed in Jesus’ ‘being for others’ in categories from the Ich-Du-philosophy.\textsuperscript{294} He states that the Ich of the fundamental personal statement Ich bin implies a Du, to whom the sentence is addressed, and further that the person, who states the Ich bin, is in an encounter (Begegnung) in which the other person is a Du, not an Er or a Sie (291-296). This Ich-Du-encounter implied in the Ich-bin-statement involves not only an equality of the Ich and the Du, but even a reciprocity of existence, expressed in the statement Ich bin, indem Du bist (296-297). This is not to be understood as an elimination of the subjectivity of the Ich, but as a qualification and a determination of the Ich’s personal existence:


This is Barth’s definition of human encounter and, thus, of human nature as to principle. Consequently, he suggests four universal necessary criteria (notwendigen Kategorien, Merkmale und Kriterien der Humanität) for humanness (299-319). These are the mutual looking the other in the eye, the

\textsuperscript{294} Barth does not mention Martin Buber in this context, even though the structure of thought as well as the terminology even in detail shows his dependence on Buber’s “Ich und Du” (Buber 1983; Mikkelsen 2010, 98–99).
mutual speech and hearing, the mutual assistance, and the doing of these things with gladness.295

These criteria for the relational encounter, in which Barth finds the image of God analogously reflected, are not extraordinary. True humanness, thus, is not to be sought in the special or spectacular, but in the simple and everyday free and glad being with others. Further, this fellow-humanness is universal; Barth does not speak of an ethical ideal or of the specific Christian life in the sphere of the church (Link 2016, 338). Nor does he speak about Christian love (331), but about created humanness as such.

As we saw, Tertullian believes that Christian faith, in order to be considered true, must appear to be in accordance with an anthropology that can account for the phenomena, by which God communicates (p83), in particular sensation, understanding and emotion (p78).

According to Barth, God communicates by revelation’s analogous making use of universal humanness. In light of Tertullian, then, the question is whether Barth’s ‘criteria for universal humanness’, are recognisable and understandable from common reason.

According to what Barth says he does, they are not. Any attempt to understand them from other perspectives than the perspective of faith leads to ‘idealistic illusions’.296 While Jesus’ humanness, by means of every human being’s participation in him (268-269), is a universal reality, its recognisability is, so Barth, tied to the particularity of his person. Were it otherwise, it would imply a return to the ‘spekulative Theorie vom Menschen’ (23-25, note 219).

Therefore, it is important for Barth to state that despite approximations and similarities (Annäherungen und Ähnlichkeiten, 334) between philosophical anthropology297 and his own theological anthropology of human encounter based on the humanness revealed in Jesus, they are in no way identical. Further, he states that the seeming confirmation (Bestätigung) of theological anthropology from such similarities ultimately is unnecessary to theology (eine Bestätigung, die wir nicht nötig haben).

295 “…daß es hinüber und herüber gerne geschieht,” (Barth 1948, 318).
296 “Man hat sich noch immer in idealistischen Illusionen bewegt, wenn man die Humanität des Menschen überhaupt und im Allgemeinen mit Zügen ausgestattet hat, die der Humanität des Menschen Jesus nun einmal ausschließlich eigentümlich sind,” (Barth 1948, 265).
According to what Barth does, on the other hand, his mentioning of Buber, as it were, in passing, appears as an intentional downplaying of the importance, Buber’s 1923 book *Ich und Du* had for Barth’s own understanding of human relationality as encounter. In fact, as evident from the manuscript for Barth’s 1943/44-lectures on anthropology, which served as his preparation for §45, he had worked intensively with Buber. In *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*, however, Barth has left out both the positive evaluation of Buber and the somewhat harsh critique, so that the similarities between Buber and Barth appear as coincidental.

In reality, however, what Barth does is to present an anthropology of the human being as being in encounter, which is not only in accordance with the *Ich-Du*-philosophy of Buber, but appears as an incorporation a line of thought and a distinct terminology in the theological framework of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik*.

With regard to the understanding of Barth’s anthropology, this is only a question of its genesis. The crucial point, in this respect, must be the use Barth makes of the *Ich-Du*-encounter as a description of the real humanness revealed in Jesus Christ, that is: a qualification of subjectivity (p126).

In light of Tertullian, however, who stresses the importance of Christian faith’s accordance with an anthropology that from common reason can

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298 “Barth does refer explicitly to Buber at a few places in the CD, but here it seems to serve more to distract than to inform the reader of the connections and differences between the I-Thou philosophy’s and Barth’s interpretations of the human being as a being in encounter,” (Mikkelsen 2010, 98).


300 Especially the long excursus on *Ich und Du* (Barth 2014, 359–81).

301 Hans Vium Mikkelsen has analysed the excursus on Buber from *Des Menschen Menschlichkeit* and draws attention to the fact that Barth omits several of important issues of his own loyal and positive presentation of Buber, for example Buber’s “dialectic between the active and the passive dimension of human action in the actual encounter” (Mikkelsen 2010, 105). He concludes that “Barth’s critique of Buber – that he is a thinker who is caught up in German idealism – is at best to be described as a caricature,” and that “Barth is either unable or unwilling to see the positive aspect of the method of Buber, who presupposes a non-personalized approach to God,” (106).

account for the phenomena, by which he believes God to communicate (p78), Barth’s insistence on the non-necessity of such Bestätigungen is striking.

To Tertullian, accordance is crucial, because he understands God’s communication as universal and, thus, as constitutive of human nature. Therefore, the common reason, by which he understands the phenomena of sensation, emotion and understanding, belongs itself to divine communication (pp68.74.79). He is maintains this even concerning the human being under sin, as he does not understand sin as annihilation or depravation of the original, created nature, but as a ‘second nature’ that co-exists with and contradicts the first nature (p71).

His appeal to common reason against the alleged reductionism of his opponents presupposes God’s universal testimonium, to which he believes they have access by nature, and the truth, he believes they know, even though they suppress and distort it (p61).

Barth’s theological anthropology appears as in accordance with the Ich-Du-philosophy of Buber. He believes that God communicates by revelation’s making use of the Ich-Du-encounter of human existence. As such, his theological anthropology meets the third point of my concluding summary of Tertullian (p83, cf. p79).

However, Barth claims that this understanding of human existence is not available from common reason, but only in faith’s interpretation of the person of Jesus.

His reluctance to acknowledge or approve philosophical knowledge of universal humanness, that is: of human life as mutual encounter (299-319), seems to be caused by anxiety that it would lead theological anthropology to ‘idealistic illusions’ (265) or natural theology (Mikkelsen 2010, 106).

The question is, then whether this reluctance of Barth follows necessarily from his concept of revelation. In my opinion, it does not. Faith holds, so Barth, the humanness of the Ich-Du-encounter to be universal by means of participation in Christ (268-269, cf. Barth 1940, 169.174, p105) and, ultimately, by means of God’s self- and all-determining election (p148). From this perspective, Barth has no problem with the fact that worldly wisdom’s understanding of the human being in general (Mensch insgemein, 334) is not always mistaken, that is: not always looking for humanness in idealistic direction (in der Richtung des Idealismus und schließlich in der Richtung von Nietzsche).

Even more, revelation’s analogues use of created human relationality leads faith to affirm that the very structure of human existence teleological oriented towards God (p124), created for the purpose of the God-human relation fulfilled in Christ.
If the humanness, of which revelation makes use, at least partly and in non-idealistic terms can be an ‘understood humanness’, I see no reason, why Barth should not be able to state his accordance with Buber explicitly.

Still, if Christology is the sole criterion of theological anthropology, such accordance can never be crucial to its credibility, as in Tertullian. The credibility of theological anthropology lies, so Barth, solely in faith’s self-understanding as subsequent subjectivity, that is: as established by God’s addressing of the human being as a rational being.

Sin as Contradiction
According to Tertullian, sin is possible because of the human being’s relative independence from God in the formal human correspondence to him (p42). This ‘correspondence of freedom’ presupposes the qualitative difference between divine and human being. The difference is, so Tertullian, overcome by the ‘correspondence of goodness’ (p97), and so human nature is established.

Sin, then, is a contradiction of human nature and of human knowledge of God (p50). It reaches back behind the relative disposition of goodness and orientation towards God (p49) to the ‘pre-natural’ qualitative difference between divine and human being (pp42.79).

Nevertheless, sin is, so Tertullian, a universal reality. It is a ‘second nature’ that co-exists with original human nature in every human person (p71).

His main concern is to avoid the problem of divine responsibility for sin, and he uses the rhetorical figure of remotio criminis (pp40.45) to state sin’s fundamental inexplicability. This means that sin in Tertullian is an act of the human will, the human arbitrium (p45), and thus arbitrary to human nature.

Barth addresses the problem of God’s responsibility for sin. Sin, so Barth, is essentially inhumanity (Unmenschlichkeit, Barth 1948, 329), that is: an ‘incurable contradiction’ (unheilbar Widerspruch, 244) of true humanness, which makes human life an actual antithesis (tatsächlich Gegensatz). On a concrete level, this means the contradiction of human nature as existence in encounter, that is: avoidance of eye contact, lack of mutual responsiveness, shortage of assistance to fellow humans and unfree being together.

This means that sin is alien to and inexplicable from human nature. Human freedom does not consist in abstract freedom of choice, but in the concrete

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life of the Ich-Du-encounter. Therefore, not even the possibility (Möglichkeit) of sin can be traced back to human nature:


Were it otherwise, that is: had human choice of sin had an Ansatzpunkt in human nature as such, God would be responsible for sin.304

From faith’s perspective, sin is a contradiction of the true human subjectivity, the human ‘mode of existence’ as God’s partner. This means that sin can be known truly as sin only through faith (Krötke 2013, 202, 2016, 342), that is: from Christology (Barth 1950, 342–45). Consequently, the most comprehensive unfolding of the doctrine of sin in Die kirchliche Dogmatik is in the context of the doctrine of reconciliation.306 Sin, here, is presented as the human pride (Hochmut) revealed as such by the self-humiliation of Jesus Christ for the benefit of sinful humanity (Barth 1953, 462–64, 1955, 452–53). Further, sin is the human sloth (Barth 1955, 455–59) revealed as such by the exaltation (Erhöhung) of Jesus Christ, by which he has lifted humanity up into true humanness. Sin as Trägheit is in this regard the ungratefulness (Undankbarkeit, 455) that rejects Jesus Christ and the human determination fulfilled in him. Even further, sin is the human lie and condemnation (Lüge und Verdammnis, Barth 1959, 428–43), revealed as such by Jesus Christ as the true witness (Jesus Christus als der wahrhaftige Zeuge seiner wahren Gottheit und Menschheit, 428).307

304 “Dann darf also für diese fatale Möglichkeit nicht etwa Gott sein Schöpfer haftbar gemacht werden,” (Barth 1948, 328). In this context, Barth warns to praise God for giving the human heart possibility to choose between a life according to human nature and sin; that would, says Barth, be a choice between being human and being inhuman.

305 “Erkenntnis [der Sünde] geschieht, wo sie wahre Erkenntnis ist, als Element von Gotteserkenntnis, Offenbarungserkenntnis und also Glaubenserkenntnis, auf deren Vollzug er sich selbst von sich aus nicht einmal vorbereiten kann und wird,” (Barth 1955, 424).

306 In §§60, 65 and 70. An excellent summery in (Krötke 2016, 345–46).

307 “Er ist das Gesetz Gottes, ist die Norm, mit der konfrontiert, an der gemessen, der Mensch sich als Übertreter – und nun also im Besonderen: als Unwahrhaftiger, als Fälscher, als Lügner erweist,” (Barth 1959, 429).
Sin and Das Nichtige

Thus, Barth, within the doctrinal framework of Christology and the doctrine of reconciliation, presents quite detailed and precise answers on how sin is to be known as sin, that is: on the epistemology of sin from the perspective of faith.

Concerning sin’s cause and being, by contrast, as it were: the ontology of sin, Barth’s presentation is, even though it is extensive, deliberately ambiguous and non-definitional. He warns, in the context of harnmatiology, against making theology a system; it must always be a report (Bericht) of the specific history, in which the Creator is dealing with his creatures, and in which sin is a disruptive an alien element (ein feindselig Element, Barth 1950, 333–34). Consequently, he is reluctant to define sin. Sin is a not, a negation of human creatureliness in its core dimensions (Barth 1990b, 434; Ensminger 2016, 106).

When Barth in 1950 describes sin as das Nichtige, or as a form of it (eine konkrete Gestalt des Nichtigen, 350), it indicates the implicit negation in the notion of sin, which fundamentally is a break (Bruch) in the Creator’s relation to his creature.

“Eben die Existenz, Gegenwart und Wirksamkeit des Nichtigen, um dessen Erkenntnis es hier geht, ist ja auch objektiv der Bruch im Verhältnis zwischen Schöpfer und Geschöpf,” (Barth 1950, 332).

By this negative definition as opposition and resistance to God’s reign Barth understands sin as a reality that co-exists with the created order in the individual human being and in the world. Sin as das Nichtige is both personal and supra-personal, that is: at the same time existent in the individual person and an actual reality beyond the individual sphere. It is the Chaos of Gen. 1:2 (406-407): an uncreated and from God’s side unwilled reality, which nonetheless is creation’s horizon in the biblical account of it.


Das Nichtige as concept, thus, expresses not only the negative and annihilating character of sin as human behaviour and human reality, but also as radical power of evil, to which the human being falls victim:

Faith’s perspective on sin and evil is, then, to avoid both the ‘pessimism’ that overlooks God’s lordship over das Nichtige and the ‘optimism’ that treats this lordship as if it were at human disposal. It is, at the same time, an attitude of confidence (Zuversicht, 332) and humility (Demut).

The only perspective, from which das Nichtige can be understood, and, thus, the only perspective from which the double attitude of confidence and humility is possible, is when it is seen as the enemy, Jesus Christ has overcome. By the crucifixion of Jesus, sin is ultimately exposed as rebellion against God (344-346), and, hence, as das Nichtige. Further, Jesus’ earthly ministry, and in particular his miraculous healings and exorcisms, disclosed the illness and death he defeated as more than mere natural matter of mortality,

“…sondern um den Tod als den Unerträglichen, als des Lebens Vernichter, dem alles Erleiden des Übels entgegeneilt als seinem Ziele, als dem endgültigen, das geschöpfliche Dasein auslöschenden, eben damit aber wiederum auch den Schöpfer kompromittierenden und desavouierenden Hereinbruch und Triumph jener Fremdmacht,” (353).

This touches a point, Barth makes in 1945 (Barth 1945, 424–46) and develops further 1950, namely that creation has both a light side and a shadow side. As the Genesis account mentions God distinguishing between light and darkness (Gen. 1:4), darkness belongs to God’s original creation. The dark side or shadow side of creation, and of human life, is part of what

309 “[D]as Nichtige ist die ‘Wirklichkeit’, um derentwillen (nämlich im Gegensatz zu der) Gott selbst in der Geschöpfwelt Geschöpf werden, der er sich in Jesus Christus selbst stellen und unterwerfen und sie eben so überwinden wollte, und also die Gott widersprechende und widerstehende und darum umgekehrt seinem Widerspruch und Widerstand unterworfene und unterlegene und in dieser doppelten Bestimmung – ihn verneinend und von ihm verneint! – von ihm verschiedene ‘Wirklichkeit’. Was Jesus Christus ans Kreuz gebracht und was er am Kreuz besiegt hat, das ist das wirklich Nichtige,” (Barth 1950, 346).


311 Barth understands this Schattenseite as a part of the creatureliness of God’s creature: “Es gehört … zum Wesen des Geschöpfes,” (Barth 1950, 335). It is even as a mark of its perfection as creature, that is: as a being, different from God, whom God has created out of nothing, and who, therefore, is limited both towards God and towards the nothing, out of which God has called it forth. God’s ‘no’ (Nein, Barth 1950, 335) in this regard is not to be understood as his judgement of sin and evil, but as a reality within the dialectics of God’s ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in the created order. Das Nichtige, by contrast, is by definition not a part of such dialectics, but the very opposite of God and, therefore, of the entire creation (Barth 1950, 242–43).
God confirms as good. This negative side of creation includes not only human limitation, but also decay, sorrow and death. Das Nichtige is, so Barth, impossible to disclose by means of philosophical analysis because of its status outside the created order. It hides behind the Schattenseite of creation, for which is easily mistaken (339-342), as Barth finds it is the case in Schopenhauer. Only from Christology is das Nichtige knowable as the evil, Christ has defeated and, thus, as a reality not belonging to and not constitutive of creation.

This leads, so Barth, to an ambiguous answer to the question, whether or not das Nichtige exists. It has no reality in the sense that God has reality or in the sense that his creature has reality, as it by definition is a contradiction of the created order. It would, however, be hasty and mistakenly harmlessmaking to conclude it does not exist, since God takes it into account:

“Daß es folglich Nichts ist, d. h. nicht ist, wäre freilich eine voreilige, verharmlosende Folgerung. Gott rechnet mit ihm…,” (402).

With regard to ontological status, then, das Nichtige must be understood from God’s eternal election. His decision for the creature implies his rejection of the negation of creation. On this basis only, faith must hold that das Nichtige has reality. Das Nichtige is the impossible possibility (die unmögliche Möglichkeit, 405) as its only knowability and only reality is as object of God’s eternal decision against it.

This means that das Nichtige is outside the created order of being and becoming. It is, thus, no ‘antithesis’ of Hegelian dialectics, and its ontological inferiority is, so Barth, clear from the fact that it has no perpetuity (Bestand). It exists, in light of the eschaton, only ‘in an echo and as a shadow of what it was but is no longer’ (nur noch im Nachklang und als Schatten dessen, was es war, aber nicht mehr ist, 424). Hence, it has no

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312 “Es ist wahr, daß es in der Schöpfung nicht nur ein Ja, sondern auch ein Nein gibt … Und es ist wieder wahr, daß die Anteile, die die einzelnen Kreaturen und Menschen an dem allem haben, sehr ungleich … nach einer sehr verborgen Gerechtigkeit verteilt sind. Es ist aber noch wahrer, daß eben die gute Schöpfung, das gute Geschöpf, auch darin gut ist, daß alles, was ist, in diesem Unterschied und Gegensatz ist,” (Barth 1950, 336).


necessity, not even in any ‘dialectics of salvation’, as the negative condition for grace.

The question is, then, how das Nichtige can be said to have existence – even though an existence of inferior reality – by God’s rejection of it. According to Wolf Krötke this is a ‘problematic figure of thought’ (Krötke 2016, 343) that stems from German Idealism. 315

Barth’s concern is clearly to avoid any dualism that makes Evil or das Nichtige a counter-God. 316 According to John Hick, who criticises Barth’s concept for lacking logical and philosophical clarity, 317 Barth nonetheless does not succeed in escaping dualism. 318 Therefore, so Hick, Barth’s suggestion to ascribe das Nichtige ontological reality on the basis of God’s rejection of it in election is fundamentally a ‘theodicy of Augustinian type’ that – while maintaining ‘the perfect goodness of God’ – tends “to let go of the absolute divine power and freedom,” (Hick 1990, 143–44), and even is bound to do so on logical grounds.

Along the same lines Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that it is at best unclear to say that das Nichtige has ‘existence’ from God’s denial of it and concludes “that in spite of his [Barth’s] claim that evil is ‘incomprehensible and inexplicable,’ there is much about evil that Barth professes to comprehend and explain – more that he should.” (Wolterstorff 1996, 598).

Wilfried Härle suggests a completely different interpretation (Härle 1975, 226–69). He stresses Barth’s emphasising that das Nichtige is ultimately impotent in its opposition to God’s gracious election, by which it has its inferior existence. God’s grace, then, controls sin and evil, both regarding its eternal defeat and its particular negative form of reality, through and by God’s active and effective (wirksam, 267) voluntas permittens. Thus, das Nichtige is subject to God’s grace in such a comprehensive way that Härle’s

315 According to F. W. J. Schelling, evil is possible by virtue of human freedom and exists due to human self-determination (Dudley 2007, 134–35), which in Schelling establishes the ontological reality of nothingness (das Nichts, Snow 1996, 201).


317 Cf. his characterisation of Barth’s thought on this point as “primitive picture thinking,” (Hick 1990, 136).

318 “By postulating a previously existing situation within which God acts, and of whose character He must in acting take account, Barth is half-way towards a Manichaean dualism,” (Hick 1990, 187).
Barth-interpretation tends towards a ‘monism of grace’\(^{319}\) rather than the dualistic tendency criticised by Hick. It exceeds the scope of this dissertation to decide on this disagreement. I find it most likely that the issue cannot be finally settled, as Barth’s text is deliberately ambiguous in its attempt to avoid both dualism and monism.

The approach from Tertullian, however, gives rise to a brief consideration on the question of, why Barth, though he insists on the fundamental inexplicability of sin, still considers it necessary to deal so thoroughly with the question of the ontological status of \textit{das Nichtige}.

Sin is, so Tertullian, fundamentally inexplicable from the created order (p45) and even inexplicable from its diabolic origin (note 108). While Tertullian occasionally understands creation and incarnation from the ‘outward-directedness’ of God’s triune being (p54) and even speaks of this in terms of necessity, because it is essential for God to make himself known, no such necessity applies to sin. That the creature should fall into sin, and that the incarnation should take the form of salvation history, does not follow necessarily from divine being. Salvation is the triune God’s reaction to human rebellion against him and, thus, \textit{accidental} to his being.

In Barth, by contrast, salvation is ultimately a matter of God’s self-determining act of election (p148), so that the history of salvation is included in God’s eternity.\(^{320}\) This means that God, so Barth, eternally determines himself in the initial act of election, which includes creation, reconciliation and final fulfilment, and thus simply \textit{is} in this act.

Hence, God’s act in overcoming \textit{das Nichtige} is not only his historical act, as in Tertullian, but his eternal self-determination, in which he \textit{is}. Any attempt to speak of a \textit{being} of God prior to this act must, so Barth, end up in abstraction. God has no being, which is not also his action. This action is a reality within the inner-Trinitarian relation, so that God’s life is a ‘history in partnership’ (\textit{Geschichte in Partnerschaft}):

“Sodaß jene Partnerschaft nicht etwa ein Erstes, Statisches ist, dem dann die so stattfindende Geschichte als ein Zweites, Dynamisches erst folgte, sondern indem da Partnerschaft ist, geschieht da auch \textit{Geschichte} und indem da Geschichte geschieht, entsteht, erneuert sich da – fern von aller Erstarrung eines Seins, das nicht als solches auch Akt wäre – ewig auch die \textit{Partnerschaft}: Gottes Sein als

\(^{319}\) To reach this conclusion, Härle openly admits that he has to correct Barth’s formulations in some places from the ‘latent consequence of his teachings on \textit{dem Nichtigen}’: “Hätte Barth, was immerhin sachgemäßer wäre, ‘Verursachen’ gleichgesetzt mit ‘wirksam Wollen’, dann wäre die latent Konsequenz seiner Lehre vom Nichtigen, nämlich daß Gott der Urheber des Nichtigen ist, auch manifest geworden,” (Härle 1975, 267–68).

\(^{320}\) “…daß die Zeit von seiner [Gottes] Dauer nicht ausgeschlossen, sondern von ihr eingeschlossen ist,” (Barth 1940, 690).

The inclusion of history into eternity by divine self-determination means, then, that God’s action in overcoming sin and evil in salvation history is his mode of being, so to speak. His rejection and defeating of sin’s rebellion against him is not and cannot be accidental to his being, as in Tertullian, but must be essential to him:

“…Gott … ist vor aller irdischen Geschichte, aber auch in dieser die seinige, ist er der, der auch für uns und bei uns Übergang, Vermittlung, Kommunikation und so Leben schafft und gibt: die Beantwortung und Lösung unseres Problems,” (385).

If this is the case, that is: if God’s being is being in that action, in and by which he is ‘solution to our problem’, then this problem must have some sort of reality even beyond its historical and accidental manifestations. Barth’s suggestion that das Nichtige has existence, though an inferior existence, because of God’s eternal rejection of it, attempts to explain more about the inexplicable than does Tertullian, and, according to Wolterstorff, more than Barth should have attempted to explain, cf. above. But if the action of God’s Sein in der Tat (Barth 1940, 288–305) is the action, by which he rejects das Nichtige, he cannot abstain from ascribing das Nichtige ontological reality.

3.4 Barth’s Doctrine of Election and the Humanness of God

As we saw (p83), it is crucial for Tertullian that Christian faith is able to provide a convincing interpretation of the human being from what he understands as the inherent humanness of God’s triune being. This God-inherent humanness is, so Tertullian, ‘the Son, who was to become human’, (Adversus Praxean 12,3, p51). This indicates – although this line of thought is uncommon in Tertullian – a teleology of the Trinity, according to which creation and incarnation follows with necessity from divine triune being.

To read Barth from Tertullian is, then, to ask if and how Barth interpret human nature as grounded in God’s being, and how this interpretation responds to the question of the necessity of the Trinity’s economic actions in relation to divine freedom.

At first glance, it may seem strange to speak of ‘the humanness of God’ in Barth. His doctrine of God is certainly not ‘anthropological’ in the sense that God’s being or essence is to be understood from any anthropological category or concept. That would be exactly the kind of analogia entis Barth opposes in Liberal Protestantism (p102).

However, the question is if the insistence on the radical transcendence and Ganz-Andersheit of God leads to an ‘anthropological deficit’ in theology,
and if so, how to avoid it. In a 1956 retrospect, Barth self-critically asks, if his confrontation with liberal theology in the 20’s ‘was only a new Titanism’, the final result of which was ‘to stand Schleiermacher on his head’, in the sense of ‘making God great at the cost of the human being’ (Gott ... auf Kosten des Menschen groß zu machen, Barth 1956, 8). The consequence of this emphasis on God’s freedom was then, though unintended, the secularisation of anthropology and the separation of the human being from God.

According to the 1956 Barth, his concern is the opposite, that is: To present God’s deity, sovereignty and freedom as defined in what he terms as ‘the humanness of God’. So, he emphasises God’s fundamental Zusammensein with the human being:

“Wer Gott, und was er in seiner Göttlichkeit ist, das erweist und offenbart er nicht im leeren Raum eines göttlichen Fürsichseins, sondern authentisch gerade darin, daß er als des Menschen (freilich schlechthin überlegener) Partner existiert, redet und handelt,” (10).

This is, so Barth, essentially a Christological statement (ein christologischer, vielmehr: ein von der Christologie her begründeter und zu entfaltender Satz). What has happened between the early Barth and the Barth of Die kirchliche Dogmatik is, then, that he has abandoned the concept of God’s freedom as absolute power and sovereignty in favour of a Christologically defined concept of freedom. In the 1940 vocabulary, it is the difference between a ‘God in general’ (Gott im Allgemeinen, Barth 1940, 52), who is ‘free in abstracto’, and a God, who in his love and freedom has determined and bound himself to be God in particular (im Besonderen), not in general.

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322 “Wie ... wenn das Ende des Liedes von der Majestät Gottes eine neue Bestätigung der Hoffnungslosigkeit alles menschlichen Tuns, eben damit eine neue Rechtfertigung der Autonomie des Menschen und also des Säkularismus im Sinne der lutherischen Lehre von den zwei Reichen sein sollte? Bewahre! So meinte und wollten wir es nicht,” (Barth 1956, 9–10).
323 Or, at least, from Die kirchliche Dogmatik II,1 (Barth 1940), in which the Christological understanding of election first presented in Gottes Gnadenwahl (Barth 1936) is incorporated in the very concept of God, cf. below.
324 “Auch die Ergänzung des Begriffs der Freiheit durch den der Liebe wird daran nichts Wesentliches ändern können, wenn nicht bei beiden Begriffen das Entscheidende verstanden ist: der wirkliche Gott ist der, dessen Freiheit und dessen Liebe eine abstrakte Absolutheit, eine nackte Souveränität völlig fremd ist, der sich vielmehr in seiner Freiheit und in seiner Liebe bestimmt und gebunden hat, gerade im Besonderen und also nicht im Allgemeinen Gott und als solcher souverän und allmächtig und der Inhaber jeglicher anderen Vollkommenheit zu sein,” (Barth 1940, 52).
God is free, so Barth, in that he confirms to be, who he is in the act of the Christ event:

“Die Freiheit Gottes will als seine Freiheit und das heißt: sie will so, wie sie in Gott besteht und so, wie Gott sie betätigt hat, erkannt sein. Sie besteht aber in Gott in seinem Sohne Jesus Christus und eben in ihm hat er sie auch betätigt,” (360).

God’s being in this act is his own free decision, in which he determines himself, as he is even free with regard to his own freedom, so that he can use it to give himself in communion (Gemeinschaft, 341) to his human partner. This is the essential concern of the 1940 and 1942 doctrine of election.

Thus, Barth’s doctrine of election is crucial for his entire doctrine of creation, and is the core of his answer to the question from Tertullian of, how human nature is grounded in God’s being. This ‘sum of the gospel’ is ultimately about God’s eternal self-determination (Selbstbestimmung) to be related to his human partner, that is: about God’s being (Jüngel 1967, 82–97; Gunton 1974).

Barth presents his doctrine of election in Die kirchliche Dogmatik II,2. In the preface he states that he does so with anxiety, since he leaves das Geländer der theologischen Tradition (Barth 1942, VII), and especially departs radically from Calvin: Firstly, in that he understands Jesus Christ as both subject and object of election. This means that Jesus Christ is the electing God (der erwählende Gott) and at the same time the elected human being (der erwählte Mensch). Secondly, and as a result, in that he transforms the Reformed doctrine of a double predestination to either salvation or reprobation into a concept of God’s universal election of every individual human being in Christ.

Barth mentions his reconstruction of the doctrine of election as a ‘renewal’ (Neuerung). This is a mild wording, considered how profound and thorough going his transformation of the doctrine is. Barth and Calvin do not mean the same by the word election. Calvin’s doctrine is about an absolute decree, whereas Barth’s doctrine is to deny that there is such an absolute decree. Calvin’s doctrine is about a decision that God made prior to salvation history. Barth’s doctrine is about God’s self-determination to be in salvation history, and about how this self-determination determines his divine being.

325 “Aber weil die Doppelseitigkeit der göttlichen Erwählung in Jesus Christus, unserem Bruder, sich ursprünglich offenbart, darum wird sie zum Grundthema, zum Leitmotiv der ganzen Heilsgeschichte, ja, durch diese hindurch zum Mal und Wasserzeichen der Schöpfung selbst. In der Schöpfung gibt es die ‘Erwählung’ des Kosmos, und, in dieser, sekundär, begleitend, die Verwerfung und Hinausbannung des Chaos,” (Balthasar 1951, 190).

326 “Die Lehre von Gottes Gnadenwahl ist die Summe des Evangeliums. Sie ist Inbegriff der frohen Botschaft, die Jesus Christus heißt,” (Barth 1942, 9).
This is the reason, why Barth presents the doctrine of election as part of the very doctrine of God. Calvin, by contrast, presents his doctrine in the *Institutes* at the end of the book on soteriology (Calvin 2006, 920–87, 1968, 368–432). Calvin’s doctrine of election responds to the question, why some people do not hear the gospel, and why some of those, who hear it, do not believe, which in both cases means that they are not saved. The answer, which, so Calvin, is the only possible consequence of salvation being by faith, not by merit, is that God has predestined some to salvation and others to perdition.

Although Barth interprets the same biblical texts as does Calvin, Barth’s doctrine of election does not just give a different answer to Calvin’s question, but responds to a wholly other question, namely the question of how God in the name of Jesus ‘could make Himself known to us or exist for us’ (Barth 1942, 2) without having a different being (ein anderes Wesen) in himself (an sich und in sich).

**Jesus Christ as the Electing God**

Barth takes issue with the doctrine presenting God as the electing God, who before the beginning of time and space anticipated that he would, in Jesus Christ, be gracious towards humans. That God’s gracious acts in creation, incarnation and eschatological fulfilment are, thus, anticipated in the initial act of election, underlines that these events of salvation history are grounded solely in God’s free decision and not in any quality or ability of the creature. Barth emphasises election as an act of the Trinity:

“Es war im Anfang die Wahl des Vaters, diesen Bund mit dem Menschen darin wahr zu machen, daß er seinen Sohn für ihn dahingab, um selbst Mensch zu werden zum Vollzug seiner Gnade. Es war im Anfang die Wahl des Sohnes, der Gnade gehorsam zu sein und also sich selbst hinzugeben und Mensch zu werden, damit darin jener Bund seine Wirklichkeit habe. Es war im Anfang der Beschluß des Heiligen Geistes, daß die Einheit Gottes, die Einheit des Vaters und des Sohnes durch diesen Bund mit dem Menschen nicht gestört, geschweige denn zerrissen,

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327 “Die Lehre von Gott,” *Die kirchliche Dogmatik* II (Barth 1940, 1942).

328 Calvin emphasises that predestination is not to be confused with God’s foreknowledge of the merit of the elected, but is of God’s sovereign and gracious purpose (Calvin 2006, 932–40, 1968, 379–86).

329 “Im Anfang, vor dieser unserer Zeit und vor diesem unserem Raum, vor der Schöpfung und also bevor eine von Gott verschiedene Wirklichkeit Gegenstand seiner Liebe, bevor sie der Schauplatz der Taten seiner Freiheit sein konnte, hat Gott in sich selber (in der Kraft seiner Liebe und Freiheit, seines Wissens und Wollens) dies vorweggenommen, dies schon bestimmt als das Ziel und den Sinn seines ganzen Handelns mit der Welt, die noch nicht war: daß er in seinem Sohn dem Menschen gnädig sein, daß er sich ihm verbinden wolle,” (Barth 1942, 108–9).
vielmehr um so herrlicher werde, daß die Gottheit Gottes, die Göttlichkeit seiner Freiheit und seiner Liebe eben in diesem Hingeben des Vaters und in seinem Sichhingeben des Sohnes sich bestätigen und bewähren solle,” (109).

By this Trinitarian starting point, Barth believes to be able to interpret Jesus Christ as subject of election and therefore to identify him as der erwählende Gott. He is, says Barth, not only the measure and instrument of God’s freedom. He is the divine freedom in itself, in its outward expression, and, thus, not only the elected, but the elector:

“Er ist nicht nur Maßnahme und Instrument der göttlichen Freiheit, sondern er ist zuerst und eigentlich die göttliche Freiheit selber, sofern diese nach ‘außen’ in Kraft tritt ... Und so ist er nicht nur Gewählter, sondern selbst Wählender; so muß seine Erwählung zuerst aktiv verstanden werden,” (112).

The question is, then, how Jesus’ passive self-submission to the Father’s will can be understood as his active role, so that he, the Son, is himself the electing God. Barth refers to a large number of Scriptural passages, especially from the Fourth Gospel and the Christ hymn in Philippians 2, and answers that Jesus’ obedience (Gehorsam), in and by which he passively surrenders to the will of the Father, is his own free decision and, thus, his active yes to the Father’s plan and to humanity elect. Therefore, he participates in divine subjectivity by his obedience and is himself the acting subject in election, rather than just the passive object chosen by the Father.

The point is crucial for Barth. He presents his position in a discussion with Aquinas (114-115), which shows why. To Barth, the discussion of Jesus as subject of the election deals with, who God is. Barth’s concern is the unity of the Trinity and, even more, that it is impossible to distinguish between divine being and divine action, since God is in his action:

“Sagt man nur das, was Thomas sagen wollte, weiß man nur um die Erwählung des Menschen Jesus als solchen, nicht aber um das Erwählwerden und eigene

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331 Aquinas limits the election of Jesus Christ to his being the elected (praedestinatus), that is: the first of the elect, and so only in his human nature and only in his passive relation to the Father, as mere recipient. This, for Barth, threatens the unity of the Trinity, in that it ascribes the act of election only to the Father (Bromiley 1979, 88). Barth follows the rule he explicitly stated as early as in §12: “Wir sind nun aber durchweg der Regel gefolgt – und halten diese Regel für grundlegend – daß die Aussagen über die Wirklichkeit der göttlichen Seinsweisen ‘zuvor in sich selber’ inhaltlich keine anderen sein können als diejenigen, die über ihre Wirklichkeit eben in der Offenbarung zu machen sind,” (Barth 1932, 503).
Erwählen des Sohnes Gottes, das jener Erwählung vorangeht, dann hat man die Gnadenwahl doch wieder zu einem von der Person Jesu Christi gelösten göttlichen Geheimnis gemacht, um dessen Wirklichkeit wir gar nicht wissen, das wir nicht einmal glauben könnten und dem gegenüber wir uns dann durch die Konstruktion eines decretum absolutum die nötige Wissenschaft zu verschaffen suchen müßten,” (115).

This critique of Aquinas concerns not only theological epistemology, but ultimately God’s being. Had Jesus just been the object of predestination, not the subject of it, then predestination would essentially have been something different from his person (sie wäre dann etwas in seinem Wesen Anderes dieser Person gegenüber, 115). Consequently, God’s eternal self-determination would have been as a God, different from who he is in Jesus Christ, that is: from who he is in his salvific action, and from who he is in the covenantal God-human relation. Barth’s concern is, thus, to state that God has no other essence than to be, who he is in the act of the Christ event, and, so, that there cannot be any electing God apart from or behind, who God is in Christ.

This concern is, so Barth, in line with Augustine and Athanasius. Augustine stated that what was to be fulfilled in time was already fixated by predestination “[i]n (Dei) ipsius aeternitate atque in Verbo eius coaeterno,” (116). In doing so he identified God’s co-eternal Word with Jesus Christ as his Word-to-be-incarnate (Verbum incarnandus). In this state Jesus even before the beginning of times was the subject of the triune God’s promise of eternal life to human beings.

Further, in line with the antelapsarian structure of Athanasius’ doctrine of predestination, Barth concludes that the subject of the eternal election is

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332 The notion of a decretum absolutum involves, obviously, an unacceptable theological epistemology to Barth. Thus, he refuses to understand the λόγος of the Johannine prologue as das Prinzip einer Erkenntnistheorie oder einer metaphysischen Welterklärung (Barth 1942, 104). Had the point of the Johannine text been to say something about Jesus from an already identified metaphysical explanation of the world, it would imply the possibility of a knowledge of God on other grounds than the revelation in Christ. Barth’s critique of the ‘construction’ (Konstruktion, 107-108) of a divine act of predestination behind and ontologically prior to the historical Christ event corresponds, thus, to his rejection of any natural theology.

333 Barth points to Athanasius emphasising that it would be unfitting (es ziemte sich nicht, οὐκ ἔπρεπε τὸν θεόν) to understand salvation as a subsequent reaction from God’s side to deal with the consequences of the fall. Metaphorically he describes God as a wise master-builder (ein weiser Baumeister), who already when building a house considers how he may repair it. In a similar way the renewal of our salvation (die Erneuerung unseres Heils) is eternally grounded in Christ, so that we can be created anew in him (Barth 1942, 117).
the triune God, the Son no less that the Father and the Spirit, and that Jesus Christ is the basis of divine election as a whole:

“…die Praedestination [ist] … die … Entscheidung, deren Subjekt der dreieinige Gott – mit dem Vater und dem Heiligen Geiste also auch der Sohn Gottes – deren Objekt aber im besonderen der Sohn Gottes ist in seiner Bestimmung zum Menschensohn, der praeexistierende Gottmensch Jesus Christus, der als solcher der ewige Grund aller göttlichen Erwählung ist,” (118).

Thus, it is clear, what the decisive point of Barth’s critique of the Reformed doctrine of election is, and why his Neuerung of it has the character of a complete transformation. What Barth finds wrong in Calvin is that he separates God from Jesus Christ by asserting a Deus nudus Absconditus as the electing God (119). Any distinction between God as he is in himself, and God, as he is in Christ incarnate, presupposes a divine essence, ontologically prior to the act of election. Barth, as well, is able to speak of God’s essence (Wesen), but not as a hidden something behind his actions. As God’s being is in his acts, and since the initial act of election includes every action of God in creation, incarnation and final restoration, it is constitutive of God’s being as his eternal self-determination (Selbstbestimmung):


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334 “Alle anderen Bedenklichkeiten der Praedestinationslehre Calvins folgen aus diesem Grundmangel: daß er Gott und Jesus Christus letztlich doch auseinanderrückte, daß er das, was im Anfang bei Gott war, letztlich doch anderswo als in Jesus Christus zu sehen meinte, daß er bei seinem an sich so gewaltigen und eindrucksvollen Bekenntnis zu Gottes Gnadenwahl an der in Jesus Christus erschienenen Gnade Gottes letztlich doch vorbeiblickte,” (Barth 1942, 119).

335 In the words of McCormack this “is a clash between a theologian working with what we might call an ‘essentialist ontology’ and a theologian working with an ‘actualistic ontology’, ” (McCormack 2008b, 189).

Jesus Christ as the Elected Human Being

Jesus Christ being the electing God does not, however, rule out that he is the elected human being. Quite the contrary: Barth strongly emphasises how the notion of Jesus as the electing leads to a more comprehensive understanding of him as the elected.

Had the doctrine of election been about a decision of a hidden ‘God behind God’, then the possible understanding of Jesus as the elected human (der erwählte Mensch) would be as an example and, perhaps, a revelation of this election. God’s election of Jesus would then only apply to his human nature (125). While Barth surely affirms this prototypical and revelatory aspect of Jesus as the elected, he emphasises much more, that the election of Jesus means that the elected is himself the electing. Therefore, the initial election is universally effective (wirksam):


The election of Jesus Christ\(^{337}\) means that all others are elected in him, as Barth states with reference to Eph. 1:4. This, however, could never be said of a mere creature, who would not be able to stand before God above and on behalf of others. That Jesus is the true elected must, therefore, apply to his divine as well as to his human nature:

“Ist es wahr, daß dieser Mensch über anderen und für andere vor Gott steht … dann ist dieser Mensch nicht nur Geschöpf, sondern Schöpfer zugleich, dann muß also seinem Erwählwerden als Geschöpf sein eigenes Erwählen als Schöpfer vorangegangen sein,” (124-125).

Obviously, this inclusive understanding of the election of Jesus breaks with the way especially Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin have shaped the doctrine of predestination based on God’s eternal election of the individual. It is not that Barth has nothing to say about the election of the individual,\(^{338}\) but only as the consequence of the fundamental and decisive election of Jesus:

“Grundsätzlich wichtig als notwendige Korrektur ist nur die Einsicht, daß die Erwählung des Einzelnen in strengem Zusammenhang mit der Erwählung Jesu

\(^{337}\) “Jesus Christus ist also nicht nur ein Erwählter, sondern der Erwählte Gottes. Er steht als Erwählter zum vornherein (von Ewigkeit her!) nicht neben den anderen Erwählten, sondern als der ursprünglich und eigentlich Erwählte vor und über ihnen,” (Barth 1942, 125).

\(^{338}\) He deals with it at length in §35 and states that it would have been possible, and perhaps even advisable, to begin the presentation with the election of the individual, and, thus, to follow the reversal order than he actually does. The question of order (Reihenfolge) is, though, not of fundamental importance (Barth 1942, 340).
Eternally Elected in Christ. The Theological Anthropology of Barth


This means that the doctrine of predestination, including the election of the individual, is a doctrine about God’s salvific act for the individual human being in his or her relation to Jesus Christ. In Barth’s view, this is the positive concern of the traditional Reformed theological treatment of predestination, a concern, which he, though generally critical, wants to affirm (357-375). What he criticises is that Calvin failed to maintain the Christological focus.

This critique, however, leads Barth’s to transform the entire doctrine in terms of an understanding of God’s being as determined by what he does in the Christ event. To be elected is, then, from the perspective of faith to see one’s own individuality constituted in God’s individuality:

“Es ist das Einzelsein und Einsamsein Gottes, das den erwählten Einzelnen konstituiert und dem er die Besonderheit seines Namens verdankt. Weil und indem Gott Dieser ist, sind sie, die erwählten Menschen, Diese und Diese,” (378).

This implicit universalism clearly implies a break, not only with traditional Calvinist understanding of predestination, but with the Reformed

339 Barth states that die Notwendigkeit einer Totalrevision des Dogmas (Barth 1942, 373) is clear from the fact that Calvin’s followers have not been able to escape the unavoidable dilemma of ‘the Christological beginning and the anthropological end’ of Calvin’s thinking (Barth 1942, 372). If predestination ultimately rests on an absolute decree, then Jesus Christ cannot be the legitimate reason for the Christian’s assurance. The tragedy of the reformed teaching on election of Theodore Beza and others is, then, that it fails to assert the Christological matter, which, according to Barth, indeed was Calvin’s concern. Calvin, however, could only maintain the Christological basis of his teachings on assurance due to a happy inconsistency (glücklicher Inkonsequenz) in his thinking, that is: simply because he did not realise the problem.

340 Barth’s concern is also the assurance (Vertrauen) of the believer: “Denn das Vertrauen auf Gottes freie Entscheidung hängt daran, daß sie uns als Gottes Entscheidung offenbar werden kann und tatsächlich offenbar wird; sie kann das aber nicht, wenn sie uns nicht als die Entscheidung Jesu Christi selber offenbar werden kann und offenbar wird,”(Barth 1942, 115).

341 Ultimately election applies to believers as well as non-believers, as they both testify, positively and negatively, to God’s will. Barth emphasises that they belong together (zusammengehören, Barth 1942, 382). Believers testify to God’s will through their lives. Barth states that they ‘are’ the elected in so far they actually bear witness to the truth and represent and reproduce the life of the true elected, Jesus Christ: “Wie die Glaubenden in diesem Dienst die Erwählten ‘sind’, sofern sie die Wahrheit, d. h. den erwählten Menschen Jesus Christus bezeugen…” (382). Non-believers, however, testify no less to what God does not will, in that they reproduce the death of the true rejected, Jesus Christ, who is elected precisely to bear the rejection on behalf of all creation. Both the elected and the rejected, then, bear witness to the one truly elected and rejected, Jesus Christ, and represent him. This forms a characteristic belonging together (Zusammengehörigkeit),
understanding of final judgment as such. Equally clear is it that it has consequences for the understanding of eschatology, though Barth himself is reluctant to a doctrinal affirmation of *apocatastasis panton*.

In the present context, however, the focus is the anthropological content of Barth’s doctrine of election. His understanding of the inclusive election in Christ is, what from God’s side assures the relation to God in Christ, which encompasses every human being, and which therefore is universal. The

which in turn leads to a specific recollection (*Erinnerung*) and a specific expectation (*Erwartung*) in those, who believe and, thus, understand themselves as elected.

The recollection is that they themselves owe their elected relation to God solely to God’s original distinction in his election of Jesus Christ to be the true elected and rejected. This is because he as the one rejected bore their rejection, and because he as the one elected is the proper son and friend of God, whose God-sonship and -friendship they share by participation (382-384). The expectation is that God’s calling will reach others, so that their rejection finally will be overcome by their election (384-386).

Barth formulates this as a hope and an expectation from the perspective of faith, not as a doctrine. The universalistic implications of this thought are, however, clear: “Eben das Leben eines Verworfenen hat Gott, indem er es das Leben seines eigenen Sohnes sein ließ, für uns andere Alle zur objektiven Unmöglichkeit gemacht,” (381).

God’s rejection of the individual is, then, in this sense ‘impossible’, just as *Das Nichtige* is impossible in God’s creation (p134). Nevertheless, Barth considers both *Die Verworfenheit* and *Das Nichtige* to be real. From faith’s perspective, though, rejection can only be temporary and passing, and faith must expect that the rejection of the non-believer will be overthrown by the universal election of every human being in Christ.

In 1942 Barth rejects any doctrinal statement of *apocatastasis panton* quite clearly: “Daß er sich mit der Menschenwelt als solcher (nach der Lehre von der sogen. Apokatastasis) endlich und zuletzt decken müsse und werde, das ist ein Satz, den man unter Respektierung der Freiheit der göttlichen Gnade nicht wagen kann,” (Barth 1942, 462). He discusses this in detail in the subsection on Judas Iscariot (508-563), where he elaborates his appeal to God’s freedom further.

Later on, by the end of *Die kirchliche Dogmatik* IV,3, Barth repeats his rejection of a doctrinal teaching of universal reconciliation (*Allversöhnung*), but states that ‘theological consistency might seem to lead our thoughts and utterances most clearly in this direction’ and that we are commanded “zu hoffen und darum zu beten, daß Allem, was für das Gegenteil sprechen und definitiv sprechen könnte, zum Trotz ‘die Guttaten des Herrn noch nicht aus sein möchten’,” (Barth 1959, 550–51).

This hope of universal salvation is even more clearly expressed in *Die Menschlichkeit Gottes*: “Das ist sicher, daß es kein theologisches Recht gibt, der in Jesus Christus erschienenen Menschenfreundlichkeit Gottes unsererseits irgendwelche Grenzen zu setzen. Unsere theologische Pflicht ist, sie als immer noch größer zu sehen und zu verstehen, als wir es zuvor getan hatten,” (Barth 1956, 24).
election of Jesus is comprehensive (komprehensiv, 125) in a way that sums up the teleology of God’s creation of the human being in his own image:

“Denn die Erwählung des Menschen Jesus schließt zwar teleologisch in sich die Erwählung der nach Gottes positivem Willen guten Schöpfung und also des nach seinem Bilde geschaffenen und zu seinem Bilde (seinem Spiegelbild!) bestimmten Menschen,” (131).

Hence, every human being is included in God’s original decision (Urentscheidung). Barth emphasises that this does not eliminate the otherness of the human being as creature vis-à-vis the Creator, but it is still a decision that ordains human participation (Teilnahme) in God’s glory, to which the human being is destined (bestimmt).

Election as God’s Self-determination

The election of Jesus and of every human being in him is not just a decision that affects the reality aside from God. Ultimately, it is about an aspect of the fourth point of my concluding summary of Tertullian (p83), namely whether God’s actions in creation and salvation follow with necessity from his being. Barth addresses this point by his crucial claim that election is God’s eternal self-determination, his election of himself:

“Was wählte Gott in der ewigen Erwählung Jesu Christi? Wir haben auf diese Frage nach dem Inhalt der Praedestination schon in unseren bisherigen Überlegungen nie

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343 This teleology, states Barth, includes necessarily (notwendig) the rejection of Satan, who is the sum of what God has not elected, that is: *Das Nichtige* (p132). The rejection of the demonic, which Jesus as the true rejected is eternally determined to bear, is then part of the original creation of the human being *imago Dei*: “Eben damit ist sie aber auch notwendig die Verwerfung des Satans, des sich gegen Gott erhebenden Engels als des Inbegriffs der von Gott nicht gewählten (und nur kraft dieser Negation existierenden!) Möglichkeit, als des Inbegriffs des seine Schöpfung und seine Bestimmung mißverstehenden und mißbrauchenden, des Gott gleich zu sein, selber ein Gott zu sein begehrenden Geschöpf's. Er (und, in ihm begründet, das ganze Reich des Bösen, d. h. des Dämonischen) ist der Schatten, den das Licht der Erwählung des Menschen Jesus (und in ihm der guten Schöpfung, in ihm des Menschen nach und zu dem Bilde Gottes!) als Gegenstand der Verwerfung im Ratschluß Gottes selbst notwendig zur Seite hat,” (Barth 1942, 131).

Barth’s fundamental question is that of das Subjekt der Erwählung, that is: who the electing God is (52). His answer is that God in election determines himself to be God for humans in Jesus Christ, and, thus, that the electing God is no other than the God revealed in salvation history, culminating in the incarnate Jesus. The doctrine of election, then, means that God from eternity determines himself to take into his own life the human history of Jesus and the human experience of his suffering and death. Consequently, God’s eternal being remains unchanged by the incarnation and the cross, since God from eternity is what he became in Jesus. In the words of McCormack:

“…Barth … insist[s] that when God gives himself over in this way to our contradiction of God and the judgement which falls upon it, God does not give himself away. God does not cease to be God in becoming incarnate and dying in this way. God takes this human experience into his own life and extinguishes its power over us. But God is not changed on an ontological level by this experience for the simple reason that God’s being, from eternity, is determined as a being-for this event,” (McCormack 2008b, 189).

This understanding of divine Selbstbestimmung by the election of Jesus Christ is the most crucial novelty in Barth’s doctrine of God from 1940 onwards. In 1942, he presents the missing Christological foundation of God’s eternal being as a serious lack in his earlier, purely ‘actualistic understanding’ (aktuelle Verständnis) of God. He refers to the 1936 Congrès international de théologie calviniste, where his brother, Peter Barth, had defended this understanding (Barth 1942, 207–14). Shortly after the conference Barth wrote the brief Gottes Gnadenwahl (Barth 1936), which is the first expression of the Christological doctrine of election from Barth’s hand. He emphasises this focus of the doctrine as his central concern:

$^{345}$ The earlier version of Barth’s doctrine of election is set forth in Unterricht in der christlichen Religion II (Barth 1990b, 166–212). McCormack summarises Barth’s understanding of election at this point: “[It] was thus theocentric and actualistic. It was theocentric in that his concern was everywhere to turn attention away from predestined human beings to the predestinating God. It was actualistic in that it was the description of a concrete event in time, not of a fixed and unchangeable reality. What is missing in this account, as judged by the standards of Barth’s later, mature doctrine of election (in CD II/2), is any serious reflection on the fact that the election is ‘in Christ’,” (McCormack 1995, 373)

$^{346}$ McCormack states that the view defended in Geneva 1936 by Peter Barth was identical with the 1925 view of Barth. (McCormack 1995, 456). He points to Pierre Maury’s paper on the conference as the crucial inspiration for Barth to the alteration of the doctrine in Die kirchliche Dogmatik, but seems to have overlooked that Barth does the same himself (Barth 1942, 168).
“Die Richtung, in die hier gewiesen wurde, war doch die, in die man in dieser Sache in der Tat blicken muß. Die These von der aktuellen Prädestination ist dann einwandfrei begründet und gegen Mißverständnisse zur Linken und zur Rechten gesichert, wenn dabei vorausgesetzt wird, daß die Prädestination mit der Erwählung Jesu Christi identisch ist,” (Barth 1942, 210).

While Barth even after 1940 maintains the understanding of predestination as ‘designation of God’s eternal action in time’ (als Bezeichnung des ewigen Handelns Gottes in der Zeit, Barth 1942, 205), he now emphasises that the act of election in such an understanding is utterly dependent on being identified as the election of Jesus Christ.

The earlier understanding was entirely based on the actualistic concept of God’s being-in-action, which Barth accentuated in the 1924-26 Unterricht in der christlichen Religion II. Here, he even speaks of God’s essence (Wesen) in a verbal form, stating that God ‘essences’: “Alles, was Gott ist, ist er, sofern er Er ist. Er ist Wesen, er west als Person, er ist Vater, Sohn, Geist von Ewigkeit zu Ewigkeit,” (Barth 1990b, 70).

The first subvolume of Die kirchliche Dogmatik (Barth 1932) has left the verbal form of divine essence behind. But the way the 1932 Barth derives the doctrine of the Trinity from the event of revelation is still purely actualistic in that it simply understands God’s triune being from his revealing act. God’s freedom is, thus, defined as his lordship (Herrschaft), which is entirely self-grounded and needs nothing but its actual occurrence to be actualised or legitimated (nicht anders zu aktualisieren und zu legitimieren braucht, 323).

This means, of course, that God is free in the sense that he is not compelled or effected by anything, neither by any external factors, nor by any lack or deficiency in his own being. Regarding such factors it is, obviously, meaningless to ask for any necessity in God’s way of being in relation to what is different from himself, that is: in his mode of being in the particular acts of creation, incarnation, reconciliation and eschatological fulfilment.

Even more, however, the 1932 and 1938 Barth emphatically rejects to speak of God’s acts as being necessary on grounds of God’s own being or essence. Any such necessity would, states Barth at this point of time, contradict the very notion of divine freedom:

“Wenn es heißt, daß das Wort Fleisch ward, so geschah dieses Werden in der göttlichen Freiheit des Wortes. Wie es nicht aus dem Weltprozeß zu erklären ist, so beruht es auch nicht auf einer Notwendigkeit des göttlichen Wesens oder des Verhältnisses von Vater, Sohn und Geist, daß Gott Mensch wird. Wohl werden wir

347 “That is why Barth replaces the noun form Wesen (‘essence’) with the verbal form west (‘essences’). He wants to understand the divine ‘essence’ in terms of willed activity directed towards the human creature,” (McCormack 2010, 210).

348 “Gott offenbart sich als der Herr … Herrschaft heißt Freiheit,” (Barth 1932, 323).

God is free, but not with regard to his own freedom, so to speak. It is at this particular point the concept of divine Selbstdetermination from 1940 onwards means a crucial difference concerning the question from Tertullian of divine freedom and necessity. Self-determination in the act of election of Jesus Christ means that God is free even to use his freedom to surrender himself, not to his own freedom, but to his human partner (frei dazu, sich, ohne sich ihrer zu begeben, ihrer nun doch auch dazu zu bedienen, sich in jene Gemeinschaft zu begeben, Barth 1940, 341). Hence, Barth explicitly states that God is free with regard to his own freedom (frei ... seiner Freiheit gegenüber).

This means that Barth refuses to understand divine freedom in terms of lordship and sovereignty only. At this point of time he considers such an understanding to be a subtle kind of logical bondage, which give rise to a concept of God that assumes God to be subject to an internal necessity. The importance of the changed understanding of freedom, now in terms of divine Selbstdetermination, is evident in Barth’s 1947 characterisation of Hegel’s concept of God and in particular of Hegel’s doctrine of the Trinity:

“Die Hegelsche Trinitätslehre fällt zusammen mit dem Grundprinzip der Hegelschen Logik, die ausgesprochenweise zugleich das Grundprinzip der Hegelschen Anthropologie und Lebenslehre ist. ‘Gott ist dies: sich von sich selbst zu unterscheiden, sich Gegenstand zu sein, aber in diesem Unterschiede schlechthin mit sich identisch zu sein’,” (Barth 1994b, 375).

349 Already in the 1924 Unterricht in der christlichen Religion I, this ‘necessity’, which is the logical consequence of pure actualism, is evident: “Die Beziehung Gottes zum Menschen ist keine zufällige, sie ist notwendig in Gottes Wesen enthalten und begründet … daß Gott nicht Gott wäre, wenn ihm nicht von Haus aus die Beziehung zum Menschen innenwohnte,” (Barth 1990a, 156–57). It is exactly this consequence of actualism, Barth eagerly seeks to escape in the passage from Barth 1938, 148 quoted above. However, only by the notion of divine Selbstdetermination, Barth has achieved the conceptual apparatus that allows him to speak of God’s determination grounded, not in any necessity, but in his ultimate freedom.
It is easy to recognise the structural similarity to Barth’s own 1932 doctrine of the Trinity, according to which the triune God by revelation makes himself his own object and yet remains unity.

Pannenberg draws attention to this similarity and explains it as a result of a common point of departure as both Hegel and Barth derives the doctrine of the trinity from the inner logic of the concept of revelation (der inneren Logik des Offenbarungsbegriffs, Pannenberg 1977, 30). Barth understands God as a unity of subject, object and predicate, that is: Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness. This understanding corresponds closely to the structure of Hegel’s doctrine as derived from the manifestation of The Absolute Spirit. Barth even recognises that Hegel affirms and emphasises the positivity and historicity of revelation, that is: the uniqueness of Christ:

“Hegel hat die Positivität, die Geschichtlichkeit der Offenbarung, die Einzigartigkeit Christi nicht in Abrede gestellt, sondern mit Emphase behauptet,” (Barth 1994b, 375–76).

However, Barth criticises Hegel for asserting that the manifestation of God/The Absolute Spirit happens by necessity, that is: as the necessary consequence of the character of God’s being. Hegel’s God is, states Barth, his own prisoner:


By the concept of divine Selbstbestimmung, by contrast, Barth intends to ensure both the freedom and the self-limitation of God, the latter of which can only be certain, when it is grounded solely in God’s free, decision, that is: in the act of election of Jesus Christ. From this act, and from this act only,

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350 In the programmatic words of §8: “…Gott offenbart sich als der Herr und das bedeutet nach der Schrift für den Begriff der Offenbarung, daß Gott selbst in unzerstörter Einheit, aber auch in unzerstörter Verschiedenheit der Offenbarer, die Offenbarung und das Offenbarsein ist,” (Barth 1932, 311).

it follows that God’s will towards the human being is unambiguous. Since this unambiguousness does not contradict or weaken divine freedom, but springs from it, God’s human partner is ultimately assured of God’s establishing and perseverance of the covenantal God-human relation:

“Die Geschichte, in der diese besteht, ist ja nicht irgend ein Geschehen, sondern sie hat einen bestimmten Gehalt und eine nicht umzukehrende Richtung. An ihre Stelle kann nicht irgend eine andere, gerade entgegengesetzt verlaufende Geschichte treten. In ihr ist Gottes Wille völlig eindeutig. Er ist und bleibt wohl frei in sich selber, aber eben in seiner Freiheit entscheidet er sich zugunsten des Menschen für die Begründung und Erhaltung des Bundes zwischen ihm und jenem,” (Barth 1940, 211).

If God’s act in election is self-determining, and if he in this election anticipates (vorwegnimmt) Jesus’ salvific work, then there can obviously not be any hidden will of God prior to or behind this initial act. Hence, there can be no difference between the hidden God and Jesus Christ as he is in history. God’s being, then, is not only revealed, but determined in the ‘there and then’ (dort und einst), of the incarnation and the cross. In 1940 this is, so to speak, Barth’s ontological basis for the statement about Jesus Christ as the one Word of God to the world (das eine Wort Gottes), as he cites from the Barmen Declaration (Barth 1940, 194–200). At this point of time, then, the Barmen-vocabulary is not just a matter of theological epistemology or of God’s knowability (Erkennbarkeit), as the title of §26 might seem to suggest, but of the character of God’s being.352

352 For example the statement that “…eben Gott der Schöpfer ist ja dieser eine Gott des einen Heils!” (Barth 1940, 193), which makes a claim about divine being in the act of salvation, rather than just about divine knowability.

353 In an much debated study from 2000 (McCormack 2008b), McCormack raises the question, if it is “Barth’s view … that the incarnation of the ‘Son’ (and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit) are constitutive of the being of God in eternity,” (190), that is: constitutive of God’s triune being.

McCormack’s claim is that God’s self-determining act of election is constitutive of and, thus, prior to his Trinitarian being. In 2000, he claims a ‘logical’ priority of election over triunity. Later on, in 2010, he speaks instead of an ‘ontological priority’, whereas he seems to allow the Trinity to be logically prior to election, since election is an act of the triune God (McCormack 2010, 212–13). The question is not about temporal order. If election is eternal, then there can, of course, be no before it or after it. According to McCormack, however, if God’s triunity were ontologically prior to election, the election would not fully determine his being, which in turn would imply a ‘metaphysical gap’ between divine essence and divine will, that is: between God’s being and acting (McCormack 2010, 212-213.222).

McCormack’s study has given rise to a discussion, characterised by George Hunsinger as a dispute between ‘traditionalists’, to whom he counts himself, and ‘revisionists’, represented by McCormack, Paul Nimmo (Nimmo 2007) and others (eg. Paul Dafydd Jones and Matthias Gockel, Hunsinger 2008, 179–80, 2015, 115–19). The ‘traditionalist’
view of Hunsinger suggests that the Trinity in Barth’s thinking is ontologically prior to the act of election, and that it subsequently has impact on God’s being by the divine perichoresis (183, cf. ‘the trinitarian pattern of dialectical inclusion’, Hunsinger 1991, 107).

To speak of the election as constituting God’s triune being would, says Hunsinger, be “to assert that God needs the world to be fully realized as God,” (Hunsinger 2015b, 78–81).

McCormack comments on Hunsinger’s critique at several places. In an 2011 study he brings in the different Barth interpretations by Jüngel and Härlé (McCormack 2011a, 123–35). Härlé argues, as McCormack rightly points to, that God’s Trinitarian being must precede the act of election. Härlé cannot state this from the concept of ‘being-in-action’. Based on this concept, the question of the subject of revelation (die zentrale Frage nach dem Subjekt der Offenbarung, Härlé 1975, 25) must lead Barth to an epistemological circle (einem erkenntnistheorethischen Zirkel): If God’s being is determined by the revelatory act, then God can only be known by this same act. The revelatory act, on the other hand, can only be known as revelation, when God is known to be subject of it: “Einerseits kann die Frage nach dem Sein Gottes nur beantwortet werden im Hinblick auf ‘Gottes Tat in seiner Offenbarung’, andererseits kann die Offenbarung nur dann ‘als wirkliche Offenbarung’ erkannt und verstanden werden, wenn sie als ‘Gottes Tun und Wirken’ erkannt und verstanden wird,” (25).

According to Härlé, however, the very concept of revelation requires a concept of the God, who reveals himself, and the doctrine of the Trinity is in Barth the fundamental fact that ensures the revelation event as God’s revelation: “…die Trinitätslehre sichert wiederum das Verständnis des Offenbarungsgeschehens als Offenbarung Gottes. Im Blick auf diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich der Gottsbegriff als das grundlegende Datum der Barthschen Noetik,” (28-29). By this step, Barth breaks open the epistemological circle, establishing a noetic fixed point by his derivation of the doctrine of the Trinity from God’s revelation of himself as Lord. Thus, Barth’s concept of God, defined as lordship, is axiomatic ([d]iese Definition hat für Barth axiomatischen Charakter, 28).

Jüngel, on the other hand, against whom Härlé argues at this point, identifies the immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity in Barth in the radical sense that God’s self-revelation simply is God’s self-interpretation, in which God is his own ‘double’ (‘Doppelgänger’, Jüngel 1967, 82). If so, there is not only no difference between God as he is in the Christ event and God as he is in eternal trinity. Nor is there any real distinction, and there cannot be, since the doctrine of the Trinity is Christologically grounded: “Schon die Trinitätslehre Barths ist – nicht nur durch die Behauptung der Offenbarung als Wurzel der Trinitätslehre, sondern darüber hinaus speziell durch den Einsatz bei dem Ereignis des Offenbarwerdens innerhalb der im Offenbarungsbegriff zu unterscheidenden drei Momente – christologisch begründet,” (Jüngel 1967, 29–30).

Jüngel refers to §8 (Barth 1932, 333), which in my opinion hardly can be taken to support this claim. In fact, Barth’s interpretation of God’s self-revelation as “noch einmal Gott zu sein” is an attempt to understand Christ from the concept of revelation rather that to understand revelation from Christology. As McCormack puts it: “…Jüngel has (unconsciously?) improved upon Barth through an interpretation of the latter’s doctrine of the Trinity in the light of the later Christology of CD IV/1-2. He has corrected Barth – by Barth. It is only because he has done this that Jüngel can believe that Barth’s doctrine
of the Trinity is ‘christologically grounded.’ In truth, it is not. It is grounded in a highly formal concept of revelation,” (McCormack 2011a, 131).

According to Jüngel, God’s Trinitarian being is determined by his ‘original decision’ (Urentscheidung) to identify himself fully with the historical Christ event. Revelation, then, is God’s self-identification (Selbstidentifikation, 38). McCormack understands his own interpretation of the divine self-determination in election as constitutive of God’s Trinitarian being to be in line with Jüngel, also in the sense that he considers Jüngel to be a constructive revision of Barth at this point, “making Barth to be more self-consistent,” (McCormack 2011a, 131). By giving (logical and) ontological priority to election over Trinity, McCormack believes to be able to avoid any difference between God, as he is in himself, and God, as he is in Christ.

As far as I can see, however, McCormack by taking this step inevitably has to dissolve election as Trinitarian event, that is: as an event for which the triune God is subject. In this regard, the vocabulary of 2010 and 2011, where McCormack under the impression of Jüngel no longer speaks of election as ‘logically’ prior to the Trinity, but only as ‘ontologically’ prior to it, makes no difference. It does not suggest any explanation of, how the Trinity can be logical subject of the same act, by which it is ontologically constituted. Without such an explanation, McCormack’s formulations appear more like the stating of a paradox than a solution to it.

At first glance, Hunsinger seems to provide an explanation for the opposite view: that election, though ontologically secondary to the Trinity, can determine divine being by means of perichoresis. But he can only carry out this explanation by referring to §69 (Barth 1959; Hunsinger 2008, 183), assuming that “[a]lthough Barth first sets this grammar [of perichoresis] forth explicitly (and belatedly) in a discussion of Jesus Christ’s ‘threefold parousia’ … he has been presupposing it all along,” (197). Even more, the fact that Barth does not, himself, associate perichoresis with divine self-determination makes Hunsinger’s explanation appear unlikely.

Härle insists that Barth’s 1932 derivation of the doctrine of the Trinity from the concept of revelation breaks the epistemological circle by establishing the concept of God that the understanding of the Trinity as subject of the act of election requires. As far as I can see, Härle is perfectly right concerning the 1932 Barth of §§8-12. However, I do not think his interpretation can cover the line of thought in Barth’s doctrine of election from 1940 onwards, and in particular not the concept of divine Selbstbestimmung. Either God’s Trinitarian being must be the necessary cause of the in election anticipated events of salvation history. Or the revelatory event, for which the Trinity is subject, and which is the only possible way to know God’s triunity, is a free decision of self-determining election.

In the first case, which is the view of Härle, God is not ‘free with regard to his own freedom’ (Barth 1940, 341, p139), but is ‘his own prisoner’ just as much of the God of Hegel (p151), even though the necessary manifestation of the Trinity is laid back into the eternal act of election. The circle is broken, but God is not ultimately free, as he is bound to his own formal freedom, so to speak. In the second case, which I believe is the content of the 1940 and 1942 doctrine of election as divine self-determination, the epistemological circle is not broken, but God is ultimately free, I do not think the two lines of thought can be unified in a single, non-paradoxical formula, not even by Härle.
In a broader perspective, this is, of course, the vital presupposition for Barth’s understanding of humanness as an inherent reality in God (p138). Further, if the suffering and crucifixion of Jesus by God’s eternal, self-determining election is included in divine being, then theology, so Barth, has to take leave of the notion of divine impassibility. In the later volumes of Die kirchliche Dogmatik, especially in IV,1, Barth explicitly criticises the traditional metaphysical concept of God on the question about whether or not God is capable of suffering and death. If God has, in Jesus, made himself

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Barth never suggested that the kind of revisions of his own early doctrine of the Trinity, in which McCormack engages, was needed or desirable. Quite the contrary, he continues to speak of the Trinity as prior to election based on the freedom of God, as McCormack rightly notes, pointing to §57 (Barth 1953, 54; McCormack 2008b, 193). He simply never asked the question of ontological priority of Trinity or election in the Trinitarian, self-determining elective act. Barth’s reluctance to raise or answer McCormack’s question – “for reasons known only to himself” (McCormack 2008b, 193) – is hardly due to that “[h]e simply wrote better than he knew,” (McCormack 2011a, 135).

I find it more likely that Barth after 1940 intendedly maintained both lines of thought: That God’s Trinitarian being, as evidenced by the very concept of the revelation, for which he is the single subject, means that he as Trinity is subject of the act of election. And at the same time that election as divine Selbstbestimmung entirely determines God’s being as ‘being for his human partner’. He did not allow the first line of thought to restrict the scope of God’s freedom to be fully in the act of delimiting himself and only there. Neither did he allow the second line of thought to obscure that the divine subject, required by the act of election, is the Trinity of the particular event of revelation.

It is not possible, I think, to answer McCormack’s question, giving ‘priority’ to either Trinity or election, without assuming a quasi-temporality in God’s eternal being, that is: precisely the kind of temporality that it is Barth’s concern to avoid.

McCormack claims that Hunsinger’s goal is to bring “Barth in close proximity to the Fathers,” (McCormack 2010, 206). He states that if, as Hunsinger thinks, Barth’s point had been that the Son’s only necessary mode of being were that of his eternal relation to the Father, and that his revelation in history consequently were only a ‘mode of appearing’, then Barth would, in fact, believe “what the ancients believed”. By ‘the ancients’ he seems to mean Athanasius and Augustine, with whom Barth deals in detail (Barth 1942, 115–18, p142), but it could include Calvin as well. Such and understanding of Barth is, however, not possible, so McCormack, since it involves an ‘essentialist ontology’ (McCormack 2008b, 189), according to which God’s self-revelation in Christ is nothing but a mere theophany.

Therefore, McCormack seems to assume that any talk about the constitution of the Trinity must be highly controversial and problematic from the point of view of the ancient church. In fact, it is not so, at least not in the case of Tertullian. Tertullian’s doctrine of the Trinity includes, as we have seen (pp51-54), what may be most accurately described as a teleology of the constitution of the Trinity, but – as far as I can see – without ever asking, whether God’s trinity is the cause of the teleology, or whether it, conversely, is the teleology that causes his Trinitarian being.
subject to suffering, then a theology from the perspective of faith must affirm that he is capable of doing so (Barth 1953, 192).

Thus, the crucifixion did not take place in spite of the character of God’s being, which ought to have made it impossible, but because of the character of God’s being, which by eternal election has incorporated the cross. Had God been impassible, then Jesus’ death would have implied a contradiction within God, something Barth eagerly rejects: “Er [Gott] kommt darin mit sich selbst nicht in Konflikt,” (Barth 1953, 202). By contrast, God’s undergoing suffering and death in Jesus reveals him as having taken passibility into his own being: “Gott kann das. Und diesem seinem Können ist auch durch den Widerspruch der Kreatur ihm gegenüber keine Grenze gesetzt,” (Barth 1953, 204).

Thus, even – and in particular – with regard to the cross, the election of Jesus concerns not only God’s act of revelation, but his being. Barth does not use the term divine ontology or anything similar. He is, as we have seen, very critical to any attempt to assign the dogmatic reflection about God’s being to a general Seinslehre. He would undoubtedly consider any attempt to do so as a relapse into the thinking of analogia entis. This, however, does not prevent him from making ontological statements, which Die kirchliche Dogmatik does all the way through, not in terms of any fixed metaphysics, but as assertions about God as original and pure self-


356 McCormack claims that the very concept of divine Selbstbestimmung is taken from German idealism (McCormack 2010, 211), and that Barth’s concern may then be seen as an “attempt to overcome Kant by means of Kant” (McCormack 1995, 465–66). Understood this way, Barth’s doctrine of election is ultimately an attempt to ground theology in a reality, namely divine self-determination, that is not dependent on human subjectivity. Structurally, this understanding of Barthian theology as an escape from non-foundationalism is similar to Hunsinger’s notion of ‘the procedure of grounding’ in Barth (p18 and note 37).

This interpretation relies on McCormack’s basic understanding of what problem Barth’s theology seeks to solve, namely the epistemological problem of Kantian critique of reason. What Barth does, so McCormack, is to overcome Kantian idealism, not by bypassing Kant, but by “going through him” (466).

So, McCormack utilises the central claim of the Barth interpretation that considers a German Idealistic concept of subjectivity to be the core of Barth’s entire theology. This
determining subjectivity that from the perspective of the subsequent subjectivity of faith understands divine subjectivity as determined by the singular and unique history of Jesus.

3.5 Concluding Summary of Barth’s Anthropology
This section’s reading of Barth from the perspective of Tertullian has shown that Barth’s anthropology may be interpreted in response to the question of human knowledge of God. In Barth, this is about the human subject’s self-understanding from the perspective of faith.

The human person must, so Barth, in faith understand him- or herself as a ‘subsequent subject’ to God’s subjectivity, thereby partaking in the event of revelation. This subjectivity is a specific human mode of existence. It consists in faith’s experience of being summoned by God’s word and in faith’s free response to this word in gratitude. Barth characterises this particular ethos as recognition of God’s self-witness. The crucial point is that divine freedom by this recognition ‘draws human freedom to and after itself’, that is: establishes the ‘subsequent subjectivity’ as human freedom.

interpretation was made relatively early by Trutz Rendtorff (note 44). His thesis is that Barth, far from taking leave of the Enlightenment and of late 19th century’s thought, revitalised the themes of autonomy and subjectivity, which he, according to Rendtorff, took over in a primarily Fichtean form. The point is that he did so by transforming them from themes in anthropology to themes in the doctrine of God: “Barth leistet .. die dogmatische Legitimation für den Eintritt der neuzeitlichen Autonomie ins Zentrum von Theologie und Kirche selbst,” (Rendtorff 1972, 179).

McCormack affirms “the great debt which he [Barth] owed to the Kantian tradition in philosophy,” and emphasises that this “means that Barth still had a very strong foot in the nineteenth century,” (McCormack 1995, 466). However, he uses this understanding to the exact opposite end than that of Rendtorff and the Münich School. Far from understanding divine subjectivity dialectically in the establishing of human subjectivity as the essential step in Barth’s dialectics (p21), he considers Barth’s acceptance of the epistemology of Kant’s First Critique (245) as prerequisite for a ‘critical realistic’ way of ‘grounding’ theology: “Barth was in agreement with the nineteenth theologians to this extent: if one were to be in a position to address the questions which arise in these [metaphysical] regions of discourse, it would not be possible on the basis of the metaphysical way of knowing. The ground of the possibility would have to be sought elsewhere: in his [Barth’s] view, in God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Christ,” (246).

The concern of McCormack’s Barth is, thus “to safeguard the distinction between an objectively real self-revealing God and human consciousness,” (135) whereas Barth, according to McCormack, “had no real interest in the question of the locus of revelation in human subjectivity.”

In my opinion, the critique of Hunsinger for ignoring the crucial role of ‘subsequent human subjectivity’ in Barth’s understanding of revelation (p20) applies to McCormack as well. Cf. Baark 2018, 13–21.
In light of Tertullian’s understanding of the divine *testimonium* as a duality of communication ‘by nature’ and communication ‘by doctrine’, the crucial point in Barth is that he understands the revelation as a single act, by which the Creator subsequently enters into relation with his creature.

The human subject established this way interprets creation as divine benefit and created human nature as ‘formal’ preparation for grace. This means that creation, from faith’s perspective, is teleological as anticipation of the historical covenant between God and his human partner. Further, it even means that revelation in Barth is ontologically prior to creation, as expressed by the statement that the covenant is the internal basis of creation.

Barth interprets the covenantal relation between God and the human being by the concept of analogy. This concept holds together the similarity of the relation and the dissimilarity of the qualitative divine-human difference of being.

The analogy of faith presupposes and transcends this difference by God’s revelatory use of human language. Faith, then, acknowledges the created human ‘openness for God’ as a revelation of the true humanness in the person of Jesus Christ. Therefore, Christology is the sole criterion for faith’s knowledge of human nature.

From 1945 onwards, Barth unfolds this in terms of the created human subjectivity of the *Ich-Du*-encounter that faith knows from the fellow-humanness of Jesus. This unfolding identifies revelation’s instrumental use of relational human subjectivity as the *locus* of God’s establishing of the ‘subsequent subjectivity’.

Faith’s understanding of created human subjectivity equates Tertullian’s concept of a divine-human ‘correspondence of freedom’. This means that the humanness established by revelation far from being alien to original human nature, incorporates and renews it, so that faith compared to the situation before faith appears as a ‘surplus of subjectivity’.

Faith’s experience of being God’s counterpart is likewise the perspective of Barth’s understanding of human constitution. He believes, by this perspective, to lead theological anthropology to focus on the human ‘who’ rather than the human ‘what’.

The crucial point is, so Barth, that the human person in faith experiences to be addressed by God as a rational being, that is: as a soul-bodily unity in which the primacy of the soul in terms of thinking and willing defines the human person as a single subject.

Barth finds this particular humanness revealed in Jesus and states that he, in the course of his earthly life, never experienced any tension between mental will, consciousness, decisions etc. and bodily desires. While this description of Jesus may be debatable for exegetical reasons, the perspective
from Tertullian raises the question if Barth at this point carries on the
dichotomy between reason and passion that Tertullian rejected on
Christological grounds. If this is the case, then Barth’s understanding of how
God approaches the human being tends to be intellectualistic regarding how
God’s impact takes place.

Barth, however, states that this description corresponds to New Testament
description of Jesus. Similarly, he believes the relational subjectivity of the
human Ich-Du-encounter to be revealed in the fellow-humanness of Jesus,
so that Christology is the only source and criterion for theological
anthropology. Therefore, he holds similarities between theological and non-
theological anthropologies to be partial and superficial.

However, the terminology and the line of thought of his presentation of
the Ich-Du-existence appear to be remarkably close to that of Martin Buber.
In that case, Barth may be closer than he likes to be to meet Tertullian’s claim
that Christian faith in order to be credible must be in accordance with an
anthropology that can account for the means, by which God communicates.

Sin is, so Barth, a concrete form of das Nichtige, that is: the
incomprehensible, inexplicable and impossible negation of creation that
faith, nonetheless, must regard as creation’s horizon. According to Barth, das
Nichtige has reality only in God’s eternal rejection of it in his act of election,
that is: an inferior kind of reality without perpetuity that exists only in God’s
defeating of it.

This is, according to Barth, ultimately about God’s being. God is in the
act of election, by which he eternally determines himself to be God for his
human partner.

Barth presents his transformation of the reformed doctrine of election as a
rejection of the understanding of election as a decretum absolutum of a
divine will behind the incarnate Christ. As Christ is both the subject and the
object of election, this means that election is universal because of universal
human participation in him. In this sense, the concern of Barth’s
interpretation of election is faith’s assurance about God’s mercy.

With regard to the being of God, the concept of divine self-determination
means that human assurance is founded, not in divine necessity but in divine
freedom. God is free with regard to his own freedom to determine himself,
so that he – in his being – is bound to his human partner.

By this ‘boundness’, divine individuality is, so Barth, paradigmatic for
human individuality. In the sense of paradigmatic humanness, this line of
thought equates the inherent ‘make-himself-knownness’ of Tertullian’s
doctrine of the Trinity, although Barth neither understands divine triunity as
caused by self-determination, nor lets the Trinity limit the extent of the self-
determination.
However, the decisive and unique novelty in Barth is that the ‘boundness’ is an expression of God’s radical subjectivity. This is why the humanness of the human person, eternally elected in Christ, has the character of ‘subsequent subjectivity’.
4 Destined for Fellowship with God. The Theological Anthropology of Pannenberg

The overall aim of this section is to conduct a problem-oriented study of Pannenberg’s anthropology from the four main points of my reading of the anthropology of Tertullian. The section consists of five chapters: a chapter on each of the four points and a brief concluding summary.

In the first chapter (4.1) I investigate how Pannenberg’s anthropology can be understood in response to the question of human knowledge of God. This implies that I decide on the issue of the relation between fundamental anthropology and theological anthropology in Pannenberg. I argue that Pannenberg’s theological anthropology incorporates his fundamental anthropology in a way that corresponds to his concept of revelation, according to which revelation presupposes a notion of God in its human recipient. Further, I present Pannenberg’s argumentation against the claim of Feuerbachian critique of religion that the idea of God is a mere human projection, and his understanding of how religious statements of God – with their implicit claim on intersubjective truth – must be tested from its coherence with other knowledge. Further, I argue that Pannenberg’s argument from the reductionism of nonreligious anthropologies in itself represents an attempt to put to test the religious truth claim by showing that Christological determined knowledge of God, which incorporates the fundamental anthropological idea of God, is more convincing than all nonreligious conceptions of the human being and the world.

In the second chapter (4.2) I investigate the theological anthropology of Systematische Theologie with regard to, how it can account for the anthropological conditions for human knowledge of God. Pannenberg’s answer to this question utilises – as do the answers of Tertullian and Barth – the concept of imago Dei. Unlike Barth, Pannenberg understands the divine image as an orientation towards God, intrinsic to human nature. Based on Tertullian’s concept of ‘double correspondence’, I examine a particular characteristic of Pannenberg’s doctrinal understanding of the divine image, namely that the divine-human fellowship, which is the content of this concept, is a reality only in the creature’s explicit self-distinction from the Creator.

In the third chapter (4.3) I examine, how Pannenberg materially shapes his theological anthropology regarding the human being as ‘personal unity of body and soul’. I argue that the particular human form of soul-being, according to Pannenberg means to be determined by the destiny of fellowship with God, and that sin means the misery (Elend) of being alienated from this fellowship. From the perspective of Tertullian’s understanding of sin’s inexplicability, I then present how Pannenberg understands sin as rooted in a universal anthropological structure.
In the fourth chapter (4.4) I investigate how Pannenberg understands the human destiny of fellowship with God as a reality in God’s Trinitarian being. I argue that this can be understood in terms of a God-inherent humanness, which, according to Pannenberg, is identical with Jesus’ earthly obedience in his life, death and resurrection. Consequently, the paradigmatic significance for others, Jesus’ humanness achieved in the particularity of his creaturely life, is in Pannenberg the content of his divine sonship.

In the fifth chapter (4.5) I summarise the section’s reading of Pannenberg’s theological anthropology from the perspective of Tertullian. This summary provides the basis for the dissertation’s final conclusions on the theological anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg.

4.1 Pannenberg’s Anthropology and Theology’s Truth Claim

Tertullian’s anthropology is ultimately about human knowledge of God. To study Pannenberg’s anthropology from Tertullian is, then, to read it as thematising this issue. This means that I approach Pannenberg’s anthropology from a specific doctrinal concern.

I believe this approach to be in line with Pannenberg’s own overall understanding of his large-scale anthropological proposal. In a 2006 retrospect, he points out that he developed his fundamental anthropology for specific dogmatic reasons:

“...in dealing with the God of the Bible, theology has to claim all reality – and first of all the human reality – to be the creation of that God. To that end it was not sufficient to develop some idea of the human person on the basis of biblical presuppositions; but it seemed necessary to claim the human reality as it is studied and presented by the secular disciplines and try to show that it is necessarily related to religion and to God,” (Pannenberg 2006, 190, emphasis added).

The quotation must be read carefully: the dogmatic claim that all reality is created by God is based on ‘dealing with the God of the Bible’, not on fundamental anthropology in itself. However, this dogmatic claim makes it ‘necessary’ to engage in dialogue with ‘secular disciplines’, as “…a doctrine of God touches upon everything else. Therefore, it is necessary to explore every field of knowledge in order to speak of God reasonably,” (ibid.).

Pannenberg understands this concern as an alternative to Barth, or more precisely: as an alternative to Barth’s own way of carrying out his opposition to ‘anthropocentrism in theology’. Barth’s approach is, so Pannenberg, from the outset mistaken on a specific point, namely his ‘mere decision to begin with God himself.’ (Pannenberg 1983, 16). The problem is that this bloße Entscheidung is unable to account for the fact that revelation is mediated, and that this mediation requires that theology engages in the dispute about
the reality of God. Today’s field of this dispute is, so Pannenberg, anthropology.

**The Religious Human Being and the Horizon of Infinity**

The fundamental concern of *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive* is to show that the question of God belongs intrinsically to the very humanness of human beings (*dem Menschsein des Menschen unveräußerlich*, Pannenberg 1983, 70), or, as Pannenberg quotes Cicero to say that human beings are religious by nature. Pannenberg endeavours to demonstrate this from a large and diverse material, covering biological, psychological, sociological and historical research, of which I present only a minor part in what follows.

The crucial point of his line of thought is that human beings are characterised by a certain eccentricity (*Exzentrität*), that is: that human existence transcends itself and, thus, is centred outside itself. This eccentricity can be understood biologically as a reduction of the influence of instinctual behaviour in the human species compared to animals. Thus, Pannenberg agrees with Konrad Lorenz that animal response to certain stimuli depends on the behavioural schema (*Verhaltensschema*, 30) of the particular organism but states, referring to Arnold Gehlen and others (35-39) that such behavioural schemata exist only in a rudimentary form in human beings:

“Wenn es beim Menschen angeborene Verhaltensschemata gibt, so jedenfalls nur in eigentümlich rudimentärer und abgeschliffener Form,” (32).

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358 As early as in the 1962 *Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie* (Pannenberg 1972c), he states that the anthropological sciences in the modern era have taken over the place in common consciousness, which classical metaphysics previously held, as the basis for evaluating any truth claim, theological truth claims included (5-6).


Therefore, human beings are, according to Gehlen, distinguished from animals by the particular human ‘openness to the world’ (*Weltoffenheit*). This openness is an evolutionary adaptation to the human lack of instinctual behavioural schemata and consists in the conscious perception of things as objects, that is: as distinct and different from the sentient human subject and from other objects.

By this argumentation Gehlen has, so Pannenberg, offered a naturalistic explanation for the philosophical-anthropological concept of *Weltoffenheit* in Max Scheler. The same human ability for self-transcendence is what Helmuth Plessner speaks of as *der exzentrischen Position des Menschen* (34).^361^ Pannenberg argues that the particular human object-awareness implies a religious dimension. He speaks of this as an *Ausgriff auf das Allgemeine* (65) in the sense that the human ‘being with the other’ (*Sein beim andern als einem andern*, 63), implies a horizon, which itself transcends the category of finite objects. This means that the human eccentric existence presupposes a concept of the divine in the unthematic form of infinity:

> “Im Ausgriff auf den alles Einzelne tatsächlicher und möglicher Wahrnehmung umgreifenden allgemeinsten Horizont verhält sich aber der Mensch exzentrisch zu einer ihm vorgegebenen *Wirklichkeit*, und daher ist in diesem Ausgriff implizit die göttliche Wirklichkeit mit bejaht, auch ohne als solche schon thematisch oder gar schon in dieser oder jener besonderen Gestalt erfaßt zu sein,” (66).

Pannenberg emphasises that he does not claim by this to have proven God’s existence as *vorgegebenen Wirklichkeit* or proven the human relation to God/the divine, even at an unthematic level:^362^ “Das alles bedeutet nicht so etwas wie ein anthropologischen Gottesbeweis. Daß die Frage nach Gott zum Menschsein des Menschen gehört, das besagt noch nicht, daß ein Gott existiert und welcher Gott das ist,” (70).^363^  

^361^ Pannenberg point out that whereas human object-awareness in Scheler conditions self-reflection, Plessner conversely understands the capacity for self-objectification as prerequisite for object-awareness in general (Pannenberg 1983, 35).  
^362^ What Pannenberg believes to have proven is the ‘unavoidableness of the question of God’ ([d]ie Unveräußerlichkeit der Gottesfrage, Pannenberg 1983, 70), not the reality of God, as if religion and theology were afterwards to thematise and specify such an ‘unspecified God’: “Alle diese Vollzüge [des Gottverwiesenseins des natürlichen Menschen] werden im Ausgang vom menschlichen Bewusstsein bzw. von einer anthropologischen Grundlage aus vollzogen und bleiben so durch diese bedingt. Das heißt in letzter Konsequenz, dass sie zum einen weder über die ‘Realität Gottes’ Auskunft geben, ja, nicht Auskunft geben können, weil sie letztinstanzlich dem bloß subjektiven Deutungsrahmen verhaftet bleiben,” (Axt-Piscalar 2015a, 115).  
^363^ Daniel Munteanu attaches great importance to the terminology of ‘question’ (Munteanu 2010, 158–61). He understands it from the 1965 the article *Die Frage nach Gott* (Pannenberg 1971), stating that ‘the question’ is much more than a metaphor: “Die
Still, theology must incorporate the fundamental anthropological notion of divinity implied in eccentric existence. At this point, Pannenberg differs from the concept of revelation in Barth, which he believes leads to subjectivism.364

Pannenberg does not comment on Barth’s understanding of human subjectivity as ‘subsequent’ (p86), which in Barth implies that the human subject, who recognises revelation as such, is established by the same revelation, that is: in and by what Barth terms as a ‘circle of God’s truth’ (cirkulus veritatis Dei, Barth 1940, 276–84, p107). He seems to assume that the human subject in Barth’s theology is fundamentally a choosing, fideistic subject, whose ‘act of faith’ (Glaubensakt) is the ultimate source of the authority of God’s word as revelation:

“Barth wollte an der doppelten Annahme festhalten, daß die Wirklichkeit Gottes und seines Wortes einerseits dem Glauben vorausgeht und andererseits für die Dogmatik von vornherein feststeht. Letzteres konnte jedoch nur durch den Begriff eines Glaubensaktes eingeführt werden, und die unvermeidliche Folge war, daß die von Barth intendierte Priorität Gottes und seines Wortes vor dem Glaubensakt nun nicht mehr unzweideutig thematisiert werden konnte.” (Pannenberg 1988c, 54).

By this, Pannenberg rejects Barth’s distinction between Erkenntnis and Postulat (Barth 1945, 25, p113), which allowed him to understand the theological exposition of the inner rationality of Christian faith as genuine knowledge, though its truth claims are impossible to put to test on external

Fraglichkeit des Menschseins soll keineswegs als bloße Metapher begriffen werden, sondern als ‘Grundstruktur des Menschseins’ ..., ja sogar als ‘umfassende Kennzeichnung für das gegenwärtige Wissen vom Menschen’. ” On this basis, Munteanu concludes that in Pannenberg the ‘natural religiousness’ expressed in the unthematic notion of divinity is nothing but a ‘form’ of the creaturely human relation to the Creator. If that were the case, the anthropological evidence of the notion of God would, obviously, be an anthropological grounding of theology.

In my opinion, however, Munteanu’s conclusion is misleading. Although he may be right that Pannenberg in 1965, and even in 1983, speaks more directly about human existence as Frage nach Gott than he does later on, he explicitly denies that this should be an attempt to prove God’s existence (Pannenberg 1971, 378). In 1988, he makes even clearer reservations regarding the pathetische Abstraktion of understanding created human existence as identical with the mere ‘question of God’. At this point of time he emphasises that human life always takes place in ‘provisional answers’ (Pannenberg 1988c, 129–30, p169).

364 Pannenberg argues that Barth, in order to assure (sicherzustellen) the truth of Christian faith in advance of all discussion of its content, presupposes a decision of faith in a way that makes the believing subject the locus of absolute truth. This is, he states, nothing but irrational fanaticism (irrationaler Fanatismus, Pannenberg 1988c, 57).
To Pannenberg, however, such a claim that cannot be put to test is simply a postulate, and he argues that the only way to avoid it and, thus, to maintain the priority of God himself over human act and experience of faith, is to abandon any subjectivist presupposition (Voraussetzung, Pannenberg 1988c, 54) as condition for the possibility of theology.

**Revelation’s Presupposed Notion of God**

The crucial point of Pannenberg’s own concept of revelation is that revelation presupposes a notion of God:


The problem in Barth is, so Pannenberg, that his concept of revelation concentrates exclusively on God’s self-revelation (Selbstoffenbarung) in in the sense of identity between the subject and the content of revelation (im Sinne der strengen Identität von Subjekt und Inhalt des Offenbarung, 244). Therefore, Pannenberg endeavours a ‘more nuanced’ (differenziertere, 260) understanding of revelation. His starting point is the phenomenon of

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365 As I have argued, the inclusion of created co-humanity in the revelatory concept of analogy (the analogia relationis) does not mean that Barth in 1945 and 1948 seeks to justify these truth claims on a broader basis, but rather that he applies the concept of analogia fidei on human Mitmenschlichkeit (p115).

366 Therefore, Pannenberg cannot accept a definition of revelation that limits the notion to communication of ‘primary knowledge of the deity’: “Man muß sich nur freimachen von der Vorstellung, als Offenbarung könne nur eine Mitteilung gelten, die eine erstmalige Kenntnis von der Gottheit vermittelt,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 213–14).

Pannenberg endorses the 1963 statement of James Barr that revelation can mean communication “from one already known,” (214). However, he does not follow Barr’s 1966 verschärften Kritik (255), which totally abandons the concept of revelation in favour of his own concept of ‘communication’. Pannenberg concludes: “Mit diesen Feststellungen ist noch nicht gesagt, daß die Wendung von Gott, der sich in seinem Wort offenbart, den biblischen Befunden unangemessen wäre, aber sie bedarf jedenfalls einer differenzierteren Rechtfertigung,” (260).

367 Even though the concept of God’s self-revelation may be said to have a long history going back to Philo and Plotinus, and present in the patristic thought of the epiphany of the Logos as well as in certain biblical passages, these occurrences of the concept do not, so Pannenberg, identify the content of the revelation with the revealing God. This identification was not made until German Idealism (Pannenberg 1988c, 244).

conscience,\textsuperscript{368} which holds a special place in human self-relation (Selbstverhältnis), since the totality of life (das Ganze des Lebens) is present in it (Pannenberg 1983, 299–300). Therefore, human self-reference (Selbstbezug, Pannenberg 1988c, 126) is originally thematised in the experience of conscience.

Human eccentricity makes this self-reference dependent on an external instance or horizon of infinity, on which the human subject bases him- or herself:

“Darin ist enthalten, was wir heute die ‘exzentrische Lebensform’ des Menschen nennen: Er muß sich auf etwas außerhalb seiner selbst gründen. Das steht nicht in seiner Wahl. Wählen kann er nur, worauf er sich gründet,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 127).

The unthematic idea of divinity in terms of infinity corresponds to the notion of an inborn knowledge of God (notitia innata) in the history of theology (121-124). Pannenberg mentions Tertullian in particular,\textsuperscript{369} stating that he by this notion is able to maintain the universality of human knowledge of God.

As we saw (p49.p79), Tertullian argues that knowledge of God and even relation to God is intrinsic and essential to human nature, established by the divine act of institutio (p42). In the context of the anti-Marcionite controversy, Tertullian’s argumentation relies on Scriptural interpretation, whereas he, addressing Carthage Christians attracted to Hermogenes, includes ‘arguments from common reason’, that is: from philosophy, from everyday human experience and from common sense.

Pannenberg, by contrast, accentuates that the unthematic idea of divinity does not establish any true knowledge of God or any genuine God-human relation. He points to Luther’s radical understanding of sin, which emphasises that sin turns the inborn knowledge of God into idolatry because of the enslaved and blinded human reason after the fall (122-123.126). Luther’s understanding corresponds to the unthematic character of human knowledge of life’s infinite basis. It does not implicate human knowledge (Erkenntnis) of God but only knowledge of what it means to have a God (darin ‘weiß’ der Mensch, was es heißt, einen Gott zu haben, 127).

At first glance, then, it seems as if what has happened between Tertullian and Pannenberg is that Luther – and with him the Reformation’s radical understanding of sin – has come between them. That would have been a

\textsuperscript{368} “Die Erörterung des Sachproblems, das für die reformatorische Theologie von der Paulussexegese her im Hinblick auf das Verhältnis von Röm 1,19f. und Röm 2,15 gestellt war, läßt sich auch heute nicht sachgemäß führen, ohne auf das Phänomen des Gewissens einzugehen,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 124).

\textsuperscript{369} Referring in general to De Testimonio Animae (Pannenberg 1988c, 121).
reasonable assumption, if Tertullian had understood the human nature’s essential knowledge of God as independent of revelation.

In fact, he does not. His ‘arguments from common reason’ are based on analyses of sensation, motion, understanding and emotion, as he believes that God communicates universally by exactly these phenomena of human life (p79). Hence, God’s universal ‘making himself known’ (Adversus Marcionem I,10,4, p43) in Tertullian does not correspond to Pannenberg’s description of notitia innata in the history of theology. Pannenberg’s reference to an angeborene Kenntnis von Gott (122) corresponds only seemingly to De Testimonio Animae 5,3, where Tertullian mentions the ingenitam conscientiam. In Tertullian, the inbornness of the soul’s knowledge means that it does not stem from the opinions of published books (opinionibus publicatarum litterarum), that is: from the sacred writings of heathen poets, but is dependent on God’s communicative act (5,7). In the terminology of Pannenberg this is clearly an erworbenen Kenntnis. What distinguishes Tertullian from what Pannenberg describes as ‘acquired knowledge’ in Luther and Melanchton (122-124) is that the ‘acquiring’ in Tertullian is included in the act of creation, both in case of the initial creation of Adam and in case of all subsequent creation of human beings.

Pannenberg’s ‘fundamental’ anthropology aims to describe human nature, including the unthematic notion of God in terms of infinity, but without the concrete God-human relation, which, so Pannenberg, is a reality only in positive religion. Using the conceptual apparatus of Tertullian, that would mean human nature without the relative disposition (p49) of the relation to God.370 Since relative disposition is constitutive of natura in Tertullian, I have referred to this as ‘pre-natural soul’ (pp42.79), corresponding to Barth’s 1929 notion of ‘the creature in itself’(das Geschöpf als solche, Barth 1994, 464, pp101.112).

As we have seen, Tertullian may possibly mention such a ‘pre-natural soul’ as a hypothetical abstraction in De Anima 11,6. Apart from this single reference, however, his focus is everywhere on the concrete and evident phenomena, by which he believes God communicates, whereas he shows no interest in the ability of an abstract soul to understand God’s revelation.

Pannenberg, too, believes the anthropological approach of Systematische Theologie, which has an explicit religious basis (Pannenberg 1991, 203) to be closer to concrete human existence than the ‘fundamental’ anthropology of 1983. The human being is religious, not just in the sense that the question of God is part of eccentric existence, but even more in the sense that actual,

370 That is: the concept of nature suggested by Laura Nasrallah, in which the relation between God’s spirit and the human being is not essential but accidental (Nasrallah 2003, 58, p78).
‘positive religion’ is a formative factor in any known human culture (note 388). Human beings are not just abstractly religious, but live in concrete religious worship.

At this point Pannenberg makes reservations regarding the abovementioned terminology of a ‘question’ of God (Frage nach Gott, Pannenberg 1988c, 129–30) that he endorsed in 1983 (p164). The ‘question’ may be a good metaphor for the human being’s unspecified openness to the ultimate basis of life. However, it is an abstraction (eine pathetische Abstraktion) to assume that anyone actually exists in such a question. Human existence, by contrast, takes place in ‘provisional answers’ (vorläufigen ‘Antworten’ auf die ‘Frage’ ihrer Existenz).\(^3\)

Nonetheless, Pannenberg finds it necessary to account in detail for the ‘fundamental’ – and, as it were, abstract – unthematic ‘knowledge’ (‘Wissen’, 127) of God, which belongs to the primordial human situation (129). The reason for this necessity is that the unthematic knowledge is conditional for the very concept of revelation, even if it is no more than ‘a vague sense of infinity’\(^3\)

According to Pannenberg, the original function of older natural theology (die ursprüngliche Funktion der alten natürlichen Theologie, Pannenberg 1988c, 107), including the proofs of God’s existence, was to describe the reality of the human being and the world in order to validate the intelligibility of and the criteria for human talk about God. Similarly, the natural theology of the Enlightenment was an attempt to demonstrate that the existence of the human being and the world would be impossible without the existence of God.\(^3\)

\(^3\) It is only in the dissatisfaction with the finitude of the finite things of human world experience (Ungenügen an den endlichen Dingen der Welterfahrung, Pannenberg 1988c, 130) that the question of God arises, and only in so far as this negative and unthematic idea of God meets a knowledge of God from elsewhere, that is: from God. Hence, even to the unresolved conflicts of religious truth claims are, so Pannenberg, ultimately part of the history of revelation, in which God themasises the ‘unthematic Wissen’: “Das Inerscheinungtreten der göttlichen Wirklichkeit, auch inmitten der noch ungelösten Konflikte religiöser und ideologischer Wahrheitsansprüche, heißt Offenbarung … Vielmehr ist der Offenbarungsbegriff im Gang der Religionsgeschichte selbst zur Bezeichnung für das Ergebnis des Selbsterweises Gottes im Prozeß geschichtlicher Erfahrung geworden,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 188).


\(^3\) “Der natürlichen Theologie des Barockzeitalters und der Aufklärung dagegen muß man bei aller Kritik die Ehre lassen, daß ihre Argumentation gerade umgekehrt darauf zielte, daß das Dasein des Menschen (und seiner Welt) nicht möglich wäre ohne die Voraussetzung des Daseins Gottes,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 119). Pannenberg refers in
This attempt has, however, been made impossible by the modern critique of religion, in particular that of Feuerbach (116-120), relying on Kant’s and Hegel’s anthropological interpretations of the proofs of God’s existence (119). Pannenberg opposes Barth’s acceptance of Feuerbach’s attempt to disclose all religions as human imaginations, but he does not oppose the anthropological interpretations of Kant and Hegel as such. What he presents is a different understanding of the consequences of these interpretations. According to this understanding they essentially confirm what Pannenberg believes to be able to conclude on the basis of philosophical anthropology, namely the inherent tendency and need of human reason to transcend its own finitude and the finitude of the perceived objects, which inevitably leads to the assumption of the infinite and absolute.

“Die seit Kant und Hegel anthropologisch interpretierten Gottesbeweise sagen nur noch etwas aus über die für den Menschen bzw. für seine Vernunft bestehende Nötigung, sich über die Endlichkeit des eignen Daseins und der Weltdinge zum Gedanken des Unendlichen und Absoluten zu erheben” (119).

Such an understanding is fully compatible with and perfectly meaningful within the religious perspective (173, 193, p176), but it cannot validate the religious truth claim. Hence, it is clear that philosophical anthropology cannot be the basis of any true knowledge of God. The idea of God has reality only in the positive religions:


In terms of the conceptual apparatus of *Systematische Theologie*, which Pannenberg mentions as the *Terminologie der altprotestantischen Dogmatik* particular to the Third Meditation of Descartes, cf. the 2016 study of Pannenberg’s reception of Decartes by Friederike Nüssel, who from *Systematische Theologie* and the 2006 *Metaphysik und Offenbarung* concludes: “Zwar kommt der philosophischen Theologie ... die Aufgabe zu, die Plausibilität des biblischen Gottesgedankens zu erweisen anhand der ‘Kriterien, die philosophische Theologie für den Gedanken des Einen Gottes formulieren kann’,” (Nüssel 2016, 103).

374 Barth even utilised Feuerbach in his attempt to distinguish between a revelatory theology of God’s word and a natural, religious theology based on anthropology (Pannenberg 1988c, 115) to an extent that made Feuerbach “‘Grundlage und Voraussetzung’ der Offenbarungstheologie,” (117, quoting Hans-Joachim Birkner). The core of Pannenberg’s critique of Barth is, once again, that Barth’s attempt to exempt Christian proclamation (Verkündigung, 119) from Feuerbach’s critique ultimately rests on a subjective decision, and that the ‘genetic connections and structural analogies’ (die genetischen Zusammenhänge und strukturellen Analogien, 118) between Christian proclamation and non-Christian religions makes such and distinction unconvincing.
Destined for Fellowship with God. The Theological Anthropology of Pannenberg (120-121), his understanding of revelation’s presupposed anthropological notion of God may then be summarised as follows:

The crucial distinction in human knowledge of God is the distinction between natural knowledge (cognitio Dei naturalis) and supernatural knowledge (cognitio Dei supernaturalis). The first is independent of revelation, whereas the latter is revealed knowledge.

The natural knowledge may be either inborn (insita, innata, angeboren) or acquired (acquisita, erworben), and Pannenberg’s notion of an unthematic knowledge corresponds to the inborn knowledge, as it is an anthropological universal.

While the natural, unthematic knowledge cannot in itself validate religious truth, it is still necessary, because the very concept of revelation presupposes a notion of God.

True human knowledge of God is, thus, only possible from historical revelation, even though this revelation states that human destiny (Bestimmung) of fellowship with God is essential to human nature, as it interprets human eccentricity in light of Jesus as the image of God.

The same conceptual apparatus applies to Barth: The crucial distinction is between natural and revealed knowledge. What Barth rejects, due to his understanding of revelation as Selbstoffenbarung, is that the concept of revelation implies a presupposed idea of God.

Hence, Barth has no need for a notion that corresponds to the cognitio Dei naturalis, neither in the form of inborn, nor of acquired knowledge. The human recognition (Anerkennung) of the God, who reveals himself, is, in Barth, established in and by revelation itself (p96).

Pannenberg mentions that Barth considers the universal knowledge of God von Natur aus (Pannenberg 1988c, 121) as ‘imputed’ by the gospel. He refers to Barth’s exegesis of Rom. 1:19-20 in Die kirchliche Dogmatik II,1: “Das Alles wird den Heiden als Wahrheit über sie selbst zugeschrieben, zugerechnet, imputiert: daraufhin, daß in und mit der Wahrheit Gottes in Jesus Christus auch die Wahrheit des Menschen offenbar geworden ist. Das Alles ist also nicht zeitlose, allgemeine, abstrakte Wahrheit, nicht geeignet als Satzbildung einer vom apostolischen Kerygma auch nur einen Augenblick zu trennenden Anthropologie oder Religionsphilosophie oder Apologetik,” (Barth 1940, 133).

While Pannenberg agrees that the universal knowledge is revealed and even in principle endorses the term imputiert, he ads that it is not imputed so externally that Christian proclamation cannot address those, who have turned away from God: “…sie wird ihm nun doch nicht so äußerlich ‘zugerechnet’, daß die christliche Botschaft sich dabei nicht auf den Menschen selber, der sich von dem wahren Gott abgewendet hat, berufen könnte,” (Pannenberg 1991, 121). That, however, does not solve the problem, but sharpens it, as it is not clear, how an imputation can be less than entirely external. As we shall see, Pannenberg’s own proposal of sublation (Aufhebung, p193) involves a reciprocity between the unthematic idea of God and the historical revelation, which, in my judgement, hardly can be understood as Zugerechnung.

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Similarly, Barth’s concept of human nature does not include the God-human relation (pp89,101,116). Consequently, revelation in Barth does not confirm such a relation, but establishes it. This establishing happens in and by revelation’s utilising created language (p106) and created relationality (p115), thereby providing the surplus of meaning and relationality of the ‘subsequent subjectivity’.

As we saw (p47), Tertullian utilises a diverse terminology regarding God’s communication. My presentation focuses mainly on the term testimonium, which designates both what later theology has referred to as revelation and what is the basis of the later notion of cognitio Dei naturalis.

In both cases, however, testimonium is God’s communicative act. In this sense, God’s communication by means of the phenomena of motion, emotion, sensation and understanding is ‘revelation’, just as much as are Scripture and prophecy, and Tertullian never considers any human knowledge of God that is not dependent on God’s communication.

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377 Such as Adversus Marcionem II,19,4 about the Biblical text (Scripturae Creatoris) and De Anima 51,7 about spectacular and miraculous occurrences.

378 Both in the sense of cognitio acquisita, eg. in references to God’s communication by the phenomenon of sensation (De Anima 17,12, cf. 18,12) and in ‘the souls testimony, as described in De Anima 41,3 in a way corresponding to De Testimonio Animae, which Pannenberg mention as his chief example of cognitio insita, though it is ‘acquired’ in creation by the divine act of institutio.

379 Obviously, Tertullian distinguishes between two forms or genres of divine communication, as it is clear from De Anima’s differentiation between ‘Christian arguments’ and ‘arguments from common reason’ (p66). This distinction corresponds to the distinction between revelatio specialis and revelatio generalis in later theology (Härle 2012, 100). The difference between the two divine genres is, however, not a question of their ability to reveal divine truth, but of the character of the truth, they provide. The truth of God’s universal testimonium, which even ‘the philosophers’ and the heretics know, although they suppress it and pervert it by abstract reductionism (p61), is an epistemological truth, that is: a correspondence between human knowledge and the external reality of God (pp5080). The truth of Christian doctrine, on the other hand, puts its recipient under the influence of the power of divine grace (vis divinae gratia, De Anima 21,6, p80). Therefore, it provides salvation (sals hominis, Adversus Marcionem II,27,2) and proves its superiority vis-á-vis ‘the philosophers’ in Christian ethics, that is: in that Christians actually live according to the truth, whereas the philosophers teach a wisdom, they do not follow (pp62.80).
Quite the contrary, he eagerly emphasises the unity of Christ’s *testimonium* in Scripture and the *testimonium*, with which the whole world is inscribed, and which is read by the conscience of every human being.\textsuperscript{380} This universal *testimonium* (*Adversus Marcionem I*,10,2-3) is intrinsic to the *institutio*, by which God creates the human being (*Adversus Marcionem II*,6,3-5) and, thus, constitutive of human nature (p42). It happens ‘first by nature, then by doctrine’ (*Adversus Marcionem I*,1,8,2).

Barth’s understanding of the relation to God as external to human nature corresponds, obviously, to his rejection of natural revelation. In Pannenberg, by contrast, the relation between human nature and natural, universal revelation is more complex.

As a theological statement Pannenberg endorses that the God-human relation is universal – and inextinguishable (Pannenberg 1991, 205) – as destiny (*Bestimmung*) of fellowship with God. He even emphasises that this destiny is grounded in human nature (*der Mensch seiner Natur nach*, 208) and refers it explicitly to an interpretation of human nature in non-religious terms, namely human eccentricity (262-263).\textsuperscript{381}

Clearly, human accordance to the destiny and *Würde* of the divine image implies an acceptance of one’s own finitude and a self-distinction from God that is possible only for a person ‘lifted’ (*über sich selber erhoben*, 265) by the Spirit of God. Ultimately, such self-distinction is a reality only in the Son’s self-distinction from the Father, and it applies to other human beings only by participation in him.\textsuperscript{382}

\textsuperscript{380} *Adversus Marcionem* II,17,1, quoted above note 117.

\textsuperscript{381} In approval of Johann Gottfried von Herder (Pannenberg 1991, 250), in particular his interpretation of human formability (*Bildsamkeit*, Pannenberg 1983, 49), plasticity and lack of instinctual behaviour in terms of the divine image.

\textsuperscript{382} “Die Menschen müssen dem Bilde des Sohnes gleichgestaltet werden, seiner *Selbstunterscheidung* vom Vater. So werden sie auch an der *Gemeinschaft* des Sohnes mit dem Vater teilnehmen.” (Pannenberg 1991, 265). The word ‘teilnehmen’ sounds very much like Barth. In reality, there is an important difference. As we saw (pp94.96.146), Barth understands the God-human relation from the universal human participation in the eternal election of Jesus Christ, that is: Solely from Jesus’ unique eternal proximity to the Father. Barth emphasises that this participation can be thought out ‘only hypothetically’ (Barth 1940, 174, p105) as it rests solely on God’s eternal gracious election, not on human nature. Further, he stresses that the recognisability of this participation is exclusively tied to the particularity of the person of Jesus Christ.

Pannenberg, on the other hand, states that human participation in the Son’s self-distinction from the Father is based on human nature as the incarnation is the very fulfilment of human creaturely destiny: “Die Inkarnation des Sohnes ist kein in dem Sinne ‘übernatürliches’ Ereignis, daß sie mit der Natur des Geschöpfes und insbesondere des Menschen nichts oder nur äußerlich zu tun hätte. In der Inkarnation des Sohnes kommt vielmehr das geschöpfliche Dasein in seiner Unterschiedenheit von Gott, aber gerade so
Still, this means that the God-human relation as *Bestimmung* is intrinsic to and discernible from human nature. Correspondingly, Pannenberg holds human eccentricity to imply the unthematic idea of God, which is an indispensable condition for human understanding and reception of divine revelation. Theologically he understands this anthropological notion of God as the human creature’s necessary, though inadequate, knowledge of the Creator (Pannenberg 1988c, 173), and, thus, as God’s intentional act, by which his goal of fellowship with his creature takes definitive shape (*definitive Gestalt*, Pannenberg 1991, 138) in human history.

In terms of Tertullian, such intentional, divine ‘making-himself-known’, even provisionally, would undoubtedly be referred to as God’s *testimonium*, that is: God’s universal communication. Yet, Pannenberg does not include the natural, unthematic idea of God in the revelatory act, but speaks of it as conditional for revelation and as distinct from historical revelation.\(^{383}\)

This might seem to be no more than a matter of defining terms. To Pannenberg, however, this means that even though the human being is intimately associated with God in every moment and every aspect of life, knowledge of God is a reality only where the unthematic notion of divinity is thematised from God’s side.\(^{384}\) This is essentially his understanding of revelation, and it happens, so Pannenberg, only in positive religion.

At this point he differs crucially from Tertullian, to whom universal knowledge of God is a reality as God communicates in and by concrete phenomena of human life, thereby creating the human being in his own image. Rather than with any abstract concept of humanness he is, therefore, concerned with these particular phenomena, from which human knowledge

\(^{383}\) Maintaining the basic understanding of historical revelation from *Offenbarung als Geschichte* as the series of events in ‘the history of Israel all the way to the resurrection of Jesus Christ’ (Pannenberg 1961, 100).

\(^{384}\) “Menschliche Gotteserkenntnis aber kann nur unter der Bedingung wahre, der göttlichen Wirklichkeit entsprechende Erkenntnis sein, daß sie in der Gottheit selbst ihren Ursprung hat. Gott kann nur erkannt werden, wenn er sich selbst zu erkennen gibt,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 207).
of God must be tested and proved. Hence, Tertullian emphasises the distinct opposition of this knowledge to any concept of God in positive religion.

This is in particular the case in De Testimonio Animae, which describes the wisdom of the soul’s testimony as the complete negation of the foolishness of the doctrina peruersa (1,4) of heathen religion, whether in sacred texts or in ceremony (1,3), especially regarding the concept of God.  

Thus, the soul’s knowledge of God implies denial and rejection of any such knowledge in religions (2,1), just as Christian faith ‘freely denies the gods of this age’. Far from being God’s revelation the religions are, so Tertullian, the Devil’s attempts to obscure (obumbrare) and deprave (depravare) human knowledge of God (De Anima 39,1-3). Hence, the ultimate proof of the truth of the soul’s testimony is that it even in the midst of pagan worship at the shrines and temples invokes a God, who is elsewhere (De Testimonio Animae 2,7). So, to Tertullian, the idea of God has reality only outside the positive religions.

Thus, the history of religion is in Tertullian interpreted within the overall framework of conflict (Osborn 2003, 144) – between God and the Devil, between truth and perversion of truth, between assimilation to God and idolatry, the ultimate sin (242-243).

Pannenberg, by contrast, understands the history of religions, and even the conflicting and rival religious truth claims as belonging to the history of revelation, cf. note 371. His overall frame of interpretation is that the diversity of religion is part of the world that belongs to God, and in which God reveals himself by showing the universal, unthematic notion of divinity to refer to his own reality. According to the positive religions’ own self-understanding, in particular the standpoint of the monotheistic religions, the history of religion is, then eine göttliche ‘Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts’ (Pannenberg 1993, 474), and, ultimately, the history of the manifestation of the unity of God (Erscheinungsgeschichte der Einheit Gottes, Pannenberg 1988c, 164), which God himself establishes as his way to reveal his essence.  

385 “…uani poetae, cum deos humanis passionibus et fabulis designant,” (De Testimonio Animae 1,3).
386 “Haec sapientia de schola caeli deos quidem saeculi negare liberior,” (De Anima 1,6). The statement is explicitly based on the identification of the Homerian gods – and all other heathen gods – as demons, which is common in Tertullian, cf. De Anima 57,2. Apologeticum 22-26.
387 “Da das Bewußtsein von einer die Vielheit ihrer Manifestationen dominierenden Einheit der Gottheit nach heutigem Wissensstand in den Anfängen der Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit jedenfalls nicht definit, sondern allenfalls implizit in der Spannung des Einen und des Vielen gegeben war, so liegt es nahe, die Religionsgeschichte als
Knowledge of God in Positive Religion

According to Pannenberg, this religious understanding of the history of religion is both possible and reasonable. He states so in a minor argumentation presented in order to limit the scope of the objection against religious belief for subjectivism. The objection says that religious knowledge of God must be purely subjective because of the anthropological basis of the idea of God.

This, however, is not necessarily the case. The religious understanding of the history of religion as the history of God’s revelation is consistent with contemporary knowledge (heutige Wissensstand, 164), just as much as is modern critique of religion. Therefore, the anthropological basis of the idea of God cannot lead to any conclusion against the reality of God.

Similarly, this anthropological basis is in itself perfectly meaningful in the self-understanding of religion. That religion is a constitutive feature of human nature, such as Pannenberg finds it evident in human history from its earliest stages, is exactly what one would expect when God is believed to be the originator (Urheber) of the world and the Creator of humankind:

> “Wenn nämlich der eine Gott Schöpfer des Menschen sein soll, dann muß der Mensch als selbstbewußtes Wesen auch in irgendeiner, noch so inadäquaten Form um diesen seinen Ursprung wissen. Sein Dasein als Mensch müßte die Signatur der Geschöpflichkeit tragen, und das könnte dem Bewußtsein des Menschen von sich selber nicht gänzlich verborgen bleiben,” (173).

Considerations such as these do not, of course, validate religious truth claims, but they make possible the understanding that Pannenberg endorses, namely that the metaphysical idea of absolute infinity, which is implied in human eccentricity, ultimately is an approximation (Näherung, 193) to the reality represented by the religious concept of God.

If that is the case, and if even the diversity of conflicting religious truth claims is part of revelation, then a criterion for assessing the possible truth of religious statements is needed. According to Pannenberg this criterion of validity is that the statement corresponds to (entspricht) God and his revelation. Such correspondence presupposes further that the human subject

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388 Pannenberg points to religion’s significance for all forms of human culture (Pannenberg 1988c, 171–72, 1986) and he even finds it likely that it has played an important role in the origin of speech (Pannenberg 1983, 348–50).
of worship corresponds to God, that is: that the subjective side of religion is essential to any positive religion.389


Validation of the Religious Truth Claim

The religious truth claim is, however, universal. Therefore, theology cannot simply presuppose its truth. The anthropological interpretation of the proofs of God and, in a broader perspective, of the very idea of God has reduced any talk of God to subjectivity, and this reduction penetrates the thought of the modern secular age at a fundamental level. Pannenberg therefore defines theology’s task as validating the truth claim of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ:


If theology’s task not just is to make faith in God possible but to validate (geltend Machen, 143) the Wahrheitsanspruch implied in faith in God and his revelation in Jesus Christ, then it is crucial to point to a place where the truth of religion can be verified, or, as Pannenberg puts it, where the world show itself to be as if it is determined by God (sich ... als durch Gott bestimmt erweist, 175).

This place is the experience of the world (der Welterfahrung) in its totality. It has to be so, because God is the all-determining reality (die alles bestimmende Wirklichkeit, Pannenberg 1988c, 175).390 Pannenberg’s formulations at this point in Systematische Theologie are brief and concise,

389 Pannenberg quotes Hegel to say that in the life of religion is “die subjective Seite [ein] wesentliches Moment,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 189).

390 The concept of God as the all-determining reality is taken over from Bultmann, from his famous 1925 speech Welchen Sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?, (Bultmann 1933, 26). Pannenberg, however, states that it simply is the religious idea of God (der religiöse Gottesgedanke, Pannenberg 1988c, 175). Therefore it corresponds to the assumption (Mutmaßung, Pannenberg 1973, 304) that God reveals himself in and by reality in its totality.
but refers to the more comprehensive dealing with the subject in *Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie:*


This *Prüfung* and *Bestätigung* cannot take the form of a cosmological proof of God’s existence or, as it were, any other ‘proof’ that states the reality of God from the finite and contingent, since the idea of God for religion is the very starting point for any appeal to the experience of the world (Pannenberg 1988c, 175). With regard to the ‘testing’ and ‘confirming’ according to the experience of the world in its totality, however, the concept of God implies statements (*Aussage*), which ultimately have the same epistemological *Hypothese*-character as has any dogmatic statement in Pannenberg.392

The point is that even though the idea of God cannot be tested or verified directly, since God is not available to human perception, the concept of God as all-determining reality nevertheless implies that God is so intimately associated with the world that any statement about God at the same time is a statement about the world.393 Such statements have the form of hypotheses that can be tested because they offer a model of the world, the human being

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391 As early as in the fundamental 1974 study on the theoretical understanding of theological statements in light of philosophy of science, Pannenberg pleads that systematic theology should take the form of putting assumptions and hypotheses to test. His basic argument is that it is the only way to avoid the objection that theology is grounded in irrational faith: “Nur ein Denken in Hypothesen und Mutmaßungen, das sich nicht auf angebliche letzte Gewißheiten beruft, ist gegen solche Einwände gefeit,” (Pannenberg 1974, 31).

392 “Im Hinblick darauf sollte es nun auch nicht als sonderbar empfunden werden, wenn sowohl den Aussagen der Dogmatik als auch den Behauptungen der durch sie dargestellten christlichen Lehre wissenschaftstheoretisch der Status der Hypothese zugeschrieben wird?” (Pannenberg 1988c, 66).

393 Pannenberg unfolds this further in the 1974 study, pointing out that a statement can be tested on its implications: “Behauptungen über göttliche Wirklichkeit oder göttliches Handeln lassen sich überprüfen an ihren Implikationen für das Verständnis der endlichen Wirklichkeit, sofern nämlich Gott als *die alles bestimmende Wirklichkeit* behauptet wird,” (Pannenberg 1974, 34).
and the history as grounded in God (*ein Modell von Welt, Mensch und Geschichte als in Gott begründet, 70*). If this model is convincing and valid (*stichhaltig*), that is: if world, human being and history as they are according to contemporary knowledge are recognisable (*wiederzuerkennen, 71*) in the model, it is, so Pannenberg, a strong argument in favour of ‘the reality of God and the truth of Christian doctrine’.

This concern for the truth of Christian doctrine corresponds to Pannenberg’s understanding of the task of theology (143, p177). Systematic theology is, so Pannenberg, obliged to the truth claims of Christian faith, an even to the questioning of and objections made against God’s revelation and God’s reality in modern debate.

If truth, thus, is about making judgements (*Urteilen, 62*) concerning inherent truth claims in specific dogmatic statements, thereby confirming certain hypotheses, it presupposes a concept of truth that implies correspondence between statement and object, that is: between judgement and fact.

Pannenberg endorses that truth implies such correspondence (*Gegenstands-correspondenz, Pannenberg 1973, 219*), which is an implicit claim of any statement that alleges intersubjective validity. However, a simple understanding of truth as correspondence does not encompass the entire concept. In *Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie* Pannenberg draws attention to the fact that factual correspondence (*Sachkorrespondenz*) is impossible to ascertain without a subjective factor in the judgement. Therefore, consensus between specialists (*Sachkundige*) or *kompetente Beurteiler* is an important criterion of truth.

Thus, consensus is included in Pannenberg’s understanding of truth. At the same time, the emphasis put on *Sachkunde* indicates that consensus cannot be the sole criterion of truth, that is: the sole epistemological basis...
for deciding whether a statement expresses correspondence between judgement and fact. This is Habermas’ proposal (Pannenberg 1988c, 22), but exactly by requiring expertise of those, who are to achieve consensus, insight into the specific case is made conditional for the value of consensus. Were it otherwise, scholarly consensus as expression of the universality of truth would be indistinguishable from mere conventional consensus.397

Pannenberg’s own proposal is that the notion of coherence is the primary component in the concept of truth (das eigentlich Fundamentale im Wahrheitsbegriff, 63). He presupposes, thus, an all-comprehensive, non-contradictory unity of truth (die Kohärenz oder widerspruchslose Einheit alles Wahren). Therefore, the decisive criterion of truth is, so Pannenberg, that a statement is in agreement (Übereinstimmung) with other knowledge (Nüssel 2015a, 66).

An important strength of this understanding of truth is that it is able to include both correspondence and consensus,398 which he in 1973 refers to as “den beiden Aspekten des Wahrheitsbegriffs” (Pannenberg 1973, 219). Thus, both a statement’s correspondence (Entsprechung) with the object, with which it deals, and the consensus between those, who make statements about a given object, are parts of the concrete truth’s participation in the universal unity of truth. Consequently, Pannenberg understands correspondence as a ‘derived element’ in the concept of truth and emphasises the ontological status of universal coherence:399


397 Such as the universal acceptance of the geocentric model of the solar system before modern age, (Pannenberg 1988c, 22).
399 In turn, this means that Pannenberg aligns himself with Augustine in stating that God is the ontological locus of the coherence of all truth: “Das bedeutet aber, daß sich das Gewicht der parmenideischen und auch der augustinischen Wahrheitsidee wieder neu geltend macht, die Zusammengehörigkeit der Wahrheitsidee mit dem Seinsbegriff und auch mit dem Gedanken Gottes als des Absoluten und Allumfassenden: Nur Gott kann der ontologische Ort der Einheit der Wahrheit im Sinne der Kohärenz als Einheit alles Wahren sein,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 63).
Dingen selbst, nicht erst in den Urteilen über sie, ist dann für die Wahrheit auch unserer Urteile konstitutiv,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 63).

In concrete terms, this means that the truth of Christian doctrine, and ultimately, the truth of the religious idea of God, is confirmed to the extent that the statements about the world in its totality, which follows from the hypothesis of God as the all-determining reality, are consistent with all other contemporary knowledge and understanding (70).

This universal ambition in Pannenberg’s concept of truth and, hence, in his entire theology is striking in light of Tertullian’s focus on specific phenomena of human life.

In a sense, Tertullian’s theological ambition is no less universal (Osborn 2003, 39–41) than Pannenberg’s. Clearly, he believes that his anthropology must be interpreted within the framework of a large-scale and comprehensive theological understanding of the world’s creation, history and eschatological fulfilment from the perspective of God’s Trinitarian being, summing up everything in Christ (pp51-54). He even believes that Christian faith’s ability to provide such an interpretation of otherwise inexplicable phenomena of human life proves its credibility (p67).

This last point presupposes a concept of a universal unity of truth in line with Stoic thought (Baltzly 2014), but Tertullian’s concept of truth has a specific profile in relation to what I have termed as ‘double correspondence’, that is: the correspondence between divine and human freedom and the correspondence between divine reality and human knowledge (p42). The crucial point is that even though truth in terms of correspondence between knowledge (judgement) and reality (fact) is conditioned by the correspondence between divine and human freedom, it is a reality only because God addresses the human being by the law. A ‘formal’ human freedom cannot, according to Tertullian, guarantee or validate human knowledge of God; such validation presupposes a communicative act from God’s side.

This testimonia, by which God addresses the human being speaking his law, is, however, always already a reality in human life, as it is part of the very creative act of God, both in the first creation and in every subsequent creation of human beings. It happens continuously by particular phenomena of human life in God’s ongoing act of creation, by which the God-human relation is established.

These phenomena of sensation, motion, understanding and emotion are universal, as is the God-human relation. The Christian understanding of the soul is, thus, about the universal circumstances of human life. Therefore, everyday language and common reason testifies, so Tertullian, to the truth on common premises.
But as much as they are universal, the phenomena are singular and specific. Therefore, universal and divine truth is accessible in and by these particular phenomena of human life. In turn, this means that they function as criteria for truth in the sense that the inability to account for these phenomena of the rival truth claims of ‘the philosophers’ of De Anima proves these claims to be reductionist and false (pp65-66-74-79).

Pannenberg’s understanding of the implied self-transcendence of human object-awareness (p164.p216) functions in a way comparable to the formal freedom of Adversus Marcionem II,9,4, which, so Tertullian, may ‘express all the lineaments of truth’ (omnes lineas veritatis exprimere), but lacks its power (vis). Similarly, Pannenberg argues that philosophical anthropology has a critical function in formulating minimal conditions (Minimalbedingungen, Pannenberg 1988c, 120) for what can be held as true and universally valid knowledge of God, even though anthropology cannot in itself guarantee or validate the existence of God.

Unlike Tertullian, however, Pannenberg’s concept of revelation does not include God’s concrete and continuous communicative act by phenomena of human life (pp166-175). Consequently, he does not refer to such phenomena as criteria for truth in any direct way.

Pannenberg nowhere comments specifically on Tertullian’s concept of truth or on his understanding of human phenomena as criteria for universal truth. Yet, he would undoubtedly maintain that such phenomena do not provide any short cut to prove human life als durch Gott bestimmt (175, p177). To state that God is ‘always already present all in human life’ (immer schon in allem menschlichen Leben gegenwärtig, 385) is possible only from the explicit religious perspective of historical revelation and religious experience, and it necessarily involves the comprehensive, hermeneutic task of interpretation of the world (Weltinterpretation, 386).

However, in light of Tertullian, Pannenberg’s insistence on the totality of the world and the all-comprehensive unity of truth, which makes consensus and universal coherence the overall criterion for human knowledge, may be questionable. The universal ambition in the concept of truth has, in Pannenberg, the particular consequence that possible ‘traces of God’ (Spuren Gottes, Pannenberg 1973, 304, p178) epistemologically has the character of

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400 “Obwohl die philosophische Reflexion auf die anthropologische Notwendigkeit einer Erhebung zum Gedanken des Unendlichen und Absoluten für sich allein nicht mehr zu einem theoretischen Beweis des Daseins Gottes ausreicht, behält sie doch die kritische Funktion, … Minimalbedingungen für ein Reden von Gott, das als solches ernst genommen sein will, geltend zu machen. In diesem Sinne bleibt auch durchaus ein philosophischer ‘Rahmenbegriff’ für das, was ‘Gott’ genannt zu werden verdient’, möglich,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 120).
hypotheses to be tested on their agreement with all other knowledge. From the perspective of Tertullian, however, this seems to lead theological anthropology away from concrete human life and towards an abstract synthesising, which according to Tertullian lies at the core of the reductionism of the Platonising anthropology of his day.

The question is not, then, whether truth is universal and unified, but whether a universal – though provisional, see below – criterion for truth in practise must become abstract, because it endeavours an all-comprehensive scope. Taken as an objection against Pannenberg, this question does not imply that theology must neglect overall perspectives, but it points to the need to deal with the question of human knowledge of God in the concrete context of phenomena of experienced human life.

The Eschatological Determination of Revelation

Pannenberg’s own reservation regarding the experience of the world as a whole as criterion for truth is not that it is abstract, but that it is provisional. Any world-experience is unfinished, as the world is historical, and as the end of history has yet to come. Therefore, the answers to the question of truth as it is raised in the hypotheses that follow from religious experience’s concept of God are necessarily provisional in the sense that they await their final, eschatological confirmation (Nüssel 2015a, 73–74). This is, so Pannenberg, characteristic of the biblical understanding of revelation and in particular of the later prophets, Isa. 40ff marking a ‘turning point’ (Wendepunkt, 233-234).

Fred Dallmayr has made an objection against Pannenberg that goes one step further than this question from the perspective of Tertullian (Dallmayr 1987, 104). He is sympathetic to Pannenberg, but criticises him for – in line with Plessner (Pannenberg 1983, 66–67) – shaping the notion of the infinite horizon implied in human perception of finite objects in a way that makes it more suitable to understand it as an ‘unthematic notion of God’ or a ‘question of God’, than the notion necessarily is in itself. This is a polite way to say that the anthropological notion needed to make the religious idea of God meaningful and plausible, in Pannenberg is shaped in presupposition of the same idea of God, and, hence, that it is ultimately a circular argument.

If Dallmayr is right, then the unthematic notion of infinity is not only an abstraction, but a tendentious one. I am not convinced by Dallmyars critique, but the fact that Pannenberg’s fundamental anthropology includes and syntheseses so many different perspectives makes it, in my opinion, vulnerable to such suspicions, the core of which is that the “escape from some of the ills of modernity” by recourse to a “central modernist idea” is impossible, unless this idea is shaped in a way that presupposes, what is to made plausible (Dallmayr 1987, 103).
This means that only the end of history will reveal the God, who acts in history, as the truth about the world and the human being. This is so because the prophetic-apocalyptic understanding of revelation, so Pannenberg, corresponds to a ‘Hebrew concept of truth’, according to which truth is understood not as ‘timeless self-identity of things’ and agreement (Übereinstimmung) between judgment and fact, but as the essence, which shows itself as such in the process of events and at the end of this process.

The all-comprehensive, coherent unity of truth, which ultimately is to be found in God, and in which any concrete truth of statements participates, thus includes the contingent and yet unfinished history. Therefore, this truth is only fully revealed at the eschaton.

If history is to be able to reveal God, then it must necessarily be understood as an act of God (Handeln Gottes). Further, it must be an act of historical self-actualisation and self-disclosure that includes the contingency of historical events as well as human subjectivity. Hence, history as God’s act is not an “am Anfang der Zeit gefaßten Vorsatzes” or the divine carrying out of an absolute decree, which would make the doctrines of predestination and providence appear ‘tyrannical’. By contrast, the religious idea of God as all-determining reality interprets exactly God’s act in and through contingent history as the historical realisation of his double goal (Ziel): the creation and completion of a reality distinct from himself, and the final revelation of his deity.

Pannenberg is careful to emphasise that this inclusion of contingent history in God’s historical self-realisation does...
not mean a kind of processual or temporal ‘becoming’ (*Werden*), as if God’s identity develops and changes in history.\(^{406}\) Quite the contrary, God is eternally identical with himself, but ‘realises’ himself in relation to the world.\(^{407}\)

Faith’s interpretation of worldly events as God’s act, thus, assumes that occurrences, of which the meaning is hidden by contingency, will be disclosed eschatologically:

> “Die Rede vom ‘Handeln’ Gottes führt die im Weltgeschehen sich zeigenden Zusammenhänge auf Gott zurück, Zusammenhänge, die sich erst vom Ende der Geschichte her erschließen und darum den Menschen auf dem Wege zu diesem Ende verborgen bleiben wegen der unvorgreiflichen Kontingenz der Ereignisfolge, die von Israel als Ausdruck der Freiheit Gottes in seinem Handeln erfahren wurde,” (420).

The terminology of *Selbstverwirklichung* and even *Wiederholung* accentuates that God’s act does not aim to fill any lack (*Mangel*, 421) in God’s essence but to include thecreaturely being in the eternal fellowship of the Trinity. As God’s act, and, thus, as eternal act in history, there can be no distinction between the decision and the execution in time,\(^{408}\) and no preceding divine need (*Bedürfnis*) that the act seeks to overcome. By contrast, God’s act and its eschatological result are from God’s eternal viewpoint simultaneous: “Gott ist in seiner Ewigkeit aller Zeit gleichzeitig,” (421. p188.232).\(^{409}\)

God’s eternal act is fundamentally one, single act (Pannenberg 1991, 57; Gregersen 1999, 120) that encompasses all of history (*das ganze Geschichte*).

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\(^{407}\) In 1988 Pannenberg even uses the Barthian notion of *Wiederholung* (Barth 1932, 315, 369–70, 1948, 261, p125), though he underlines that he, unlike Barth’s and Jüngel’s inner-Trinitarian use of the notion, speaks only of God’s *Welthandeln*, that is: of his eternal deity in relation to the world (Pannenberg 1988c, 422). Cf. Gregersen 1999, 107. In 1991 he makes reservations regarding *Wiederholung*, as it almost unavoidable is understood in terms of a relation of repetitive reproduction (*Abbildungsverhältnis*, Pannenberg 1991, 437). He prefers, once again, the term *Selbstverwirklichung*.


durch seine ‘Ökonomie’ umgreifende Handeln Gottes, Pannenberg 1988c, 420). Such an ‘encompassing’ of history is possible, so Pannenberg, only because of God’s participation in worldly, contingent life by the Son and the Spirit that prepares the way (den Weg bereitet, 421) for the monarchy of the Father by ‘winning it form’ (Gestalt) in the life of the creature:

“…die Monarchie des Vaters ist vermittelt durch den Sohn, der ihr den Weg bereitet, indem er im Leben der Geschöpfe Gestalt gewinnt, und durch den Geist, der die Geschöpfe befähigt, Gott als ihren Schöpfer zu ehren, indem er sie teilnehmen läßt an der ewigen Beziehung des Sohnes zum Vater,” (421).

Hence, the Son’s and the Spirit’s integration in the world and in the historical process is from God’s eternal, inner-Trinitarian perspective 410 identical with their participation in the Father’s kingdom and, thus, in his divinity. This is so because God by creating the world has made his own deity dependent on his actualisation of his lordship over the world: “Die Herrschaft, das Reich des Vaters ist nämlich seiner Gottheit keineswegs so äußerlich, daß er Gott sein könnte ohne sein Reich,” (340). 411

In a sense Pannenberg is, thus, in line with the concern of Tertullian’s understanding of the teleology of the constitution of the Trinity (p54). As we saw, Tertullian emphasised that the Son’s historical, incarnate immanence was possible because of his ‘derived mode of being’ (pro modulo derivationis, Adversus Praxe 14,3). His divine sonship is, so Tertullian, conditional for his immanence, whereas the Father’s divine fatherhood is conditional for his radical transcendence.

Thus, the crucial step of Tertullian’s doctrine of the Trinity is that he states a substantial unity between the radically transcendent Father and the radically immanent Son and Spirit. The concept of emanation (prolatio, προβολή, Adversus Praxe 8,1-7) is in this regard simply Tertullian’s means to conceptualise this statement (p54).

This means that the Son’s incarnation in Tertullian is possible because of an original immanence-ability of his sonship, and that the Son, due to this immanence-ability, has been immanent prior to the incarnation, as the divine λόγος, that is: as the Creator’s inherent, structuring reason (ratio, Adversus Praxe 5,1-4; Apologeticum 21,10-11, note 132) in the created world.

410 Thus following Rahner’s rule of identity between the immanent and the economic Trinity, which, so Pannenberg, means that the doctrine of the Trinity must constantly link (verbinden) the three-ness of God’s eternal essence to his historical revelation (Pannenberg 1988c, 355–56).

411 Pannenberg adds that this does not mean that the world or the lordship over the world in itself is necessary for or conditional for God’s deity, as he created the world out of freedom. The Abhängigkeit, however, follows from the actual existence of the world, since a world, over which God is not Lord, is incompatible with him being God (Pannenberg 1988c, 341, cf. 1991, 434).
Unlike Barth, who understands the possibility of the Son’s incarnation and suffering from the unity of divine being in the initial, self-determining act of election (pp148.152), Pannenberg is in line with Tertullian in that the doctrine of the Trinity must be stated from the distinctness of the divine persons. Consequently, Pannenberg, like Tertullian, emphasises the basic identity between the character of the eternal sonship and Jesus’ earthly life.

However, at this particular point it becomes clear, how Pannenberg’s understanding of the historical character of Jesus’ sonship differs from Tertullian. In Tertullian, the sonship conditions the possibility of the incarnation, whereas in Pannenberg, the historical life of Jesus in self-distinction from the Father conditions his sonship. It is not only the noetic basis (Erkenntnisgrund, Pannenberg 1991, 36) for the recognition of him as God’s Son. Even more, it is the very condition for the manifestation of the eternal Son in Jesus’ human obedience to his mission from the Father (die Bedingung ... für das Inerscheinungtreten des ewigen Sohnes in Jesu menschlichem Gehorsam gegen die vom Vater empfangene Sendung, 418).

The two crucial steps of Pannenberg’s Christology is, thus, to state that the Son is related to the Father only by self-distinction from him, and that this self-distinction takes place in his historical taking on creatureliness before God, that is: in the incarnation. While the character of the relation of the historical person Jesus to God makes it adequate to ascribe to him both pre-existence (411) and eternal proceeding (Hervorgehung, 47) from the Father, such ascription is about a reality wholly conditioned by his earthly obedience and his historical exaltation by the resurrection.


413 Thus, Jesus’ historical self-distinction from the Father is, in turn, the ontological basis (Seinsgrund, Pannenberg 1991, 37) for the creature’s existence in distinction from the Creator.


In Tertullian, the incarnation follows from the character of the divine sonship, the outward-directedness of which was displayed prior to creation, as the divine λόγος was transformed from ratio to sermo in the initial ‘fiat lux’ (Adversus Praxean 7,1, note 132). Even though Tertullian does not use exactly this terminology, this proceeding of the Father’s inherent ratio into the external sermo, could, obviously, be described as ‘self-distinction from the Father’. According to Tertullian, however, the logical priority of God’s Son over the incarnate Son implies a temporal order, so that his eternal proceeding from the Father takes place not only logically, but temporally before the incarnation (and even before creation). In Pannenberg, by contrast, God’s eternal Gleichzeitigkeit aller Zeit means not only the simultaneity of his historical act and its eschatological result (pp185.232), but the identity between the earthly life of the man Jesus and the self-distinction from the Father as the inner basis of his eternal being as the second person of the Trinity.

Only eschatologically, this can be recognised as, what it is, namely the common act (Zusammenwirken, Pannenberg 1988c, 424) of Father, Son and Spirit, in which the divine essence (Wesen), common to the three persons of the Trinity, is actualised and realised (verwirklicht, 423). This divine essence, of which all other attributes (Eigenschaften) of God are only aspects (429), is love.416

I shall return to this by the end of the section on Pannenberg (p233). In this context, the important point is that the touchstone of truth ultimately is the future, which is the mode of time (Modus der Zeit, 422) closest to God’s eternity.417 This means that any human knowledge of divine truth is provisional, including religious knowledge (188) and even specific Christian knowledge (273-274), since the totality and unity of ‘world, human being and history’, on which dogmatic statements and, ultimately, the very idea of God are to be tested, lies at the end of history. Only then is God’s integration

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in the life of the world by the Son and the Spirit knowable in its totality (Gesamtumfang, 388), whereby his essence is fully revealed.\textsuperscript{418}

### The End of History Anticipatory Present in Jesus

Formally, Jesus’ proclamation of the imminent kingdom of God is similar (gemeinsam) to the provisional disclosures of the end of history in Israel’s prophets, and, thus, in any human knowledge of God prior to the eschaton. However, it is, so Pannenberg, completely different in that the presence of the kingdom in the appearance and work of Jesus has event-character:

“Im Auftreten Jesu wird die Zukunft Gottes nicht nur im voraus enthüllt, sondern sie wird schon Ereignis, ohne daß sie damit aufhörte, Zukunft zu sein,” (271).

In this sense, Jesus’ person and work and, ultimately, the historical event of his resurrection, which anticipates the eschatological fulfilment (die eschatologische Vollendung antizipiert, 289), is ‘anticipatory revelation’ (antizipatorische Offenbarung, 270, 281). It is an ‘in-breaking’ (Anbruch) into the present from the future.\textsuperscript{419} This means that the deity of God, which will be evident to all in his future kingdom, is definitively (endgültig, 271, 291)\textsuperscript{420} revealed in him, as his all-comprehensive, eschatological lordship over the world is anticipatory present in the historical appearance of Jesus:

“Weil die Herrschaft des einen Gottes als alles Geschehen umfassend zu denken ist, das Weltgeschehen im Ablauf der Geschichte aber erst von deren Ende her als ganzes in den Blick kommen kann, darum kann die Gottheit Gottes in seinem Königtum über die ganze Welt nur unter der Bedingung in Jesus offenbar sein, daß in ihm das Eschaton der Geschichte antizipativ gegenwärtig geworden ist,” (251).

This understanding of Jesus, and in particular of his resurrection, is crucial for the question of human knowledge of God. The definiteness of Jesus’ resurrection makes his fate (Geschick) definitive as a criterion for the truth of theological statements, because the eschatological criterion for truth is

\textsuperscript{418} The single manifestation (die einzelne Erscheinung) differs from God’s essence, which can only be determined by the totality of historical manifestations, that is: The history of the cosmos from beginning to end: “Die einzelne Erscheinung ist vom Wesen verschieden, insofern dieses zwar in ihr zur Erscheinung kommt, aber nur durch den Gesamtumfang seiner Erscheinung und seines Daseins erschöpfend bestimmt werden kann,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 388).

\textsuperscript{419} “… der handelnde Mensch antizipiert nur subjektiv das Ziel, auf das sich sein Streben richtet; es ist noch nicht realisiert. Im Kommen Gottes in die Welt hingegen wird das Ziel ihrer Geschichte, das Reich Gottes, schon real gegenwärtig als Anbruch ihrer Vollendung von ihrer Zukunft her,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 422).

\textsuperscript{420} In Pannenberg, Endgültigkeit is usually technical term for the eschatological manifestation of God’s divinity and glory ‘to all flesh’ (vor ‘allem Fleisch’, Pannenberg 1988c, 270). Thus, the definiteness of God’s revelation in the resurrection of Jesus is simply the eschatological Endgültigkeit manifesting itself.
present in it. Therefore, the fate of Jesus is made valid (gelten, 388) as revelation by virtue of his resurrection. This means that the eschatological Gesamtumfang of the manifestations of God in the events of history is present in a single event and, thus, no longer exclusively referred to the future:

“Aber auch das kann nur im Vorgriff auf die ganze Reihe der Erscheinungen entschieden werden. Als Offenbarung des Wesens kann jedenfalls nur der Gesamtumfang seiner Erscheinungen oder aber eine solche Einzelerscheinung gelten, die für jenen Gesamtumfang konstitutiv ist,” (388, emphasis added).

The Theological Anthropology of Systematische Theologie
Pannenberg emphasises that the fundamental basis and the specific perspective of the theological anthropology of Systematische Theologie is the religiously and biblically grounded awareness of human destiny of fellowship with God:


Thus, it differs from philosophical anthropology, even when philosophical anthropology is carried out in the form of an ‘anthropology in theological

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422 It must be added, though, that Pannenberg operates with a difference between the eschatological recognition of God’s deity and the theological knowledge in light of Jesus Christ. The latter one is only ‘proleptically present’ (proleptisch gegenwärtig), which implies a ‘brokenness’ of Christian knowledge in terms of the Pauline distinction between ‘already’ and ‘not yet’: “Allerdings ist die eschatologische Offenbarung Gottes in Person und Geschick Jesu Christi vorerst nur proleptisch gegenwärtig, und das impliziert mit dem ‘Noch nicht’ der christlichen Existenz auch eine Gebrochenheit der Offenbarungserkenntnis im Kontext noch fortdauernder Strittigkeit und der auch die Glaubenden selber immer wieder anfechtenden Macht des Zweifels,” (Pannenberg 1988c, 273–74).

At this point, Pannenberg acknowledges a difference from his 1961 emphasising that the universality of revelation is open for anyone, who has eyes to see, and that God has proved his deity “[i]n … Sprache der Tatsachen,” (Pannenberg 1961, 100). He states that the ‘not yet’ of Christian existence was not dealt with properly in the third thesis of his contribution to Offenbarung als Geschichte (Pannenberg 1988c, 274).
perspective’ aiming a ‘fundamental theological’ examination of the theological implications of certain phenomena of human life as investigated by the anthropological sciences (note 51).

In the 1983 preface, Pannenberg states that traditional dogmatic anthropology argues from dogmatic presuppositions. Such formulations might give the impression of an uncomplicated and straightforward relation between ‘fundamental theological anthropology’ and dogmatic anthropology, as if the first were based on general anthropological research, of which it drew certain, theological consequences, whereas the latter were based on the Bible, the anthropological statements of which it arranged systematically.

The relation is, however, much more complex, at least in Pannenberg’s own case. This is clear already from the fact that anthropological analyses and conclusions from 1983 to a large extent are included in the 1991 chapter on anthropology in Systematische Theologie without substantial modification.

Nonetheless, there are obviously two different anthropological genres. What distinguishes them is not just the difference of topics dealt with, but even more the way Jesus Christ in Systematische Theologie is made the definitive criterion for human relation to God, that is: the way the Endgültigkeit of God’s anticipatory revelation in Jesus’ appearance and resurrection determines anthropology:


This does not mean that philosophical anthropology can be ignored by systematic theology. Quite the contrary, it is crucial for Pannenberg to emphasise that Christologically determined human self-identification in terms of the imago Dei necessarily presupposes that the human being by nature is destined for fellowship with God:

“Das ist der Fall, wenn ihm die Gemeinschaft mit Gott zur Identität mit ihm selber verhilft, und das setzt voraus, daß der Mensch seiner Natur nach zur Gemeinschaft mit Gott bestimmt ist,” (208).

This human destiny is, however, only known with ‘final clarity’ in light of the New Testament message of Christ:


The Bestimmung zur Gemeinschaft mit Gott is to Pannenberg the very content of the creation of the human being in God’s image, that is: the eschatological human destiny, which has been fulfilled by Jesus. This is, so Pannenberg, what is expressed in the Pauline identification of Jesus Christ as the divine image, which is the eschatological goal of human beings, 1 Cor. 15:49, and after which the believer is renewed, Col. 3:10 (252-253).

At this point, Pannenberg differs remarkably from the anthropology of Herder, with which he in almost all other respects aligns himself, and which he unfolds thoroughly by in-depth analyses, acknowledging him as the decisive source of inspiration regarding anthropology.

The crucial insight of Herder, on which Pannenberg entirely agrees, is that the particular human instinctual reduction corresponds to the imago Dei, when this concept is not understood as the original human state, but as the human goal and destiny (Bestimmung). Thus, the divine image sets the direction for human existence, though it will be reached only in another existence of immortality (Pannenberg 1979, 1–6, 1983a, 40–76, 1991b, 250). Hence, the entire process of human history is, so Herder, a process of formation towards humanness (Bildungsgeschichte zur Humanität, Pannenberg 1979, 20), or, in Pannenberg’s concise summary: “Wie der Instinkt das Verhalten der Tiere leitet, so das Gottesbild den Menschen,” (Pannenberg 1983, 42).

There is, however a problem in Herder (a limit, eine Schranke), namely that the human process of formation, in the history of the human race as well as in the individual human being, is driven solely by divine providence (Vorsehung, Pannenberg 1979, 21–23, 1983, 50), not by the in-breaking of the divine eschatological image in human history in an by the appearance and resurrection of Jesus.

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426 This interpretation presupposes the understanding of the bet of the Hebrew as bet normae rather than as bet essentia, in agreement with Tertullian (p51) and Barth (p108): “Als Ansatzpunkt dafür bietet sich … die Tatsache an, daß in Gen 1,26 f. … der Mensch nicht einfach als ‘Bild Gottes’ bezeichnet wird, sondern als ‘nach’ oder ‘gemäß’ … dem Bilde Gottes geschaffen. Darin ist eine Differenz zwischen Urbild und Abbild impliziert: Der Mensch ist Abbild Gottes,” (Pannenberg 1991, 248).
Pannenberg finds this unsatisfactory, in the context of philosophical anthropology as well as in the context of dogmatics. In the first case, as argued in 1983, the idea of providence (*der Vorsehungsgedanke*, Pannenberg 1983, 63) is introduced into the anthropological data from outside (*äußerlich*), which is unacceptable to contemporary claims of plausibility (*heutige Plausibilitätsansprüchen*). In the second case, he states in 1991 that the problem in Herder is that he did not relate human becoming towards the goal of the divine image to the definitive manifestation of God in Jesus Christ:


At exactly this point, the two genres differ from one another. The step from fundamental theological anthropology to dogmatic anthropology is not taken by a Herderian concept of human history in terms of providence, but by making the definiteness of Jesus Christ as anticipatory revelation the decisive criterion for theological truth.

According to Wolfgang Greive, this is merely a clarification (*Präzisierung*) of the concept of *Weltoffenheit* from 1983 (Greive 2017, 472–79). What happens is simply that Pannenberg integrates the theological consequences of the anthropological analyses from 1983, thereby overcoming certain one-sidednesses of his earlier anthropology.

In my judgment, however, this characterisation is not sufficient to cover Pannenberg’s own description of the step taken. He states that he attempts to ‘identify the anthropological elements of truth’ in the theological approach from the concept of religion, and that his interest in doing so is the ‘sublation’ (*’Aufhebung’*) of these elements of truth into the perspective of a theology of the primacy of God and his revelation.

F. LeRon Shults draws attention to the concept of *Aufhebung*, stating that the two ‘movements’, the ‘systematic theological’ and the ‘fundamental

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428 “Pannenbergs Verständnis mit der Auslegung der Weltoffenheit des Menschen wird jetzt komplexer und präzisiert,” (Greive 2017, 474).
429 Greive refers at this point to Pannenberg’s own correcting of the 1962 *Was ist der Mensch?* (Pannenberg 1991, 263).
theological’ are related in that the first sublates the latter.\textsuperscript{431} Whereas the concept of Aufhebung is Hegelian,\textsuperscript{432} in the context of Pannenberg it simply means

“a taking up of one level into another, whereby the first level is negated in some sense but is preserved as it is elevated into the new level … Pannenberg is using the term here in a methodological sense simply to describe an explanatory procedure,” (Shults 1998, 186)

“We have here the idea of something being negated, yet preserved, as it is elevated into something else. This is not the founding of one concept or belief upon another, but a dialectical relation between them. Anthropology, then, is not a foundation, but the field within which the philosophy and history of religion interact, mutually influencing each other,” (168).

The crucial point is, then, that the truth of the ‘fundamental’ anthropology is not negated, but presupposed and ‘lifted’ by the Aufhebung to the ‘dogmatic’ anthropology.\textsuperscript{433} While the two are “still clearly differentiated, maintaining their own integrity,” (186) the relation between them is ‘reciprocal’ (187) or ‘dialectical’ (168).

This means that while it is true that the definitive (endgültige) touchstone for the truth of Christian doctrine is the revelation in Jesus Christ (p189), the dogmatic saying incorporates the general anthropological knowledge by Aufhebung.

Therefore, it still applies that the truth of dogmatic statements depends on their coherence with all other true knowledge (p180). This is why the

\textsuperscript{431} “… Pannenberg clearly sees the ‘systematic’ movement as sublating the ‘fundamental’ movement,” (Shults 1998, 186).

\textsuperscript{432} Gregersen 1989, 31. Shults is eager to emphasise that Pannenberg’s “use of the word ‘aufheben’ does not make him a Hegelian,” (Shults 1998, 186) and to “strip away any Hegelian overtones,” (Shults 1998, 168). While I fully agree that Pannenberg should not be made a Hegelian, I doubt that Shults is able to avoid it by appealing to an underlying concept of truth in terms of a “more radical unity” that “already constitutes the differentiated reciprocity,” (Shults 1998, 187). I seems to me as if Shults on this point comes very close suggest to solve the task of transcending the antithesis between the infinite and the finite ‘by the logic of concept and conclusion’ (durch die Logik des Begriffs und des Schlusses, Pannenberg 1988c, 481), that is: exactly what Pannenberg criticises in Hegel. Over against Shults, I then emphasise that the methodological step of Aufhebung in Pannenberg is entirely dependent on the historical, divine Aufhebung of the separation between God and human creature by the management of divine love (im Walten der göttlichen Liebe, 480), cf. p197.

definiteness of Jesus’ resurrection does not lead Pannenberg to a new foundationalism, and why this dogmatic methodology, so Pannenberg, differs from the subjectivism he finds in Barth:


Regarding the material dogmatic understanding of the *imago Dei* as the human destiny of fellowship with God, which is the core of human identity, the divine image sublates human eccentricity by incorporating the ‘fundamental anthropological’ insight in the dogmatic statement of the human dignity (*Würde*) and destiny (*Bestimmung*) in light of Jesus Christ as the true image of God.

In a similar way the concept of human centrality (*Zentralität*) in its persistent contradiction of eccentricity is, by *Aufhebung*, incorporated in the doctrine of sin. Pannenberg’s analyses of centrality draw in particular on Helmuth Plessner and Dieter Wyss (Pannenberg 1983, 77–83), arguing that the tension between centrality and eccentricity causes a certain ambiguity in the basic structure of human existence and, thus, leads to brokenness (*Gebrochenheit*) and failure to live according to the eccentric identity.

Centrality is, so Pannenberg, in a sense ‘natural’, as it is anchored in the natural conditions of human existence (*in den Naturbedingungen des menschlichen Daseins verankert*, 104), and at the same time ‘unnatural’ in that it contradicts human nature in terms of *Weltoffenheit* and eccentricity:


I shall return to Pannenberg’s concept of sin (pp219-228). In this context, the point is that the ‘fundamental anthropological’ notion of centrality is included in the ‘dogmatic’ concept of sin. Centrality in its tension to eccentricity, and, thus, in its distortion of true human subjectivity (*Verkehrung der Subjektivität*, 125) is a ‘natural biological datum’ (*naturhaft biologische Gegebenheit*) and belongs as such essentially to the doctrine of inherited sin (*Erbsünde*).

The radical understanding of sin as disbelief (*Unglaube*), and not merely in moralistic terms as the breaking of certain rules, clearly incorporates the

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[^434]: “Insofern hat die reformatorische Theologie mit Recht den Unglauben als Wurzel der Sünde bezeichnet: In der Angst um sich weigern sich Menschen oder sind unfähig, das eigene Leben als Geschenk anzunehmen und darum dankbar und vertrauensvoll der Zukunft entgegenzugehen. Vertrauen in diesem allgemeinen Sinne ist freilich nicht schon Glaube im Sinne der Hinwendung zum Gott der Bibel. Solche Ausdrücklichkeit des
anxiety (Angst, 99-100). Angst, so Pannenberg, expresses the human self-care (Sorge) as opposed to a life characterised by trust (Vertrauen). As such, the centrality of human existence means that human life is controlled by amor sui, that is: by sin.

The step from centrality to sin is, however, is not just a Präzisierung. It is possible to take only in encounter with the God of the historical revelation in Jesus Christ:


Not only is sin as disbelief, when conceived as a general anthropological fact (als anthropologisch allgemeiner Sachverhalt), characterised by imprecision (Unbestimmtheit). Even more, in its everyday forms (alltäglichen Erscheinungsformen) sin is hidden, in the sense that it is impossible to recognise as sin against God:

“…erst im Gegenüber zum Gott der geschichtlichen Offenbarung wird das Unwesen solcher Lebensweise als Sünde an diesem Gott benennbar und damit auch ihre Wurzel als Glaubenslosigkeit identifizierbar.” (289-290).

Thus, Pannenberg explicitly agrees with Barth that knowledge of sin must be based on Christ (p131). However, he criticises Barth for not taking into account the universal fact (Sachverhalt) that precedes revelation, thereby turning the doctrine of sin into a mere postulate. Even though the doctrine of sin must be based on Christ, as sin is only identifiable as such in light of the historical revelation in him, it still deals with a universal fact. Christian faith does not, so Pannenberg, establish sin, but presupposes and recognises it:

“Wer die Tatsache der Sünde zu einer reinen Glaubenserkenntnis erklärt, die des Anhalts an der menschlichen Wirklichkeit, wie sie allgemeiner Erfahrung zugänglich ist, nicht bedarf, der verkennt, daß der Christusglaube die Tatsache der


Pannenberg relies on Heidegger at this point and concludes that anxiety is already an expression of sin, not a “Zwischenbestimmung” im Übergang von einer ursprünglichen Unschuld zur Sünde,” as Kierkegaard suggested (Pannenberg 1983, 100).

Greive 2017, 474.476.

Sünde nicht erst schafft, sondern voraussetzt, wenngleich ihre Tiefe erst im Lichte der durch Jesus Christus vermittelten Gotteserkenntnis zu Bewußtsein kommen mag,” (271).

It is this step from the ‘fundamental’ *Tatsache* to the ‘dogmatic’ *Glaubenserkenntnis* that I, inspired by Shults, want to summarise by the concept of *Aufhebung*, even though Pannenberg only rarely uses the term. It means the ‘taking up’ of universal anthropological notions into systematic theology, and I believe it can be said to characterise Pannenberg’s entire dogmatic methodology. So, his concern for an anthropological approach to the question of the truth of Christian doctrine determines not only the material content of his theological anthropology, but the two different genres, which are exemplary represented by the 1983 volume on anthropology and the theological anthropology of *Systematische Theologie.*

*Aufhebung* as methodological step, however, is not made possible by any ‘logic of concept and conclusion’, as in Hegel (Pannenberg 1988c, 481), by which the antithesis between the finite and the infinite may be transcended. It is ultimately dependent God’s own overcoming of the separation between time and eternity, which, so Pannenberg, has the character of *Aufhebung*:

“Der Gegensatz zwischen Ewigkeit und Zeit wird durch die Inkarnation des Sohnes aufgehoben, indem die Zukunft des Vaters und seines Reiches den Menschen durch den Sohn gegenwärtig wird ... Die Aufhebung des Gegensatzes zwischen Ewigkeit und Zeit in der Ökonomie des göttlichen Heilshandelns nach der Weisheit der Liebe Gottes ist die Versöhnung des Gegensatzes zwischen Schöpfer und Geschöpf.”

(480-481)

*Aufhebung* in this sense means creaturely participation in divine love ‘in its Trinitarian concreteness’ (*in ihrer trinitarischen Konkretheit, 481*). Thus, the methodological *Aufhebung* is made possible by the Trinitarian *Aufhebung*, to which it testifies, that is: the concrete and historical self-distinction of the Son from the Father, and the Spirit’s glorification of the Father and the Son.

Clearly, the human being is not negated, but preserved and ‘lifted’ (pp173.205) in this reconciling act of God. Similarly, on the methodological level, universal anthropology is not negated but preserved, when it is incorporated in the systematic theological anthropology.

Pannenberg raises the question if this means that the relation between theology and anthropology is a circular mutual conditioning (*eine zirkulären Wechselbedingtheit, 329*). He answers that it is not in the sense of a *circulus vitiosus*, that is: a logical shortcoming of assuming, what is to be proved. However, Pannenberg accepts to speak of mutual conditioning in the sense that Christian doctrine presupposes an anthropology that accounts for the human relation to God (*Beziehung sum Schöpfer*). Still, this is not, so Pannenberg, a circular argument, as this anthropology can be tested and confirmed by demonstrating that all nonreligious conceptions of the human
being and the world, because of their neglecting of the idea of God (Gottesvorstellung) inherent in human existence, rest on reductions:

“Die Probe auf diese Behauptung ist zunächst der Nachweis, daß alle nichtreligiösen Auffassungen des Menschen und seiner Welt auf Reduktionen beruhen, die konstitutive Bedingungen und Charakteristika der menschlichen Wirklichkeit verdrängen und die als Reduktionen erweisbar und damit argumentativ auflösbar sind,” (329).\(^{438}\)

As we saw, the demonstration of reductionism in the Platonising ‘philosophers’ plays a crucial role in Tertullian’s argument in *De Anima*. However, Tertullian’s argument from the reductionism of his opponents has a different structure than has the argument of Pannenberg. Reading Pannenberg in light of Tertullian at this point, then, can serve to illuminate the argumentative step taken by the latter, and to raise two questions to Pannenberg.

According to Tertullian, the reductionism of his opponent is twofold: Firstly, their dualist understanding of soul and body makes it impossible for them to account for phenomena such as sensation and motion, as it has to neglect the immediate human experience of sensation (p73) and of being the subject of one’s own bodily actions (p65). Secondly, the anthropology of the ‘philosophers’ is reductionist in the sense that it causes ethical shortcoming (p80). It does not enable its followers to cope with his or her own experienced reality and to act according to the phenomena described, and, thus, to live according to the wisdom, the ‘philosophers’ claim to represent (p61, cf. p172).

The theological concern behind Tertullian’s argument from reductionism is clearly that the phenomena neglected by ‘the philosophers’ are exactly those phenomena, by which he believes God to communicate truth (p78), and on which he therefore focuses his argument.

Pannenberg’s ambition is, compared to Tertullian, much more comprehensive, as it concerns ‘all nonreligious perceptions of the human being and the world’. What he attempts to ensure against the alleged reductionism of his opponents is, therefore, not certain concrete phenomena, by which he believes God to communicate, but the unthemetic notion of God in terms of infinity inherent in human eccentricity. This is, so Pannenberg, the universal, anthropological criterion for the plausibility of any truth claim about God (p169), presupposed by the very notion of revelation (p166).

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The anthropological universal that any nonreligious perception according to Pannenberg neglects is, then, the horizon of infinity implied in the particular human object-awareness, which causes the notion of divinity in human existence.

As we saw (p183), it is debatable whether it is possible to meet such a comprehensive ambition without shaping the notion of infinity after the concept of God, which it is meant to make plausible. If that is the case, Pannenberg’s *Nachweis* can hardly be said to have prevented the relation between theology and anthropology to end up in a ‘circle of mutual conditioning’.

From the perspective of Tertullian, however, the question is rather if Pannenberg by focussing the argument of reductionism on a universal feature of all human recognition inevitably leads theological anthropology into the kind of abstract synthesising, which Tertullian in *De Anima* believes is characteristic to his dualist opponents. If that is the case, my suggestion from the approach from Tertullian is to supplement Pannenberg’s overall perspective by analyses of concrete phenomena of experienced human life (p183).

However, Tertullian’s insistence on what I have called ‘the ethical component’ (p80) of the concept of truth raises a second question to Pannenberg’s argument from the reductionism of nonreligious anthropology. The question is, if true knowledge of God implies a particular practise of life, and if the lack of such practise is, in itself, a sign of reductionism.

Truth is, so Tertullian, not a purely theoretical concept, whether in terms of epistemological correspondence between human knowledge and reality or in terms of universal, non-contradictory unity of knowledge. It involves living in accordance with knowledge, as true knowledge of God involves living according to ‘the power of divine grace’ (*vis divinae gratia*, *De Anima* 21,6).

Hence, Tertullian argues, there is an aspect of his opponent’s reductionism that would not be overcome by their mere acceptance of the argumentation from common reason of the *reprehensio* paragraphs of *De Anima*. Simply to agree that the soul is the uniform *principale* of human existence (15,1-6, p70) or to accept the souls corporeality and, consequently, the reliability of the senses and the mutual dependence of sensation and understanding (6,1-4; 17,1-18,13, p74), would not enable them to live according to divine truth, as this is possible only by faith (21,5), not by theoretical avoidance of philosophical reductionism.

Over against this kind of reductionism, Tertullian argues in favour of the superiority of the Christian faith by giving examples of how it actually
enables believers to live in accordance with the truth acknowledged by both Christians and ‘philosophers’.

As we have seen, Pannenberg, like Tertullian, distinguishes between non-reductionist anthropology and religious faith. He believes ‘all nonreligious perceptions of the human being and the world’ to neglect ‘the metaphysical idea of the Absolute as condition for all experience of the finite’ (der metaphysische Begriff des Absoluten als Bedingung aller Erfahrung von Endlichem, Pannenberg 1988c, 192).

However, the mere acceptance of the arguments in favour of a notion of God implied in human existence is not identical with religious belief. In this regard the speaking of das Absolute rather than of the God of religion is a recourse (Rückgriff) to philosophy of religion and, thus, to a concept of God that is defective (defizitär, 193) compared to the religious concept. Compared to the latter it is impersonal and unable to perceive God as the power of personal encounter (die personale begegnende Macht, 193). This corresponds to Pannenberg’s statement that the idea of God has reality only in positive religion (119, p170).

Unlike Tertullian, however, Pannenberg does not provide concrete examples of, how this personal concept of God, which is definitively present in the historical fate of Jesus, enables believers to live according to the truth. He certainly agrees that the Spirit initiates a ‘new life’ in faith by mediating participation ‘the Trinitarian concreteness’ (p197), that is: in the filial relation (Sohnesverhältnis, Pannenberg 1991, 440) of Jesus Christ to the Father. Further, as we have seen, he very often points out that this participation anticipates the eschatological human destiny,*439* and he even states that this human ‘correspondence to God’ in worship is essential to the truth of religion (Pannenberg 1988c, 189, p177).

Still, his focus is to prove false the reductionism of any anthropology based on a Feuerbachian critique of religion (p170), over against which he wants to state that the religious understanding of the anthropological notion of God is fully consistent with contemporary knowledge (164, p176). Despite the historical ‘concreteness’ of the Trinity in Pannenberg, this focus leaves little room for concrete examples of how faith enables believers to handle life in practise, just as his strong focus on the all-comprehensive perspective of universal coherence of truth in practise implies that he does not emphasise Christian faith’s ability to provide credible descriptions of concrete phenomena of experienced human life (p183).

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*439* A bit more concrete, he links this to baptism in 1993, stating the eccentricity of the new identity of the baptised as opposed to the I-centricity (Ichzentriertheit) of ‘the old human being’ (Pannenberg 1993, 284).
4.2 Conditions for Human Knowledge of God: the *Imago Dei*

According to Tertullian, the credibility of theological anthropology depends on its ability to account doctrinally for the conditions for human knowledge of God (p82). His own proposal in *Adversus Marcionem* II is an interpretation of the concept of *imago Dei* in terms of the human being as a sign of God (5,6, p41). The ‘signifying’ implied consists in a ‘double correspondence’ between God and the human being (p42). On the one hand there is a correspondence of freedom, that is: of human independence vis-à-vis God. This correspondence is *formal* and presupposes the qualitative difference between divine and human being (pp42.99) and, thus, the God-human dissimilarity. On the other hand there is a correspondence of goodness, that is: of being sustained and ruled by God (*substrueretur*, *regeretur*, 9,8), as God addresses the human being by his law. Thereby, God establishes a correspondence between his own divine truth and human knowledge and, thus, a God-human similarity.

The double correspondence is, so Tertullian, intrinsic to human nature, which makes the human knowledge of God universal, as God’s communication is universal (*Adversus Marcionem* I,10,4, p43).

As we have seen (p97), it is possible to understand Barth’s concept of analogy from Tertullian and the concept of ‘double correspondence’. The concept of analogy, then, holds together the divine-human qualitative difference of being and the similarity between God and human, established by God in revelation. As such, analogy is fundamentally a revelatory concept in Barth, designating revelation’s utilising of created human language (p106) and created human *Ich-Du* existence (p115). Therefore, the God-human relation is a reality only in and by revelation, and so is, according to Barth, the human subjectivity established and presupposed by revelation, that is: the ‘subsequent subjectivity’ (p86).

The following interpretation of Pannenberg’s 1991 understanding of human destiny in terms of the *imago Dei* attempts to apply the same

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440 That is: corresponding to ‘God’s form’ by the human ability to choose and to act independently: “[Homo] in ea substantia, quam ab ipso Deo traxit, id est anima, ad formam Dei spondentis et arbitrii sui libertate et potestate signatus est.” (*Adversus Marcionem* II,5,6).

441 He does so, according to Tertullian, in human conscience (*Adversus Marcionem* IV,17,12, p43), as he ‘moves the soul’ by certain phenomena of human life (p78), and he does equally so in the giving of the original law of Paradise and the later giving of the Mosaic law (p43).

442 The God-human *Kontinuität* and the human *Bereitschaft* or *Offenheit* for God (pp100.104).

categories of ‘correspondence of dissimilarity’ (freedom) and ‘correspondence of similarity’ (goodness) to Pannenberg.

In line with Tertullian, Pannenberg states that the human imago must be based in human likeness (Ähnlichkeit) to God’s eternal being:

“Der Rede vom Menschen als Gottes Bild muß eine Ähnlichkeit mit Gottes ewigem Wesen zugrunde liegen. Nur dann beruht sie auf einer tragfähigen Basis,”

(Pannenberg 1991, 252).

The core of this likeness is ‘connectedness’ (Verbundenheit) to God, so that human life, and especially human personality, is to be understood as present manifestations of the future human destiny, where the likeness is fulfilled in God-human fellowship (p190):

“Sinn der Ähnlichkeit mit Gott … ist die Verbundenheit mit ihm. Von dieser zukünftigen Bestimmung her ist dann auch sein gegenwärtiges Dasein, insbesondere seine Personalität zu verstehen. Sie ist die Weise, in der seine zukünftige Bestimmung sich gegenwärtig manifestiert,” (258).

Even more, Pannenberg understands this divine determination as the crucial formative factor in human existence, by which human life is shaped and ‘moved from within’: “Der Lebensvollzug des Geschöpfes muß … als von seiner göttlichen Bestimmung innerlich bewegt gedacht werden,” (261).

As we saw (note 426), this understanding presupposes an exegesis of Gen. 1:26f in terms of Urbild and Nachbild, so that the human being is said to be created according to (‘nach’ oder ‘gemäß’, 248) the image of God rather than as (als) the image. The Pauline identification of Jesus with the divine image refers then, so Pannenberg, to the fulfilment of human destiny in him, which in turn is the basis (Ausgangspunkt, 259) for the doctrinal statement of his eternal sonship (p187).

Pannenberg claims to be in line with Irenaeus over against Origen, Athanasius and Augustine by this understanding of Paul’s identification of the divine image with the incarnate Logos (Pannenberg 1991, 239–40). If – like in Origen and Athanasius – the image of Gen. 1:26f is interpreted in terms of the eternal Logos as such, the logos asarkos, then the Pauline Christological image-sayings are no longer of general anthropological relevance (cf. note 500).

Hence, Pannenberg’s understanding of Paul corresponds to his theological concern for a Christology that makes Jesus’ earthly life in obedient self-distinction from the Father constitutive of his eternal sonship, and, thus, for his status as the pre-existent Logos-image. Exactly by not making himself equal to God, but by subordinating himself to God’s rule in his historical existence as creature, is he as human being the Son of the eternal Father: “Es hängt also für den christlichen Glauben sehr viel daran, daß Jesus solche Gleichstellung mit Gott vermieden und sich vielmehr als Gottes Geschöpf der von ihm verkündeten Nähe der Gottesherrschaft mit derselben Vorbehaltlosigkeit untergeordnet hat, die seine Botschaft anderen zumutete. Einzig in solcher Unterordnung unter die Herrschaft des einen Gottes und nur durch sie ist er der Sohn. Indem er sein menschliches Leben hingab zum Dienst an der Herrschaft Gottes über seine Geschöpfe,
In this respect Pannenberg repeatedly emphasises his understanding of the divine image as opposed to the understanding of the post-Reformation tradition, which identifies the image with the perfect moral righteousness of the original state (Urstand, 242-247).\textsuperscript{445} If the divine likeness is understood

um der Anerkennung der Gottesherrschaft den Weg zu bahnen, ist er als dieser Mensch der Sohn des ewigen Vaters.” (416).

However, the alternative between a Jesus, whose earthly obedience is conditional (die Bedingung, 418) for his pre-existent sonship, and a logos asarkos, whose mediating role in creation has nothing to say about image-anthropology, does not apply to Tertullian. As we saw (p51), Tertullian emphasises that the image of Gen. 1:26f was ‘the Son, who was to take on humanness’ (filius quidem qui erat induiturus hominem, Adversus Praxeum 12,3). It is, so Tertullian, as homo futurus certior et verior (12,4) that the second person of the Trinity is the image, in whom the human being is created and exists. This prototypical understanding of Gen. 1:26 implies, thus, that humanness according to Tertullian is a distinct reality in God’s triune being (p54), and that this original humanness of the Son applies universally to human beings, thus conditioning their knowledge of God.

\textsuperscript{445} Besides excluding the Irenaean-Herderian idea of growth and, hence, the entire concept of the imago Dei as human destiny, the post-Reformation identification of the image-likeness as moral righteousness has, according to Pannenberg, the consequence that both sin and righteousness are interpreted as accidental to human nature. Otherwise one would have to state that the very humanness of the human being were lost in the Fall: “Da damit [mit dem Sündenfall] keine Veränderung der geschöpflichen Natur des Menschen verbunden, der Mensch vielmehr – gegen Flacius – auch als Sünder Mensch bleiben sollte, so mußte die Gottebenbildlichkeit ebenso wie die Sündhaftigkeit von der altprotestantischen Dogmatik zu einer akzidentellen Bestimmung der menschlichen Natur erklärt werden,” (Pannenberg 1991, 243).

Pannenberg states that Luther’s “Andeutungen zu diesem Thema” points ‘in a completely different direction’, referring to the 1536 Disputatio de Homine, and in particular to thesis 35’s mentioning of present human life as ‘mere matter’ (bloße Materie, pura materia), from which God will bring forth the eschatological human being in the state of glory.

Pannenberg seems at this point to presuppose an understanding of Luther that emphasises the latter’s disinterest in a concept of human nature in Aristotelian terms, that is: a substantial human nature that is to be completed or fulfilled by being supported by the accidental addition of supernatural divine grace. And rightly so; De Homine is basically a critical and uncompromising break with such Thomism, a break which later becomes even more outspoken in the 1535-45 lectures on Genesis, where Luther opposes the view that nature is perfected through grace: “Similitudinem autem dicunt esse in donis gratuitatis. Sicut enim similitudo est quaedam perfectio imaginis, ita dicunt naturam perfici per gratiam.” (WA 42,45,11-12). If so, states Luther, it follows that human beings from the powers of human nature can bring about their own salvation: “Sed si hoc verum est, sequitur, quod homo viribus naturae possit facere, ut salvus fiat,” (WA 42,45,38-39).

However, I am not convinced by Pannenberg’s attempt to interpret Luther in line with his own concern, namely that the Gen. 1:26-image and the New Testament sayings of the renewal according to the image appeared in Jesus Christ, represents an ‘actualisation’ (Realisierung) of human essence (Wesen). Pannenberg refers to Luther’s mentioning of a
in terms of original state, then the New Testament Christological use of the image provides no more than a description of the historical Adam (253), and human destiny – as a recapitulation of the original righteousness lost by the Fall – must be understood morally.

Only if, by contrast, the human *imago Dei* is in becoming in the historical process of human life (250), then it is possible to understand it as human destiny in line with Herder (p192).

In that case, ethics rests on human nature, that is: on is the eschatological destiny of fellowship with God. Pannenberg’s understanding of the connection between knowledge of God and ethics is, thus, the reversal of Kant, in whom God’s existence is postulated on the basis of moral reason (258).

If the destiny of fellowship with God is the core of human existence, then there must be a fundamental correspondence between God and human reality, which does not presuppose the Christological doctrine of God-human unity in Jesus Christ (*die kirchliche Lehre über die Einheit von Gott und Mensch in die Person Jesu Christi*, 259). According to Pannenberg, universal human religiosity testifies to such correspondence, as religion is constitutive of human nature (258, p169). As we saw (p388), Pannenberg understands both the constitutive role of religion in all known human cultures and the underlying unthematic notion of divinity implied in human existence as the creature’s necessary, though inadequate, knowledge of the Creator (Pannenberg 1988c, 173, p176). Hence, the God-human correspondence is, according to Pannenberg, prior to and independent of historical revelation, quite the reverse of what is the case in Barth.

As created and independent of revelation, this correspondence is equivalent to the correspondence of freedom in Tertullian (p42). It confirms

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_Wiederherstellung_ of the image of God, and, “im Geiste des Irenäus”, in addition to the _Vollendung_ of it, as if Luther spoke about a human ‘nature’ or ‘essence’, which were to be restored in Christ. As far as I can see, Luther refuses such a view quite emphatically in _De Homine_ (thesis 26, WA 39/1,176.21-21). The ‘mere matter’, which God is to transform into eschatological glory, is for Luther not human ‘nature’ or ‘essence’, but ‘life’ (*vita*, WA 39/1,177,35) and ‘majesty’ (*Maiestatis*, thesis 7-10, WA 39/1,175,16-23), that is: the superior human position as ruler of the animals and the created world. Both life and majesty are mere consequences of God’s entrusting of the human being with them, similar to what we saw in Tertullian (p40). Unlike Tertullian, however – and unlike Pannenberg’s concern – Luther does not refer this to human nature, but exclusively to the God-human relation (Slenczka 2014, 217–20).

446 Such moralistic understanding has, so Pannenberg, dominated the theological debate since the 18th century (Pannenberg 1991, 256–57).

447 According to Pannenberg, Herder in this regard represents a continuation of the concern of Irenaeus and of the Renaissance philosopher Pico della Mirandola (Pannenberg 1991, 249).
the divine-human difference, to which I have referred as ‘pre-natural’ (p79), and it is insufficient for the establishing of human nature, even though it is a necessary element in God’s creative act of institutio (p42). Similarly, the created God-human correspondence of human nature in Pannenberg is necessary for the human destiny of fellowship with God, but is not in itself sufficient for the fulfilment of this destiny, as it implies that the human person is ‘lifted’ (über sich selber erhoben, Pannenberg 1991, 265) by God’s Spirit (p173).

In Tertullian, the correspondence of freedom and relative independence of the human being vis-à-vis God conditions the possibility of sin (p45). The freedom is formal (Adversus Marcionem II,5,6), as it does not in itself guarantee the goodness (bonus, bonitas, pp42.49) of the human being. Similarly, Pannenberg emphasises that the correspondence to God implied in human existence, the ‘implicit openness to God’ (implizite Gottoffenheit, 264), is explicit to human consciousness only retrospective (im Rückblick), in light of historically concrete experience of God. Therefore, the inherent God-correspondence cannot guarantee the actualisation of the destined fellowship with God. It is not only the basis of religion, but also the condition for the possibility of disbelief and existential enclosure against God (die Möglichkeitsbedingung des Unglaubens und der existenziellen Verschlossenheit gegen Gott).

Likewise, the ‘correspondence of being sustained and ruled’ (goodness) in Tertullian (p42) has an equivalent in Pannenberg, namely the anticipatory actualisation of the human destiny of fellowship with God, which is a reality in the human existence of Jesus. As ‘union between God and humanity in the life of a human being’ (Vereinigung Gottes und der Menschheit im Leben eines Menschen, 259) it is, so Pannenberg, inexceedable by any other form of human fellowship with God.\textsuperscript{448}

However, this does not mean that this ‘second correspondence’ is external to human nature, as it is the case in Barth.\textsuperscript{449} As we saw (p115), Barth’s concept of analogia relationis is about God’s revelatory use of created human relationality, not about any Anknüpfungspunkt for divine-human correspondence in human nature. If, however, the externality of the divine purpose in relation to the creatively reality of human life (die Äußerlichkeit der göttlichen Absicht im Verhältnis zur geschöpflichen Lebenswirklichkeit

\textsuperscript{448} Cf. the Endgültigkeit of the actualisation of the relation between Creator and creature in Jesus (Pannenberg 1991, 203, p189).

The image of God, Knowledge of God
des Menschen, 260) is maintained, then one has to conclude that human nature in itself is not oriented (gerichted) towards God or towards being with him.

This is exactly the conclusion Pannenberg wants to avoid, arguing that the orientation towards God is intrinsic to human nature. Therefore, the historical union of human and divine in the incarnation is no ‘supernatural event’ (kein in dem Sinne ‘übernatürliches’ Ereignis, 265), but natural, that is: perfectly in line with human nature: “Die menschliche Natur als solche ist zur Inkarnation des ewigen Sohnes in ihr bestimmt,” (429). What Jesus historically fulfilled in his earthly life is, so Pannenberg, nothing but the destiny of human nature, that is: an expression of the Creators maintenance of his creative work (Ausdruck seines Festhaltens an seiner Schöpfungstat, 337). Thus, the image of God, which was not actualised from the outset of creation, was achieved in Jesus as the fulfilment of human nature, anticipatory on behalf of humanity and even on behalf of the entire cosmos.

Reversal of Similarity and Dissimilarity: the ‘Double Correspondence’
Unlike Barth (pp89.101.116), Pannenberg may then be said to be in line with Tertullian in that the God-human relation essentially belongs to human nature. There is, however, a striking difference:

In Tertullian, the ‘correspondence of freedom’ is characterised by the human being’s formal distinctness and relative independence from God, whereas the ‘correspondence of being sustained and ruled’ (goodness) designates human proximity to God.

In Pannenberg, by contrast, the case is quite the reverse. Pannenberg’s equivalent to the ‘correspondence of freedom’ is a divine-human correspondence of proximity, and even of an inborn human knowledge of God. Awareness of one’s own finitude points towards the knowledge of life’s infinite basis and carries, thus, within it the unthemetic notion of divinity

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450 “[V]on sich,” that is: what Barth terms das Geschöpf als solche (Barth 1994, 464, pp101.112) or die menschliche Natur als solche (Barth 1948, 328, p131).


Not finitude in itself, but finitude in the awareness of infinity is the occasion of temptation and sin. Ultimately, sin is human rebellion against creaturely finitude, that is: an attempt to be like God:


Unlike Tertullian, who holds the relative independence from God to be conditional for the possibility of sin (p45), Pannenberg understands sin’s possibility from the fact that humans have the centre of their existence in God’s infinity. Sin is not simply human centrality, that is: the self-centeredness of human life as a ‘natural biological datum’ (Pannenberg 1983, 125, p195), but stems from the ambiguity of human existence caused by the tension between centrality and eccentricity.

This is why the eccentric proximity to God is conditional for the possibility of sin, as Pannenberg states:


Regarding Tertullian’s ‘correspondence of being sustained and ruled’ (goodness), which designates the God-human similarity established by God in creation by his addressing of the human being by his law, Pannenberg’s equivalent is, consequently, also the opposite of Tertullian in the particular respect of proximity/distance. Materially, the human destiny of fellowship with God finds its only actualisation in the creature’s self-distinction from the Creator:


Such actualisation is, however, not only the fulfilment of the human destiny of the imago Dei. As the quotation indicates, it applies to the entire created

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world. The ‘correspondence of self-distinction from the Creator’ is, thus, not only human destiny, but cosmic destiny according to God’s will in creation (dem Schöpferwillen Gottes):

“Gerade unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Logoshaftigkeit des Menschen läßt sich das Erscheinen Jesu Christi als Vollendung der Schöpfung des Menschen verstehen,” (331).

It belongs to human dignity (Würde) that the goal of creation (Ziel der Schöpfung, 92), which is the participation of the created universe in the Trinitarian fellowship of the Son and the Father, is possible only in human existence. It confirms, so Pannenberg, the central position of the human being in the universe (die zentrale Stellung des Menschen im Universum, 95), and in this sense it is even likely to speak of human beings as ‘the goal of creation’ (93). The reason for this traditional and, as it were, anthropocentric understanding of the entire world is that only the self-conscious, eccentric existence is able to make explicit the self-distinction from God, by which the fellowship with God is achieved:


As we saw (p187), the crucial step of Pannenberg’s Christology is to state that the Son’s relation to the Father is solely dependent on his self-distinction from him, and that this self-distinction took place in the historical incarnation (das [die Selbstunterscheidung des Sohnes vom Vater] ist in der Geschichte Jesu geschehen, 430, quoted above). This means that the historical obedient life of Jesus is the fulfilment of the divinely ordered destiny of the universe454 and the constitutive reason for his eternal sonship (p211).

454 “Das geschöpfliche Dasein Jesu realisiert in seinem Lebensvollzug die Wesensstruktur und Wesensbestimmung alles geschöpflichen Daseins überhaupt, indem er – im Unterschied zur übrigen Schöpfung – seine Unterschiedenheit von Gott dem Vater annimmt, sich ganz und gar als Gottes Geschöpf und darin Gott als seinen Vater und Schöpfer bejaht und gelten läßt,” (Pannenberg 1991, 38). Pannenberg makes the point that Jesus, for that reason, had to be human creature, not just creature, as his self-distinction from the Father presupposes not only his difference from God but his awareness of this difference. The latter is possible only for the human form of eccentric existence: “Das setzt voraus, daß Jesus nicht nur überhaupt Geschöpf, sondern Mensch ist. Als Mensch nämlich ist er nicht nur faktisch von Gott verschieden, sondern als Mensch weiß er auch von dieser seiner Verschiedenheit, von der Endlichkeit des eigenen Daseins im Unterschied zum ewigen Gott. Religion zu haben, kennzeichnet die Eigenart
In turn, this means that he is the origin (Ursprung, 36) and ontological basis (Seinsgrund, 37) of the created world. His mediatory role in creation is not due to his substantial unity with the Father because of his eternal proceeding from him, as in Tertullian (Adversus Paraxaen 7,1-3, note 132), but rather to his creaturely self-distinction from God, that is: because he as a mere creature distinguishes himself from the Father (sich selbst als bloßes Geschöpf vom Vater unterscheidet, 36).

Correspondingly, it is this ‘mere-creaturely’ self-distinction from God, in which humans take part (teilnehmen, 265) by their participation in him (430), in contrast to what is the case in Barth (p173). This participation happens as the human being is renewed (erneuert, 253, Col. 3:10) and reshaped (neugestaltet) according to the image of God that has become manifest in the world in him (2 Cor. 4:4), since true humanness has appeared in his obedient submission to the will of the Father. This is ‘the historical process of formation of the human being into the image of God’ (die Bildungsgeschichte der Menschen zum Ebenbilde Gottes, Pannenberg 1993, 473), and Pannenberg emphasises that this process implies active human participation (tätigen Beteiligung).

Anthropology and the Conditions for Human Knowledge of God
Pannenberg’s interpretation of the image of God as human nature’s divine destiny of fellowship with God, and his Christological understanding of this destiny’s fulfilment in the creaturely life of Jesus, make his theological anthropology appear as an integral part of his systematic theology as a whole.

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455 By the concept of Bildungsgeschichte der Menschen zum Ebenbilde Gottes, Pannenberg, then, ‘sublates’ the Herderian Bildungsgeschichte zur Humanität (Pannenberg 1979, 20, p192) by the hermeneutical grip of Aufhebung (p193).

456 Because it is ‘formation’ (Bildung) rather than mere ‘education’ (Erziehung), the transformation of the human being according to the image of God implies active participation in terms of human spontaneity: “Wenn man die Religionsgeschichte der Menschheit als eine göttliche ‘Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts’ auffassen kann, so geht diese Erziehungsgeschichte spätestens mit dem Erscheinen des Gottessohnes und der Bestimmung des Menschen zur Sohnschaft in Jesus Christus über in eine Bildungsgeschichte. Bildung besteht im Unterschied zur Erziehung nie nur aus pädagogischer Einwirkung von außen, sondern bewegt sich im Medium der Spontaneität der sich Bildenden, – und ohne solche Spontaneität kann das Bild des Sohnes und sein freies Verhältnis zum Vater im Leben der Menschen nicht Gestalt gewinnen,” (Pannenberg 1993, 474).
Based on my reading of Pannenberg from Tertullian’s categories of ‘double correspondence’, Pannenberg’s attempt to account for the conditions for human knowledge of God may be summarised as follows:

Pannenberg argues that the notion of divinity implied in human existence theologically must be interpreted at the creature’s necessary knowledge of the Creator, and, thus, as an implicit human openness for God. This openness, however, underlies both religious experience of God and sin in terms of disbelief, and is thus insufficient for human knowledge of God. Such knowledge is possible only in creaturely self-distinction from the Creator, because this self-distinction is the material content of the destiny of fellowship with God and, thus, of the concept of *imago Dei*.

As intrinsic to human *nature*, this is possible on natural premises. It implies no supernatural ‘break’ with the causation of immanent history, but can be carried out within the history of the world, as God’s reveals himself in and by this history. The incarnation of the Son in the creaturely life of Jesus is, thus, no supernatural event, but is the fulfilment of the destiny of human nature and, ultimately, the fulfilment of the future destiny of the entire cosmos. This makes God’s revelation in him final and inexceedable. In turn, it is the reason for his divine sonship, and even for his pre-existence and his mediatory role in creation.

Summarised like this, it becomes clear how thorough-going and radically Pannenberg endeavours to carry out the understanding of God’s revelation as humanly and historically mediated (p162). It is not just that God – from without the realms of the world’s immanent history – addresses the human being by means of certain phenomena of human life, as in Tertullian (p78). God’s revelation is historical, not only in the sense that it happens by and through historical reality, but in the sense that it is the historical actualisation of the creaturely human destiny.

Nor is the incarnation simply the earthly appearance of the divine Son of God from outside or beyond the created order. Pannenberg explicitly refuses such a ‘mythological’ understanding of the incarnation, quoting Karl Rahner:

“Die Menschwerdung Gottes ist … der einmalig höchste Fall des Wesensvollzuges der menschlichen Wirklichkeit,” (332).

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457 The Spirit’s *Erhebung* (Pannenberg 1991, 265, p173) of the human being into the image-fellowship with God is, thus, not counter-natural or supernatural but perfectly in accordance with human nature.

458 Thus, the warning against ‘mythological Christology’ is maintained in 1991, though it is not emphasised nearly as much as in in *Grundzüge der Christologie* (Pannenberg 1964, 187–89).

459 Rahner 1960, 142.
Certainly, Pannenberg’s methodological approach ‘from below’ (eine ‘von unten’ ansetzende Christologie, 327) does not attempt to rule out the classical doctrine of the incarnation. He presents it as nothing but a reconstruction of classical Christology’s basis in revelation history.\textsuperscript{460} Hence, he even states that the eternal son of God holds ‘material primacy’ (sachlichen Primat) over the incarnate Jesus of Nazareth.

However, this can only be maintained, if the eternal sonship of the Son is constituted by the self-distinction from the Father, which took place in the creaturely life of Jesus (Pannenberg 1988c, 337–38, 1991, 36.418.430, pp187.202). It is, as Pannenberg points to by the repetitive, Arian-sounding \textit{als Geschöpf} and \textit{als bloßes Geschöpf}, only by his fulfilment of his creaturely existence, he is the divine Logos and, thus, redeemer and mediator of creation.

4.3 The Human Person: Soul-being and Sin

As we have seen, Tertullian states the soul’s corporeality (\textit{De Anima} 6-9), over against the dualism of his Platonising opponents to defend the view soul and body affect each other mutually.

The soul’s effect on the body is, so Tertullian, a necessary condition for its causation of bodily motions (6,3, p65), that is: that the soul can be the subject of bodily actions and, thus, the \textit{principale} of the human being (15,1-6, p70). Therefore, human freedom presupposes the soul’s corporeality.

Correspondingly, the body’s effect on the soul is a necessary condition for the soul to be moved by physical objects such as food (6,4), and by sensation, emotion and understanding (16-18). Tertullian’s theological concern at this point is that he believes God’s (as well as the Devil’s) communication to happen by these bodily phenomena (16,1; 17,11.14; 18,12, p77). Therefore, God’s addressing of the human being presupposes the soul’s corporeality, as he influences the human soul through the body by means of objects of the physical world.

The soul’s uniformity (10-22) means that the human individual is a unity, that is: that the human being as such, and in particular in relation to God (15,4), is a self/a person,\textsuperscript{461} not determined by the different ‘parts’ of a composite soul (p70).


\textsuperscript{461} Tertullian does no use these terms but speaks along Stoic lines of \textit{ηγεμονικόν} or \textit{principale} (\textit{De Anima} 15,1, p70).
Obviously, Pannenberg takes leave of any substantial notion of the soul such as Tertullian’s, but at the same time he endorses the intentions of early Christian anthropology (die Intentionen ..., die die Anfänge frühchristlicher Anthropologie bestimmt haben, Pannenberg 1991, 211). The following interpretation of Pannenberg’s understanding of ‘the human being as personal unity of body and soul’ attempts to understand Pannenberg from the specific ‘intentions’ of Tertullian, that is: from how the notion of soul as an expression of the human, relational reliance on God conditions human knowledge of God. In particular this concerns the human freedom of being subject of one’s own acts. Further, it concerns human dependence on God, who impacts the human being from outside, and human personhood/selfhood in relation to God.

**Soul, Dependence on the Spirit and Subjective Freedom**

Pannenberg’s concern is to present his doctrinal understanding of the *imago Dei* as human destiny of fellowship with God on a more general anthropological basis (einer allgemeineren anthropologischen Begründung, 208). In doing so, he believes to be in accordance with patristic interpretation of the human being as spiritual (geisthaft) rather than just as psychosomatic.

His point of departure is the unity of the soul-bodily constitution, as conscious and self-conscious life is known only as bodily life (210). Following ‘leading tendencies of modern anthropology’ (maßgebliche Richtungen moderner Anthropologie), he holds soul and body to be ‘constitutive and interrelated aspects of the unity of human life’ (konstitutive...
Destined for Fellowship with God. The Theological Anthropology of Pannenberg

und zusammengehörige ... Aspekte der Einheit menschlichen Lebens), which cannot be reduced to one another.

This is, so Pannenberg, essentially biblical, as Gen. 2:7 describes the living being as such as ‘soul’. The crucial aspect of human ‘soul-being’ is, however, not reason or language or the like, but that the human being is needy and, therefore, desirous.

“The Bezeichnung des Menschen als nephesh hajja kennzeichnet ihn als bedürftiges und darum begehrendes Wesen. Sein Leben selbst hat die Form der Bedürftigkeit und Begierde ... Der Mensch als nephesh ist ein Wesen der Begierde, angewiesen und auf der Suche nach allem, was seine Begierde stillt. Darum ist beseeltes Leben nicht durch sich selbst lebendig, sondern durch den Geist Gottes, der es durch seinen Hauch belebt,” (213-214).

To be ‘soul’ means, then, simply to be alive, and to be so only by receiving the Spirit as ‘creative, vital power’ (schöpferische Lebenskraft, 214). This, of course, is common to every living creature, not just human beings, as evidenced in the biblical account of creation, according to which humans and animals alike are mentioned as ‘living souls’ and said to have the Spirit of life in them (218). This creaturely ‘referredness’ (Angewiesenheit) to the impact from outside of the divine Spirit of life is, so Pannenberg, due to the eccentric character of creaturely life:


Eccentricity in this sense characterises, thus, not only human life but all of created life. What distinguishes human beings from other living creatures is

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466 Pannenberg finds the Aristotelianism of Aquinas, stating das Seele als Wesensform des Leibes (Pannenberg 1991, 213) in accordance with the biblical emphasis on the unity of body and soul, though Aquinas’ intellectualistic interpretation of soul implies an ‘Akzentverschiebung’ compared to biblical understanding.

467 “Nach Gen 2,7 ist die Seele nicht nur Lebensprinzip des Leibes, sondern sie ist der beseelte Leib selbst, das Lebewesen als ganzes,” (Pannenberg 1991, 213).


469 Over against the view that spirit belongs essentially to human constitution, either as a created part of it, as in rabbinic writings, which according to Pannenberg echoes a line of thought also found in Paul, or as a divine part of a tripartite human constitution, an interpretation he finds present in the Qumran texts, in the Wisdom of Solomon and in Philo (Pannenberg 1991, 215–17). Cf. p69.
the image of God and the associated human task of dominion (*Herrschaft*, 218) over other creatures.

This means that the human being exists as soul in a particular human way. The human precedence (*Vorrang*, 219) is neither reason nor any other intellectual ability but the destiny of fellowship with God. This is, in fact, the destiny of the entire created universe, which, however, can find its fulfilment only in human life. As fellowship in distinction it presupposes not only creaturely difference from God, but even more awareness of this difference (38), which is characteristic to the human object-awareness only (p164). Hence, Pannenberg states that the entire created world culminates in the human being (*daß die ganze Schöpfung im Menschen kulminiert*, 203).

The human destiny has reached the highest possible fulfilment (*die höchste überhaupt denkbare Vollendung*) in the incarnation, and since this fulfilment is not external to human nature, it is even the realisation of the destiny of humanity as species (*als Gattung*, 204).

This means that human reason exist only in the particular human form of ‘soul-being’. Thus, it cannot be autonomous, but – exactly in human awareness of the difference from God and in the destiny of fellowship with him in self-distinction from him – has to be just as referred to the life-giving, divine Spirit as are all other living beings:


Pannenberg’s dogmatic concern is, thus, to state that human reason’s dependence on the Spirit’s work is the basis of the subjective freedom of the human being. Hence, receptivity and freedom is united in human ‘soul-being’.

This dogmatic concern is presented within the specific theological framework of the doctrine of creation that unfolds the religiously and biblically grounded understanding of human destiny fulfilled in Jesus

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470 Pannenberg finds this expressed in Augustine’s doctrine of human reason’s ‘referredness’ to the enlightenment of the divine light of truth. Augustine is, according to Pannenberg, superior to Aquinas and others, who emphasise the independence of autonomous human reason, a point which is even sharpened in Nicholas of Cusa, who understands imagination (Phantasie) as the true creative principle in mental activity. However, in Cusa, imagination rests on a ‘higher form of receptivity’ that relates human consciousness to the infinite basis of subjectivity, and on this level, Cusa is closer to Augustine’s concern than is Aquinas (Pannenberg 1991, 220–21).

(p192). Pannenberg’s endeavours to achieve a more accurate understanding (ein genauere Verständnis, 221) from an anthropological understanding of the relation between the Spirit and the general functions of consciousness is, thus, a step of ‘sublation’ or Aufhebung (p193) of the anthropological insight. As a presentation of the anthropological ‘basis of subjective freedom’, this line of thought in Pannenberg functions as an equivalent to Tertullian’s argumentation from the soul’s corporeality and uniformity.

Pannenberg’s point of departure is the sense of life (Lebensgefühl). The sense of life, shared by all living creatures, is the basis of the self-acquaintance (Selbstvertrauheit, 222), which during the human course of life develops from the self-reference (Selbstzug, 221) of early childhood to the adult experience of grasping the difference between self and world.

Explicit self-consciousness is, in this adult experience, based on the object-awareness implied in human ‘being with the other as the other’ (Sein beim anderen als den anderen, 222, p164). Hence, the sense of life is the basis of the self-conscious distinction between self and world, which is conditional for subjective freedom.

At the same time, the sense of life is sense of the presence of the indefinite totality of life that precedes and overarches the subject-object difference (der der Subjekt-Objekt-Differenz vorgängigen und sie übergreifenden Präsenz der noch unbestimmten Ganzheit, 223). Therefore, the subjective freedom of self-consciousness cannot be ascribed to any autonomous human reason, as in the tradition of Kantian transcendental philosophy (224), but is receptive vis-à-vis life’s infinite basis, which in dogmatic perspective is an expression of the presence of the Spirit (Ausdruck der Geistgegenwart, 223).

Correspondingly, imagination’s perception of particular objects in their difference from on another presupposes an underlying unity of everything finite, a unity that does not stem from the perceiving subject. The unity of the subject’s consciousness is in this regard ‘correlative’ to the ‘objective’ unity of the ‘concept’ that grasps the unity of what is distinct (Die Einheit des Ich ... bildet sich aus als Korrelat der objektiven Einheit des ‘Begriffs’, der das gegenständlich Unterschiedene in seiner Einheit begreift, 224).

This ‘correlation’ is what interests Pannenberg. It means, he argues, that the notion of infinity, which is conditional for any perception of the

difference of distinct finite objects, must comprehend everything finite.\textsuperscript{473}

This is what he in 1983 described as the \textit{Ausgriff auf das Allgemeine} (Pannenberg 1983, 65, p164) in human object-awareness, that is: the ‘horizon’ of infinity presupposed in human existence as ‘Sein beim andern’.

The ‘correlation’ to the ‘objective’ unity means, then, that the presupposed notion of infinity ‘as indefinite infinity’ (\textit{als unbestimmt Unendliches}, Pannenberg 1991, 225) is always already present in human consciousness. The ‘\textit{Unbestimmtheit}’ of this ‘indefinite infinity’ equates what Pannenberg earlier spoke of as ‘\textit{Unthematisch}’, that is: ‘unthematic awareness’, ‘unthematic consciousness’, ‘unthematic knowledge’ etc. (Pannenberg 1988c, 128–31). As we have seen, Pannenberg eagerly emphasises that it does not lead to any knowledge of God unless it is thematised from God’s side in historical revelation. Therefore, he states that the idea of God has reality only in positive religion (119, p170).

Still, it is possible to ‘thematisise’ the unthematic notion of infinity metaphysically in terms of ‘the Infinite One’:\textsuperscript{474}

\begin{quote}
“\ldots daß es [das Unendliche] nicht nur das andere gegenüber dem Endlichen ist (so wäre es selber endlich), sondern zugleich alles Endliche durch sich selber umgreift.”(Pannenberg 1991, 225)
\end{quote}

This metaphysical concept of ‘the Infinite One’ or ‘the Absolute One’ may be an abstraction\textsuperscript{475} compared to the religious experience of personal encounter with God (Pannenberg 1988c, 193, p200). Still, it is not just a conceptualisation of the idea of God implied in religious belief, which as such, because of Feuerbach, must be judged to be a projection of human longings and desires. Quite the contrary, if the unity of the consciousness ‘correlates’ to an ‘objective’ unity, then the concept of this ‘objective unity’ must point to a metaphysical reality.\textsuperscript{476}

\textsuperscript{473} \ldots daß es [das Unendliche] nicht nur das andere gegenüber dem Endlichen ist (so wäre es selber endlich), sondern zugleich alles Endliche durch sich selber umgreift.”(Pannenberg 1991, 225)

\textsuperscript{474} This metaphysical concept of ‘the Infinite One’ is equivalent to \textit{der metaphysische Begriff des Absoluten als Bedingung aller Erfahrung von Endlichem} (Pannenberg 1988c, 192, p200). Pannenberg refers at this point to Hegel, who has given the most accurate description of (\textit{[die treffendste Beschreibung}, 189) of the imperfect human awareness of God implied in religious cultus.

\textsuperscript{475} Cf. Pannenberg’s reservations regarding the terminology of human existence as a \textit{Frage nach Gott}, which he characterises as \textit{eine patetische Abstraction} (Pannenberg 1988c, 130) that fails to take into account the ‘provisional answers’, in which human existence always takes place (p169).

\textsuperscript{476} The terminology of ‘objective unity’ does not, as far as I can see, imply that Pannenberg claims to have proven the reality of God, no more that did the 1983 stating of the \textit{Wirklichkeit} of the horizon of infinity (Pannenberg 1983, 66, p164). Even the metaphysical concept of \textit{das Absolute} is still conditioned by the human subject, as
The presence in the sense of life of this absolute unity means dogmatically the presence of the life-giving Creator Spirit in living creatures (der belebenden Gegenwart des Schöpfergeistes in den Lebewesen, Pannenberg 1991, 225). Therefore, the Spirit is the ultimate basis of the interrelatedness (Zusammengehörigkeit) of what is distinct in human consciousness. Hence, knowledge of God is not to be sought by introspection, since the very awareness (Bewußtsein) of God is caused by the ‘ecstatic’ (‘ekstatisch’) way the human ‘Sein beim andern’ transcends the self. The very outward-directedness of consciousness, by which it focuses on the other rather than on the self, means the increase of life. The more the conscious life focuses on the other, the more intensively does the human being partake in the Spirit:

“Die Ekstatik des Bewußtseins ist gesteigertes Leben, Verinnerlichung des Lebens, damit auch intensivere Teilhabe am Geist, dem schöpferischen Ursprung allen Lebens. Solche Teilhabe am Geist braucht nicht Entrückung aus der Welt zu bedeuten, wie sie als Grenzfall im Bewußtsein des Gegensatzes des Unendlichen zu allem Endlichen in der Welt stattfinden mag, sondern sie erweitert die Seele durch die Erfahrung der Welt, die der Geist schöpferisch durchwaltet, insbesondere aber durch das Erleben menschlicher Gemeinschaft angesichts des unendlichen Grundes der Welt,” (227).

The Verinnerlichung is, thus, not to be confused with introspection, as it happens by the experience of the world that the Spirit permeates and, above all, in human fellowship. The ‘godly’ life is, then, the life that is about the other, and in particular about the human other. Human reason is essentially implied in this, as it happens by the ‘rational distinction’ (im vernünftigen Unterscheidung, 226) of finite objects from one another and of all finite objects from the infinite. However, it is surely no autonomous reason, but the work of the divine Logos, who brings forth the particularity (Besonderheit) of all creaturely beings. Thus, human reason participates in the Son’s self-distinction from the Father, which is the ‘principle of all creaturely existence in its particularity.

The Human Person

The ‘referredness’ (Angewiesenheit, cf. 220, p213) of human reason to the life-giving impact of the Spirit is, thus, mediated in the imagination’s perception of the difference of objects based on their underlying unity. In

emphasised by Christine Axt-Piscalar, quoted above, note 362. The human subject must, however, necessarily understand ‘the Infinite One’ as a reference to an objective reality, and it is thus, the criterion of plausibility for any religious truth claim.

477 This is, so Pannenberg, the point of the ‘reasonable’ (vernünftige) knowledge of God from his works in Rom. 1,20: “In aller Erkenntnis der Welt wird immer schon auch Gottes ewige Macht und Gottheit an seinen Werken ‘vernünftig erschaut’,” (Pannenberg 1991, 225).
this way, Pannenberg believes to have presented the specific dogmatic understanding of soul as ‘being in Bedürfnis’, and the particular human ‘soul-being’ as the need of the Spirit’s life-giving inspiration of reason, on a general anthropological basis (208, p212).

The distinction between body and soul is possible to make only in the field of intersubjectivity, as it presupposes that the ‘world of consciousness’ is ascribed to the conscious subject as different from the corresponding ‘worlds of consciousness’ of other conscious subjects (223). This happens only in encounter with others. In such encounter, the ‘world of consciousness’ is available to the subject only, whereas the body belongs to the world of others as well. This does not mean that the soul simply is identical with consciousness, but that it refers to the ‘I-identity’ of the individual living being, that is: the psychosomatic unity including the unconscious in its relation to the person’s body and history.478

The encounter with others is, however, not just the basis of the explicit self-consciousness of self-reference, but even more of the experience for the other’s personal freedom. In turn, this occasions the realisation of one’s own personality: “Darum kann die Begegnung mit dem Du den Anstoß dazu geben, der eigenen Personalität inne zu werden,” (228), but this happens only on the premise that the human subject meets the ultimate basis of his or her own existence in the encounter with the other.

Therefore, there would not be any human personality without the work of the divine Spirit (227), since personality ‘in the deeper sense of the word’ is a relational concept that holds together freedom and unity on the basis of the destiny that goes beyond empirical reality. In modern understanding, ‘person’ means the human self, that is: selfhood (Selbstsein, 230) as identity of the individual life. This individual identity of the human person over time, which in Tertullian is due to the substantial soul (De Anima 37-38), is, so Pannenberg, only possible in anticipation (Vorgriff) of the truth of human existence, that is: in the destiny of fellowship with God, which the Spirit in present reality mediates by the sense of life.

Because this mediation happens in encounter with others, this encounter may become a calling (Anruf) to take on one’s own particularity as personal.


479 “Was mir so begegnet, berührt mich als personhafte Wirklichkeit,” (Pannenberg 1991, 228).
This processual formation of personality is accomplished in an identity of authentic selfhood (in die Identität authentischen Selbstseins).

Internally in the human being this process is, so Pannenberg, headed by the rational consciousness, which can hold together temporarily separated moments of life in memory and expectation. However, the personal identity itself is not constituted internally in the human being but from outside (231), as the Spirit inspires human reason and, ultimately, as human reason partakes in the eternal Son’s self-distinction from the Father, which is the divinely ordered destiny of creaturely human existence.

Sin
According to Tertullian, sin is ultimately a contradiction of created human nature (De Anima 38,2). It is possible because of the relative independence vis-à-vis God, by which the human being corresponds to God in freedom of will and power to act (Adversus Marcionem II,5,5, p45), that is: the correspondence of dissimilarity (of freedom, libertas).

God’s addressing of the human being by the law confirms the freedom (6,5, p41), and even more it establishes the God-human relation (6,7), that is: the correspondence of similarity (of being sustained and ruled, substrueretur, regeretur, 9,8, p42). Human nature has, so Tertullian, its basis in this creative act of communication (the institutio). Sin as contradiction of human nature is, thus, ultimately a contradiction of the human relation to God. Correspondingly, sin is only recognisable as sin because of this relation.

Tertullian’s concern in the argumentative context of Adversus Marcionem II is to exonerate God from responsibility for sin. Sin is referred to the disobedience of free will, which means that it remains fundamentally inexplicable (p45). The universality of sin is, thus, not bound up with any universal trait of human nature. It is simply a persistent relation to the Devil (De Anima 41, p71), which has become internalised in the human person as a result of this relation.

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480 “So vollzieht sich in der Persongegenwart die Integration der eigenen Lebensmomente in die Identität authentischen Selbstseins. Dabei fällt dem vernünftigen Bewußtsein die Führung zu, weil es durch Erinnerung und Erwartung die Momente des eigenen Lebens sich gegenwärtig zu halten und auf ihre Vereinbarkeit hin zu reflektieren vermag,” (Pannenberg 1991, 230). This is, so Pannenberg, what philosophical and theological tradition has discussed from the standpoint of the soul’s mastery over the body.

481 The rhetorical figure of remotio criminis, pp40.45, presented as an answer to the presumed objection of the imagined Marcionite reader.

482 As opposed to the line of thought in Irenaeus, according to which sin is due to human finitude as the imperfect state, from which the human being was to grow into divine likeness (p45).
a ‘second nature’ (natura altera, 16,7) that co-exists alongside with the original nature. As equally substantial, both human nature and sin are passed on traducianistically to the entire human race.\footnote{De Anima 19,6; De Testimonio Animae 3,2 (Billy 1989, 22–24, cf. note 194).}

The problem addressed by Tertullian’s emphasis on human will, is, thus that if sin and evil have their ultimate basis in created human constitution, it seems impossible to maintain the Creator’s goodness (bonitas, Adversus Marcionem II, 5,1-2; 6,8).

Pannenberg approaches the problem of relation between sin and human will from a different angle, namely that sin, according to Augustine and older patristic tradition, can only be justly imputed as guilt, when it is committed voluntarily and could have been avoided.\footnote{“Nur dem Täter, genauer dem sündigenden Willen, wird gerechterweise die Sünde zugerechnet. Denn wer sündigt mit etwas, das er nicht vermeiden kann?” (Pannenberg 1991, 290).} His thorough presentation of sin’s anthropological root leads him to refuse to make human responsibility dependent on the freedom of will, whereas he only additionally mentions the problem raised by Tertullian.\footnote{At this point he states the Creator’s responsibility for the development of things in the created world, including sin and evil (Pannenberg 1991, 302) in terms close to the objection Tertullian opposes in his imagined Marcionite reader (Adversus Marcionem II,5,7; 6,8; 7,1-2.4, p40).} Nonetheless, the following interpretation of Pannenberg’s doctrine of sin focuses on its ability to solve Tertullian’s problem, that is: the problem of the Creator’s goodness in a world that suffers from sin and evil.

**The Universality of Sin**

As we have seen (p207), Pannenberg understands the possibility of sin from the fact that human existence carries within it the notion of infinity, which tempts to rebel against creaturely finitude. This means not only that he, unlike Tertullian, associates sin with human proximity to God rather than with distinction from him. Even more, it means that Pannenberg states sin to be evident in universally experienced human life, independently of God’s revelation:

“Die christliche Rede vom Menschen als Sünder ist nur dann realitätsgerecht, wenn sie sich auf einen Sachverhalt bezieht, der das ganze Erscheinungsbild des menschlichen Lebens unabweisbar kennzeichnet und der als solcher auch ohne Voraussetzung der Offenbarung Gottes erkennbar ist, obwohl seine eigentliche Bedeutung erst durch sie aufgedeckt werden mag,” (Pannenberg 1991, 271).\footnote{Pannenberg’s concern is, he says, that the decline of the doctrinal understanding of sin’s universality, which has been the consequence of the decay of the doctrine of inherited sin in Protestant theology since the 18th century, has led to a reduced concept of}
The basic structure of Pannenberg’s doctrine of sin is taken over from Augustine.\textsuperscript{487} The lasting and important, fundamental Augustinian thought\textsuperscript{488} is that sin is a perversion (\textit{Verkehrten}) of human desire caused by a perversion of the will, which in the ranking of goods gives priority to lesser (worldly) goods over the highest good (God):

\begin{quote}
“Die Verkehrtheit des sündigen Begehrens ist nach Augustin in einer Verkehrtheit des Willens begründet, die darin besteht, daß der Wille das in der Rangordnung der Güter Höhere (Gott) zugunsten niedrigerer (weltlicher) Güter zurücksetzt,” (279).
\end{quote}

According to Pannenberg, this can be formulated independent of Augustine’s framework of a Platonic hierarchy of being. It is, then, an autonomy of the will that places the ‘I’ of the sinner in the centre and uses everything else as mere means to own advantage (\textit{eine Eigenmächtigkeit des Willens, die das eigene Ich in den Mittelpunkt rückt und alle anderen Dinge als bloße Mittel für das eigene Ich benutzt}). This pride (\textit{Hochmut}), which by making one’s own ‘I’ the principle of everything takes God’s place, is, thus, the core of all perverted desire (\textit{der Kern alles verkehrten Begehrens}).

By this thought, Augustine has unveiled the opposition against God in human desire, that is: in a general anthropological structure of being.\textsuperscript{489}

sin in terms of sinful acts (\textit{Tatsünden}, Pannenberg 1991, 269). Inevitably, this has resulted in a ‘pharisaic’ moralism and in a false sense of guilt, which has been demonstrated oppressive and neurotic by Freud and Nietzsche. Only by arguing in favour of sin’s universality can theology, so Pannenberg, avoid moralism and hypocrisy. This is the ‘anti-moralistic’ function of the doctrine of universal sin: “Gerade die christliche Lehre von der Allgemeinheit der Sünde hat die Funktion, bei aller Notwendigkeit einer Eindämmung des manifest Bösen und seiner Folgen doch zur Wahrung der Solidarität mit den Tätern beizutragen, in deren Verhalten das in allen latent wirksame Böse offen in Erscheinung trat,” (Pannenberg 1991, 273).

\textsuperscript{487} In 1983 Pannenberg stated the superiority of the Augustinian presentation of the doctrine of sin from the empirical orientation of Augustine’s psychological descriptions and from the resulting relevance of the doctrine for human self-relation (Pannenberg 1983, 88). \textit{Systematische Theologie} includes this 1983 line of thought (83-93; Pannenberg 1991, 274–82).

\textsuperscript{488} This thought, which must be distinguished from the dubious aspects of Augustine’s thinking, in which it is embedded, is according to Pannenberg crucial for Christian theology: “Die Theologie muß hinter den mit Recht der Kritik verfallenen Aspekten der augustinischen Sündenlehre ihren bleibend bedeutsamen Grundgedanken erfassen und in seiner Selbständigkeit gegenüber jenen andern Aspekten zur Geltung bringen,” (Pannenberg 1991, 277).

\textsuperscript{489} “Dabei ist es Augustin gelungen, auch in der allgemeinen Wesensstruktur der Begierde den Gegensatz zu Gott aufzudecken,” (Pannenberg 1991, 281). Augustine has, thus, according to Pannenberg taken a step further than Paul, who summed up the law’s commandments in the ‘Du sollst nicht begehren’ of Rom. 7:7 (275). Augustine’s interpretation of Paul differs from the apostle in that he has omitted the reference to the law, speaking instead of \textit{concupiscencia} as a general anthropological phenomenon (281).
Pannenberg argues that this Augustinian connection between *amor sui* and concupiscence materially makes any theory of inheritance of sin from generation to generation unnecessary regarding sin’s universality. Sin is universal simply because it is evident from a structure of human behaviour shared by all individuals (281-282).

**Sin and Guilt**
The crucial question for Pannenberg is, then, how human beings can be responsible for a sin that rests on a universal anthropological structure, and how guilt in this case may be justly imputed. To speak about sin seems only to be reasonable if such imputation is justified; otherwise it would be more appropriate to speak of sickness or of a miserable situation (290).

But exactly by this step he has brought forward the deeper sense of the universality and general psychological validity of Paul’s idea.

490 According to Pannenberg, Paul simply stated sin’s universality from the universality of death (Rom. 5:12, Pannenberg 1991, 281). In the history of Christian theology, however, another Augustinian conception, namely that of the inheriting of sin by biological propagation, overshadowed both this insight and Augustine’s *Grundgedanke* of sin as perverted desire. Theology, then, made the structural universality of sin an independent theme only after the Enlightenment’s critique of the doctrine of inherited sin. Kant’s concept of the radical evil is important in this regard, as he acknowledges sin’s universality by a structural analogy to Augustine. Kant’s equivalent to concupiscence is the impulses of sensuality (*‘Triebfedern der Sinnenlichkeit’*, 282) that demand fortune (*Glückseligkeit*) instead of subordinating to the moral law. Unlike Kant, Hegel includes the relation to God as the Absolute One, to whom humans ought to lift (*erheben*, 284) themselves, as opposed to any finite contents of consciousness. Sin’s possibility is then the actual human freedom not to do so, but to treat the Absolut One as other contents of consciousness. Kierkegaard, like Hegel, understands sin as *Verkehrung der Struktur des Menschseins* (284-285), but rather than the actual freedom, he emphasises that any human self-realisation (*Selbstrealisierung*) on the basis of own finitude reverses the God-human relation, regardless of whether it is as an attempt to actualise eternity on finite premises or it is as an attempt to replace finitude with eternity. Thus, Kierkegaard has unveiled the despair (*Verzweiflung*) of the human situation, which gives rise to anxiety (*Angst*, 286-289). As we have seen (p196), Pannenberg endorses Kierkegaard’s description of the phenomenon of anxiety, but disagrees in Kierkegaard’s understanding of it as ‘psychologische Zwischenbestimmung zwischen Unschuld und Sünde’ (286). Pannenberg argues that the sinful fixation on the ‘I’ (*Ichfixierung*, 288) is contained in anxiety from the beginning, even though it is recognisable as sin in terms of disbelief only in light of historical revelation (289-290, p196).

491 Augustine’s answer from the Vulgate text of Rom. 5:12, that Adam’s descendants were present in him at the Fall and, thus, took part in his free decision to sin, implies that the freedom of will is a necessary condition for sin. According to Pannenberg, this theory – anticipated as early as in the traducianism of Tertullian – became the answer of Medieval and Reformation theology to the question of, how original sin can be justly imputed as guilt, even though the rejection of traducianism in favour of creationism made it hard to
Nevertheless, it is, so Pannenberg, only possible to maintain the soteriological concern of Augustine’s position against Pelagius, when sin belongs to the structural constitution of the human being:


Pannenberg takes this as the indispensable condition (die unerläßliche Voraussetzung) for how the question of individual responsibility may be meaningfully (sinnvoll) posed. His crucial point is that it is impossible to refer human responsibility for sin to a decision of the will (die Verantwortlichkeit für die Sünde auf eine Entscheidung des Willens zwischen Gut und Böse zurückzuführen, 297), since a will able to choose anything but good is already sinful.

This does not make illusory the entire phenomenon of choice, which is rooted in human ability to take distance from perceived objects. God, however, who transcends (übersteigt, 298) all objectification of religious conceptions, cannot be made the object of human choice. He remains the innermost divine secret of life (das unserem Leben zuinnerst gegenwärtigen göttlichen Geheimnis), but he remains so as the God, from whom humans have always already turned away by their self-willing (Sichselberwollen).

This turning away from God (Abwendung von Gott) rests, thus, on human centrality (Zentriertheit, cf. p195). In itself centrality as the basis of self-consciousness is a necessary condition for human independence (Selbständigkeit). It belongs to created human nature, and is as such not sinful:

“…darum darf die Zentrierheit des Lebens in sich nicht schon als solche für sündhaft erklärt werden,” (298).

Neither is centrality’s contradiction of the eccentric human destiny just ‘simple’ (einfach), as this destiny is constitutive of self-consciousness, and, thus, for the ‘I’ of centrality (299).

Nonetheless, the tension between centrality and eccentricity lies so close (liegt ... so nahe) to the perversion of the relation of the finitude of the ‘I’ to

maintain. Scholasticism as well as older Protestant theology attempted to ensure universal participation in the guilt of Adam’s voluntary sin by following Anselm’s suggestion to understand the imputation in terms of a debt, that is: in the soul owing to God the original righteousness. Julius Müller’s proposal of a pre-existence of souls, in which the individual soul decides for sin, demonstrates, so Pannenberg, how unavoidable the link between imputed sin and freedom of will has been throughout the history of theology. This applies even to modern attempts to understand sin from a combination of social context and individual setting. Pannenberg argues that such attempts in most cases involve a Pelagian tendency, but more important they all approve the connection between sin and will (Pannenberg 1991, 290–95).
the Infinite that sin ‘in fact always’ (faktisch immer) is the result, except in explicit self-distinction from God. The self-willing is always sinful without such existential self-distinction from God, as it ultimately consists in unrestricted self-affirmation, even when it takes the form of anxiety and self-care. Thus, Pannenberg concludes, is sin closely tied to the natural conditions of human existence.\footnote{492}

This is the ‘state of the wicked heart’ (der Zustand des bösen Herzens, 300), which underlies the sinful acts, and without which the acts in themselves would not imply guilt, even though the concept of sin as the choice of transgression of a norm does not cover it (299). However, human consciousness of own identity links the self to certain norms and obligations, which results in sense of guilt.\footnote{493} Thus, not only sin, but even the subjective acceptance of it as guilt, and the normative basis for this acceptance, rest ultimately on the structure of human constitution. No primal Fall is needed for the universality of sin,\footnote{494} neither is any original giving of the law or any continuous communicating act of divine testimonium by phenomena of human life needed to recognise sin, as in Tertullian, or to accept it as guilt. Thus, Pannenberg attempts to maintain the concern of the Augustinian position against Pelagius: The human being is entirely sinful and totally dependent on the saving grace of Christ, as perverted desire precedes all human actions and decisions. Neither God, nor salvation can be the object of choice, since the perversion of the will underlies human existence.

Consequently, Pannenberg approves Augustine’s audacity to emphasise the Creator’s responsibility for the creaturely development, including sin:

\footnote{492} “Insofern ist die Sünde eng verflochten mit den Naturbedingungen menschlichen Daseins,” (Pannenberg 1991, 299).

\footnote{493} “Schuldbewußtsein, Gewissen und Verantwortung haben also etwas zu tun mit der Bindung des Bewußtseins der eigenen Identität als Sollbegriff des Selbst an bestimmte Normen und an die daraus fließenden Forderungen für das eigene Verhalten,” (Pannenberg 1991, 300). While the ‘voluntary accomplishing’ (willentliche Vollzug, 301) of the deception (Betrug) of temptation, by which sin promises life but brings about death, is conditional for the sinner’s subjective acceptance of guilt, it does not have to be accomplished by a free will.

\footnote{494} “Dazu ist nicht das einmalige, urgeschichtliche Ereignis eines Sündenfalls erforderlich, den Adam einst – noch jenseits aller Verstrickung in Sünde – sich hätte zuschulden kommen lassen,” (Pannenberg 1991, 301). Pannenberg thus states that Adam, in Paul’s exposition in Romans 5, simply was the first sinner (nur der erste Sünder). His significance in this regard lies not in any original state of innocence, which he lost on behalf of his descendants, but in that his story is the story of the entire human race, who has sinned in an analogous way. This is, so Pannenberg, also the intention of Gen. 3, which is an etiological explanation for death, rather than for sin.
“Augustin hatte den Mut … die Verantwortung des Schöpfers für die Entwicklung der Dinge in seiner Schöpfung … zu betonen,” (302), adding that God foresaw not only sin but also salvation. Along these lines, and against the alleged dualism of those, who holds God not to be responsible for sin because the entry of sin and evil in the created order was surprising to him, Pannenberg finds it a ‘worthier expression’ (würdigere Ausdruck, 303) of faith in an almighty Creator to believe the permission (Zulassung) of sin to be the cost of the creature’s independence (der Preis für die Selbständigkeit der Geschöpfe), without which the Son’s self-distinction from the Father in the medium of creaturely existence could not have taken place.

**Sin’s Inexplicability?**

This does not mean that sin follows with necessity from human existence, neither in Augustine, nor in Pannenberg. The latter is careful to say that sin is ‘rooted in’ structural human constitution, that the Verkehrung of human desire ‘lies near to’ natural centrality, that sin has an anthropological ‘basis’ and has divine ‘permission’ etc. He goes very far in demonstrating anthropological root of sin, not only from historical, psychological and social aspects that lies behind sinful acts (300), but from the basic conditions of self-willing, which makes these acts sinful, and of the inherent normativity in human life, which links sin to guilt. Nonetheless, he never states that sin is a necessary consequence of creaturely human existence.

The question is, then, if there is anything about sin’s occurrence that is not explained from structural human constitution. This is essentially Tertullian’s problem: If sin is fully explained from the Creator’s being, from the created order or from created human nature, then it is impossible to maintain the Creator’s goodness over against his imagined Marcionite reader. Tertullian’s answer is to state that sin is impossible to explain from any of these viewpoints.

The freedom of will (arbitrium, Adversus Marcionem II,5,5, p45) does not explain sin by referring it to a certain human capability, but states sin’s ultimate inexplicability. As it is not determined by human nature, it remains arbitrary in regard to any explanation from the perspective of creation.

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495 This must refer to Clement of Alexandria’s “später oft wiederholte Antwort” (Pannenberg 1991, 192) to the question of how sin could enter the world that God created good. However, Pannenberg’s point that sin should be surprising to the Creator is, of course, a caricature, which can hardly be sustained in Clement.

Similarly, the reference to the Devil offers no explanation of sin. Sin’s origin in the Devil is, so Tertullian, evident from its destructivity, and the lifelong relation to the Devil is even a substantial reality in the sense of sin as ‘second nature’. Tertullian, however, eagerly emphasises that this does not explain sin, since the Devil never had the strength to overpower the human being, created in the image of God (Adversus Marcionem II,8,2, note 108). Even as supra-personal diabolic evil, sin’s entrance in the world remains fundamentally inexplicable.

Pannenberg, by contrast, does not answer Tertullian’s question. Neither does he claim to have explained sin by demonstrating its anthropological root, nor does he state sin’s ultimate inexplicability. In view of the great attention he devotes to the question of sin, this is not likely to be accidental. Rather, I suggest, it is due to an intended inconclusiveness or ambiguity, the reason of which is that whether he states sin’s explicability or not, it raises insoluble problems with regard to his theological anthropology:

If, on the one hand, sin cannot be fully explained from the structural human constitution, then Pannenberg is, strictly speaking, unable to conclude sin’s universality from this constitution. If, on the other hand, sin follows necessarily from human constitution, then the persistent existential self-distinction of the finitude of his ‘I’ from God (299) that Jesus carried out throughout his life implies a break with the natural premises of human life and with the causation of immanent history (p210). Jesus cannot, then, als bloßes Geschöpf anticipatorily have fulfilled the creaturely destiny of human beings and of the entire cosmos.

As Pannenberg strongly adheres to both, the ambiguous inconclusiveness is, as far as I can see, inescapable in his doctrine of sin: From the perspective of theological anthropology, sin ‘lies so close’ to the structure of human existence that its universality is evident on general, creaturely premises, with no reference to inheritance of sin between generations needed. From the perspective of Christology, however, the point is that human destiny of fellowship with God has been fulfilled in Jesus’ earthly life on the same general, creaturely premises.

This inconclusive reference to two different perspectives is, as far as I can see, characteristic of Pannenberg’s overall concern regarding the universality of sin.

In Grundzüge der Christologie, this is explicitly referred to as ‘sinlessness’ (Sündlosigkeit): “Wenn Sünde wesentlich das Leben im Widerspruch gegen Gott, in der selbstzentrierten Verschlossenheit unseres Ich gegen Gott ist, dann bedeutet Jesu Einheit mit Gott in seiner Persongemeinschaft mit dem Vater und seiner Personidentität als Sohn Gottes unmittelbar die Geschiedenheit von aller Sünde,” (Pannenberg 1964, 368).
There are, however, single formulations in *Systematische Theologie* §8,3-4 that point beyond sin’s root in human constitution to a ‘demonic dynamic’ generated in prehuman history:


In the context Pannenberg describes the corruptibility (*Vergänglichkeit*) of everything living as ‘analagous to human death’ (*einen den Tod des Menschen analogen Sachverhalt*).

In this perspective, human sin is the culmination of a basic dynamic, which rests on the fact that God willed a world of finite, independent creatures at the cost of corruptibility and suffering and even at the cost of the possibility of evil (*die Möglichkeit des Bösen*, 200) by creaturely striving for autonomy (*Verselbständigung*). Human self-willing is the climax (*Höhepunkt*) of this process, not only as self-consciousness but as explicit turning away from God, since the God-creaturely relation has become thematic only in human existence. However, the connection between sin and death is, according to Pannenberg, operative even at a prehuman stage, as corruptibility basically is to close oneself against the creative potential of God’s future (*sich der Zukunft Gottes, dem Reich seiner Möglichkeiten verschließen*, 131). This turns, fundamentally, natural forces into ‘ungodly and demonic powers’, evident in the destructivity of creaturely corruptibility.

Thus, Pannenberg eagerly maintains that physical death results from sin, because sin is turning away from God, who is the source and infinite basis of life:

“Mit der Trennung des Sünders von Gott impliziert die Sünde bereits den Tod, der als ihre Folge eintritt. Der Tod ist die Folge des Abbruchs der Beziehung zu Gott, der Quelle des Lebens,” (309).

Death is not simply part of the ‘shadow side’ of creaturely finitude, as in Barth (p133), for the eschatological hope of Christians is a finite, created existence without death.

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498 Against the distinction between ‘natural death’ and ‘death of judgment’ in many 20th century Protestant theologians including Barth, whose emphasis on that sin can be known only in faith (p131), means that death only for the consciousness of faith becomes an expression of divine judgement (Pannenberg 1991, 307–8).

This totality (Ganzheit, 311) of life, flowing from God’s eternity, is unattainable on the premises of temporality. Human beings are, compared to other creatures, more deeply aware of the temporality, which makes the totality of life accessible only by anticipation. As we saw (p218), this anticipation in temporal existence is conditional for formation of identity and personality.

Therefore, temporality – and thus death – is, so Pannenberg, internal to human existence, as it is conditional for the independence vis-à-vis God, which makes it possible for humans to stand independently before God (selbständig vor Gott bestehen). Such independence is implied in human destiny of fellowship with God, as fellowship im Unterschied.

Hence, anticipation of finite life without death consists ultimately in acceptance of own finitude in self-distinction from God. Such acceptance shows mortality to be a mere Durchgang durch die Zeitlichkeit, whereas the non-acceptance of own finitude turns the inescapable end of finite existence into a manifestation of the threatening power of death (312). This fear of death, then, pushes the sinner even deeper into sin in terms of clinging to life in self-care and unlimited self-affirmation. This is, so Pannenberg, due to the temporal structure of human existence, which makes sin universal. This structure is, however, in itself rooted in the ‘demonic dynamic’ of creaturely striving for autonomy that has turned in to corruptibility.

4.4 The Humanness of God

According to Tertullian, the credibility of theological anthropology is ultimately dependent on its ability to provide a convincing interpretation of humanness as inherent in God’s being (p83). As we saw (pp51-54), he identifies this God-inherent humanness with the second person of the Trinity (Filius quidem qui erat induiturus hominem, Adversus Praxean 12,3). As such, the Son is, so Tertullian, the mediator of creation, that is: the divine image, in whom human beings are made and exist (p202).

As we saw, Barth’s doctrine of election may be interpreted from the perspective of Tertullian as meeting this condition. Barth speaks in this regard of die Menschlichkeit Gottes (Barth 1956). The point is that Barth from 1940 onwards takes leave of his earlier understanding of God’s absolute freedom in favour of a Christologically determined understanding of divine freedom, according to which God, in his initial act of election, has bound himself to his human partner (pp93.138.142). As göttlicher Selbstbestimmung this act refers ‘the humanness of God’ to God’s being (p148.152). This is true even though a – perhaps intended – ambiguity regarding the relation between divine self-determination and God’s Trinitarian being remains in Barth’s thought (p152).
This final paragraph on Pannenberg attempts likewise to interpret his anthropology from the concept of an inherent humanness of God. As we have seen (p192), it is crucial for Pannenberg to understand the obedient life of Jesus in creaturely self-distinction from God as the fulfilment of human destiny, and of the destiny of the entire created world.

From God’s eternal, inner-Trinitarian perspective, this historical obedience of Jesus, culminating in his passion and death, is identical with his participation in the Father’s kingdom and, thus, in his divinity (Pannenberg 1988c, 340–42, p187). Therefore, his earthly, creaturely life is the conditional basis of his divine sonship (p211).

This means, however, that he in his ‘mere-creaturely’ existence (als bloßes Geschöpf), is ‘the eschatological form’ of humanness, that is: the anticipation of future human destiny, the true human being:


Elsewhere, Pannenberg refers to this prototypical significance of Jesus’ humanness by the concept of imago Dei (pp192.202). In his presentation of Jesus as the ‘new human being’ (neue Mensch) and the ‘author of a renewed humanity’ (Urheber einer erneuerten Menschheit), however, he takes his starting point in the Pauline Adam-Christ-typology.

Unlike the Christology of the early church, and in fact unlike all Christology prior to the late 18th century (343), Pannenberg does not refer this universal humanness present in Jesus to the eternal, pre-existent Logos,

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500 The ‘general human relevance’ of Jesus is what Pannenberg earlier speaks of as the ‘benefit’ Paul’s Christological image-statements ‘for the understanding of the mere divine likeness of the human being’ (für das Verständnis der Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen schlechthin, Pannenberg 1991, 240, p202).

501 According to Pannenberg, the early church’s anti-gnostic emphasis on Rom. 5 and 1 Cor. 15 was of fundamental importance for the development of Christology, since it stressed the meaning of the redemption revealed in Christ as expressions of the Creators maintenance (Festhalten) of his creative work, that is: his faithfulness to his creature (Pannenberg 1991, 336–37). He refers in particular to Irenaeus on this point.

502 As early as in Irenaeus, the perfection (Vollendung) of the human being is associated with the event of incarnation of the divine Logos, rather than with the resurrection or with Jesus’ obedient life. The same is, so Pannenberg, true of Athanasius and the entire Alexandrinian Christology, who stated that the divine Logos was the only acting subject in the person of Jesus, as well as of Theodore of Mopsuestia the Antiochene Christology, who emphasised Jesus’ human obedience to death, but held this obedience to be made possible by the union with the divine Logos nature (Pannenberg 1991, 337–41).
who became incarnate in him by conception and birth. Quite the contrary, the unique historical humanness of Jesus is, so Pannenberg, the ‘medium of the revelation of the divine Logos’ (*Medium der Offenbarung des göttlichen Logos*, 341). This reversal from a Christology ‘from above’ to a Christology ‘from below’ (p211) is not just about ‘subsequent knowability’ (*nachträglich erkennbarkeit*, 342). Since the identity of Jesus was decided (entscheidet) in the course of his earthly life, then the content of his paradigmatic status as ‘the new human being’ coincides with his historical and creaturely existence in obedience to God.

Hence, Jesus’ unique humanness is exactly ‘the social, towards human community oriented reference (der soziale, auf die gemeinschaft der Mensch zielende Bezug, 344) of his life: “Die Sendung des Sohnes hat also in den anderen Menschen ihre Zielbestimmung,” (361). The soteriological meaning of this is that the particularity (Besonderheit) of the personal identity of Jesus brings forth a renewed humanity shaped after him. Pannenberg finds a remarkable analogy to Alexandrinian theology in this soteriological pattern (347). Unlike Athanasius and Cyril, however, but in accordance with Schleiermacher, Pannenberg understands the uniqueness of Jesus as a ‘purely human particularity’ (*eine rein menschliche Besonderheit*, 348).

Yet, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of this in terms of the ‘powerfulness’ of Jesus’ God-consciousness fails, so Pannenberg, to account for the historical reality of Jesus, and in particular it cannot answer to the question of, how the individual God-consciousness of Jesus could give rise to redemption for others (349). This last point is crucial for Pannenberg. He believes a more nuanced (differenziertere) definition of the renewed humanity is needed, if Jesus’ historical proclamation of the kingdom of God is to express his human particularity as the basis of the apostolic message of him as the Christ.

Pannenberg’s starting point in this regard is the earthly ministry of Jesus. As proclamation of and living out of the imminent rule of God, this ministry is fundamentally nothing but his self-distinction from God. For this reason it is important for Pannenberg to emphasise that Jesus did not proclaim himself as Messiah (352-354), as messianic self-consciousness would blur his life’s character of humble subordination to the Father’s will.

Pannenberg states that Jesus, before Easter, denied to be the Messiah (353), and even that God’s vindication of Jesus in the resurrection proved

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503 Pannenberg endorses at this point Ritschl’s critique of Schleiermacher for underestimating the historical proclamation of Jesus (Pannenberg 1991, 350). However, Ritschl himself was, so Pannenberg, equally committed to Schleiermacher’s idea of an unbroken continuity between Jewish messianic expectations and a universal, renewed humanity.
the accusation against him for being a messianic pretender (355.406) to be false. However, only by the false condemnation for being a messianic rebel was the title of Christ associated with Jesus in a way that redefined the title substantially (355-356) in terms of universal salvation in the Crucified, rather than in term of Israel’s messianic rule over the nations. In this way, the universal, paradigmatic (salvific) humanness of Jesus is conditioned and defined by his historical life in obedience, including the historical rejection of him by the majority of his contemporary fellow Jews.504

This means that the content of his – compared to Jewish expectations radically altered – Messiahship is that he is the eschatological new human being, the definitive form of human reality that corresponds to the will of God (der eschatologische neue Mensch, die endgültige, dem Willen Gottes entsprechende Gestalt der Wirklichkeit des Menschen, 356). He fulfils the divine destiny of humanity as such (357) and does so exactly by his creaturely obedience and in the course of his earthly life.505

From the Trinitarian perspective of the eternal Son, this formation of the filial identity of Jesus has the form of incarnation (Menschwerdung, 360). Mediated by the Spirit,506 this is ultimately a manifestation of God’s Trinitarian life, in which the Son takes part, thus sharing the Father’s divinity. In this way, the Son’s free, creaturely self-distinction from the Father makes possible (as Möglichkeitsgrund) all creaturely reality distinct from God, that is: what Pannenberg elsewhere states in terms of Jesus as the image-Logos (pp202.211).

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506 “[D]as Gestaltwerden des ewigen Sohnes in der Person Jesu stets vermittelt durch den Geist,” (Pannenberg 1991, 358). According to Pannenberg this is also the real purpose of the Lucan account of the virgin birth. The reason for the critical evaluation of the historicity of the virgin birth is, in Systematische Theologie, the ‘legendary character’ (359) of the narrative, rather than Grundzüge der Christologie’s statement of its ‘irreconcilable contradiction’ of ‘the Christology of the incarnation’ (Pannenberg 1964, 142) or even Das Glaubensbekenntnis’s reference to a ‘reduction of Jesus’ true humanness’ (Pannenberg 1972a, 79).
This means that his obedient self-humbling (*Selbstermiedrigung*) of Jesus must be understood, not as a reduction (*Einschränkung*, 361) of his deity, but rather as an actualisation (*Betätigung*) of it. From the Trinitarian *von-oben*-perspective, then, the divine sonship of Jesus is *manifest in* his obedience to the cross, whereas it is *conditioned by* his obedience from the Christological *von-unten*-perspective. The cross is what makes his particular humanness paradigmatic, so that it is the formative factor for the transformation of all human beings according to the human destiny of fellowship with God fulfilled in him. This is the core of Pannenberg’s soteriology (Pannenberg 1991, 362.479-481, cf. pp173.209), by which he – unlike Schleiermacher – believes to have accounted for, how the humanness of Jesus can be redemptive for others.

Thus, the inherent humanness of God’s being has the character of an ‘orientation’ (*auf die Gemeinschaft der Menschen zielende Bezug*, 344) of the Trinity. This is equivalent to the ‘outward-directedness’ and ‘make-himself-known-ness’ of the structure of God’s Trinitarian being in Tertullian (pp54.136). Unlike Tertullian, however, Pannenberg understands God’s being historically from the perspective of God’s eternal *Gleichzeitigkeit aller Zeit* (Pannenberg 1988c, 421, pp185.188), according to which his historical act does not precede its eschatological result. This eschatological goal (*Ziel*) is the Son’s and the Spirit’s participation in the Father’s kingdom, by which they share in his divinity (360). Human participation in the Son’s humanness means, then, the incorporation (*Einbeziehung*, 421) of God’s creatures into the Trinitarian fellowship, and ‘the definitive eschatological knowledge of God interconnected with the return of Christ and the consummation of God’s kingdom’ (*die endgültige, eschatologische Gotteserkenntnis, die mit der Wiederkunft Christi und der Vollendung des Reiches Gottes verbunden sein*, Pannenberg 1993, 158).

### The Humanness of God’s Eschatological Self-Actualisation

As we saw, Tertullian understands God’s economic acts in creation and salvation as grounded in his Trinitarian being. Consequently, he speaks of these acts as necessary (*necessarius, Adversus Marcionem I,17,4*), and in particular of the necessity of God to make himself known (*oportebat Deum cognosci, II,6,2*).

The 1932 and 1938 Barth understands God’s acts in a purely actualistic way. Thus, he refuses emphatically that they follow with any necessity from God’s being: “…es [beruht] … nicht auf einer Notwendigkeit des göttlichen Wesens oder des Verhältnisses von Vater, Sohn und Geist, daß Gott Mensch wird,” (Barth 1938, 148, p150). From 1940 onwards, the concept of divine self-determination by the act of election allows Barth to speak of a
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**Bestimmtheit** in God. This, however, is far from being a restriction of God’s freedom, as it is the ultimate affirmation that God is free with regard to his own freedom (*frei auch dieser seiner Freiheit gegenüber*, Barth 1940, 341, pp139.152).

Pannenberg explicitly endorses Barth’s rejection that God’s actions should follow with necessity from his being:


Like Barth (p151), Pannenberg at this point comments on Hegel. According to Hegel, both the outgoing (*Hervorgehen*, 33) of the finite world from the Absolute and the Son as ‘principle of otherness’ (*Prinzip das Andersheit*, 42), are necessary for the Absolute to achieve its unity in ‘difference’ (*Verschiedenheit*, 33) in the course of history.⁵⁰⁷

Pannenberg refuses to speak of such Hegelian necessity. According to him, the Trinitarian persons’ mutual self-distinction from the others (43-44), which finds its clearest expression (*schärfste Ausprägung*, 43) in the Son’s self-distinction from the Father, leads to the conclusion that the humanness fulfilled in Jesus’ life is a possibility, not a necessity, in God’s eternal being.⁵⁰⁸ Only by virtue of the historical, creaturely obedience of Jesus, this possibility has become reality, so that his humanness is paradigmatic as ‘structural prototype’ (*als strukturelles Urbild*, 44), that is: as Logos, as mediator of creation.

The inherent humanness is, thus, not necessary to God’s being. Yet, the very creation of the world has, so Pannenberg, made the Father’s deity dependent on the incarnation and on the success of the Son’s mission (435), as it the realisation (*Verwirklichung*) of his royal rule (434).⁵⁰⁹ Therefore, the creation ‘draws with it’ the incarnation: “[D]ie Schöpfung der Welt zieht die

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⁵⁰⁹ As a world over which God does *not* rule is inconsistent with him being God (Pannenberg 1991, 434, cf. 1988, 341, cf. note 411).
Menschwerdung des Sohnes nach sich,” (434). The God-inherent humanness is fundamentally the filial relation (Sohnesverhältnis), which is the basic form of human destiny of fellowship with God (Grundform menschlicher Bestimmung zur Gemeinschaft mit Gott, 357). Ultimately, this is an eschatological reality, but it is anticipated in the resurrection of Jesus (das Ostergeschehen, 439). The ‘new life’, mediated by the Spirit to believers, is, thus, participation in the eschatological fellowship of the Trinity (440), in which God’s historical Selbstverwirklichung is fulfilled.

4.5 Concluding Summary of Pannenberg’s Anthropology

This section’s reading of Pannenberg from the perspective of Tertullian has shown that Pannenberg’s entire anthropology can be interpreted in response to the question of human knowledge of God.

Pannenberg argues that such knowledge is possible, because the idea of God is intrinsic to human nature and, therefore, not simply a human imagination. Revelation presupposes this anthropological notion of God, which, according to Pannenberg, corresponds to the notion of an inborn knowledge of God in the history of theology. In light of Tertullian’s distinction between the two genres of divine communication, ‘by nature’ and ‘by doctrine’, it becomes clear that Pannenberg does not include the natural, unthematic notion of God in the genuine revelatory act, which he believes takes place only in positive religion. This corresponds to the point he makes in 1988, namely that the fundamental anthropological ‘question of God’ is an abstraction compared to concrete human existence, which always takes place in the religions’ provisional knowledge of God.

This religious faith and its implicit truth claims can, so Pannenberg, be put to test, because it offers a ‘model of world, human being and history as grounded in God’. Such models have the character of hypotheses that can be tested, based on their coherence with other knowledge.

This applies, of course, also to the theological anthropology that he develops on explicitly religious and biblical grounds. This theological anthropology is not identical with the fundamental anthropology presented in 1983, and neither is it a mere clarification of it. However, the theological anthropology incorporates insights of fundamental anthropology, both in terms of the human dignity of being destined for fellowship with God and in terms of human misery of being alienated from this fellowship. Christian faith does not establish or postulate theological anthropology’s basic statements about divine image and sin, but presupposes and recognises them in human existence, in light of Jesus Christ. This methodological step of systematic theology can be summarised by the concept of Aufhebung. Because religious anthropology by this step incorporates indispensable
anthropological insights, it can, so Pannenberg, be validated in that it is superior to nonreligious conceptions based on reductionist anthropology.

In light of Tertullian, it becomes clear that Pannenberg’s argumentation against his opponents’ alleged reductionism is guided by his focus on the all-comprehensive perspective of universal coherence of truth. I have raised the question of whether Pannenberg’s overall perspective on truth as universal coherence needs to be supplemented by analyses of faith’s significance for the understanding of concrete phenomena of experienced human life as well as by concrete examples of how faith enables believers to handle life in practise.

Pannenberg understands the fellowship with God, for which the entire cosmos is destined, as a ‘fellowship in distinction’, implying the creature’s independence vis-à-vis the Creator. Knowledge of God is possible only in this fellowship, because the unthemtic notion of God is an abstraction that lacks the personal God-human encounter. Since explicit self-distinction from God is possible only for self-conscious, eccentric beings, that is: for human beings, he affirms the central position of humans in the created universe. The crucial step of Pannenberg’s Christology is to state that Jesus, in the course of his creaturely life, fulfilled the self-distinction from God, for which human beings are destined, and that his historical obedience is identical with the Son’s eternal self-distinction from the Father. Hence, his earthly life is conditional for his eternal sonship and his divine Logos-being.

This affects Pannenberg’s understanding of the human person. He presents it in terms of ‘unity of body and soul’. To be ‘soul’ means to be alive, and to be so by receiving the Spirit as God’s vital power. Human soul-being, then, means that the human being, exactly in the particular human conscious awareness of difference from God, is as referred to the life-giving, divine Spirit as are all other living creatures. Personal identity is possible in the self-conscious relation to one-self as soul-bodily unity, distinct from other self-conscious persons. However, since life’s infinite basis is present in the sense of life, personal identity is, ultimately, anticipation of the eschatological truth about the human individual, that is: the fellowship with God that the Spirit in present reality mediates by the sense of life. This means that personality to Pannenberg is a relational concept, by which the human being, mediated by the Spirit, participates in the Son’s self-distinction from the Father, and, thus, in the God’s Trinitarian being.

This participation in God is in the deepest sense natural to the human being, and sin is, consequently, ‘unnatural’ in that it contradicts and perverts human nature. At the same time, sin is ‘natural’ in the sense that it is rooted in the structural tension between human centrality and eccentricity. Ultimately, so Pannenberg, sin consists in the failure of relating the finitude
of the ‘I’ to life’s infinite basis in God, and as such it is universally and independently of revelation experienced in human life. Thus, Pannenberg believes to have unfolded the universality of sin without any need for a thought of inheritance of sin between generations. This does not mean that sin follows with necessity from human existence, but that it is ‘so closely tied’ to the structural tension that it ‘in fact always’ is the result, except in the explicit distinction of the self in its finitude from God.

This self-distinction from God was, so Pannenberg, fulfilled in the earthly life of Jesus. This means that he, in his creaturely life, is ‘the eschatological form of humanness’, the true human being. And because his historical obedience is identical with the Son’s Trinitarian self-distinction from the Father, this humanness is established as a reality in God’s being. In the course of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection his particular humanness gained its meaning and significance as paradigmatic for others, with the eschatological goal of incorporating God’s creatures in the Father’s kingdom and in the Trinitarian fellowship. Thus, it is clear how comprehensive Pannenberg ultimately understands human knowledge of God, namely in terms of the human destiny of fellowship with God in eschatological consummation in the future kingdom.
5 Conclusions

Chapters 2.4, 3.5 and 4.5 outline, in a brief and summarising manner, the main findings of the analysis of Tertullian’s anthropology, and of the interpretations of Barth’s and Pannenberg’s theological anthropologies that the dissertation aims to present. I do not, by this concluding section, intend to repeat the entire content of these chapters, but I would like to make an evaluation of the theological anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg, based on whether – and to what extent – they solve the problems stated in my concluding summary of Tertullian. Hence, I do not, as in sections 3 and 4, use the four points to structure the interpretation, but as criteria for evaluation.

According to Tertullian, Christian anthropology is ultimately about human knowledge of God. His interpretation of the human being, and in particular of the human soul, is determined by the fundamental conviction that God creates humans in order to make himself known (p39). He believes this ‘make-himself-known-ness’ to be essential to divine being (p43), and he even speaks of it in terms of necessity (p54). Hence, every human being is, so Tertullian, addressed by God in creation, and the divine communication is intrinsic to human nature (pp48-49). It happens, he says, in human consciousness (p43) and by particular phenomena of human life (p78).

Both of the anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg deal with the question of human knowledge of God, but they do so in decisively different ways. Barth’s anthropology is about how faith understands its own humanness as a ‘subsequent subjectivity’ to God’s subjectivity, that is: it is about a particular human mode of existence in recognition of God (p96). Hence, theological anthropology has the character of faith’s self-interpretation, both with regard to the faith’s formal understanding of itself as summoned by God’s word, and with regard to the object of faith, that is: as confession to the triune God (p91).

In this Trinitarian perspective, faith must presuppose that its knowledge of God is entirely dependent on God’s eternal election in Christ of the human believer (p145). Further, it must presuppose election to be universal in the sense that faith must expect God’s calling to reach all others, so that they will know God too, and that the eternal election in Christ will overcome sin’s contradiction of the God-human relation (note 341). This means that knowledge of God is exclusively associated with salvation in Barth. He never understands it as a possible reason for judgement, as does Tertullian (p40, based on Paul, Rom. 1:19).

Barth’s understanding of the human being as eternally elected in Christ can be said to meet Tertullian’s point about the universality of human knowledge of God and of divine communication. However, as it can be
stated from the perspective of faith only, it cannot be associated with any anthropological insight on general premises.

Pannenberg agrees with Barth that the specific perspective of theological anthropology is that of faith. As such, it is an unfolding of a religiously and biblically grounded interpretation of human existence (p190). However, he criticises Barth for making this perspective the reason not to deal with the religious thematic on a general anthropological basis (p24). This critique is theological: he emphasises that faith, in Christian understanding, is mediated in that revelation presupposes the anthropological, unthematic notion of God (p166). Historical revelation addresses people, who already know the idea of God in terms of infinity.

This does not mean – as it does in Tertullian – that genuine knowledge of God is universally present due to divine communication by human consciousness and by the phenomena of sensation, understanding and emotion. The idea of God has reality only in positive religion (p170), and religious truth claims must, so Pannenberg, be put to test and confirmed according to the criterion of coherence with all other knowledge.

Nonetheless, Pannenberg holds knowledge of God to be universal, because religions are universal (p169, note 388). Non-religious human existence in itself, with its unthematic ‘question of God’ (p164) is, so Pannenberg, a hypothetical abstraction, because humans always live in provisional answers to this question, that is: in religion.

Both Barth and Pannenberg, then, believe – on certain premises – that human knowledge of God is universal, and they both associate it with God’s being. But they do it differently: Barth by understanding the universal God-human relation from the eternal election in Christ, and thus, from God’s own self-determined being (p148).

Pannenberg by understanding the universal human destiny of fellowship with God from God’s eschatological being, where human destiny is fulfilled by participation in the fellowship of the Trinity (p234)

In both cases, the universality is maintained with reference to a comprehensive theological perspective. Neither Barth nor Pannenberg interpret concrete phenomena of experienced human life as expressions of divine communication, as does Tertullian in De Anima. They both explicitly refer their reluctance to do so to their acceptance of Kant’s and Hegel’s anthropological interpretations of the proofs of God’s existence. (pp151.170). As such, they are equally ‘modern’, agreeing that theological anthropology has the character of faith’s interpretation of its own human existence.

However, unlike Barth, Pannenberg’s anthropological proposal incorporates the pre-religious human experience of being dependent on life’s
infinite basis, theologically interpreted as creaturely reliance on God’s life-giving Spirit (p213). Thus, he is able to unfold how religious knowledge of God is rooted in human existence prior to faith.

This does not prove ‘the truth of Christian doctrine’ or any religious proposal of human knowledge of God, and it does not make Pannenberg an apologist in the sense of Tertullian’s apologetics. Rather, it addresses a problem in Barth in terms of a critique of the subjectivism implied in his ‘mere decision to begin with God himself’ (p162).

I believe that Pannenberg, hereby, points to a genuine problem in Barth’s theology, and that it must be addressed anthropologically. However, I doubt that this can be done solely from an all-comprehensive perspective, such as Pannenberg’s. Despite his emphasis on ‘Trinitarian concreteness’ (p197), it remains, I think, a question, whether such a universal ambition in practise must become abstract, referring theological anthropology to abstract synthesising rather than to phenomena of experienced human life (p183).

According to Tertullian, Christian anthropology implies to account doctrinally for the conditions for human knowledge of God. His own most thorough proposal to do so is *Adversus Marcionem*’s interpretation of created human life by the concept of *imago Dei*. This concept is, so Tertullian, about a ‘double correspondence’ in human relation to God (p42), which both confirms and overcomes the divine-human difference of being.

Barth’s interpretation of the *imago Dei* in terms of the concept of analogy meets this second point of Tertullian. Analogy means, so Barth, that revelation establishes a God-human correspondence by its instrumental use of human language (p106, note 255) and of the created human relationality of the *Ich-Du*-engounter (p111). Thus, the ‘true humanness’ is established as the human mode of existence, which is genuine subjectivity in relation to God’s subjectivity.

Since faith must understand this correspondence as participation in Christ (p105), it must also hold it to be knowable in him, and in him only. This means that faith’s knowledge of God has the character of a circular line of thought, according to Barth a ‘circle of God’s truth’ (p107), which cannot be approached on external grounds. Theology’s knowledge – of God and of the human creature – is then an affirmative unfolding of the inner rationality of the human mode of existence of faith, and this is what makes it knowledge (*Wissen*) rather than postulate (p113).

Pannenberg opposes, as stated, the distinction between knowledge and postulate, insisting that faith’s knowledge as historically and humanly mediated must incorporate a fundamental anthropological understanding of the basis of the idea of God in human existence (pp114.165). Otherwise,
Theology and religion are, themselves, in danger of distorting the knowledge of God by subjectivism, so that they end out making Feuerbach’s critique true (p24).

The crucial point of Pannenberg’s own doctrinal understanding of the conditions for knowledge of God is that he interprets the creaturely life of Jesus from the fundamental anthropological understanding of human dependence on life’s infinite basis. This dependence is, in theological perspective, the creature’s inherent openness for the Creator, and, thus, for the knowledge of God possible in explicit self-distinction from him (p210).

Jesus is, so Pannenberg, the definitive (note 420) revelation of God, and he is so, because he in the course of his historical life, death and resurrection anticipated the comprehensive, all-coherent unity, in which God will actualise his identity definitively at the end of history (p189). Jesus did so, on purely creaturely premises, by fulfilling the self-distinction from God that is constitutive of the God-human fellowship in distinction, that is: human destiny. Hence, his life, death and resurrection anticipate not only the realisation of God’s eschatological identity, but even the eschatological human identity of participation in the Trinitarian fellowship.

Pannenberg emphasises that this Christological approach ‘from below’ is no attempt to rule out the doctrine of the incarnation, but rather to reconstruct classical Christology’s basis in revelation history (p211). Nonetheless, it implies that the eternal sonship of Jesus is constituted by his historical, creaturely obedience, and that God’s Trinitarian self-actualisation happens in Jesus’ creaturely realisation of human destiny, without any break with the causation of immanent history. Pannenberg accentuates his agreement with Schleiermacher in the understanding of the uniqueness of Jesus as a ‘purely human particularity’ (p230).

From the perspective of Barth, this interpretation of Jesus seems to blur the difference between Creator and creature (p100). God’s inclusion of the historical life and death of Jesus in his divine being (p157) by the self-determining act of election implies a capability from God’s side to cross the border between Creator and creature, that is: divine passibility (p155), even as a statement of divine ontology (note 355). But certainly not a creaturely capability to be the eternal Son by fulfilment of human destiny.

From the perspective of Tertullian, no less, the immanence ‘from the beginning’ of the second person of the Trinity (note 132) means that the Son could do, what was impossible for the Father, namely ‘conform’ himself with humans (p54). But he could so – and did so – as co-substantial with the Father, that is: as divine being conforming to creaturely human being, not as mere-creaturely fulfilling of human destiny conditioning eschatological participation in the Father’s kingdom and divinity (182).
Conclusions

According to Tertullian, it is indispensable for the credibility of Christian faith to appear in accordance with an anthropology that can account for the phenomena, by which he believes God to communicate. His problem with Platonic dualism is that it makes human knowledge a matter of introspection (p73). Therefore, he attempts in *De Anima* to solve a double task: Firstly, he seeks so demonstrate that his own Stoic influenced physicalism is superior to the reductionist (pp65.66.79) Platonic dualism of Hermogenes and ‘the philosophers’. Secondly, he tries to show that Christian faith is in accordance with this anthropology and, therefore, credible. In the polemic context of *De Anima*, this is about showing that his (and the Carthage church’s) understanding of Christianity is superior to the understanding of Hermogenes and the other ‘heretics’.

Barth rejects, as we have seen (p127), that theological anthropology needs any confirmation from similarities to non-theological anthropologies. His presentation of the fellow-humanness of the Ich-Du-encounter claims to be based of faith’s understanding of the person of Jesus (pp105.125). However, his mentioning of Buber, as it were: in passing, appears as an intentional down-playing of the importance of the Ich-Du-philosophy for his own understanding of relationality in encounter. His understanding of human existence may, then, be closer to meet Tertullian’s requirement of accordance, than he says it is (p129).

In any case, Barth shapes his material understanding of human constitution in terms of the soul-bodily unity and the soul’s primacy (p118) from faith’s experience of being addressed by God as a rational being.

Pannenberg does, in a sense, something similar, but on a general anthropological basis (p212), and emphasising self-consciousness rather than rationality (note 466). The human being is, so Pannenberg, as referred to the vital power of the Spirit as are all other living creatures. To be alive is, then, to be ‘in need’ and to be desirous, dependent on life’s infinite basis present in the sense of life. So, theologially interpreted, God addresses the human being – and all living beings – in the sense of life. But the particular human object-awareness, which is the basis of human self-consciousness, makes the human experience of being addressed by the totality of life an experience of own distinctness from life’s basis. Yet it is, at the same time, an experience of the totality that precedes own individuality (p215). Thus, the Spirit causes the formation of personal identity as an anticipation of the eschatological fellowship with God, for which the human being is destined (p218).

This means that the theological statement about the human being as created in God’s image is not only in accordance with, but is rooted in the structure of human existence as self-conscious unity of body and soul.
So is sin, so Pannenberg. He understands it from Augustine as a perversion of created human desire in terms of human centrality. Centrality belongs essentially to human nature as necessary basis of self-consciousness and, thus, of personal identity (p223). However, the tension between centrality and eccentricity makes sin ‘lie so close’ to the structure of human existence that it appears as ‘natural’ (p195), and Pannenberg believes by this to have demonstrated the universality of sin without needing to refer to any heritage of sin between generations.

This does not mean that Pannenberg claims to have explained sin. On the other hand, he cannot endorse Tertullian’s (p45) and Barth’s (p130) understanding of sin as fundamentally inexplicable from human nature.

At this point, Pannenberg is closer to Irenaeus, or at least to the perspective of transformation and growth in Irenaeus (p45). This corresponds to the Herderian (pp192f), understanding of identity as formation (p184) towards a goal, which in Pannenberg’s theological interpretation in light of the anticipatory revelation of the eschaton in the resurrection of Jesus means that personal identity as such is anticipation of the future human destiny.

Sin, in this perspective, is ‘the cost of creature’s independence’ (p225). This independence is, in turn, necessary for the Son’s self-distinction from the Father in the medium of creaturely existence, that is: necessary for God’s being in ‘Trinitarian concreteness’.

Over against Irenaeus and Augustine, with whom Pannenberg at this point claims to be in line (note 445, p224), Pannenberg’s theological Aufhebung of the Herderian concept of formation is more radical. In Irenaeus and Augustine, the perspective of growth stands alongside with the perspective of recapitulation (note 109), whereas it in Pannenberg is the ontological key, even to divine, triune being.

So, the Christology ‘from below’, the ‘natural’ sin, and the equally ‘natural’ human destiny are in Pannenberg held together in an ultimately eschatological theology of the Trinity.

However, the ‘necessary’ role of the creature’s independence touches upon a question, I have dealt with in Barth in relation to the fourth point of my interpretation of Tertullian, the question of divine freedom and necessity. As we have seen (notes 411.509), Pannenberg endorses the fundamental freedom of God, but states at the same time that it follows from the actual existence of the world that God’s deity is dependent on the actualisation of his lordship, since a world, over which God does not rule, is incompatible with his divinity. This ‘boundness’ to the creature is the focus of Pannenberg’s theology.
The same boundness is, I believe, the core concern of Barth’s radical insistence on divine freedom. As we have seen (p148), the concept of divine self-determination from 1940 onwards allows Barth to ensure both the freedom and the self-limitation of God, in that God is ‘free with regard to his own freedom’. This is, so Barth, ultimately a question of faith’s assurance about God’s mercy in Christ (p159). His concern is to ensure faith that there is no hidden divine will behind Christ, no *decretum absolutum* (p142). God is free, so Barth, in that he has bound himself to his human partner.

Pannenberg’s theological focus on God’s eschatological self-actualisation, and Barth’s focus on God’s eternal decision in freedom as the ‘sum of the gospel’ (note 326) are in many ways mutual exclusive. However, they share a focus on God’s boundness to his human creature.

And they share, I believe, this focus with their second-third century counterpart from Carthage. Tertullian’s understanding of the necessary ‘make-himself-known-ness’ of the Trinity (p54) is ultimately a matter of ensuring that it is the same God that addresses the human being universally in creation and in the *testimonium* of Christ (p47).
English Summary
This dissertation provides a problem-oriented interpretation of each of the theological anthropologies of Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg based on an analysis and interpretation of the anthropology of Tertullian. It consists of five sections: a brief introduction, a section on each of the anthropologies of Tertullian, Barth and Pannenberg, and a brief conclusion.

The introduction states the overall aim of the dissertation and the particular perspective on theological anthropology implied in the approach from Tertullian: that it ultimately is about human knowledge of God. Further, I address the question of whether, and how, it is possible to structure the interpretation of modern writers from a contribution from antiquity. At this point I align myself with Eric Osborn and his ‘method of problematic elucidation’.

The introduction also contains brief chapters on each of the three theologians studied, in which I specify my overall approach to their respective anthropologies and state which texts I have chosen to examine, and why.

Section 2 consists of four chapters on the anthropology of Tertullian.
2.1 introduces Tertullian and takes position on a historical question of importance for the textual analyses of the following chapters.
2.2 interprets Adversus Marcionem II,1-10 from a rhetorical analysis of the text. It contains Tertullian’s understanding of God’s creation of humans in his own image, and focuses especially on the inclusion of divine communication in the very act of creating. This means, so Tertullian, that the human being by nature corresponds to God, both in terms of subjective freedom and in terms of moral goodness.
2.3 interprets De Anima 1-22 from a rhetorical analysis of the text. In this text Tertullian presents his understanding of how God (and the Devil) impacts the human soul mediated by phenomena such as sensation, understanding and emotion. I argue that the rhetorical structure of the text reflects the understanding that Christian faith, in order to be credible, must appear to be in accordance with a non-reductionist anthropology.
2.4 summarises the section’s analyses and interpretation of Tertullian’s anthropology in four decisive points. These four points structure the following sections’ interpretations of the anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg.

Section 3 consists of five chapters on Barth’s theological anthropology.
3.1 argues that Barth understands human knowledge of God as faith’s interpretation of its own subjectivity in relation to God’s subjectivity, that is:
as a knowledge accessible in a particular human mode of existence and a particular human ethos of recognition of God.

3.2 interprets Barth’s concept of analogy from Tertullian’s concept of ‘double correspondence’. I argue that Barth understands analogy as revelation’s instrumental use of human language and of created human Ich-Du-relationality.

3.3 interprets Barth’s material anthropology, including his understanding of the human being as soul-bodily unity and as relational being, and his understanding of sin. In all cases, this is about humanness as faith’s mode of existence, revealed in Christ.

3.4 interprets Barth’s doctrine of election from Tertullian’s understanding of an inherent paradigmatic humanness of God’s triune being. In particular, I examine Barth’s concept of divine self-determination.

3.5 summarises the main findings of the interpretation of Barth’s theological anthropology from Tertullian.

Section 4 consists of five chapters on Pannenberg’s theological anthropology.

4.1 interprets Pannenberg’s anthropology in response to the question of human knowledge of God. The notion of God in terms of infinity is, so Pannenberg, implied in human existence. I argue that he carries out this fundamental anthropological interpretation for specific doctrinal reasons: Since knowledge of God is humanly mediated, it is necessary to consider the human notion of God in order for theology not to distort the content of faith.

4.2 interprets Pannenberg’s understanding of human creation in the divine image from Tertullian’s concept of ‘double correspondence’. I argue that Pannenberg’s understanding of human destiny of fellowship with God differs from Tertullian’s traditional understanding, as Pannenberg holds the God-human relation to be a ‘fellowship in distinction’, anticipated in the earthly, created life of Jesus.

4.3 interprets Pannenberg’s understanding of the human being as personal unity of body and soul and his understanding of sin. The two basic statements of theological anthropology, divine image and sin, are hereby presented as rooted in the structure of human existence and unfolded from a specific theological perspective.

4.4 interprets Pannenberg’s understanding of the paradigmatic significance of Jesus’ humanness from Tertullian’s Trinitarian understanding of the inherent humanness of God. Jesus’ paradigmatic humanness is, so Pannenberg, conditioned by his historical life, death and resurrection, by which his identity is determined. This historical identity
anticipates every human being’s eschatological destiny of fellowship with God.

4.5 summarises the main findings of the interpretation of Pannenberg’s theological anthropology from Tertullian.

Section 5 is a brief, concluding section that evaluates various aspects of the theological anthropologies of Barth and Pannenberg.
Dansk Sammenfatning


Indledningen indeholder desuden korte kapitler om hhv. Tertullian, Barth og Pannenberg, hvor jeg angiver min overordnede tilgang til deres respektive antropologier og angiver, hvilke tekster jeg har valgt at undersøge, og hvorfor.

Sektion 2 består af fire kapitler om Tertullians antropologi.
2.1 introducerer Tertullian og tager stilling til et historisk spørgsmål af betydning for den følgende tekstanalyse.
2.3 fortolker *De Anima* 1-22 på baggrund af en retorisk analyse. Det er i denne tekst, Tertullian fremlægger sin forståelse af, hvordan Gud (og Djævelen) over indflydelse på den menneskelige sjæl gennem konkrete fænomener som sansning, forståelse og følelse. Jeg argumenterer for, at tekstens retoriske opbygning afspejler den forståelse, at kristen tro, for at være troværdig, må kunne vises at være i samsvar med en ikke-reduktionistisk antropologi.
2.4 opsummerer sektionens analyse og fortolkning af Tertullians antropologi og identificerer fire afgørende punkter i den. Disse fire punkter strukturerer de følgende sektioners tolkninger af Barths og Pannenbergs antropologier.
Sektion 3 består af fem kapitler om Barths teologiske antropologi.

3.1 argumenter for, at Barth forstår menneskelig erkendelse af Gud som troens fortolkning af sin egen subjektivitet i forhold til Guds subjektivitet, dvs. som en erkendelse, der findes i en særligt menneskelig eksistensform og en særligt menneskelig ethos.

3.2 fortolker Barths analogibegreb ud fra Tertullians begreb om ‘dobbelt korrespondens’. Jeg argumenterer for, at Barth forstår analogi som åbningen til menneskelig sprog og menneskelig jeg-du-relationalitet.

3.3 fortolker Barths materialantropologi, herunder hans forståelse af mennesket som sjæl-legemlig enhed og som relationelt væsen, og hans forståelse af synder. I alle tilfælde handler dette om menneskelighed som troens eksistensform, åbnet i Kristus.

3.4 fortolker Barths lære om udvælgelsen ud fra Tertullians trinitariske forståelse af menneskelighed som en paradigmatiske virkelighed i Gud, forud for skabelsen. Jeg undersøger særligt Barths begreb om guddommelig selvbestemmelse.

3.5 sammenfatter de vigtigste resultater af fortolkningen af Barths teologiske antropologi ud fra Tertullian.

Sektion 4 består af fem kapitler om Pannenbergs teologiske antropologi.

4.1 fortolker Pannenbergs antropologi som svar på spørgsmålet om, hvordan mennesket kan kende Gud. Pannenberg bestemmer gudstanken fundamentalantropologisk. Jeg argumenterer for, at han gør det med den dogmatisk begrundelse, at erkendelse af Gud altid er menneskelig formidlet, og at det derfor er nødvendigt at medtænke den gudstanke, der er givet med menneskets eksistens forud for troen, for at teologien ikke skal forøge troens indhold.

4.2 fortolker Pannenbergs forståelse af menneskets skabelse i Guds billede ud fra Tertullians begreb om ‘dobbelt korrespondens’. Jeg argumenterer for, at Pannenbergs forståelse af den menneskelige bestemmelse til fællesskab med Gud adskiller sig fra Tertullians traditionelle forståelse, fordi den handler om et fællesskab i selvadskillelse, som er foregribet i Jesu jordiske, skabte menneskeliv.

4.3 fortolker Pannenbergs forståelse af mennesket som personlig enhed af legeme og sjæl og hans forståelse af synder. I begge tilfælde er der tale om, at den teologiske antropologis hovedtemaer – gudbilledlighed og synd – er forankret i den menneskelige eksistens’ struktur, og udfoldes fra et specifikt teologisk perspektiv.

4.4 fortolker Pannenbergs forståelse af den paradigmatiske betydning af Jesu menneskelighed ud fra Tertullians trinitariske forståelse af
menneskelighed som en paradigmatisk virkelighed i Gud. If. Pannenberg er Jesu paradigmatiske menneskelighed begrundet i hans historiske liv, død og opstandelse som bestemmende for hans identitet. I denne historiske identitet foregriver han ethvert menneskets eschatologiske bestemmelse til fællesskab med Gud.

4.5 sammenfatter de vigtigste resultater af for tolkningen af Pannenbergs teologiske antropologi ud fra Tertullian.

Sektion 5 er en kort, konkluderende sektion, som vurderer forskellige aspekter af Barths og Pannenbergs teologiske antropologier.
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