The Ambiguity of Foreign Military Assistance

This study tests the argument that Foreign Military Assistance and the consequently professionalizing of the recipient military has a positive effect on the process of democratization in Kenya.
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ISBN 978-87-93361-21-8
Chapter One – Introduction.................................................................................................................. 4
The Theoretical Arguments on Foreign Military Assistance........................................................................ 13
Theoretical Criticism of the FMA argument .............................................................................................. 20
Theoretical Starting Point ......................................................................................................................... 26
The Kenya Case ........................................................................................................................................ 31
Final Operationalization and Coherence of the Study ............................................................................. 36
Research Design and Methodology .......................................................................................................... 39
Data Availability, Collection and Usability .................................................................................................. 40
Chapter Two – The Socioeconomic Context ............................................................................................ 51
Why Inequality? ......................................................................................................................................... 55
How Inequality? .......................................................................................................................................... 56
The Socio-Economic Effect of Inequality .................................................................................................... 60
Chapter Three – The Democratic Identity of Kenya (KDI) ......................................................................... 69
Measuring Democracy ............................................................................................................................... 74
Theoretical Point of Departure .................................................................................................................. 78
Operationalization of the Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................... 82
The Analysis of Exclusion ......................................................................................................................... 87
The Dimension of Liberalization ............................................................................................................... 88
The Dimension of Participation .................................................................................................................. 106
Consolidating the Investigation on Exclusion (KDI) .............................................................................. 122
Conclusion on KDI ..................................................................................................................................... 130
Chapter Four - the Professional Military Position (PMP) ......................................................................... 134
Theoretical Point of Departure .................................................................................................................. 142
Key Findings on the Professional Military Position .................................................................................. 150
The Meritocratic Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 150
The Altruistic Dimension ........................................................................................................................... 164
Conclusion on PMP ................................................................................................................................... 176
Chapter Five – Military Assistance and Africa ......................................................................................... 182
Foreign Military Assistance and Democracy ............................................................................................. 190
Foreign Military Assistance Programs in Kenya ....................................................................................... 192
Conclusion on Foreign Military Assistance Programs ............................................................................ 200
Chapter Six – Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 202
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 209
Appendix ..................................................................................................................................................... 220
Chapter One – Introduction

Foreign Military Assistance, the “Silver Bullet” in Foreign Policy

In the scramble for successful democratic transition in Africa, an old argument from the civil - military relations debate has not only resurfaced theoretically but also taken on a dominant position in policymaking. This argument posits that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive effect on the process of democratization. By training and educating the armed forces in developing countries, national militaries can turn into a catalyst for the democratization process in said countries. As we shall see, there is no universal definition of FMA. Basically FMA must be understood as a political instrument that comprises everything from financial support and weapons and equipment sales to engagement in more ambitious political partnerships, involving strategic defense planning and military education. The military is often viewed as the most powerful institution in developing countries, and FMA from the military in well-established democracies is vital when it comes to transforming autocracies into democracies, by encouraging leaders to choose the path of democracy and consequently avoid military coups. Judging from the extensive reliance on foreign militaries in foreign policy, FMA seems to deliver the political results desired by the donor countries. FMA has developed into a global phenomenon allowing several sponsors to have a global impact. The United States (US) is by far the largest provider of security assistance worldwide. US-run security assistance programs in Africa, Asia, and Europe address political issues of interest to the US, such as counterterrorism and crime. The general US security assistance strategy is guided by four strategic objectives: strengthening democratic institutions; spurring economic growth, trade and investment; advancing peace and security; and promoting opportunity and development. In the diagram below, the Obama Administration provides details on its Financial Year 2016 request to Congress to fund security assistance encompassing aid,

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2 http://www.state.gov/t/pm/c17251.htm
3 “The fourth pillar of this Administration’s (Obama) engagement with Africa, alongside democracy, security, and economic growth, is promoting opportunity and development. http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2013/202943.htm
training and equipment to foreign military and police forces – around the world.\textsuperscript{5}

The Obama Administration’s Financial Year 2016 Request for Security Assistance amounts to USD 18.72 billion, which corresponds to approximately DKK 118 billion, the equivalent of a third of Denmark’s GDP in 2013.\textsuperscript{5} Judging from these figures alone, providing training and equipment to foreign military and police forces with the aim of promoting democracy, economic growth and development is a significant enterprise for the US. However, the United States is not the only actor in the field of utilizing security assistance as a political instrument. The United Kingdom (UK) also uses FMA to promote a political agenda, although this does not come near to being on the same scale as that implemented by the US. The UK provides training and equipment to foreign military and police forces as an element of a larger engagement in security sector reforms formulated in security assistance and justice programs (S&J). Countries targeted by these programs in Africa are Libya, DRC, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Malawi. In Asia we find countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Jamaica.\textsuperscript{6}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{us_security_assistance_graph.png}
\caption{Security Assistance Monitor, The Obama Administration’s Financial Year 2016 Request for Security Assistance amounts to USD 18.72 billion.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{5} World Bank.
In the last 15 years, security sector reforms and development assistance for security and justice (S&J) – namely, support for policing, judicial systems, community justice and related initiatives – has become an increasingly important part of the UK aid program. Expenditures have more than doubled.\textsuperscript{7}

Security and justice (S&J) assistance, including support for policing, courts and community justice, is an increasingly important part of the UK aid portfolio. In 2013-14, it accounted for £95 million in expenditure, across different agencies, which equals the amount of approximately one billion Danish Kroner. Furthermore, the British army coordinates UK military assistance to armed forces in Eastern Africa, South Africa and Sierra Leone in order to contribute to Security Sector Reforms and to increase peacekeeping capacities.\textsuperscript{8} Although it is just a fraction of total US expenditures providing training and equipment to foreign military and police forces and promoting democracy, justice and development is a significant and an increasing activity for the UK. Even though the programs launched by the US and UK have slightly different objectives and vary in content, they in general express an growing belief in the idea that the military in well-established democracies are vital institutions when it comes to changing autocracies into democracies. However, not only the United States and the United Kingdom are providers of FMA, also nations like Japan, Denmark, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands apparently find FMA a useful tool in assisting the process of democratization and the

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{8} http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx
transition from autocracy to democracy. In 2011 I wrote a paper on the Danish ambitions regarding Military Capacity Building in East Africa. It was during that process a number of questions about FMA emerged and founded my initial interest for this subject and eventually created the foundation for this thesis. Even though the Danes have no way near the same amount of money to spend on FMA as our partner countries, they seem to be as convinces as everyone about the effect of FMA. Through the Peace and Stabilisation Fond the Ministry of Defence allocate around 75 million DKK pr. year. The Peace and Stabilisation Fond was establish in 2010 as financial support for an integrated and comprehensive approach to stabilisation of fragile states, mostly between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. As recently as today the expectations on behalf of the effect of FMA is still prevailing. The Ministry of Defence, on their webpage, declares the following statement:

“The overall purpose of the Danish Defense support for African countries, is to contribute to stability and democratic development, and thereby enable the countries to tackle conflicts themselves”

Also the Ministry of Foreign Affair, who accounts for the majority of Danish foreign policy, seem to regard military capacity building as a feasible tool in foreign policy. On their webpage they join the expectations by a announcing:

“Preventive action can also be of a military nature. Through long-term capacity building of military structures and capabilities, the Danish defense contributes to the enabling of fragile states to handle own security. This can be achieved through justice and security sector reforms, a comprehensive approach to building security institutions. Justice and security sector reform is about building the country's judicial institutions, police force, prison service, coast guard, border control, defense, etc., and the necessary democratic control of these”

If we are to believe these statement, building military capacities in fragile states contributes to stability and democratic development. According to the Danish Ministry of Defence the background for this policy on using military capacities is mostly drawn from own experience. In the Danish Defence Agreement (DDA) 2010 - 2014 the justification is found in experience drawn from stabilisation operation in Iraq and Afghanistan in which Denmark participated.

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11 Danish Defence Agreement (DDA) 2010-2014 and 2013-2017
12 http://www.fmn.dk/videnom/Pages/Langsigtetstabilitetgennemkapacitetsopbygning.aspx
13 http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/11221/html/chapter03.htm
“The local building of competent security structures, including military capabilities, is crucial for the success of any international mission”\(^{14}\)

Again in the DDA from 2013 - 2017 we find justification for the continuation of FMA (Military Capacity Building in Danish terminology) within both the Danish Defence and the Danish Home Guard. The policy implementation of the Danish FMA takes primarily place in East Africa and also to some extent in Afghanistan. Until 2011 the training and support to the Afghan security sector has been handled by special formed units the so-called Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT). From around 2011 training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) has been an increasing part of the Danish battle units’ contribution to the mission in Afghanistan.\(^ {15}\)

In East Africa Denmark is engaged in both multilateral as well as bilateral cooperation with African partners. In the framework of the Nordic Defence Cooperation\(^ {16}\) (NORDEFCO) Denmark together with Sweden, Norway and Finland provides staff training and military advice to officers at the East African Standby Force (EASF) through a special formed unit called the Nordic Advisory and Coordination Staff (NACS). Furthermore, Denmark has a bilateral cooperation with the Kenyan Navy dealing with maritime issues of a technical character. Expanding our view from the Nordic countries turning toward the rest of Europe, we find other examples of FMA in foreign policy. Also in the Netherlands we see that the idea of supporting or building military capacities, or other security related capacities, is not far fetched. Dutch troops assist with reconstruction and development in countries that are (or have been) the site of violent conflict. For instance, through the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia Dutch military personnel assist in the training programme for Somali security troops, in order to strengthen the country’s new government (the Somali National Government), as it is stated on the official website. Dutch personnel operate from the Ugandan capital city of Kampala and the Bihanga Training Camp in western Uganda.\(^ {17}\) Other relevant missions, in which training and support of foreign military takes place for the Dutch, is the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA). I will end my listing of nations using FMA in their foreign policy by shortly mentioning France. It will be partly beside the point and also to extensive to provide a detailed presentation of French history and present engagements in West Africa. However, a

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\(^{14}\) Danish Defence Agreement (DDA) 2010-2014

\(^{15}\) [http://www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/afghanistan/styrker/helmand/hold13/Pages/default.aspx](http://www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/afghanistan/styrker/helmand/hold13/Pages/default.aspx)

\(^{16}\) NORDEFCO, African Capacity Building Perspective Plan 2010 - 2015

reminder regarding the French engagement in Mali is appropriate and illustrative for the French use of FMA in their foreign policy. However, not only nations find FMA a useful tool in assisting the process of democratization. Also actors like UN and NATO but also EU seem to have discovered the usefulness of training and supporting a broader spectrum of security actors. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNODC has the ambition of fighting crime, drugs, and terrorism by, among other things, “conducting field-based technical cooperation projects to enhance the capacity of member states to counteract illicit drugs and crime” as it is announced on the organization’s website. UNODC partners are to be found within the public and private sectors, as well as civil society to pursue that ambition.\(^{18}\) NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” program is yet another example of how to provide military assistance to countries in the process of democratization and how to support peaceful development.\(^ {19}\) On the 18\(^ {th}\) of February 2013, the European Union engaged in a training mission for the Malian Defence Forces. The European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM) is a perfect and very straightforward example on how military training is directly linked to restoration of “security and lasting peace in Mali”\(^ {20}\). By accentuating these examples from the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands and France, UN, NATO and EU, it is justifiable to suggest that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has taken on a dominant position in policy making among these nations and organizations. Since these actors also represent the largest and most frequent users of FMA and thus can be identified as “trendsetters” in this field, it is also justifiable to suggest that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has taken on a dominant position in policymaking in general. In some cases it is argued that training and educating of the armed forces in developing countries directly support the democratization process, in other cases the ambition is stabilization and security, as a precondition for democratization. In both cases “security providers” seems to increasingly deliver the political results desired by the donating countries and the tool to obtain either the one or the other is Foreign Military Assistance (FMA).

Research Question
Judging from the popularity and the extensive use of FMA in foreign

\(^{18}\) https://www.unodc.org/unodc/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop

\(^{19}\) “Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the Partnership for Peace [program] is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm

policy, the idea seems pretty straightforward and the story about FMA could end right here. However, some questions arise in the aftermath of this run down on FMA. By analyzing the role of the military in developing countries one might expect to find a gap between theoretical expectations and the political, social, and economic reality on the ground. Can the outmost positive effect (Democracy), apparently desired by the donating countries, be obtained through FMA? What is actually the secret behind this “silver bullet”? The questions sort of revolve around two sets of issues. The first issue deals with the causality. What is democracy, and how is it linked to the armed forces. Between the two extremes of FMA and democracy, there seem to be a wide range of relations that all demand certain preconditions to fulfill the claimed causality. How can we make FMA a successful instrument for democratization? The second issue deals with politics in a wider sense. Are all nations and organization providing military aid motivated by the alleged “democratizing effect”, or are there other reasons? Are countries pursuing own strategic interests like own security, economic gains etc. instead of focusing on the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts needed? If there is no “democratizing effect” there must be other reasons. Therefore, to seek answers:

This study is testing the argument that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) and the consequently professionalizing of the recipient military, has a positive effect on the process of democratization.

What is the secret behind this “silver bullet”? Let us move on to look for a scientific explanation in some of the theoretical literature on the subject.

**Foreign Military Assistance and Democracy**

One of the most predominant advocates in favor of FMA, Admiral Dennis Blair USN (ret.), former Director of National Intelligence, argues in his book (2013, that influencing dictatorships by military means, such as foreign military assistance (FMA), is a powerful instrument to democratize autocracies. Blair suggests that the uneasy alliance between a dictatorship and its armed forces surfaces when the dictatorship fails to meet the economic, social and political aspirations of the people. This pertains to regime change by military means but not by invading a country or supporting freedom fighters, Blair argues. Often leaders of the armed forces in a dictatorship recognize that the supreme leader is losing the support of the populace, and they often take action to shift their own support, he claims. The task of democratic countries, then, is to persuade the armed forces that it is in their own interest to support democratic development. In 21 Blair, Dennis (2013) Military Engagement, Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transition, Vol.1, Overview and Action Plan, Brookings Institution press, Washington, D.C. pp. 3 - 10
his second book, Dennis Blair empirically undergirds his argumentation by using case studies from Nigeria, Thailand, the Philippines, and Turkey. In his chapter on regions, he draws on cases from the Middle East and North Africa. In most cases of multiple interventions by national militaries, national governments were not able to deliver economic development, basic security, and social order to the countries they, in the best case, were elected to lead. Military leaders stepped in because they believed that their governments were failing in their basic functions. However, and very importantly, in none of these countries did the plotters of military coups believe that direct military rule or military-supported dictatorships should be permanent, he claims. Thus, a military-to-military relation, such as Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) from democratic countries, must then persuade the recipient armed forces to support democratization and turn them into catalyst for democratic reforms. Military-to-military relations between democracies and autocracies are viewed as important catalysts in the democratic transition. Neglect the “guys with the guns”, and a peaceful transition towards democracy is impeded. But how is this possible? How can the military, which obviously is trained to fight wars, engage in supporting democratization? Let us have a closer look at the causal chain of Blair’s argument and address each specific link of it to get a better understanding of the presented argument. To describe the military-to-military relation, Blair’s main argument primarily revolves around three institutions and three main sets of relations between these institutions. As presented, the institutions are the external armed forces from democratic country A, the armed forces from autocratic country B and the government in the autocratic country B. The given Foreign Military Assistance program, the growing pressure and demand for democracy and, finally, an increasing level of democracy, defines the relations between these institutions.

![Diagram of military-to-military relations](image)

Figure 3 (1) Blair’s main argument primarily revolves around three institutions and three main sets of relations between these institutions.

The first step in Blair’s causal chain is the donating country. Just as the country has to be a democracy, it also has to have a declared ambition of supporting democratization in a peaceful way. That ambition must be explicit and traceable in the policy and the FMA programs launched by the government. Step two is the FMA programs. In general the FMA programs must be characterized by a high degree of trust-building and value-

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22 Ibid. Blair, Dennis (2013) Vol. 2
23 Foreign Military Assistance or Military Capacity Building, the idea is discussed and defined in chapter 5.
based activities integrated in exercises and social events. Especially the officers have a central position in the trust-building measures by being role models not only in speech but also in their conduct of duty. They must engage in social conversation as presented in the democracy “elevator speech”, i.e. a list of points that an officer from a democratic country can convey in a short conversation with a counterpart from an autocratic country. The “elevator speech” contains nine headings that allow for a conversation about the advantages of democracy to take place. It is imperative that the message about democracy is delivered with due deference to the history of the respective, autocratic country and the aspirations of the young officer who is being addressed. Otherwise the message will be counterproductive, Blair claims. Words cannot do it alone, however. Other fora must also be support the trust-building and value-based activities. Blair specifies:

“During education and training courses, through rewards and sanctions and in professional and personal discussions, the military forces of democratic countries can convey by both example and persuasion the advantage that the armed forces of democracies enjoy and encourage their peers to support democratic transition in their countries.”

Exercises, cooperation and education must aim at streamlining the organization with the armed forces B, supporting them in establishing policies, authorities and practices of the military service in a democratic system of government. This is what Blair claims constitutes the democracy mission. The third step is the turn-around of the armed forces in country B. Eventually, they are swayed by the advantages that the armed forces of democracies enjoy. That leads directly to step four, which is the increasing demand for government B to support the democratic transition in country B and deliver on security, economy and development. Finally, step five is the result of the accumulated efforts by the armed forces A, the armed forces B and government B. The process of democratization in the recipient country moves forward primarily driven by the “spillover” from increasing reformation of policies, authorities and practices of the military service in a democratic system of government. The national government now becomes increasingly able to deliver on economic development, basic security, and social order to the people they were elected to lead. According to Dennis Blair, that is how military-to-military relations between democracies and autocracies become an important catalyst in the democratic transition and consequently the reason why several, primarily western nations, apply the FMA tool to strengthen democratic institutions, spur economic growth and advance peace and security. The idea of using the military as a catalyst for democracy is by no means new. Since the ‘60s, scholars have presented similar thoughts about how the military can serve as a catalyst for development and democracy. In the following section, I will expand on Blair’s argumentation by introducing the different theoretical perspectives

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25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
regarding the use of FMA, professionalization of the military and the relations between the military and society. By broadening the argument, we can take a step further in our understanding of the FMA argument.

The Theoretical Arguments on Foreign Military Assistance

The argument that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive effect on democracy actually presents two extremes of a long causal chain. Along the space separating the two extremes of FMA and democracy, we find a wide range of actors and relations that all demand certain preconditions to fulfill the claimed causality. It is a useful exercise to expand on this causal chain of the FMA argument since we need to establish how and why these preconditions are satisfied and which actors are found necessary in the causal chain to make FMA a successful instrument for democratization, depending on the theoretical perspective applied. As presented below, it is possible to identify a generic model of a full causal chain of actors and relations from which the discussion of the dominating theories on the effect of FMA in civil-military relations can take place. The following section will present the generic model of the FMA argument by presenting and discussing each single step of the variation in the theoretical perspectives on civil-military relations brought forward and presented in the existing literature.

Figure 4 (1) The Generic Model presenting the alleged causal chain

The model of the causal chain of the FMA argument presented here captures the common denominator for the various arguments pertaining to the causality of the FMA process. The model allows for the possibility of discussing the effect of FMA on democratization without excluding any fundamental approaches to the debate. The model consists of the two obvious actors in the civil-military relations debate, namely the military and the given society. Furthermore, it presents the relations between the actors as a process moving forward from the launching of a FMA program further towards the democratic end state. The clarification of the model is very straightforward, as well, and falls into two phases. The first phase revolves around the armed forces in the recipient country. Basically, the argument here is that by training and educating the armed forces it is possible to increase their level of professionalism. FMA must address the
explicit educational needs and improve the military merits of the recipient armed forces. By increasing the level of military merits, often referred to as professionalism, the precondition for the second phase to take place is established. For a variety of reasons, depending on the theoretical starting point, at one point in time the “spillover”, created by the increasing level of military professionalism, will have a positive effect on society in general. Society will gradually emulate the professional development taking place in the military, and the society’s demand for suitable solutions and practical procedures will steadily increase. Eventually, this relationship, which obviously can take years, will guide the government to realize the benefits of a democratic transition.

Figure 5 (1) The Generic Model presenting the two phases in the FMA argument

This generic argument presented here, due to its rather simplistic nature, raises a lot of questions. How is the process of professionalization exactly going to take place? And even more critically, how are the conditions for advancing to Phase Two attained? To gain a better understanding of the FMA argument, I will expand further on the main theoretical perspectives that espouse these arguments. I have divided the literature, both proponents and critics, into three categories by using the generic model to structure the presentation and discussion of said literature. The main purpose of this exercise is to present the FMA argument in as much detail as possible and lay the theoretical foundation for a critical analysis of said argument. I will start by analyzing the argument of the proponent, then turn to the critics, and finally I will conclude on the decisive findings.

**Foreign Military Assistance and Professionalization**

The first perspective on the FMA argument, and the first step I want to introduce, is concerned with the first phase of the generic mode presented earlier, the phase of professionalization. The group of scholars dominating this part of the FMA argument consists of Howe 2001, Ouédraogo 2013
and Blair 2014.\textsuperscript{27} Their main argument revolves around how military-to-military relations and military cooperation, in particular, can professionalize the military. The theoretical focus of these scholars is on why professionalization of the armed forces has to take place and the impact of FMA on the process of professionalism, whereas they do not expand on the process of how precisely the “spillover” and the democratization of society can take place. The need for the professionalization of the “African army” comes directly from the inexpedient consequences of being unprofessional, i.e. not being technically capable and politically responsible, as Howe puts it.\textsuperscript{28} The infantry arm usually defines the African army since it is easily trained and deployed. However, increasing the level of military merits on technical issues and more complicated defense systems is often hampered by illiteracy. Especially the air force but also air defense systems demand a high level of technological knowhow and training. The political perspective is not much better. The colonial era has led to conditions where the armed forces usually do not find themselves in a democratic structure with an elected and politically acceptable ruler. Moreover, elements such as ethnic recruitment and military corruption are brought forward as means for a ruler to secure short-term political survival and personal gains.

Also the issues, such as the numerous domestic deployments against own population are viewed as unprofessional behavior. The process of professionalization must address exactly these issues, and the FMA must contain tools for handling these challenges. This concerns changing the military culture, as Ouédraogo emphasizes\textsuperscript{29}. This part of the FMA argument, as presented here, gives an interesting insight into how the

process of professionalization takes place and the issues that have to be addressed in the process of increasing the professional merits. It does not focus as heavily, however, on how the conditions for advancing into Phase Two can be obtained, although Howe simply argues that the increasing level of professionalism may reduce the risk of coups and thereby provide “breathing space” for the process of democratization. To narrow in on that part of the argument, we need to turn to the next perspective, since this will bring us forward in the causal chain of the FMA argument.

Professionalism and Civilian Control
The second group of scholars (Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1960, Feaver 1996 and Houngnikpo 2014) represents the most classical theoretical CMR perspective and is mainly concerned with how to obtain civil control. The focus is again on the variable of professionalizing the armed forces, but this time as the key to civilian control. The civil control issue is often referred to as the “Problematique” and is preeminent in the writings of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, the predominant voices in the debate on CMR since the 1960s. The key issue in this debate is the degree of civilian meddling in military affairs, or the “division of labor” as Huntington puts it. What kind of professionalization will provide the best opportunity for civilian control?

Figure 7 (1) The Generic Model, professionalization and key to civilian control

Where Huntington argues for military autonomy, i.e., a minimum of civilian meddling in military affairs, as the best approach to secure the political neutrality and voluntary subordination of the military, Janowitz, on the other hand, argues for the unavoidable politicization of the military and the need to accommodate the military profession in an ever-changing world. This debate must primarily be understood in the Cold War political

31 The “Problematique” refers to the dilemma between military and civil institutions. The state needs the military to protect it from external threats, but how does the state protect itself from the military? See Peter D. Feaver, Armed Forces and Society. Winter 1996. p. 149, for example
32 The “Soldier and the State”, by Huntington and “The Professional Soldier” by Janowitz, are the leading contributions on this subject.
context in which it was written, i.e., the US fear of losing combat power in relation to the USSR, but it still raises two fundamental questions: How can the military be controlled and utilized for the benefit of society, and how can society arrive at the voluntary subordination of the military. In slightly different terms, does the military focus on increasing military meritocratic values alone (Huntington), or does military professionalism require developing altruistic values as well (Janowitz)? In 2014, Houngnikpo suggested the merger of these perspectives by arguing that the military must avoid being politicized but at the same time must appear as a legitimate and necessary security institution under political control. As we shall see later, this part of the FMA argument is important because it brings important knowledge about the delicate dynamics between the military institutions and the democratic institutions. What kind of relations are necessary for maintaining democratic control of the armed forces and how are they established? In relation to the discussion on turning the armed forces into catalyst for democratization the altruistic dimension is extremely helpful. However, it is still rather unclear how the so-called “breathing space” for democratization mentioned by Howe can be obtained. To address that part of the argument we need to turn to the last perspective since it will bring us to the end in the causal chain of the FMA argument.

The Impact of Military Power on Civil Institutions

The last group of scholars (Andreski 1957, Finer 1962, Halpern1963 and Zoltan 2014) is particularly engaged in the discussion on how society can benefit from the military institution as a frontrunner for development. The focus is primarily on the impact of military power on developing civil institutions. This perspective picks up from “modernization theory”, which from a military perspective basically means that instead of focusing on how society can arrive at the voluntary subordination of the military, as in the previous perspective, the military is seen as a catalyst for developing society.

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34 Altruism or selflessness is the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others. See detailed information in chapter 4
By identifying the key social variables within a society, social progress and development could be enhanced by redirecting efforts in a more efficient way. As an example of this, Walt Rostow\textsuperscript{35} presented the economy as the catalyst for modernization. Just as the economy can serve as a driver, so can the army become an instrument of political modernization, and the professional armed forces can play an important role in the process of modernization. Manfred Halpern argues that the army can turn away from being an instrument of repression, pursuing its own interests or that of the ruler, into a vanguard of nationalism and social reform.\textsuperscript{36} In general, the point made by “modernists” is that the army, due to its discipline, training, organizational structure and technological know-how, can take on the role as front-runner in the effort of modernizing society. Furthermore, the demands for sustaining a relatively high technological level within the army give rise to increasing industrial standards in society in general. In 1968 Stanislaw Andreski even took the argument further and suggested a causal link between the participation in military affairs and the likelihood of self-government and human rights. This is designated as the “Military Participation Ratio”.\textsuperscript{37} A high military participation ratio (MPR) decreases (income) inequality within a society. As late as 1989, Robert A. Dahl argued\textsuperscript{38} that as far back as the ancient Greeks, the dynamics between military organizations and technology, on the one side, and social progress in a society, on the other, have been paramount in understanding why some countries have developed into democracies and why others have not. The major point made by Dahl is that the access to the military virtues and the ability to exert “violent coercion” has resulted in demands for political systems and organizations in a society and thus driven the development towards democracy. Except perhaps for the violent coercion, it evident that altruistic relations between the military and society now plays an important role. The argument on modernization is very important in relation to the FMA argument, since it is the closest we come to an explanation of how the precondition for Phase Two (democratization) develops. It is obvious that for society in general to view the military as a frontrunner, the military must satisfy the citizens’ need not only for security but also for economic,

\textsuperscript{37} Andreski assessed the impact of military power on social structure, introducing the concept of the Military Participation Ratio (MPR), or the proportion of the general population in military service.
\textsuperscript{38} Dahl, Robert A. (1989) Democracy and its Critics, Yale University Press, pp.244-249
technological and developmental needs in general. The military’s professionalism must thus encompass a high level of military meritocratic skills as well as a high level of altruistic values and, consequently, so must the FMA program supporting it.

Earlier I presented the FMA-democracy argument as the two extremes of a long causal chain. Along the space separating the two extremes of FMA and democracy, I have presented a wide range of actors and relations which all demand certain preconditions to effect the alleged causality. I have introduced the argument of FMA arranged into three perspectives (the professionalizers, the civil controllers and the modernizers) using the generic model. Let us sum up the argument regarding actors, relations and preconditions supporting the FMA argument. To obtain a successful effect from FMA on democracy, adherence to three steps is necessary: Step one concerns tailoring the FMA programs to address the military merits and thereby increasing the level of military professionalism. The focus of the FMA programs is on increasing training of basic military skills, as well as raising the level of technology. The result is a well-trained and well-organized military institution. The preconditions are military-to-military cooperation and training, the actors are external armed forces and recipient armed forces, and relations are primarily educational. A direct effect on democracy is not yet obtained but preconditions are established. Step two is about “boosting” the FMA programs into addressing issues such as the military culture and the notion of professionalism in a broader sense. The objective is education and development of a dominating loyalty towards democratic institutions and elected political leaders within the military domain. Furthermore, a legitimate and professional image with the people must be cultivated. The preconditions are education and negotiation between civil and military institutions, the actors are the armed forces and the government, with relations primarily based on dialog. Any effect on democracy is small but possible. Step three is the final step. The military has, through intensive FMA programs, obtained full military professionalism in two dimensions, that is, in meritocracy as well as altruism. The high level of professionalism brings the military into a position as a frontrunner for democratic, social and economic reforms. Besides being a well-trained and well-organized military institution with a high technological level the military can now satisfy the citizens’ need for not only security but also economic, technological and developmental needs in general. The preconditions for the final step are a high degree of education, legitimacy and social acceptance, the actors are the armed forces and society, and the relations are again primarily educational. An effect on democracy is now obtained. I will now turn toward the criticism of the FMA argument. Scholars have from time to time brought forward some
doubts on the effect and, not least, the motive for military assistance. Is the military really that good as a democratizer? Let us take a closer look at the trends in this debate.

Theoretical Criticism of the FMA argument
The argument of FMA and consequently the military in the role of the modernizer does not stand unchallenged. In the following section, I will introduce the main trends in the criticism of Foreign Military Assistance (FMA). The criticism of FMA and the military in the role as a catalyst for democracy can be divided into three main trends following the previous tripartition. The first part of the critic challenges the core idea that the motive of training and educating the armed forces should be to increase their level of professionalism. The second part addresses the core civil military relation by pointing out the very delicate balance between military leadership and military coup and the third part of the critic questions the whole “modernizer” argument. According to the critics, it is doubtful whether society gradually can emulate the professional development undergoing in the military and increase the demand for suitable solutions and practical procedures paving the way for democracy. Let us have a look at the first part of the critic.

Foreign Military Assistance and Professionalization
The most acute and explicit critic of FMA we find in the critic of US policy, especially in Africa. In 2012 we find scholars like Steven Klingman (2012) and Adam Branch (2012) as frontrunners in questioning the US motives behind the establishing of Africa Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM was formed in 2008 by George W. Bush as a part of a general restructuring of US headquarters. Both Klingman and Branch exchange the word military assistance with “militarization of peace” and as such announce a more critical approach from the beginning. In general, Klingman is questioning the US motive in Africa arguing that rather than focusing on the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts needed in Africa, US is pursuing own strategic economic interests and balancing the increasing present from China.³⁹

Figure 9 (1) The Generic Model

Branch follows the critic and ads that the AFRICOM ambitions about professionalizing the security sector and support the Africans in solving their own problems is nothing but a cover up for taking care of own national interests. Counter terrorism and securing access to resources like oil and rare minerals before China is the true inducement for the US present in the shape of AFRICOM. When Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA) plans and execute an exercise with the declared objective to strengthen state institutions and build state capacity to counter terrorism it is just a cover up for strengthening undemocratic US allies (like Kenya) laying the ground work for future military operations in relation to secure valuable resources. Klingman and Branch do not have to look far for support to his argumentation. Speaking at the forum at Washington’s Howard University, General Carter Ham of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), said its forces had failed to train Malian troops on ”values, ethics and a military ethos”. It is widely reported that Malian troops kill Arabs and ethnic Tuaregs as they establish control in the north of the country. According to General Ham, Malian troops were given plenty of tactical training, but not enough ethics training, ”We didn’t spend probably the requisite time focusing on values, ethics and a military ethos”, he said. Summing up the critic of the first part it’s easy to see that the argument on FMA having a democratic effect is farfetched. The motive is not exiting and in the Mali example even the military admit that training at the tactical level is completely insufficient. The result is random and far from having any democratic effect whatsoever.

Professionalism and Civilian Control
To establish a better understanding on the delicate balance between the state and the military, McBride (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2007) focused their analyses on the military and the internal factors allegedly leading to a coup. According to McBride, the military intervene in political affairs mainly for reasons of personal greed, being motivated by the gains they

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40 Branch, Adam (2012) AFRICOM: Militarizing Peace, Chapter 7 in Displacing Human Rights, Oxford University Press
41 Ibid. p. 224
42 Akulov, Andrei (2014), US Boosts Foreign Military Aid to Promote Global Clout, Global Research, April
43 Ibid. p. 3
access once the coup is effectively carried out. As such, McBride minimize the possibility for the military to intervene in political affairs to lead a democratic development of the country. Collier and Hoeffler have highlighted the coherence between the risks of a military coup and an increase of the defense budget in general. They found that in countries with a low coup risk, the governments were prone to reduce military budget, whereas in countries with a high coup risk, the governments were prone to increase military budget.

Logically this alleged coherence speaks against the idea of professionalizing the military by engaging in military to military cooperation and launching other types of FMA addressing professionalism and increase the military budget. Summing up on these two arguments we find that the risk of a military coup driven by greed and supported by increasing military spending is larger than the possibility that the military engage in a reformist constructive dialog with the government about leading the democratic development. In general, McBride (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2007) undermine the idea that military professionalism can contain an altruistic dimension

The Impact of Military Power on Civil Institutions
Turning towards the third part we find critics addressing the military as modernizer. In 1971 as one of the strongest voices, Robert A. Price addresses the inconsistency in the theoretical understanding of the military as modernizer and the empirical fact on the ground by arguing “Striking characteristic of the literature on military rule in developing countries is the gap between theoretical expectations and political, social, and economic reality”.

Figure 10 (1) The Generic Model

Figure 11 (1) The Generic Model
On the one hand, practitioners\textsuperscript{45} of comparative social and political theory have tended to view the military as an organization capable of playing an important modernizing role. At the same time, empirical researchers, often the very same individuals who at a different time wear the hat of the “theoretical practitioner,” have found the performance of the military as political agents of modernization to be rather dismal”.\textsuperscript{46} One of the reasons for this alleged disconnection between theoretical and empirical findings is, as pointed out by Price, the military’s lack of ability to mobilize the popular sentiment around collective development goals, increasing the input of human, and material resources and building solidarity in an often fragile political community. Summing up this second argument, Price severely doubts the military as the popular and professional instrument from which the society’s transformation towards democracy shall be lead, mostly because of a general mistrust amongst the surrounding society, a mistrust that raises greatly concern about the effect of the altruistic element in a fragile cultural context. I have now introduced the major lines in the criticism of FMA arranged in three perspectives using the generic model as done during the previous section. Let’s sum up on the argument against the idea that FMA can have a positive effect on democratization. Again it’s a fruitful exercise to focus on actors, relations and preconditions opposing the FMA argument. To obtain a successful effect from FMA on democracy, the following three steps must be followed. Step one was about tailoring the FMA programs into addressing the military merits and thereby increasing the level of military professionalism. According to the scholars presented here the motivations for engaging in military to military cooperation is not for the benefit of the receiving country but merely a cover up for addressing own interests. The military activities serve primarily as contingency planning for future military operations with the objective to serve national interests. The preconditions are still military to military cooperation and training, the actors are external armed forces and receiving armed forces but the relation is primarily an interest driven relation. An effect on democracy cannot be obtained. Step two was about “boosting” the FMA programs. The objective was educationally with a dominating loyalty towards democratic institutions and cultivation of a professional image with the people. According to the scholars presented here we see the military described as far less interested in taking on a position as frontrunner for democracy. Military leaders are instead driven by greed and prone to increase the military spending with the objective to

\textsuperscript{45} By practitioners I refer to the scholars referred to in this chapter

conduct a military coup when circumstances are favored. The possibility that the military engage in a reformist constructive dialog with the government about leading the democratic development is insignificant. The preconditions between civil and military institutions do not exist, the actors are still the armed forces and the government and the relation is primarily driven by military elite ambitions. An effect on democracy cannot be obtained. Step three is the final step. The military has through intensive FMA programs obtained full military professionalism and the military is in a position as a frontrunner for democracy, social and economic reforms. However, according to scholars presented here a disconnection in the causal chain occurs. The reasons, however a serious reason, for this alleged disconnection is the military’s lack of ability to mobilize the popular sentiment around collective development goals, increasing the input of human, and material resources and building solidarity in an often fragile political community. This argument addresses the consideration that socio-economic dynamics always affect the various governmental institutions, including the military in the transition towards democracy. The preconditions for the final step do not exist, the actors are the armed forces and society and the educational relation does not exist. An effect on democracy cannot be obtained.

**Conclusion**

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the argument that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive effect on democracy actually represents two extremes of a causal chain. I have discussed the literature, the proponents and the critics in three categories, using the generic model to structure the discussion. The main purpose of this exercise was to shed light on the argument of FMA and lay the foundation for a critical analysis of the argument. But what is actually up and what is down in this argument when it comes to the effect of FMA on democracy? In the table below, I have summed up the main arguments previously presented. So far the discussion has indicated three central hubs around which the argument revolves, both for proponents as well as critics of FMA. These hubs were presented in the three steps towards democracy earlier on, and each hub represents some preconditions, some actors and some relations, which either are fulfilled or not, depending on the theoretical approach applied.
Furthermore, and equally interesting, is the indication that the altruistic dimension in professionalism seems to play an important role in understanding professionalism, either through recognizing or denying its

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| The process of professionalization must address technical as well as cultural issues. It is about changing the military culture as Ouédraogo emphasizes. The increasing level of professionalism may reduce the risk of coups and thereby provide “breathing space” for the process of democratization.**48** | Military cooperation is not for the benefit of the receiving country. It’s a cover up for addressing own interests. Klingman questions the US motive in Africa, arguing that rather than focusing on the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts needed in Africa, the US is pursuing its own strategic economic interests and balancing the increasing presence from China.**49** | The basic motivation for engaging in FMA programs and the beneficial

| The military must be utilized for the benefit of society and arrive at voluntary subordination. This is achieved either by increasing military meritocratic values alone (Huntington), and/or by developing altruistic values as well (Janowitz). In 2014 Houngnikpo suggested that the military must appear as a legitimate security institution under political control. | According to McBride, the military intervenes in political affairs mainly for reasons of personal greed, being motivated by the gains they access once the coup has been effectively carried out. As such, McBride minimizes the possibility of military interventions in political affairs leading to a democratic development of the country. | Can the military be utilized for the benefit of society and arrive at voluntary, democratic subordination through the process of professionalization? (Altruistic dimension)

| The Army can turn from an instrument of repression promoting its own interest, or that of the ruler, to a vanguard of nationalism and social reform, argues Manfred Halpern. In general, the point made by “modernists” is that the army, due to its discipline, training, organizational structure and technological know-how, can take on the role as front-runner in the effort of modernizing a society. | Robert A. Price addresses the inconsistency in the theoretical understanding of the military as a modernizer and the empirical facts on the ground. The military lacks the ability to mobilize popular sentiment around collective development goals. The military as the popular and professional instrument from which a society’s transformation towards democracy is doubtful mostly because of a general mistrust amongst the surrounding society. | The military’s ability to escape the general mistrust and mobilize popular sentiment around collective development goals and move society towards democracy? (Altruistic dimension)

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existence. This study tests the hypothesis that Foreign Military Assistance has a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization in Kenya. To structure the coming endeavor to arrive at my own answer, I will during the following sections set up the theoretical framework for my work. First, I will introduce a theoretical foundation that expands on the pros and cons in the discussion so far. Second, I will pre-operationalize the theoretical framework into a preliminary analytical tool, and third I will discuss and choose a suitable case as an empirical setting for the study. Finally I will engage in a detailed operationalization, determining the general structure and chapters for the study as a whole.

Theoretical Starting Point
Sociology is the science or study of the origin, development, organization, and functioning of human society, i.e., the science of the fundamental laws of social relations, institutions etc. Sociology often provides the analytical framework for the study of human social relationships and institutions involving the state, the divisions of race and social class and social stability. Keeping in mind that this study also focuses on socio-economic dynamics and the alleged effect on various governmental institutions, including the military, sociology readily constitutes the most suitable theoretical perspective for this study. However, sociology has expanded its academic field lately, adding the already quite large field of classic sociology (Durkheim, Weber and Marx), in both discipline and methodology; suddenly everything seems to fit in somehow. Thus, some delimitation of this discipline is necessary. One of the new-won territories is actually military sociology. Military sociology aims at the systematic study of the military as a social entity rather than a traditional military organization. Since the classical approaches, mentioned earlier in the discussion on the new civil-military perspective, tend to view the military as an isolated and homogeneous institution that is either controlled by society or that develops society, military sociology readily constitutes the most suitable theoretical perspective for this study. Combining the need in this project for specific knowledge on state formation, democracy and military sociology, the field of scholars quickly narrows down to very few, among whom Charles Tilly protrudes. As we shall see, Professor Charles Tilly’s theoretical understanding practically encompasses the whole CMR debate as presented above in a very useful and constructive way. Professor Charles Tilly was an American sociologist, political scientist and historian who wrote mainly on the relationship between society and politics. Tilly’s academic work covered multiple topics involving the study of politics, social relations and state formation, but he also dealt with military subjects. In the

54 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sociology
argumentation of the development of the nation state in Europe, which he suggested was partly a military innovation, Charles Tilly\textsuperscript{55} argued that military technology in pre-modern Europe made war extremely expensive. As a consequence, only states with a sufficient amount of capital and a relatively large population to tax could afford to pay for the cost of the armed forces; a very interesting perspective, especially in the light of the development of African armies in general and Foreign Military Assistance in particular.

In the same book, Tilly suggests three “main possibilities” for the military to challenge civilian power and eventually seize control of a society. A military coup is of course a less desirable outcome, seen from an FMA point of view, but this counter position to the objective of FMA is helpful when discussing and defining the theoretical framework of this study, since it also draws on the impact from the contextual dynamics. Furthermore, and very important, within these three main possibilities for military coups raised by Tilly, we practically find the whole FMA debate as presented earlier. Let me expand on the connection between the perspectives (the three steps) just presented with the generic model and Tilly’s main possibilities by giving a short presentation of the implication in relation to the literature.

Figure 12 (1) This model illustrates how Tilly’s three “main possibilities” for the military to challenge civilian control and eventually seize control of the society can be applied to the generic model as presented earlier.

The first perspective presented earlier on the FMA argument concerned the first phase of the generic model that aligns itself with Tilly’s first main implication, which he refers to as “external military support”. As we already know, the group of scholars that focuses on this part of the FMA argument consists of Howe 2001, Ouédraogo 2013 and Blair 2014, but also Steven Klingman (2012) and Adam Branch (2012), being strong critics,

belong here. The second perspective presented earlier on the FMA argument concerned the central part of the generic model and aligns with Tilly’s second main implication, which he refers to as “minimization of negotiation between citizen and state”. This implication emphasizes the discussion on how a society benefits from the military but at the same time manages to avoid a potential takeover by the military. The dominant group of scholars addressing the “Problematique” consists of Huntington 1957, Janowitz 1960, Feaver 1996 and Houngnikpo 2014 but also McBride (2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2007) add value to the understanding of this part. The third and last perspective presented earlier on the FMA argument is concerned with the last part of the generic model and aligns with Tilly’s third main implication, which he refers to as the “failure of civil institutions”. This implication is in particular engaged in the discussion of how society can benefit from the military institution as a frontrunner, and how the army can turn from an instrument of repression pursuing its own interest into a vanguard of nationalism and social reform. The dominant group of scholars in the modernization track consists of Andreski 1957, Finer 1962, Halpern1963 and Zoltan 2014 and, of course, we find that the critique by Robert A. Price fits in here, as well. Although the illustration above signal a “clear cut” separation of the literature and the FMA related perspectives, a detailed review of the perspectives will naturally reveal some overlapping argumentation. As such, the illustration is only indicative and presents the main trends in the current FMA debate. In the following discussion, I will shed more light on the three main possibilities for military coups brought forward by Tilly, and seek to lay the groundwork for a theoretical framework suitable for answering the questions raised in this study. I discuss the different perspectives in the opposite sequence as compared to Tilly, since the sequence will thereby follow the chapters presented in the study later on.

Failure of Civilian Institutions
The first main possibility for a military takeover that Tilly mentions is the “failure of civilian institutions”. He argues that weak or insufficient, civil institutions encourage the military to seize power. Primarily, he builds his argument on research done by John Samuel Fitch56 in the ‘70s. The basic point made by Fitch is that the military is prone to act on institutional failure57 that directly or indirectly threatens military institutional interests. Personal ambitions might influence the decisions to launch a military takeover, but personal ambitions are far from being dominant. We

57 Ibid. Issues like public disorder, violation of the constitution etc.
recognize the argumentation from the debate in step 3 in the process of successful FMA democratization. Strong civil institutions will, according to Tilly, increase the military’s ability to escape general mistrust and mobilize popular sentiment around collective development goals and move society towards democracy. Apparently, the military must develop altruistic as well as meritocratic capacities. If not, then directing FMA towards countries with weak democratic institutions and traditions could possibly weaken rather than strengthen democracy. According to Tilly, there is then no guarantee that FMA, of any kind, would support the democratic transition. This increases our focus on civil institutions. To what extent are the civil institutions, in general, and democracy, in particular, robust enough to keep the military under democratic control, or even learn from it? If a country is undergoing a democratic transition, as many countries in Africa are, how far along is it and how suitable and robust is the democratic institution? To what extent do the socio-economic conditions affect the democratic transition? To increase the probability of FMA succeeding, the recipient country apparently must acquire a minimum level of democracy. A democratic identity must thus be provided.

Minimization of Negotiation between State and Citizen

The second main possibility of a military takeover that Tilly presents is the “minimization of negotiation between state and citizen”. The process of negotiation and containment of the military that occurred widely in the West may not be occur because states acquire their military means from great powers outside the state, in return for commodities or political subordination, Tilly argues. Focusing on the relation between the state and primarily the military institution and the citizen is central to understanding the process of professionalization. For the military to have any impact on the process of democratization, the citizen must develop trust in and acceptance of the armed forces. A profession must acknowledge its social responsibility and promote it by making it a moral obligation for the members of that given profession. Only then can the community and the profession engaged in a social exchange, in which the community gives back autonomy, self-regulation and status to the profession. Again we recognize the point from the FMA debate’s step two: Can the military be utilized for the benefit of society and arrive at the voluntary democratic subordination through professionalization? Again the military must develop altruistic as well as meritocratic capacities in their process of professionalizing the armed forces. If not, FMA risks damaging the social relation between the military and the citizen, negatively inflicting on the

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social exchange necessary in the process of professionalization. Following Tilly’s second hypothetical process, the second step to uncover any effect coming from FMA must be a thorough mapping of the armed forces’ professional position in Kenya. What is the military’s professional position in society? How do the socio-economic variables affect the social exchange necessary in the process of professionalization? The Professional Military Position must be known.

External Support for the Military
The last main possibility for the military to take over that Tilly suggests is “external support for the military”. More precisely, he argues that the disproportionate military assistance given by outside powers to third world military organizations might be lending those organizations extra strength vis-à-vis their competitors within their own states. Radical critics of American military assistance programs often articulate that explanation. There is no universal definition of FMA and, basically, FMA has to be understood as everything from providing financial budget support to engaging in more ambitious political partnerships involving strategic defense planning and military education. Furthermore, some programs claim to support democracy and some do not.

For the third time, we recognize the argumentation from the FMA debate’s step one presented earlier. What is the basic motivation for engaging in FMA programs and who benefits from the programs? The programs that I, at least from a theoretical point of view, estimate to have the highest democratic effect are the ones with the highest value-based, service-oriented content. Therefore, if military-to-military relations (FMA) are meant to support the military in professionalization and serve as important first step catalysts in the democratic transition, then the bulk of the programs executed must at least have elements of potential altruistic support imbedded. FMA programs initiated only to safeguard own national interest are prone to challenge the balance of power on a national as well as a regional level, regardless of the content of the program.

Disproportionately, FMA could create a situation best described as the “security dilemma”, known from the realist tradition of international relations theory. In the effort to create stability and eventually development, the aggregate build-up of military capacities is increasingly perceived as a threat and eventually the opposite effect of increasing security is created.

To finalize the quest for answering the question raised in this study, the


60 Se chapter five, Military, Assistance and Africa
motivation behind the nature and content of the contemporary FMA programs must be examined.

Preliminary Operationalization
On the backdrop of the discussion of Tilly’s three main possibilities for the military to challenge civilian control and eventually seize control of a society, I have established a preliminary operationalization model that addresses the theoretical implications for the FMA programs. Later, I will develop the research design around this preliminary operationalization model. However, so far it is clear that this study must examine the effect of FMA in a contextual view, in three main parts, each representing a necessary piece in the analytical framework. The three main parts in the analytical framework are, not surprisingly, civil institutions, the military and FMA. On the issue of civil institutions, I focus on the fundamental variables of democracy and the ability to include all stakeholders in the democratic process. My purpose is to get a strong indicator for where democratic support (FMA) should be directed. Second, on the issue of the armed forces, who are the recipients of the FMA, I focus on the existence of professionalism or the “Professional Military Position (PMP)”, as I call it, and to which extent the military is socially accepted and consequently able to positively influence the democratic transition. Third and last, I analyze the content and evaluate the professionalizing effect of selected FMA programs. By categorizing the different programs, I investigate to what extent they address the socio-economic insufficiencies mentioned, and consequently evaluate their ability to support professionalization.

Before addressing further work on the research design and preliminary model of operationalization, I will turn towards the case from which I intend to establish my empirical foundation. The primary reason for this is that further operationalization of the theoretical approach, more or less, depends on the case to provide a sufficient level of detail. In the following section, I will introduce Kenya as my choice of case and discuss the theoretical challenges involving the single case study.

The Kenya Case
The Single Case Study
Before looking further into the substance of the specific Kenya case and the different perspectives it offers to the analysis, it is perhaps a fruitful exercise to have a closer look at why a single case study is chosen and what the case study can offer. As mentioned above, this study tests the hypotheses that Foreign Military Assistance has a positive effect on the process of democratization in Kenya. From a methodical point of view,
FMA then becomes the independent variable (x) and the democratization of Kenya makes up the dependent variable (y). Between these two variables, a third intervening variable (z) occurs which establishes a link between (x) and (y). That intervening variable is the professionalization of the armed forces. Every scientist’s ultimate objective is to establish as high a level of trustworthiness as possible, and the single case study as a research design has been exposed to some criticism over time. Flyvbjerg\(^{61}\) summarizes, and rejects, the five most common criticisms of the single case study. Among these, the most severe charges are: the alleged missing opportunity to generalize from a single case; the missing ability for hypotheses testing; and the imbedded bias. Following this critical approach to validate or invalidate the hypotheses, the most logical choice would then be a multi-case design to strengthen the conclusion and increase the ability to generalize as much as possible. Furthermore, in a predominantly experimental approach, it would be preferable if full control over all variables were established in order to demonstrate that with all other variables held constant, the variation in the independent variable is traceable in the dependent variable.\(^{62}\) In this study, following this logic would consequently mean that a relatively large number of countries should have been selected for testing, and the experimental research design should have been applied on all countries. However, the single case study actually offers an equally useful alternative research methodology. I shall comment on the most important reasons for why this is the case.

In this study, the understanding and defining of the term “case” is central to the argument for choosing the single case study. In medical research, for instance, a case could be an isolated laboratorial experiment in a well-prepared and fixed line-up, having all variables under control and even sometimes the ability to manipulate relevant variables. Testing, for instance, the effect of drugs on animals can be done in multiple cases with only very little adjustment as soon as the right line-up has been established. When the case is a country, the situation is completely different. A country is obviously a complex case, and the conditions for testing differ considerably from country to country. Furthermore, controlling, not to mention manipulating, variables are extremely difficult.

\(^{61}\) Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006), Five misunderstandings about Case Study Research, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 219 - 245, SAGE publications

The Quasi-Experimental Design

In cases where this controlled experimental environment is not possible, like this study, the single case study, according to Baxter and Jack, offers a valid solution to alternative research methodology. Case studies can be considered when the possibility for manipulation is low, if contextual conditions are believed to impact on the phenomenon and boundaries between context and phenomenon are ambiguous. In this study, all three conditions are fulfilled. By carefully choosing the case and by emphasizing selected research essentials we can obtain what is called a quasi-experimental design. Case selection and selected research essentials do not completely eliminate the weaknesses as pointed out by Flyvbjerg and Campbell. However, especially the research essentials “allow the study to arrive at stronger conclusions” than would otherwise be possible without them. There is no universal rule or prescription for selecting a single case, however, Flyvbjerg advises looking for the “most likely” or the “least likely” case when looking for the critical case. By using the term “most likely” or the “least likely” Flyvbjerg refers to cases likely to either clearly confirm or irrefutably falsify propositions and hypotheses. In this study I will be testing the hypothesis that Foreign Military Assistance has a positive effect on the process of democratization in Kenya. If I can test this hypothesis against a “most likely” case and still not positively verify the hypothesis, I can reject the hypothesis as false. A most likely case must thus comprise optimal conditions for the hypothesis. In this study a high level of FMA and a relatively successful democratic transition is essential to the case selection. Besides selecting the critical case, research essentials must be identified in order to increase the validity. In this study, the method of triangulation forms the headline when identifying the research essentials. Triangulation, according to Campbell is when observation “through separate vantage points can be matched as reflecting the same object”. Triangulation is directly related to data collection and especially

63 Baxter and Jack, (2008) Qualitative Case Study: Study Design and implementation for Novice Researchers, Mac Master University, The Qualitative Report Vol. 13, No. 4
64 In this case research essentials could be “level of democracy” and level of foreign military assistance
65 Ibid. p. 339
66 Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006), Five misunderstandings about Case Study Research, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 219 - 245, SAGE publications
67 Campbell, Donald T. (1975) “Degrees of Freedom” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.8, No.2, SAGE publications
68 Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006), Five misunderstandings about Case Study Research, Qualitative Inquiry, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 219 - 245, SAGE publications
69 Ibid. p.231
70 Campbell, Donald T. (1975) “Degrees of Freedom” Comparative Political Studies, Vol.8, No.2, SAGE publications
stressing the variation in the method of collection. Pieces of data from different sources are converged in the analysis to establish a greater understanding of the phenomenon. \footnote{Baxter and Jack, (2008) Qualitative Case Study: Study Design and implementation for Novice Researchers, Mac Master University, The Qualitative Report Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 554} Further detail on the triangulation follows in the section “Research Design and Methodology”. Let us now have a further look into the substance of the specific Kenya case and the different perspectives it offers to the analysis.

**The Regional Hegemon**

East Africa viewed from a security perspective is one of the most fragile regions in Africa. Land borders are disputed and several unresolved conflicts affect the everyday lives of millions of people. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Congo all have interrelated and ongoing disagreements, which from time to time flare up in violent conflicts. In The Bay of Aden, the international shipping industry is experiencing severe problems with piracy, a problem, which clearly relates to the unresolved conflicts in East Africa. Added to these factors are the consequences of natural disasters, which renders East Africa a fragile region with a noticeable need for help. However, looking at East Africa from a broad security perspective, one quickly realizes that Kenya is the regional superpower, and thus a trendsetter in the region when it comes to security. Most significant are the economic and the military tracks. Since 1963 Kenya has built itself into a regional economic powerhouse. Even if growth rates\footnote{See chapter 2 for detailed information on growth in Kenya.} in 2012 have revealed a slight drop to, Kenya is still East Africa’s biggest economy. Trade in East Africa, to a large extent, involves Mombasa Harbor. That leaves Kenya as an economic driver of liberal economic reforms that both directly and indirectly (East African Community) affect the rest of the countries in the region. Furthermore, since 1996 the Kenyan Armed Forces have received extensive military training, thereby enlarging their military capacity considerably. Kenya hosts the East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM), and Kenya has, with support from UK, trained one (out of three) Rapid Deployment Capabilities (RDC), a unit that fulfills an essential role in establishing the EASF reaction force. Since September 11, 2001, Kenya has also strengthened its position as a regional hegemon by attracting international attention. From Washington’s point of view, Kenya today is considered to be at the forefront in the global war on terror in East Africa. Last but not least, the government of Kenya has with the October 2011 invasion of Kismayo (Somalia) shown that it is both willing and
capable of using military force when it comes to protecting national interests. That leaves Kenya in a leading role when regional security is discussed and, consequently, it makes Kenya an interesting case selection.

The Unique Combination
To support the argument as presented, not all regions in Africa provide the optimal conditions. However, the combination of the East African region and Kenya seems to be unique in the sense that we have a country that is a recipient of a substantial amount of FMA\(^{73}\) and very well underway in its democratic transition.\(^{74}\) This is, of course, important because without one of the two variables, the effect of FMA cannot be established. Furthermore, if a positive effect of FMA is not traceable in this relatively reasonable democratic transition in Kenya, then it is hard to imagine FMA having an effect anywhere else. Metaphorically speaking, if the crop cannot grow in the most fertile ground, where can it grow? Thus, this dissertation draws empirical data from the study of Kenya for two decisive reasons: the first is that a relatively stable and forward moving democratic transition is taking place; and the second is that a considerable amount of foreign military assistance is involved.

Democratic Transition and Foreign Military Assistance in Kenya
Let me elaborate a bit further on these two variables and clarify the selection of this case. First, the number of countries in Africa in democratic transition is increasing and the countries in transition are becoming more democratic. The number of elections held in recent years has increased over the years. African democracy appears to have flourished and the holding of elections has become commonplace,\(^{75}\) accentuating Ghana in west, South Africa in the south and Kenya in the east. Thus, in an East

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\(^{75}\) According to “The Democracy Index”, which is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, the average democracy rating for sub-Saharan countries is slowly increasing. (http://www.economist.com)
African context, Kenya has taken the idea of democracy to a relatively higher level than her neighbors, although great challenges still lay ahead.  

Three milestones in that process are worth noticing, the introduction of the multi-party system from 1992, the passing of the new constitution in 2010 and the initiation of the process of devolution as a consequence of the election in 2013. Second, since 1996 the Kenyan Armed Forces have received extensive military training and financial support and, thereby, enlarged their military capacity considerably. Kenya is now in the top five global recipients of State Department (US) security assistance. Kenya is an active partner to the US in military-to-military programs like IMET and ACOTA. Still further, Kenya is hosts the East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and Kenya has, with support from the UK, trained one (out of three) Rapid Deployment Capabilities (RDC), a unit that fulfills an essential role in establishing the EASF reaction force. The combination of East Africa and Kenya therefore seems to be a unique case for testing to which extent, if any at all, there is a connection between the substantial amount of FMA given to Kenya and the democratic transition. Having argued for Kenya as the best case for this study, I now turn towards finalizing the operationalization.

Final Operationalization and Coherence of the Study
I find my starting point for finalizing the operationalization, as mentioned earlier, in three propositions made by Tilly. They are used as a contextual analytical framework in which the propositions serve as headlines as well as analytic guidance. The project is generally arranged in three steps, where the two first steps together provide a precondition for the third step. The first step is to establish a democratic identity of Kenya. Following Tilly’s first out of three hypothetical processes, the first step to uncover any effect coming from FMA must thus be a thorough mapping of the democratic landscape in Kenya. Exactly where Kenya is in its democratic transition and what kind of weaknesses and strengths occur? How do the socio-economic variables affect the transition? For that purpose, in chapter 3, I establish Kenya’s democratic identity. Following Tilly’s second

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76 International Crises Group: However, the conflict drivers that triggered the 2007 bloodshed, including a culture of impunity, land grievances, corruption, ethnic tensions, weak institutions and regional and socio-economic inequality, have yet to be addressed adequately.


78 International Military Education and Training (IMET), Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA).
hypothetical processes, the second step is to uncover any effect coming from FMA by mapping of the military’s professional position in Kenya. What is the military’s professional position in society? How do the socio-economic variables affect the professional position? For that purpose, in chapter 4, I establish the professional military position of the KDF. The last step, still following Tilly’s third hypothetical processes, is to uncover any effect from the ongoing FMA program in Kenya. Do contingency and ongoing FMA programs comprise elements of potential support to professionalization? For that purpose, in chapter 5, I categorize and uncover the democratic potential of current FMA programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibilities for Military Coups (Tilly)</th>
<th>Implication for FMA programs</th>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure of civil Institutions Weak or insufficient civil institutions encourage the military to seize power</td>
<td>Directing FMA towards countries with weak democratic institutions and traditions is prone to weaken rather than strengthen democracy</td>
<td>Chapter 3 Exactly where is Kenya in its democratic transition? What kind of weaknesses and strengths are present, and how do they affect the transition?</td>
<td>Establishing Kenya’s democratic Identity by three years of surveys (KDI survey). Supported by interviews with people from NGOs, civil society and literature on democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimization of negotiation between state and citizen If states in a region acquire their military means from external great powers, the military has the potential to direct its loyalty away from the state and towards the provider.</td>
<td>FMA is prone to weaken rather than strengthen the social relation between the military and the people. That impacts negatively on the social exchange necessary in the process of professionalization</td>
<td>Chapter 4 What is the military’s professional position in society? How do weaknesses and strengths occur and how do they affect the transition?</td>
<td>Establishing the professional military position by two years of surveys (ACOTA sample) Supported by interviews with military personnel and literature on professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External support for the military Disproportionate military assistance given by outside powers to the military in partner countries increases the risk that the militaries can turn toward their own states.</td>
<td>FMA programs initiated to safeguard own national interest are prone to challenge the balance of power on a national, as well as a regional, level</td>
<td>Chapter 5 What is the basic motivation for FMA? Do contingency and ongoing FMA programs comprise elements of potential professionalizing support?</td>
<td>Supported by interviews with military personnel and accessible literature on FMA programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Matrix above presents the coherence of the study, beginning with the theoretical starting point, continuing over to the implications and research
question, and ending with methodology. Below is a graphic presentation and the overall structure of the study.

CHAPTER ONE
FMA as Global Tool to Enhance Democracy
The Alleged Causal Chain
The Theoretical Starting Point
The Kenya Case
Operationalization
Research Design
Methodology

CHAPTER TWO
Socio-Economic Context of Kenya

CHAPTER THREE
Kenya’s Democratic Identity

CHAPTER FOUR
The Professional Military Position

CHAPTER FIVE
FMA Programmes in Kenya
Research Design and Methodology

Qualitative Research
This project is in its general methodology comparable to the classical deductive approach in qualitative studies. First I establish a hypothesis from a theoretical point of departure, and then I proceed by testing the hypothesis against empirical data.\(^{79}\) In the following, I will lay out a more detailed description of the methodology pursued in this study. Whether one is working with measurement of democracy or professionalism, neither is a straightforward measurable phenomenon, and when it comes to measuring the level of interaction between different institutions during a process of democratization, in this case the democracy and the military, it does not get easier. Both democracy and professionalism as institutions involve people’s social consciousness, and for a social scientist it is the social relations between them that hold the relevant information. From a research point of view, that has an extensive impact on the condition for collecting relevant empirical data in a social context. Social scientists employ a range of methods in order to analyze a vast scope of social phenomena spanning survey data derived from numerous individuals to the in-depth analysis of a single social experiences. To increase both internal and external validity, social scientists will commonly combine quantitative and qualitative approaches as part of a joint strategic research design. Questionnaires (surveys), fieldwork and data collection and observations are some of the measurement techniques used.

The Method of Triangulation
Providing sufficient and reliable empirical data for any kind of study is a process often restricted by the lack of resources and thus leads to a limitation of the research design. However, using for instance only one method in collecting data can be problematic. A way of trying to mitigate the inexpedient parts of this situation and to put more quality in to qualitative research is to use the method of triangulation.\(^{80}\) The idea of triangulation, as described by Uwe Flick, is basically to have more than one perspective on a single issue when designing the research scheme. But also the use of different theoretical approaches and the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is within the field of triangulation. By engaging the subject from multiple angels, the possibility of a higher level

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\( ^{80} \) Ibid p. 444 - 445
of validity\textsuperscript{81}, within the specific measurement, is likely to increase. Also from a theoretical point of view, the idea of using different theoretical approaches will also be involved; however, the differentiation is also limited to each chapter. To increase reliability\textsuperscript{82} in general I will, in the beginning of each chapter, present and discuss the exact theoretical starting point and the methodical considerations, hereby how the use of different methods interacts and support the investigation guided by the research design.

**Data Availability, Collection and Usability**
As already mentioned, this study is in its general methodology comparable with the classical deductive approach to qualitative studies. My sources of data will originate from mainly three areas. The first source is the use of surveys. The second source is interviews with relevant actors, and the collection of written observations, and the third source is relevant litterateur (statistics, reports, articles and books) addressing relevant issues. In this study all mentioned sources of data occur, however, own surveys are primarily limited to chapter 3 and 4. I will use the following paragraph to comment on limitations and opportunities in data availability, method of collection and usability for mainly chapter 3 and 4, since they use own data most extensively.

**General Selection Criteria**
But before I go into details about each single source of data, and to avoid the previous mentioned selection bias\textsuperscript{83}, I would like to shortly address the general selection criteria for the data obtained in connection with the surveys done in the thesis. Not because surveys in general are more important, but because my specific surveys constitute my own main contribution to my argument and background information are not available elsewhere. About surveys in general, to provide an absolute accurate profile on democracy, professionalism or other similar subjects is an almost impossible task. Establishing an accurate “democratic identity”\textsuperscript{84} in Kenya for instance, would require that every voter has had a chance (greater than zero) of being selected in the sample, and this probability can be accurately

\textsuperscript{81} Validity refers to the degree to which a study accurately reflects or assesses the specific concept that the researcher is attempting to measure.

\textsuperscript{82} Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same result on repeated trials.

\textsuperscript{83} Selection bias is the selection of individuals, groups or data for analysis in such a way that proper randomization is not achieved, and consequently the sample obtained is not representative of the population intended to be analyzed.

\textsuperscript{84} See chapter 3 for a detailed explanation on the meaning of democratic identity.
determined. Likewise, establishing an accurate “professional military position”\textsuperscript{85} of the KDF would require that every soldier has had a chance of being selected in the sample. Instead the frequently used idea of a “representative” sample is introduced in this thesis. When for instance conducting election polls, this technic is recurrently used. In statistical sampling the concern is with the selection of a given number of individuals, from which a statistical population to estimate characteristics of the whole population, can be chosen.\textsuperscript{86} In slightly different terms, the chosen voters in an election poll “represent” all voters in the country. However, the problem with this method is, that an incorrect selection may result in a sample that doesn’t represent the whole population. For instance, a random sample of a hundred people from a given country will on average produce fifty men and fifty women, but in many cases one sex will be overrepresented. In the same way elections polls can misrepresent one or several political parties. The phenomenon is called selection bias and refers to a sample obtained which is not representative of the population intended to be analyzed. To mitigate the selection, weights can be applied to the data obtained. Also, by using background information about the voter population in general, this bias can be minimized. Let’s turn towards the details about each single source of data for further information.

**Surveys**

In the following section, I turn towards exposing limitations and opportunities in data availability, method of collection and usability for surveys done in relation to Kenya’s Democratic Identity (KDI) and the Military Professional Position (MPP). Data used primarily in chapter 3 and 4. This study uses “sampling” as described above, as a selection technique and therefore this study is exposed to the risk of selection bias as mentioned. To give the selection of the sample, from which characteristics of the whole population can be estimated the optimal conditions, a number of considerations was done before the general selection criteria where chosen. These criteria for surveys primarily related to chapter 3 and 4 are found in the section below and constitute an absolute possible case of selection. I will in the following argue for the necessary adjustment of the selection that took place.

**Kenya’s Democratic Identity**

At a very early stage in the planning process it became clear, that if the objective of this survey was to measure and present the contemporary democratic condition in Kenya, like we find in indices like Freedom House

\textsuperscript{85} See chapter 4 for a detailed explanation on the meaning of professional military position.

and Economic Intelligence, even with a widespread use of sampling, the task would be to voluminous. The most challenging part would be to cater the desired level of geographical and ethnic distribution. It would demand an equal distribution of samples all over Kenya, and this demand reach way beyond the limited resources available for this thesis. Instead, to create a more manageable basis for conduction the survey, another strategy was chosen. The idea was to look for dominating trends in the democratic development of Kenya. Trends, that on the one hand was reflecting and impacting the democratic development and on the other hand still was practical manageable in a selection procedure within the framework of this thesis. Arthur K. Smith presented in 1969 a study\textsuperscript{87} suggesting a linear correlation between the degree of political democracy and the development of urbanization, education and communication. Kenya has an interesting development regarding education and urbanization. According to Jesus Crespo Cuaresma\textsuperscript{88}, increasingly more young people reach the secondary educational level. Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) is used for admissions into universities and training at other institutions of higher education in the technical and vocational stream.

![Figure 2. Educational Development in Kenya since 1970, Source: Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, Vienna University.](image)

If Arthur K. Smith is right about a linear correlation between the degree of political democracy and the development of education, young people in the educational system become increasingly more influential on the democratic development and therefore, to a large extent, they become representative


\textsuperscript{88} Director of Economic Analysis and Team Leader "Economic Returns to Education" Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital
for the of contemporary democracy and its future development. The second trend I find having impact on democracy and still at the same time presents a manageable profile is urbanization, as a consequence of inequality. Inequality and the consequences for Kenya is carefully discussed in chapter 2, however the urbanization is worth accentuating.

![Population Growth](chart.png)

Figure 1. According to the 2010 revision of the World Population Prospects, the total population in Kenya was 40,513,000 in 2010 compared to only 6,077,000 in 1950. Source: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/

The number of poor people in Kenya is increasing. Even though Kenya since 2000 has improved its position on the Human Development Index (HDI UNDP) and now ranking 145 (out of 185), the factual increase in population growth more than evens out the slight improvement in HDI. Nearly half of the country's 45 million people live below the poverty line.

![Rural vs Urban](chart2.png)

Figure 3. Most of Kenya’s population growth will be urban from 2033. Source [http://www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org). This is a development that feeds directly into the process of urbanization. People increasingly move towards cities Like Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu in the quest for jobs and social services, but most likely they end up living in deep poverty in slum areas like Kibera, which is commonly

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89 Rural Poverty Portal, https://www.ifad.org
known as the largest slum in Africa. Again, If Arthur K. Smith is right about a linear correlation between the degree of political democracy and urbanization, young people in the urban slum become increasingly more influential on the democratic development and therefore, to a large extent, they also become representative for contemporary democracy and its future development.

**General Selection Criteria, Kenya’s Democratic Identity (KDI)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Educational Sample</th>
<th>Urban Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Confidence Level</td>
<td>It is widely accepted, also within social science, that a 95% level of confidence in surveys is sufficient.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Statistical Uncertainty</td>
<td>The level of statistical uncertainty is depending on the number of respondents.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of Respondents</td>
<td>A sample size of no less than 384 is desirable. That will keep the statistic uncertainty below 5%.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Age Distribution</td>
<td>The desired level in age distribution is limited according to the age of voting. The desired age level is at least 18 years. Equal distribution among high, middle and low age.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Geographic Distribution</td>
<td>The desired level of geographical distribution is as wide as possible. Equal distribution of samples all over Kenya.</td>
<td>Maseno University, Kisumu</td>
<td>Baba Dogo, Nairobi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Social Class</td>
<td>The desired level of social class is equal distribution among middle to high and low.</td>
<td>Middle to high</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Gender Distribution</td>
<td>The desired level of gender distribution is 50/50. Equal distribution among men and women.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Level of Education</td>
<td>The desired level of education is divided to medium and little or no education.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Little or no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ethnic Relations</td>
<td>To avoid any ethnic bias, the desired ethnic blend must be as wide as possible.</td>
<td>Same</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summing up on this, the idea was to look for dominating trends that on the one hand was reflecting and impacting the democratic development and on the other hand still was practical manageable in a selection procedure. These analyses lead to the establishment of two different types of samples. One sample focusing on young people in the educational system since they represent an increasing segment with potential influence on democracy, and one sample focusing on the increasing number of poor people living in urban slum, also an increasing segment with potential influence on democracy. In the table above the chosen general selection criteria is presented. I will now turn toward the discussion of the single set of surveys.

**KDI 2013**

The KDI survey was done once a year (February) for a period of three years. The survey has been developed on the basis of general experience from 2013. Survey number 1 in 2013 was composed by three small samples. Two samples were established in accordance with the selection criteria and one extra sample as an attempt to target the middleclass. Sample number 1 was conducted in relation to a civic education event.
Around 63 persons were present; I handed out 44 questionnaires and got back 33. After deselecting five answers for irregularities, 28 were found valid. The survey was done in mid-January in a slum area in Nairobi called Baba Dogo. The area is ethnically mixed but with a Luo dominance. Gender balance is by counting estimated close to 50%. Baba Dogo is an informal settlement in Nairobi’s Eastland area, and was among the slum areas affected during the post-election violence in 2007-08. With high levels of poverty, unemployment, and insecurity among its younger population, the youth in this particular area played a major role in the chaos that played out during the election in 2007, leading the gangs that caused much of the looting and riots.90

Survey number 2 was uploaded on Facebook available to answer on mobile or computer platforms on January 10 and closed down on February 12, 2015. Fifty-seven replied and 12 answers were incomplete. Forty-five answers were valid. I saw an opportunity to partly draw on the support that I could get from the NGO that I was working for and I was allowed to use Ni sisi’s (an NGO) private network on Facebook for targeting the assumed “Kenyan middle class”. Since Facebook was used as a platform, the respondent’s data are mostly unknown. However, it was launched among friends working in the NGO and that indicates a strong possibility for the respondents being at the middle class level.

Survey number 3 was done in early February. During my fieldwork, I was allowed to run my survey with the students at Maseno University (Kisumu). The survey was handed out to an unknown number of students (around 200) and 190 valid answers were returned. Students at the Maseno University include ethnic (geographic) representatives from all over Kenya, however a slight majority of Luo can be expected. Gender balance is by counting estimated close to 50%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents (Surveys)</th>
<th>Number of Respond.</th>
<th>Age Distribution</th>
<th>Geographic Distribution</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Gender Distribution</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KDI 2013 Nairobi S</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18-55 years</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed but Luo+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDI 2013 Nairobi M</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Middle/High</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDI 2013 Kisumu</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>19-22 years</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Middle/low</td>
<td>App. 50%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Mixed but Luo+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>264</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey in 2013 did not fulfill two important requirements regarding sample size and missing background information. The statistical uncertainty for the survey in 2013 is higher than desired (between 4,9% and 6%), primarily due to the low number of respondents (264).

90 http://www.sisiniamani.org/what-we-do/where-we-work/nairobi/baba-dogo/
Furthermore, sample number two (Facebook) produces too many unknown factors on background information. Thus, the following adjustments were made in relation to the follow years. To reach an acceptable level of statistical uncertainty for the survey in 2014, the number of respondents was increased by the use of local assistance, and the Facebook approach to respondents was cancelled.

KDI 2014
The second survey in 2014 was adjusted in accordance with sample size and background information as mentioned above. The 2014 survey was then composed of two large samples according to the selection criteria. Sample number one was again conducted in the slum area in Nairobi called Baba Dogo, an informal settlement in Nairobi’s Eastland area. The survey was handed out to local people in the area during a period of approx. 4 weeks and 303 valid answers were returned. Sample number two was again done in early February on the campus of Maseno University in Kisumu. The survey was handed out to an unknown number of students (around 1,000) and 993 valid answers were returned. Students at the Maseno University include ethnic (geographic) representatives from all over Kenya, however a slight majority of Luo can be expected. Gender balance is by counting estimated close to 50%. The statistical uncertainty for the survey in 2014 is low (between 2% and 2.7%) primarily due to the high number of respondents (1296).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents (Surveys)</th>
<th>Number of Respond.</th>
<th>Age Distribution</th>
<th>Geographic Distribution</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Gender Distribution</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KDI 2014 Nairobi S</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>18-55 years</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>App. 50%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed but Luo+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDI 2014 Kisumu</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>19-22 years</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Middle/low</td>
<td>App. 50%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Mixed but Luo+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KDI 2015
The third survey in 2015 was done accordance to sample size and background information from 2015. The 2015 survey was like the 2014 survey composed by two large samples. Survey number 1 was for the third time conducted in the slum area in Nairobi called Baba Dogo in Nairobi’s Eastland area. The survey was handed out to local people in the area during a period of approx. 4 weeks and 342 valid answers were returned. Survey number 2 was again done in early February on the campus of Maseno University in Kisumu. The survey was handed out to an unknown number of student (around 1,100) and 1,037 valid answers were returned. Students at the Maseno University include ethnic (geographic) representatives from all over Kenya, however a slight majority of Luo can be expected. Gender balance is by counting estimated close to 50%. The statistical uncertainty
for the survey in 2015 is low (between 2% and 2.7%) primarily due to the high number of respondents (1,379).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents (Surveys)</th>
<th>Number of Respond.</th>
<th>Age Distribution</th>
<th>Geographic Distribution</th>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>Gender Distribution</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KDI 2015 Nairobi S</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>18-55 years</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>App. 50%</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Mixed but Luo+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDI 2015 Kisumu</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>19-22 years</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Middle/low</td>
<td>App. 50%</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Mixed but Luo+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,379</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evaluation**

In general the KDI surveys meet the selection criteria as presented with only two exceptions. First, the KDI 2013 do not meet the desired sample size of no less than 384 respondents, and second the Facebook sample was cancelled because of too many unknown variables. The desired level of statistical uncertainty was kept under 5% in 2014 and 2015. The desired level in age distribution was fulfilled. The desired level of geographical distribution, social class, education and ethnic relation was as wide as possible, however with at slight majority the Lou tribe in both Maseno and Baba Dogo. The desired level of gender distribution of 50/50 was also met.

**The Professional Military Position (PMP)**

If Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization, it must be from a “spillover” from the process of professionalization (chapter 4). The military-to-military cooperation must transfer democratic values from democratic countries’ militaries to non-democratic countries’ militaries, which they eventually will extend to society. To provide empirical knowledge on the professional military position becomes decisive. The primary objective obtained by introducing the idea of a professional military position is the combination of a focused analytical approach in the perception of a military profession. In the beginning of 2013, through the Danish Embassy in Nairobi, I applied for permission to conduct a survey on military professionalism in selected units in KDF. In spite of several efforts made by the Danish Military Attaché in Nairobi, I never got the permission to do the survey. That limitation in access to the KDF had a decisive impact on the attempt to design a reliable sample for the survey on professionalism in KDF. That means that I have been referred to the second best solution and adjust my criteria. In practical terms, that means that my survey and interviews done amongst serving personnel have taken place during US ACOTA training in Embakasi in Nairobi (ACOTA sample). The students attending this course consist of officers from Uganda, Burundi and Kenya. My surveys thus do not exclusively reflect the view of KDF officers, but are consequently likely to express a more regional view. The PMP survey was done once a
year for a period of two years, 2013 and 2015. As an attempt to increase
the empirical data set on military professionalism I did a survey amongst
Army Cadets in Denmark in 2014. 155 students were given the
questionnaire. All students returned a valid questionnaire.

General Selection Criteria, Professional Military Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Confidence Level</td>
<td>It is widely accepted, also within social science, that a 95% level of confidence in surveys is sufficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Statistical Uncertainty</td>
<td>The level of statistical uncertainty is depending on the number of respondents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Number of Respondents</td>
<td>A sample size of no less than 384 is desirable. That will keep the statistic uncertainty below 5%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Age Distribution</td>
<td>Officers with international experience between 22 an 45 years (Captain to Colonel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Geographic Distribution</td>
<td>The desired level of geographical distribution is Kenya, secondly East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Gender Distribution</td>
<td>The typical African military unit has a very low or no women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Level of Education</td>
<td>The desired level of education is a basic officer training to staff officers level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ethnic Relations</td>
<td>To avoid any ethnic bias, the desired ethnic blend must be as wide as possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US ACOTA samples 2013 and 2015
The first survey was done in November 2013 during US ACOTA training in Embakasi in Nairobi. Twenty-three students were attending the four-week course, and I was allowed to hand out the questionnaire. All 23 students returned a valid questionnaire. The second survey was done in February 2015 during US ACOTA training in Embakasi in Nairobi. Thirty-eight students were attending the four-week course, and I was allowed to hand out the questionnaire. All 38 students returned a valid questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Number Respond.</th>
<th>Age Distribution</th>
<th>Geographic Distribution</th>
<th>Gender Distribution</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA 2013</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28-45 years</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>98% male</td>
<td>Basic Officer Training</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA 2015</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28-45 years</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>98% male</td>
<td>Basic Officer Training</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army Cadets Denmark 2014
The last sample was done in May 2014 amongst Army Cadets in Denmark. The purpose of this survey is to validate the argument that the altruistic dimension is more developed in western armies compared to African armies in general. One hundred fifty-five students were given the questionnaire. All 155 students returned a valid questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Number Respond.</th>
<th>Age Distribution</th>
<th>Geographic Distribution</th>
<th>Gender Distribution</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Ethnic Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DANISH ARMY 2014</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>22-26 years</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>85% male</td>
<td>Basic Officers Training</td>
<td>Danish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evaluation
The PMP have to meet a number of general selection criteria, and in
general the PMP surveys meets the selection criteria as proposed. However,
the PMP do not meet the desired sample size of not less than 384
respondents. The desired level of statistical uncertainty is thus not kept
under 5%. Instead the statistical uncertainty is in the area of 15%, which is
a serious problem. The desired level in age distribution is fulfilled. The
desired level of geographical distribution should be Kenya, but the PMP
sample has a more regional profile. The desired level in education
distribution is fulfilled. Ethnic bias is due to the regional perspective low.
The desired level of gender distribution cannot be 50/50 since the gender
distribution in the main population (the army) traditionally finds itself
dominated by males. Consequently, this means that the conclusions drawn
in chapter four on the PMP are based on a weaker statistical base and have
to be considered as indications rather than statistical facts.

Interviews
Regarding accessibility to do interviews I have met almost only practical
limitations, and I have had almost no restrictions on choosing the
respondents in relation to providing data on democracy. I have conducted
the interviews during my fieldwork in Nairobi, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. However, when it came to interviewing within the military
institutions I was either turned down or ignored. As mentioned, that means
that I have been referred to the second best solution, which is interviewing
retired officers and KDF officers doing service outside the national
framework, for instance, in multinational operations. Only U.S. officers
and a few officers from Uganda allowed recording. All officers required
full anonymity, which was provided.
Since an important purpose of the interviews is to support my survey, my
aim was to target respondents according to the same selection criteria used
for the surveys. That would still give the best variation of the variables. To
minimize the bias in the sample in general I use the background interviews.
My interviews were thus guided by one primary purpose in particular, that
is to complement and expand on my surveys. The intension, especially, is
to qualify the questions presented in questionnaires by providing more
detailed and deepening information regarding the answers. Therefore, both
the questions developed for the surveys, as well as the sequencing of
questions during the interview, are identical. This procedure is close to
what is usually addressed as “theory driven coding” or “deductive coding”.
Since my interview strategy is to categorize the respondent’s answers by
subject and consequently permit systematic access to pair these answers to
the survey, I also expose myself to criticism. As pointed out by Richard E.
Boyatzis, the “theory driven code development is probably the most
The frequently used approach in social science research. The researcher begins with the theory of what occurs and then formulates the signals and indicators of evidence that would support this theory. The elements of the code are derived from the hypotheses or the element of the theory. In slightly different terms, by predetermining the structure and the coding of the interview, I reduce the opportunity of discovering “something new”. However, a general trend in structuring and analyzing quantitative research is not possible to establish. Several methodical approaches are observed and there seems to be a broad variety in the methodical argumentation as well. This ambiguity does not in any way eliminate the classic demands to research in general or social research in particular. Nor does it affect this project. A virtue like motivated and transparent methodical choices still increases the validity of the research result, and this demand is fulfilled through this chapter as well as the rest of this project. The theoretical and empirical selection process used during most qualitative work keeps basically the same element as deductive coding. That means that deductive coding (pre-coding) demands the same transparent procedures as, for instance, explicit presentation of the codes theoretical base to obtain a sufficient level of validity. In this project, the relation between the theoretical model and the coding of the interview is argued, clarified and transparent. Therefore, it is possible for anyone to follow the analysis step by step and reconstruct the procedure if necessary.

**Number of Interviews**

In total I have done 43 interviews, 25 of them recorded. All recorded interviews have been transcribed by a local Kenyan, due to difficulties in understanding the sometime challenging language. The guidelines for transcription of interviews (above) are based on the Danish Standard Conventions on transcription, 1992. A transcription converts speech (either live or recorded) into a written or electronic text document. To maintain the highest level of authenticity in this process of transcription, no interpretation of any kind must be applied in the process. The guidelines have been applied to every transcription of recorded interviews.

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93 Guidelines for Transcription of Interviews, (1992) Based on the Danish Standard Conventions on transcription, SNAK, Statens Humanistiske Forskningsråd
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politicians</th>
<th>Civ. Serv.</th>
<th>Social work</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (2)*</td>
<td>1 (7)*</td>
<td>(4)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 (3)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 (2)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not recorded

**Other Sources of Information**

The third main source of data is external empirical data such as scientific surveys (statistics, reports, articles and books) regarding relevant issues. Data availability in the area is, generally speaking, not a problem. Valid empirical analysis on relevant issues is available in several books and articles, as can be seen in the bibliography. This almost concludes my theoretical and methodological considerations in this introductory chapter. I will turn towards the analysis on democracy in Kenya in chapter 3; the professional military position in chapter 4, and the FMA programs in chapter 5. However, the following chapter will continue the introduction and present the socioeconomic background in Kenya to support the analysis.
Chapter Two – The Socioeconomic Context

The Socio-Economic Relation to Governmental Institutions
The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the contextual background on which the democratic and military transition takes place. “Supporting an army with a repressive reputation without addressing the problem and increasing the overall legitimacy is leaving the institution isolated from the rest of the society.” These few lines, spoken by Timothy Parson (1964), firmly indicate that the armed forces in general cannot be viewed as an isolated institution. From the very short statement, at least three questions arise: Who provides support? Why is the army repressive? And how does society increase legitimacy? And furthermore, the statement overall strongly indicates that society has an essential role in shaping various governmental institutions. Bearing in mind that this study primarily focuses on the extent to which the FMA targets the socio-economic dynamics and the alleged effect on the various governmental institutions, including the military, the purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the contextual background on which the democratic and military transition takes place.

As mentioned in chapter one, an accurate analytical framework, suitable for exposing the effect of FMA on democracy, must produce an analysis of both the institution of democracy and the military and their mutual relation to the contemporary socio-economic context. But how is it possible to map the socio-economic context in an applicable way, focusing only on relevant analytical issues? Since the late ‘50s, it has been commonly accepted among scholars that there exists a correlation between social and economic development and democracy. In his article from 1959 Seymour Martin Lipset presents some “social requisites of democracy” and at the same time, moves the sociological approach to embrace society as a whole. According to Lipset, scholars so far have only dealt with the sociological dynamics within various political institutions, such as political parties, governmental institutions etc. In his move of sociological level of analysis, from micro to macro level, he presents two complex characteristics of the social system on which democracy rests, i.e., economic development and legitimacy. In his concluding remarks, Lipset states that democracy is not achieved by acts of will alone, but that men’s will through action can shape

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institutions and events in directions that reduce or increase democracy’s development. In other words, Lipset recognizes that the relationship between the social context and the various institutions in society matters. The following 10 to 15 years offered more suggestions on the particular relationship. In 1969, Arthur K. Smith suggested a causal model of democratic development based on a restructured democratic index. The index classifies and awards 110 states with one to four points according to legislative and executive variables. The study conclusively suggests a linear correlation between the degree of political democracy and the development of urbanization, education and communication. This is a clear passion for Smith, who states that the relationship between the social context and various institutions in society still matters, as presented by Lipset.

The relationship between society and its institutions, such as the military and democracy, has been questioned moderately from time to time. However, the evolutionary approach to democracy has at times been characterized as rigid and narrow-minded, leaving out important details. In 1988 Zehra F. Arat revisited the modernization theoretical perspectives by arguing that especially the longitudinal studies on the relationship between socioeconomic factors and democracy indicate that democracy is not a “one way ladder”, due to the significant variation over time. The argument also paves the way for supplementing explanations on the relationship, other than economic ones. Furthermore, since most of the early studies from the ‘50s and ‘60s came before the end of colonization and during the cold war, one can argue that empirical potential, in an African perspective, was inadequate since it did not, or only marginally, included African countries. In the post-cold war era that condition changed dramatically, and a whole new range of opportunities for collecting empirical data emerged. In the beginning of the ‘90’s Africa as a region reached the highest level of conflicts ever. The post-colonial period revealed new challenges to democratic transition. Even though Kenya itself

96 Neubauer, Deane E. (1967) Some Conditions of Democracy The American Political Science Review Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1002-1009
98 Restructured from Phillip Cutright (1963)
100 Ibid, Conclusion p. 36
managed to avoid civil war, many neighboring countries like Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia went through armed conflicts, which, to a greater or lesser extent, affected Kenya. East Africa today remains one of the most troubled regions in the world.

The relationship between the social context and the various institutions in African society brings new challenges for transitioning to democracy. Ethnicity and religious diversity are frequently mentioned as conflict drivers, but also poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources are mentioned. As the field of plausible explanations on the relationship between the social context and the various institutions, such as democracy increases, the need for new analytical tools follows. The very simplistic approaches from the 60’s, usually with very few variables, no longer capture the complexity of conflict. In 2008 Jarstad presented a highly comprehensive approach for analyzing and understanding the ragged path towards democracy. As pointed out by Jarstad and Sisk the analysis or context-specific assessment of war to democracy transition is needed for theoretical understanding of a given particular context.

In other words, no governmental institution, be it either democracy or the military, can be viewed as an isolated and homogeneous unit completely unaffected by the very context in which it exists. By introducing four transitional dilemmas, Jarstad provides an analytical framework that captures the ever-increasing complex context in a war-to-democracy transition. Although Jarstad primarily focuses on the strategic “crossover” between the process of peace building and democratic transition, the utilization of the framework is wider than that. As mentioned, Kenya did avoid civil war; however, internal conflicts in Kenya, as for instance seen during the post-election violence in 2007, bears great resemblance to civil war and thus awards the framework some justification. In relation to analytically targeting the socio-economic dynamics in Kenya, I find the dilemma described as the “horizontal dilemma” of a particularly interest; it is the dilemma of inclusion or exclusion. As presented by Jarstad, this dilemma concerns the issue of which groups should be represented in the process of peace and democratization. The political elite and the political institutions decide participation in the democratic process, Jarstad argues. I

102 Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000), Why are there so many Civil War in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflicts. Journal of African Economies, Volume 9, Number 3, pp. 244-269
104 Ibid. p. 251.
105 Ibid. p. 21.
agree that inclusion becomes central in democratic transition, and that the political elite or warring parties initially has a paramount influence, for instance, in the negotiation of a peace treaty or a constitution. The more parties involved in the founding of a democratic process, the more complicated the negotiations will be. However, when the democratic transition has been proceeding for some years and, for instance, reached the level of that in Kenya, things starts to change a bit. The dilemma of inclusion is still very much present, but it is no longer completely in the hands of the political elite. The social reality on the ground increasingly dominates the democratic transition. In Africa, as in many other places in the world, the social reality on the ground revolves around the equal distribution of wealth in the society or equality as it usually is called.

Why Inequality?
After at least 50 years of development efforts, inequality among states and people in the third world is still rising[^106]. Highlighting challenges in 2014 the World Economic Forum[^107] presented poverty, unemployment and inequality as the key challenges in Africa. Inequality affects people all over the world and seems to be the main driver of political instability, fragile economy and lack of human security. Thus, following the trail of inequality seems to be a suitable way to map the contemporary socioeconomic context in Kenya. The first step in the process is to determine the dissemination and strength of inequality. At independence Kenya focused on introducing a free market economy[^108] and poverty alleviation based on the ‘trickle down’ economic approach.[^109] This economic approach is based on the premise that, within an economy, giving tax breaks to the top earners makes them more likely to earn more. Top earners invest that extra money in productive economic activities. These activities will be productive and stimulate economic growth and, in the end, generate more tax revenue for the state to redistribute. A commonly used approach for studying inequality is therefore to look at various economic indicators like Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross Domestic Income (GDI), the Human development index (HDI) and Gini Coefficient (GINI). Where growth rates and Gross Domestic Income per capita provide average basic statistic data for comparing economies, the human development index and the Gini coefficient tell us a lot more about inequality. As presented in the

[^108]: A capitalistic economic system in which there is free competition and prices are determined by the interaction of supply and demand.
figure, I will begin by presenting the economic key figures for Kenya, Hereafter; I analyze the effect of inequality on various subjects. My basic thesis is that inequality serves excessive bureaucracy in the civil service, marginalization of weak citizens, widespread corruption, and ethnic tensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inequality</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Income (GDI)</th>
<th>Human Development Index (HDI)</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient (GINI)</th>
<th>State Formation</th>
<th>Ideology, Political System</th>
<th>Financial Systems</th>
<th>Security Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How</td>
<td>Effect on</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Kenya's economy is the largest in East Africa. The country’s economic dominance in the region is based on a strong private sector that has evolved under a free market economy for most of the post-independence era. Kenya's record of relative political stability and its lack of dramatic ideological shifts over the same period have done much to cement its position. In the Kenyan economy, as in every free market economy, growth is essential. Economic growth expresses the increase in the market value of the goods and services produced by an economy seen over time. A higher GDP helps improve the standard of living. Also, growth is an important precondition for the “trickle down” approach mentioned earlier. Kenya’s growth rates have been characterized by large fluctuations since its independence in 1963.

During the initial years of independence, the country achieved relatively high economic growth, but could not sustain that development. From 2004 until 2014 the Annual Growth Rate in Kenya averaged 5.33 percent, reaching an all-time high of 11.80 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010 and a record low of 0.20 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008. Post-election violence in early 2008, coupled with the effects of the global financial crisis, reduced GDP growth to 1.7% in 2008. But the economy has since rebounded, and the economic prospects for Kenya for the coming years remain favorable. The GDP in Kenya expanded 5.50 percent in the third

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110 http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/30-kenya-economy-kimenyi
quarter of 2014 over the same quarter of the previous year\textsuperscript{113}. It is argued, that if the positive trend continues, Kenya is projected to be the first East African country to move from low-income status to middle-income status\textsuperscript{114}. From GDP we can derive another interesting key figure in Kenya’s economy. The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP) tells us that technically every citizen of Kenya has become richer every year since 2010. As shown in the table below, individual Kenyans have on average increased earnings by approximately 300 USD (PPP) between 2010 and 2013. A higher GNI usually means a higher standard of living.

\begin{figure}[h]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{gini.png}
  \caption{GNI}
\end{figure}

However, GNI tells us very little about the internal distribution of wealth in Kenya. The World Bank Kenya office has said 4 in 10 Kenyans live below the poverty line, earning less than a dollar a day\textsuperscript{115}. Half of the people in rural areas and one-third in urban areas live below the poverty line, a difference of 18 percentage points between rural and urban areas\textsuperscript{116}. So it is obvious, that the GNI figures to some extent can be misleading. How can two countries with the same level of GNI per capita end up with different development outcomes? To understand the internal distribution of wealth in Kenya, we have to turn to the Human development index (HDI) and GINI figures. However, from the figures presented here, as GDP and GNI, we can conclude that the free market economy in Kenya in general provides the basic economic conditions for addressing inequality with economic policy instruments and increasing the standard of living for all Kenyans.

\textsuperscript{113} GDP Annual Growth Rate in Kenya is reported by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)

\textsuperscript{114} http://kenya.um.dk/en/about-kenya-new/economy-new/

\textsuperscript{115} http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000136661/world-bank-4-in-10-kenyans-live-below-poverty-line

Human Development Index (HDI)

The Indian economist Amartya Sen created the HDI index, which mitigates the inexpediencies seen when using the GNI by emphasizing that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the standard of living of a country, and not economic growth alone. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of human development.

It measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The closer the figures come to 1, the better ranking in the HDI index. As shown in the table above, Kenya has moved forward by increasing the index value every year. According to UNDP, this trend will continue for ‘14 and ‘15 as well. The fact that Kenya has scored higher in the index is positive. However, ranking as No. 147 in 2013, with an index value at around 0.535 is not impressive, and it reveals that inequality is a widespread phenomenon in Kenya. The HDI informs us about the existence of an inadequate distribution of wealth in Kenyan society as a whole, but it does not reveal the precise national distribution of wealth. If inequality must be linked to, for instance, the political system in Kenya, a more detailed picture of distribution must be drawn.

Gini Coefficient

For the purpose of generating more detail, the Gini coefficient is a suitable choice. The Gini coefficient is a commonly used measure that again varies between zero, which reflects complete equality, and one, which indicates complete inequality. The Gini coefficient is based on the Lorenz curve.

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118 Denmark’s HDI figure is 0.900. Denmark rank No.10 for comparison.
119 The Gini Coefficient in Kenya is reported by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)
120 A graphical representation of wealth distribution developed by American economist Max Lorenz in 1905
which compares the distribution of incomes across the entire population of a chosen area. It is a useful technique because it is possible to graphically view Kenya in the light of inequality, county to county, as seen on the map on the next page. We now discover great variation in equality within the borders of Kenya. If the understanding of the relationship between society and its institutions, such as the military and democracy, at times has been characterized as rigid and narrow-minded, leaving out important details, we now have a much more detailed image to which we can relate. By comparing for instance the number of armed attacks related to terror in the coastal region in 2014\textsuperscript{121}, with the lowest figures from the Gini coefficient, we find some correlation. To what extent the link is coincidental or not must rely on further analysis. However, I argue that the social reality on the ground increasingly dominates the democratic transition as well as other governmental institutions.

\textsuperscript{121} Alleged Al-Shabab armed attack in Lamu, Mpeketoni and Mombasa alone kills approx. 75 civilians.
The Socio-Economic Effect of Inequality

State Formation in Kenya
Kenya is a sovereign republic. The republic of Kenya is intended as a multi-party democratic state founded on the national values and principals of governance referred to in article 10 of its constitution, i.e., national unity, devolution, rule of law, democracy, participation, inclusiveness, equality and transparency, just to mention some of the values in article 10. This is the founding wording drawn for the Kenyan constitution adopted in 2010, a constitution widely praised in and outside Kenya. Former President Mwai Kibaki signed the constitution in Uhuru Park Nairobi three weeks after it was overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum. In the name of
devolution, the new constitution brought about two essential changes to the old one, which had been negotiated with the British in 1960\textsuperscript{122}. First, it was the hope that the new constitution could bring a more decentralized political system, in which the president's powers were limited and that the corrupt provincial governments could be replaced with locally governed counties. Second, the constitution also adopted a second chamber of parliament, the Senate, to secure that the counties’ local political interests would be represented in Nairobi. However, as we shall see, state formation in all its aspects has been challenged by inequality and socio-economic effects. Inequality breeds corruption, ethnic preferences and marginalization. The legitimacy in governmental institutions still leaves a lot to wish for.

Ideology

In his book “Freedom and After”\textsuperscript{123}, Tom Mboya argues that in the name of National Mobilization Uhuru (freedom) is the only thing needed to win independence and to establish political control after the colonial power, at least temporarily. The statement aptly captures the ideological\textsuperscript{124} consideration post-colonial Kenya went through toward the end of the 1950’s and in the beginning of 1960. The statement reveals two dimensions in political thinking at that time. Obviously, it tells the Kenyans what is important and what is not. Freedom, in one word, expresses the wish of the entire country after decades of colonization. It is hard to disagree on that point. More interestingly, it also expresses the ideological inexperience Kenya as well as many other African countries faced from the beginning of the post-colonial period. Most African countries received independence during the cold war, and the most likely ideological solution was thus to be on one or the other side, i.e., capitalism or communism. From a political ideological point of view, Hornsby argues that by observing the political elite, today’s political landscape in Kenya can be viewed in a traditional western political context, with the Kikuyu elite leading the right-wing capitalistic approach and the Luo elite leading the left anti-capitalist approach\textsuperscript{125}. However, applying this traditional western approach is not sufficient to understand the politics in Kenya. In fact, most African countries found the unity of their new nation to be the catalyst for charting their ideological direction, and nationalism looked like the right tool to do

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{122} Wanjiku’s Power, Understanding the Constitution of Kenya, Constitution and Reform Education Consortium
\textsuperscript{123} Mboya, Tom (1963) Freedom and After, Andre Deutsch Limited London p. 61
\textsuperscript{124} A system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy (Oxford Dictionary)
\end{flushleft}
It was a strong idealistic sentiment; a moral obligation to fight for independence and win\textsuperscript{127} that drove the national ideology. Nationalism had the unity of the nation in focus, and the political elite was set to change the paradigm inculcated by the colonial power. It was, so to speak, all about the creation of an African identity. If Kenya chose nationalism as its ideological starting point, it was nationalism with a strong element of state capitalism. To some extent it would be more correct to argue that is was strong state capitalism with a twist of nationalism. The inequality we find in Kenyan society today was, as I presented earlier, mainly founded in the early days when the British colonial power began handing over control of the country to the Kenyans. The system through which the British colonial power ruled Kenya for 60 years was characterized by a selective application of power, guided by ethnicity and an authoritarian and exclusive bureaucracy\textsuperscript{128}. Not really surprising, since the purpose of British presence in Kenya was due to geostrategic concerns and exploitation. The British started handing over power gradually by filling increasingly important positions with persons picked among a small but growing Kenyan elite. That was the reality in the civil institutions as well as in the military.\textsuperscript{129} That procedure assisted in handing over not only independence but also a well-tested template for ruling the country. A template with a high probability of inequality built in. Furthermore, after independence in 1963, the number of British advisers staying behind in the civil institutions as well as in the military was relatively high. That meant that the post-colonial political system, to a large extent, was built around the same institutions that earlier had oppressed and exploited the Kenyan population. Where Mzee Jomo Kenyatta (1963 - 1978) exercised an authoritarian political culture and a spurious democracy favoring corruption, Daniel Arap Moi (1978 - 1992) reintroduces the importance of ethnicity into the minds of the Kenyans. The answer to the coup attempt by the Air Force in 1982 was ethnic selection and neo-patrimonial structures undermining the development of the country, and keeping inequality in. The gap between rich and poor created by the British colonial power was maintained,\textsuperscript{130} and inequality assumed a permanent character in the ideological thinking and political foundation of Kenya.

\textsuperscript{127} Mboya, Tom (1963) Freedom and After, Andre Deutsch Limited London p. 63
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid. p.59.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. p.5.
Political System
Is contemporary politics in Kenya based on ideology? And if so, how does inequality then affect the political environment? I think it carries no risk to say that politics in its execution in Kenya today is far from comparable to what we know from Europe. A clear labeling of a traditional socialist left-wing and a liberal right-wing political environment is not possible. However, saying that politics in Kenya is without any ideological foundation at all would not be true. The multi-party system, as expressed in the constitution allows political competition in Kenya, but a political party that does not promote democracy is illegal. In the manifesto of every political party, besides declaring the party in supports for democracy, it is the procedure to state political objectives. Judging from these statements it is possible, in general, to categorize the parties according to their political beliefs. From 2013 I participated in formulating the constitution of a new political party, The Democratic Congress\(^{131}\). Judging from the party constitution, the party is clearly a left wing party, viewed though a western ideological lens. However, in election season inequality takes the upper hand and ideology becomes less important. The multi-party system was introduced during Moi when ethnic driven issues was at its highest. That is reflected in how ethnic and political lines in general follow each other.\(^{132}\) During elections, inequality and the daily struggle for resources outweigh political beliefs and neo patron-client relationships prevail. And since ethnic and political lines in general follow each other, politics becomes ethnically charged while urgent political problems and the need for choosing long-term durable political solutions are overshadowed by short-term personal gains,\(^{133}\) which largely sustains the existence of inequality. The existence of inequality affects the relationship between various institutions in society in a negative way, resulting in excessive bureaucracy in the civil service, marginalization of weak citizens, widespread corruption, and ethnic tensions.

Financial System
At a first glance, Kenyan economic development looks good, even impressive. As presented earlier, Kenya produces increasing growth rates and the economic prospects for Kenya for the coming years remain favorable\(^ {134}\). The GDP in Kenya expanded 5.50 percent in the third quarter

\(^{133}\) This argumentation is further supported by my own research presented in chapter three and four
of 2014 over the same quarter of the previous year. This evaluation of Kenyan’s financial capacity is supported by a recent recalculation that brings Kenya into the group of middle-income countries. This is a paradoxical situation since the World Bank still states that 4 in 10 Kenyans live below the poverty line, earning less than a dollar a day. We know that the move into the group of middle-class countries obviously did not affect poverty reduction and redistribution of wealth in the society in general, but why? Again inequality plays an important part in understanding why. To understand the link to inequality, one must begin by understanding the economic dynamics in the Kenyan financial system in two steps. First, it is expected that the model of state capitalism provide the so-called “Trickle Down” effect in Kenyan society. The trickle-down effect rests on an economic theory called marginal propensity to save (MPS). Basically it means that by giving the wealthy part of the population (Industrial elite) favorable terms, such as low taxes or tax breaks, they will be induced to use their savings to invest, which again leads to new jobs for the poorest part of the population.

The idea of a supply-driven economy was first introduced by the nineteenth-century French economist Jean-Baptiste Say. The model is in direct opposition to the model introduced John Maynard Keynes, a British economist. Keynes argued that the key to economic growth is to increase demand rather than supply. Government should promote consumer demand rather than entrepreneurial production. When people consume more, they create more jobs and production. Keynes argues: “Therefore, oh patriotic housewives, sally out tomorrow into the streets and go to the wonderful sales which are everywhere advertised.” Instead of accommodating the wealthy part of the population with money to save and later invest, Keynes argues for enlarging the disposable income amongst the poorest part of the population. Second, in Kenya the financial motor is based on the idea of state capitalism, in which the government supports national enterprises but also lists these enterprises on the stock market and subjects them to global competition. Coffee production in Kenya is one of the earliest examples of this phenomenon. According to the Coffee Act 333 (rev. 2012),

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135 GDP Annual Growth Rate in Kenya is reported by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)
137 http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000136661/world-bank-4-in-10-kenyans-live-below-poverty-line
138 Baptiste Say, Jean, (1880) A Treatise on Political Economy; or The Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth. (Translate into English 2001)
139 Gelting, Jørgen, (1946) Nationaløkonomisk tidsskrift, Bind 84 John Maynard Keynes
141 http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/221
the government issues license to the farmers and the Coffee Board of Kenya manages introduction to the international market. The model of state capitalism presented here originates from the Kenyatta era. Here government civil servants took up a dual role as private businessmen\textsuperscript{142} to enrich themselves. Later this mix of public and private interests has been the starting point of a substantial criticism of state capitalism in Kenya. The primary purpose of state capitalism is not to produce wealth but to ensure that wealth creation does not threaten the ruling elite's political power\textsuperscript{143} argues Ian Bremmer. On a macroeconomic level, state capitalism has serious weaknesses that affect financial long-term strategic objectives, i.e. competition and innovation\textsuperscript{144}. This unfortunate mix of private and public interests can inhibit natural competition, which usually secures low prices and industrial innovation. The combination of state capitalism, trickle-down economics and Kenya seems to be unhealthy for two at least two reasons. The mix of private and public interest reinforces the unfortunate effect of the colonial heritage, keeping a small political elite in power and neglecting the needs of the general public, providing the very basis for inequality. Furthermore, the system is prone to promote corruption due to lack of transparency in financial arrangements. There are numerous examples of the inexpedient mix of public and private interest, or conflict of interests, as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Committee call it.\textsuperscript{145} Conflict of interests can be defined as the abuse of a public office for private gain. An example of how widespread the conflict of interests goes is the human rights activists’ accusation against the chairman of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Mr. Kiplagat. He was accused of land grabbing while he served as permanent secretary under President Daniel Arap Moi.\textsuperscript{146} Whether or nor Mr. Kiplagat is guilty has never been investigated fully, but land grabbing is a widespread and serious phenomenon in Kenya. It clearly shows how politicians and civil servants, acting in their own personal interest, directly affect the living conditions of people in the rural areas, who depend on land for survival. The second issue is corruption due to the lack of transparency. Corruption is a serious


\textsuperscript{143} Bremmer, Ian. State Capitalism comes of Age, Essay in Foreign Affairs May/June 2009 issue. Ian Bremmer is the founder and president of Eurasia Group, a leading global political risk research and consulting firm, and currently teaches at Columbia University.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. Ian Bremmer.

\textsuperscript{145} Ethics and Anti-Corruption Committee (EAAC), http://www.eacc.go.ke/

\textsuperscript{146} Daily Nation, Wednesday (2011) http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Kiplagat+reinstated+as+Truth+team+boss+/-1064/1384828/-/jixq2e/-/index.html
problem in Kenya. According to Transparency International’s yearly index there is room for improvement. The Index ranks Kenya as 136th out of 177 countries and territories surveyed, with a score of 27 on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. Kenya’s score in the index remains unchanged from the 2012 index. Furthermore, Transparency international points out the seriousness of state capture. State capture is one of the most pervasive forms of corruption. Companies, institutions or powerful individuals use corruption to influence and shape a country’s policy, legal environment and economy according to their own interests. State capitalism, as implemented in Kenya seems to constitute the perfect environment for such practices. From the National survey on Corruption and Ethics we get the same indication. Respondents were asked to state how widespread corruption is in Kenya. Responding to this question, 64.1% stated that corruption is highly pervasive. Furthermore, 45.2% of the respondents indicated that the government is not committed to fighting corruption. In an inequality perspective, this is highly alarming. The alleged widespread conflicts of interest at the institutional level, combined with a high level of corruption, contribute to maintaining a financial system based on the inequality primarily inherited from the colonial period. The existence of inequality affects the relationship between the social context and various institutions in society in a negative way, resulting in excessive bureaucracy in the civil service, marginalization of weak citizens, widespread corruption, and ethnic tensions.

Security System

Drawing on the analysis of the socio-economic factors and the effect of inequality so far, it is more than likely that the interaction between economic and political factors also have contributed to crime and the state of insecurity. An OECD study from 1999 establishes and supports the connection between economic development and security. In a comparative study of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, the OECD argues for a possible correlation between political stability, economic development and the outbreak of violence. In times of political instability, decline in economic growth and general insecurity worsen. Judging from the comparison between Kenyan, Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya is portrayed as doing relatively well. Due to a relatively high level of foreign investments to drive the economy and the national effort to enhance access to primary school, the level of violence has been low compared to Uganda, for

instance. However, the OECD report is from 1999 and thus does not include the one single most violent incident in post-colonial history in Kenya, the post-election violence in 2007-2008. Politics initiated the post-election violence, Development Policy Management Forum\textsuperscript{150} argues. The violence and conflict are rooted in the nepotistic state practice based on ethnic alliances. Political activities that have often spilled over into violence and hence insecurity are a characteristic feature of Kenya and these have serious implications.\textsuperscript{151} The post-election violence in 2007-2008 to has to some extent challenged the somewhat peaceful and stable image presented by the OECD. Furthermore it clearly underlines that even though a possible correlation between political stability, economic development and an outbreak of violence is traceable; there are no guaranties for peace and security. In his paper from 2010 John Githongo supports the idea that political activities result in violence and insecurity. Precisely the downside of state capitalism, the mix of public and private interests resulted during the first years of the Kibaki administration (2002 - 2004) in unprecedented acts of greed and corruption amongst the political elite.\textsuperscript{152} Eventually this, combined with a growing feeling of exclusion among Kenyans, lead to the tragic events following the 2007 election\textsuperscript{153}. The post-election violence in 2007 suggests a relation between inequality and general insecurity. More conspicuous, however, is the absence of adequate governmental and institutional capacity. The more or less uncritical adoption of the colonial structures, as mentioned, earlier has led to the manipulation of state institutions and given rise to rampant corruption, ethniticized state institutions, absence of accountability and general impunity granted to the power elite. In 2013, Transparency International announced the Kenyan Police Service as being the fourth most corrupt institution in East Africa, and the most corrupt institution in Kenya. To a large extent that causes people to see the law applied in a discriminatory manner, and they feel they are abandoned, unprotected and insecure. Again we see that the existence of inequality affects the relationship between the social context and various institutions in society in a negative way, resulting in excessive bureaucracy in civil service, marginalization of weak citizens, widespread corruption, and ethnic tensions. The dilemma described as the “horizontal dilemma” is the

\textsuperscript{150} Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF) is a Regional Civil Society Organization (CSO) covering Sub-Saharan African Countries. It has registered offices in Nairobi, Kenya and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

\textsuperscript{151} Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF) A brief general profile on Equality in Kenya.


\textsuperscript{153} Ibid. p. 5
dilemma of inclusion or exclusion, as presented earlier by Jarstad.\textsuperscript{154} This dilemma concerns the issue of group representation, the process of peace and democratization. The political elite and the political institutions decide participation in the democratic process, Jarstad argues. Based on this chapter, I suggest that the socio-economic dynamics, as well as the political, negatively affect both democratization and various governmental institutions, including the military by sustaining a high level of exclusion. In the following two chapters we shall observe in details how this contextual background affects the military to act as a catalyst for democracy.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid. p. 21.
Chapter Three – The Democratic Identity of Kenya (KDI)

The Democratic Identity of Kenya
As mentioned in chapter one, Tilly argues that weak or insufficient institutions dominated by civilians encourage the military to conduct a takeover of power. Supported by research done by John Samuel Fitch\textsuperscript{155}, Tilly makes the basic point that the military is prone to act on institutional failure\textsuperscript{156} that directly or indirectly threatens military institutional interests. Personal ambitions might influence the decisions to launch a military takeover but personal ambitions are far from being dominant. Logically that means that directing FMA towards countries with weak democratic institutions and traditions is prone to weaken rather than strengthen democracy. According to Tilly there is absolutely no guarantee that FMA, of any kind, could support the democratic transition. On the contrary, from Tilly’s argumentation we can deduce that by training and equipping an army, whose loyalty to civilian authorities is questionable, most likely endanger the democratic transition instead. This raises our focus towards the civil institutions. If the country is in a democratic transition where is it and how suitable and robust is the democratic institution? To what extent do the socio-economic conditions affect the democratic transition? To increase the probability of FMA success, apparently the recipient country must acquire some level of democracy. A democratic identity\textsuperscript{157} must thus be provided to clarify present conditions for step 3 to take place according to the generic presented in chapter one.

Consequently this chapter is basically about understanding democracy in Kenya according to the model the Kenyans have chosen and expressed in their 2010 constitution. Having said that, it is significantly important to underline that it is not the ambition of this chapter to provide new theoretical knowledge on democracy in general; the ambition, rather, is to draw up a contemporary democratic identity by using known theoretical tools, and in a slightly new way. Understood correctly, this chapter

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{155} Fitch, John Samuel. The Military Coup D’Etat as a Political process, Ecuador 1948 – 1966.
    \item \textsuperscript{156} Ibid. Issues like public disorder, violation of the constitution etc.
    \item \textsuperscript{157} See the section called “Final Operationalization and Coherence of the Study” for detailed explanation on democratic identity.
\end{itemize}
constitutes a necessary steppingstone to address the research question through establishing the democratic identity of Kenya (KDI). Therefore this chapter will combine own and available research on democracy for the purpose of understanding how military assistance is affecting the process of democratization in Kenya. Even though I use both a quantitative and a qualitative approach, this is not an experimental chapter on democracy since we cannot isolate and repeatedly test the variation of military assistance in a closed environment. However, to get an idea of the perceived mutual relationship between this chapter and the rest of the project, one could argue that military assistance makes up the independent variable (x) and the democratic identity of Kenya makes up the dependent variable (y). Between these two variables, a third intervening variable (z) occurs which provides a causal link between (x) and (y): that is the professionalization of the armed forces. The matter of the armed forces and military capacities is dealt with in the following chapter. Thus, the overall purpose of this chapter is to provide the preconditions for a qualified discussion of the effect on the dependent variable: democracy.

Lack of Inclusion\textsuperscript{158}

The dilemma described earlier in chapter two as the “horizontal dilemma” is the dilemma of inclusion or exclusion as presented earlier by Jarstad\textsuperscript{159}. On a backdrop of the conclusion in chapter 2, I put forward the thesis that the democratic identity of Kenya is unbalanced in relation to the level of liberalization and participation In the process of democratization in Kenya, liberalization precedes inclusiveness\textsuperscript{160}, which means that exclusion is the “case in point” in the Kenyan process of democratization. Consequently, when tailoring support for democratization, all efforts to enhance democracy must be directed towards supporting the process of inclusiveness, whether it is in the shape of civilian or military capacity building. But does the lack of inclusion not just prove that democracy does not work at all? Even though the Kenyans have the newest and most comprehensive constitution, promulgating political competition and allowing public contestation, and even though Kenya has conducted one of the most complicated elections in Africa (2013) with a relatively successful

\textsuperscript{158} Excluding some or most, as from membership or participation. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/exclusiveness

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. p. 21.

\textsuperscript{160} Inclusiveness as presented by Robert A. Dahl in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, pp. 1-48
result\textsuperscript{161}, not everybody felt that their interests were taken care of by the institution of democracy. Perhaps that is why the eligibility of western democracy in Africa is rightfully discussed and questioned from time to time. Politics in Africa suffers gravely from being viewed through the eyes of westerners applying western democratic “Blue Prints” without considering the cultural and historical context in which they operate.

\textsuperscript{161} Compared to the 2007 election, the March 4 2013 election was relatively peaceful. However, technical, irregularities were reported. Kenya after the Election, International Crises Group Policy Brief, Africa Briefing No. 54 15\textsuperscript{th} of May 2013.
Postcolonial Africa is consequently understood and developed from a biased and one-sided perspective. One of the strongest advocates of this criticism is the French scholar Patrick Chabal. In his book from 2009, he identifies some of the conceptual western narratives as Development, Marxist, Dependency, Socialist, Pan-Africanist, Negritude, Ethno-Political, Neo-Patrimonial and also Democracy used to analyze and understand Africa. According to Chabal, all of these narratives and concept are equally useless in the attempt to understand Africa and the Africans, and they actually say more about the postcolonial scholarship in general. Judging from my own results on democracy in Kenya, one could easily agree with Chabal. At first glance, it does not look like democracy holds the answer to the question asked by the Kenyans. However, democracy in its nature is a process of redistributing power through different regimes, such as elections, and consequently challenging old and traditional power structures. Furthermore, the Kenyans themselves have chosen democracy as a political system and a transition toward stronger democratic institutions is inevitably ongoing. The transition is not without challenges, and lately especially elections seem to be a challenge in Kenya.

Well-executed elections are usually presented as one of the best indicators of participation (inclusiveness), and some scholars (Jørgen Elklit 2001) underline the importance of elections by suggesting a correlation between well-executed elections and the propensity to violence. Kenya is a really good example of that thinking especially back in 2007. However, he also underlines that elections are not democracy (electorialism). When it comes to political inclusion of people in general elections do not do it alone. As important as elections are for the democratic transition, they tell very little about of the level of inclusion in society in general. Not every Kenyan I have spoken to felt included in the democratic process just because he or she was equipped with a constitutional right to vote and practical facilities to exercise that right. In fact, I came to understand that participation (inclusion) is much more a matter of what takes place between elections. Establishing a democratic profile on democracy and presenting the most reliable level of democratic inclusiveness must therefore handle the “positive” impact from electoralism. The primary reason for that, I find in the socio-economic context and the inequality presented in the previous

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chapter, which elections cannot include. Of these many relations three are salient because of their dissemination, recognition and impact. First, there is the local as well as the national politicians’ misconduct within the financial and administrative areas. Corruption among civil servants and MPs is well known, tested and presented\textsuperscript{164} and the consequences of uneven distribution of land and national financial support, reducing political participation as well. Second, patron-client motivated misconduct where political or economic power is used for promoting one’s own kind has been known since the independence in 1963,\textsuperscript{165} and it creates a high level of disapproval and exclusion of the democratic process. Primarily it affects the ability to move politics from person-centric politics to ideology-centric political issues\textsuperscript{166}.

Last but not least is the alleged marginalization of minorities and following exclusion on the basis of ethnic, religious or geographically reasons. Ethnicity has been a political tool for many years, and even if the role of ethnicity is contested,\textsuperscript{167} the voting patterns at the election in March 2013 still significantly confirm the role of ethnicity in Kenyan politics\textsuperscript{168}. This of course also prevents minority groups from enjoying constitutionally awarded democratic rights. In spite of a non violent election in March 2013, and perhaps an even increasing positive evaluation of more than one democratization index, my argument is that because of these reasons exclusion in the process of democratization in Kenya is as evident as never before, if one cares to look at the four years between elections, instead of the four days of election.

In the following sections of this chapter, my investigation on exclusion falls into three main parts: First I will use data from my fieldwork from January and February 2013 - 2015, supported by external empirical data, to

\textsuperscript{164} Report by the Kenya Law Society (2013). Realizing Integrity Law, Walking the Talk. A Consolidated Analytical Account of Adversely Mentioned Persons as Contained in Publicly Available Reports

\textsuperscript{165} Haugerud, Angelique. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya, Cambridge University Press, “Africa’s post-colonial states are successors to profoundly anti-democratic colonial forms of governments”


argue the point of an unbalanced process of democratization in Kenya and the presence of exclusion. Second I analyze the existing democracy index for the purpose of establishing further validity for the same argument of exclusion in the process of democratization in Kenya. Also, to challenge my own findings I bring in indices that use elections as a variable for measuring participation. But before engaging in the analysis, I will present the argumentation for my theoretical starting point, my methodological considerations and the analytical framework as well.

Measuring Democracy
By studying the literature on democracy and democratization, one quickly discovers the predominant issues in the debate. What is democracy? And not least, how do we measure it? Without some sort of common understanding on what democracy is, a measurement becomes meaningless. The opportunity for scholars to make several interpretations on democracy is well known and well used. Even though this basic ambiguity in understanding and measuring democracy has branched out to most professionals, we do find some ambitious attempts to measure the state of democracy, as for instance, introduced by institutions like Freedom House and Economic Intelligence Unit. Freedom house began measuring democracy (Freedom in the World index) in 1972, and the organization thereby has the longest tradition on collecting data on the market. But these indices are usually criticized for being too superficial or even leaving out important details. Especially the quality and reliability of the data is contested. Too a large extent, problems of causal inference has overshadowed the equally important problems of conceptualization and measurement, Munck argues. As presented, the idea of measuring democracy is a controversial matter. Who is most democratic, and on what basis should the measurement done? Basically, I am left with two requirements in shaping my theoretical starting point. Since I need to establish a democratic identity, the theoretical approach must embrace and reflect democracy more as a process, and less as a condition. In other words, I must ask “What kind of democracy?” and not “Is it a democracy?” Furthermore, especially on conceptualization and measurement the theoretical approach must facilitate a flexible and broad approach to the

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169 Balance between liberalization and participation
170 See further discussion on the political system in Kenya in chapter two.
171 http://www.freedomhouse.org/ (Main Web page)
174 Ibid. p. 13
variable of participation to best capture the level of inclusiveness. However, in order to establish the needed theoretical starting point, let’s have a look at the idea of democracy as presented in the seminal part of the literature.

What is democracy?
Democracy means, “Rule by people\textsuperscript{175}, but the fact that people rule does not necessarily make a regime a democracy. The big question is: Who are the people and what do they rule? Georg Sørensen gives a very illustrative example as answer to this question.\textsuperscript{176} The idea of democracy is to be found somewhere on a continuum represented on the one end by Joseph Schumpeter\textsuperscript{177}, as a narrow political construction facilitating the election of leadership, to the other end represented by David Held\textsuperscript{178}, where democracy is suggested as a comprehensive idea containing free and equal rights and obligations for all citizen, called “democratic autonomy”.

\begin{center}
\textbf{The Continuum of Democracy}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Political Democracy}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item Joseph Schumpeter
  \end{itemize}
\item \textbf{Democratic Autonomy}
  \begin{itemize}
  \item David Held
  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

This continuum to some extent helps us to narrow our theoretical perspective on what democracy is, but what do we find in between the two extremes? From Charles Tilly we are introduced to no less than four types of “definitions” on democracy\textsuperscript{179}. However, no real definition is presented by Tilly but rather what I would call an intellectual categorizing of the idea of democracy according to ideological priorities. Still, this categorizing is very useful as a steppingstone towards a greater understanding of what is between the two extremes presented above and how to get an analytical grip on this elusive idea of democracy. I will discuss these four definitions in the following section.

Different Theoretical Perspectives on Democracy
The first category presented is centered on the constitutional aspect of democracy. Observers of this perspective are concerned with the restrictive and permissive laws regarding general political activity. It is emphasized

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid. p.11.
that the constitutional approach to democracy provides a transparent perspective because the discrepancies between what is written and what is done is displayed for all citizens to follow. I find the constitutional aspects on democracy an important and valuable contribution to a basic understanding of the subject. In the case of Kenya, my experience is that the constitution, which was put in place in 2010, enjoys great legitimacy even across ethnic boundaries and serves as a political lighthouse for all Kenyans as to how far their political and democratic rights extend. Furthermore, it clearly reveals the socioeconomic impact, since far from everybody enjoys these constitutional rights. Focusing on constitutional issues (liberalization) alone therefore does not provide a complete framework for measuring democracy; also the quality and the extent (participation) of the constitution matters.

The second category approaches democracy from a substantive perspective, focusing on the regime’s ability to provide and maintain a specific level of human welfare, security, and social equality. I find the elements in the substantive perspective important in a democratic context. However, the presence of substantive variables does not necessarily include political rights and the people’s ability to exercise these rights. Take the case of Rwanda, for instance. Here we find a relatively high level of human security and welfare, but at the same time Rwanda is regarded as “not free” by Freedom House\textsuperscript{180}. Human welfare matters in a democracy and it is widely documented\textsuperscript{181} that inequality and corruption severely hamper the people’s ability to utilize their constitutional rights (participation). However, caution has to be taken not to confuse a high level of human security with democracy.

The third category presented by Tilly approaches democracy from a procedural perspective. Observers of this category tend to focus narrowly on governmental procedures, especially the preparation for and conduct of elections. If the election is meeting certain standards within the area competition\textsuperscript{182} and the result has a significant effect on the political process to follow, it is recognized as a democracy. However, looking around, we find many examples on how elections have been mistaken for democracy. Take, for instance, the 2011 elections in the Republic of South Sudan. Compared with other elections held in Africa, I am sure this election was

\textsuperscript{180} Freedom House rated Rwanda not free in 2012
\texttt{http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda}.

\textsuperscript{181} See chapter two for further discussion on inequality

\textsuperscript{182} As in a genuine political and competitive election, where political parties compete on political issues
done with the best intentions in mind and that a government really was formed according to the new draft constitution. However, I am also sure that many would agree that democracy in the republic of South Sudan is not “the only game in town.” Elections are perhaps the single-most important element in a well-established democracy. It is equally important to notice that processes of election are a vital and very visual part of democracy in relation to promoting participation. However, as mentioned earlier, I find electoralism as a far too narrow perspective of the idea of democracy. Furthermore, I find the procedural approach slightly problematic since it tends to create a situation often described as “the tail wagging the dog”. In this sense, it means that far too much attention and effort are directed towards the process of voting and very little towards “the including and compromising discussion” before the election. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, my focus will be on what’s between elections as the best support for the argument for lack of inclusiveness.

The last perspective on democracy presented by Tilly is called the process-oriented approach. Tilly argues that this perspective significantly differs from the three previous mentioned approaches by being less normative and more conceptual through identifying a minimum set of democratic processes (Dahl, participation, equality, enlighten, control and inclusion), which must be meet by the regime in order for it to be labeled as democratic. This last perspective presented by Tilly I regard as a very ambitious and comprehensive understanding of democracy, but at the same time not particularly distinct from the first three mentioned perspectives. In fact, evaluating Dahl’s suggestion I find that the constitutional, the substantive and the procedural (electoral) perspective are reflected in this last perspective. The constitutional and the substantive approach have strings running to equality since both perspectives are preoccupied with providing equal access to right and goods. The procedural clearly connects with participation and inclusion because of the tendency to focus on election.

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183 A phrase used by G. Sørensen in Democracy and Democratization, Process and Prospects in a Changing World.
184 Participation in this respect has to do with the including of selected parts of the population in the democratic process.
187 I am aware that Dahl uses the term “polyarchy” instead of democracy. However, the theoretical difference has no impact on my consideration so I consequently use the term Democracy like done before by Jørgen Elklit 1994.
Let me sum up the exploration of the theoretical exploitation of democracy so far. If we for a moment assume that the analysis of Tilly’s four perspectives on democracy are credible, we see the very beginning of a theoretical profile that facilitates a flexible and broad approach to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy.

The theoretical conceptualization basically seems to suggest two main dimensions. One directed toward constitutional and liberal rights also containing the substantial welfare values, and one directed towards the procedural perspective containing electoral and including elements. That is not far from Dahl’s own definition involving participation and inclusiveness. Later we shall rediscover and discuss these two dimensions. For now we settle with concluding that the adjusted process-oriented approach may constitute the most fruitful avenue for establishing a theoretical starting point for understanding democracy. Bearing in mind that my search for the democratic identity of Kenya is not driven by the question: “Is it a democracy?” but rather “what kind of democracy is it”; we should look for an opportunity to see democracy as a process (democratization) between the two extremes introduced by Schumpeter and Held. In the following paragraph, I will discuss this opportunity and take further steps in the direction of establishing a theoretical starting point and the analytical framework

**Theoretical Point of Departure**

Like Tilly, Georg Sørensen is also looking to Dahl to find a functional understanding of democracy and not least an understanding that can lead to the establishment of a functional theoretical framework. On the background of Dahl’s 188 seven democratic preconditions, Sørensen presents a definition of political democracy.

The definition is a “distillation” of Dahl’s seven preconditions and it has three dimensions, which are Competition, Political Participation and Political Liberties. Sørensen describes the individual dimensions like this:

Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force

A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded, and

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A level of civil and political liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation\textsuperscript{189}

Taking a short look back on the four perspectives presented by Tilly, we find that, with the exception of an explicit mentioning of the “substantive” perspective focusing on the regime’s ability to provide and maintain a specific level of human welfare, security, and social equality, all perspectives are well represented in Sørensen’s definition of political democracy. The constitutional, the procedural (electoral) and of course Dahl’s process-oriented perspective are recognizable in one or more of Sørensen’s three dimensions.

\textbf{Conceptualization}
While this definition of democracy seems to incorporate most understandings of the idea of democracy, it simultaneously represents both a minimum and a maximum standard. The level of competition between individuals and political parties, the degree of political participation and the extent of political liberties can vary from little to more (from Schumpeter to Held’s comprehensive understanding), so to speak. As mentioned earlier, the question I need to ask is “what kind of democracy is it”. This variation we find in Sørensen’s tree dimensions is very useful in answering this question; however, it still appears much like a “check list” approach to an analytical framework, and, as pointed out by Sørensen, one could end up discussing first which of the dimensions that are most important and second which country is then the most democratic. Generally that is a useless discussion and not particularly fruitful in establishing the last step of the theoretical starting point. Again Dahl seems to contribute to this process in a useful way, by introducing a concept of understanding democratization. When countries are in a process of democratization, meaning moving forward from one position on the continuum of democracy towards another, there seems to be two significantly different ways\textsuperscript{190} for that particular country to choose\textsuperscript{191}. Let’s have a closer look at what Dahl suggest.

\textsuperscript{190} Actually, Dahl suggests an endless number of ways towards full democracy.
\textsuperscript{191} Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, pp. 1-48
Two Theoretical Dimensions of Democracy

If Kenya is experiencing the failure of its civilian institutions it will turn out as non-democratic and there is no argument for engaging in FMA projects since there is no democratization to support\textsuperscript{192}. In other words, these ideas will only work if democratization is taking place in the country in question. However, if we for a moment accept that Kenya is in a democratization process\textsuperscript{193}, the road towards full democracy can either begin with an increasing liberalization or later expanding to include larger parts of the population (inclusiveness). Or the road to full democracy can take its starting point by including the whole of the population and then slowly increase the extent of the liberal rights (liberalization)\textsuperscript{194}. As an example of the former we could again use the Republic of South Sudan. The people of South Sudan have their constitutional rights in place, the level of freedom of speech is acceptable and elections are almost free and fair. However, corruption, tribal issues and poverty hamper the propagation of the liberal rights to include the whole of the population. In other words, not everybody is able to enjoy these constitutional rights. As an example of the latter we have Russia. In Russia the population is, with very few exceptions,\textsuperscript{195} allowed to participate in the political process, but the participation is limited to consist of nothing more than participation in elections. Freedom of speech, legal rights (rule of law) are to a large extent controlled by the authorities.

\textsuperscript{192} See further discussion on civil-military relations in chapter one
\textsuperscript{193} Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, pp. 1-48
\textsuperscript{194} Remembering the analysis of Tilly’s four perspectives on democracy and the tool of measurement with two dimensions, (participation and equality), the model provides great resemblance.
\textsuperscript{195} Russia is ranking 143rd out of 182 countries in Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index.
Both examples are examples of countries in the process of democratization, but both examples also show that by emphasizing either the road of liberalization or participation, the process becomes unbalanced, at least for a while. Usually social and cultural factors\textsuperscript{196} influence the path the country will choose, and at the same time it indicates the kind of democratic support needed to eventually reach full democracy. As pointed out by Dahl\textsuperscript{197}, any regime that moves up and to the right is in some process of democratization regardless of which “road” is taken.

The model presented by Dahl proves to be very useful when searching for where Kenya is in the process of democratization and for supporting the argument of exclusion\textsuperscript{198}. By applying the model to Kenya, at least two important findings are provided, since it will be interesting to see what the model shows and what it does not show. First the model will suggest “what kind of democracy” Kenya is right now by placing Kenya on one (or close to one) of the two tracks mentioned above. And consequently, at the same time the model suggests where Kenya is not, and thus where “democratic support” would add positively in this particular process of democratization. Furthermore, as we shall see later in the process of shaping the survey, the

\textsuperscript{196} Social and cultural factors such as tribal issues, corruption and nepotism hamper participation, where former autocracies hamper liberalization.


model gives me the opportunity to be flexible in my approach to participation. Summing up, it looks like the two challenges mentioned earlier regarding shaping my theoretical starting point have been resolved. The basic theoretical foundation for discussing a democratic identity is in place. The next question that comes to mind is how to apply the model on Kenya, or in other words, how to obtain valid data on the process of democratization in Kenya. In the next section, I will present my consideration on that point.

Operationalization of the Theoretical Framework
As presented in the above section, using Dahl’s theoretical argument on the coherence between liberalization and inclusiveness, we can provide knowledge about Kenyan democracy and establish a democratic identity. The challenges now are how to formulate a relevant concept for obtaining valid data on the two dimensions. For that purpose, I have let myself be inspired by a methodological approach, used by Tilly in an analysis on how the political and economic development in Venezuela influenced the democratic development. By incorporating Freedom House’s yearly rating on political rights and civil liberties into Dahl’s model, Tilly manages to visualize the democratic development through a number of selected years. This visualization clearly displays the “critical moments” in the life of democratization in Venezuela. It is my intention to draw from that methodology while providing knowledge about Kenyan democracy and establish a democratic identity. However, I have at least two challenges to meet before it is possible. First, bearing in mind that the main objective of this chapter is to explore the unbalanced relation between liberalization and participation as defined by Dahl and not entirely the Civil Liberties and Political Rights defined by Freedom House, EIU or Bertelsmann although they of course are related. This becomes a challenge because I analyze the existing democracy index for the purpose of establishing further validity for the same argument of exclusion in the process of democratization in Kenya, and also to challenge my own findings. Second, the vertical arrangement (number of the components like for instance “Freedom of Speech” and “Election”) in each dimension differs from concept to concept but how many is needed? Thus, as Munck puts it “choices have to be made”. But before any choices are made more specific data on the conceptualization is needed, and for that reason we need to

have a closer look at how to construct a concept\textsuperscript{201}.

**Adjusting the Concept**

First, the relation between liberalization and participation as defined by Dahl and the Civil Liberties and Political Rights defined by Freedom House. Judging from only the headlines one could ask if participation and political rights or liberties and civil liberties actually present comparable units. For the following two reasons I argue yes. The idea of measuring democracy in two dimensions at all is developed from Dahl’s thoughts as presented earlier. Looking at the components contained by these headlines supports that argument (see the next table). For instance a strong indicator as “election” is almost always found under the same vertical arrangement no matter what indices are questioned. However, it is important to underline that a different categorization of the component sometimes has an impact on the response provided.\textsuperscript{202} As shown in the table, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, as the only concept, categorizes “Freedom of Expression” under participation. By applying that concept to the case of Kenya, for instance, we run the risk that the relatively extensive freedom of expression\textsuperscript{203} would blur the final conclusion on the state of participation. Furthermore, since “Freedom of expression” usually is considered a civil liberty, again the distinction between the two dimensions becomes blurred when different indices are compared. However, the comparison I do is not depending on the procedure or perspective towards democracy, but on the conclusion regarding the actual state of democracy. Second, the variation of comprehensiveness between the various types of concepts is often referred to as “thin” or “thick”, referring to the number of components in a concept\textsuperscript{204}. Dahl’s concept of polyarchy is, for instance, regarded as thin, and a concept like EIU is regarded as thick according to the example in the table below. It is basically a delicate balance between stability in the measurement and sensitivity for democratic fluctuation.\textsuperscript{205} By increasing the number of components, I increase the risk of conflation by letting one component overlap another. Again, the comparison I do is

\textsuperscript{201}Ibid. p. 15. The Concept, a phrase referring to the mutual relation between identification of attributes, selection of indicators and level and aggregation.

\textsuperscript{202}The problem of conflation arises when the components are not sufficiently distinct from each other. Munck, L. Gerado. (2009) Measuring Democracy, A Bridge between Scholarship and Politics. The John Hopkins University Press p.22


\textsuperscript{204}EIU, Democracy index - methodology

\textsuperscript{205}Also referred to as a maximalist definition contra minimalistic definition of a concept by Munch. Munck, L. Gerado. (2009) Measuring Democracy, A Bridge between Scholarship and Politics. The John Hopkins University Press p.16
not depending on the procedure or perspective towards democracy, but on the conclusion regarding the actual state of democracy.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
<th>Political Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Free Electronic Media</td>
<td>Voter Participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free print Media</td>
<td>Women in Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>Extent of Political participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Cover</td>
<td>Citizen Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Internet</td>
<td>Population’s Preparedness for Demonstrations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational rights</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Successfully Petition the Government</td>
<td>Adult Literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of torture</td>
<td>Population’s Interest in Political News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary and Government Influence</td>
<td>Population that follows News Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Tolerance</td>
<td>Authorities promotion of participation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equality under the Law</td>
<td>Societal consensus to support Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basic Security</td>
<td>Perception of Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respect for Private Property</td>
<td>Perception of Military Rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Freedom</td>
<td>Perception on Technocracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Perception on Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination (race, colour or creed)</td>
<td>Perception on Economy and Democracy</td>
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<td>Governments respect for civil rights</td>
<td>Support for Democracy</td>
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<th>Political and Social integration</th>
<th>Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)</td>
<td>Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party System</td>
<td>Effective governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>Assembly Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approval of Democracy</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
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<td>Social Capital</td>
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<th>Political Rights</th>
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<td>Electoral process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational, Organizational Rights</td>
<td>Political pluralism and participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Functioning of the Government</td>
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<td>Personal Autonomy, Individual Rights</td>
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<th>Liberalization</th>
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<td>Permissible Opposition</td>
<td>Equality</td>
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<td>Public Contestation</td>
<td>Election</td>
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<td>Political Competition</td>
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<th>Liberalization</th>
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<td>Confidence in Democracy</td>
<td>Economic Arrangements</td>
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<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>Code of Conduct</td>
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<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>Minorities and marginalization</td>
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206 EIU operates with more categories.
Since my basic idea with this chapter is to place Kenya on one of many roads towards democracy, I need to produce a serial of components that clearly marks one choice for another. That request relates to the kind of components I choose and how they are vertically arranged\(^{209}\). Furthermore, I will focus on sensitivity rather than stability, since the survey I am preparing is planned to run only three times (2013 - 2015). As we shall see, I can then settle for a small number of components. In the following paragraph, I will present my adjustment in the KDI concept in details.

**Vertical Organization of Attributes and Components**

A general view on Dahl’s suggestion for components on the subject of liberalization reveals that, with a few adjustments, it is usable as is. When Dahl talks about a “permissible opposition”, I want to make it clear that the respondent is focusing on the democracy in general and not only on what the respondent may define as the opposition. Using the term opposition in a country like Kenya, with relatively strong ethnic divisions,\(^{210}\) could very easily lead the respondent to speculate along tribal lines when answering the question. However, talking about democracy instead of opposition does not exclude the possibility that the respondent will speculate in tribal lines, but it will reduce the possibility and increase the chance of getting an answer that is clear and precise when later visualized in Dahl’s model. The second indicator used by Dahl is public contestation. The media in Kenya had the second highest Press Freedom Ranking in East Africa in 2012,\(^{211}\) only surpassed by Tanzania. Although Kenya’s Parliament passed some of the most repressive media legislation in the country’s 50-year history in 2013, freedom of press is still a good indicator for Kenya since most Kenyans increasingly recognize the media as the first choice for contesting the government in public. Using freedom of expression will provide a clear and distinct answer on public contestation. Indicators and questions for the dimension of liberalization are shown in the table below.

**Liberalization**

**Vertical Organization of Attributes and Components**

How far does the population experience that their liberal rights extend?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permissible Opposition (Dahl)</th>
<th>Public Contestation (Dahl)</th>
<th>Public Competition (Dahl)</th>
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Confidence in Democracy (CoK, chap. 1, part 1, paragraph 1, 2 and 3).
This variable aims at clarifying the respondents view on the democratic idea as a whole

1. Do you have a basic confidence in the democratic system you have in Kenya?
2. Do you have a basic confidence in the constitution of Kenya from 2010?

Freedom of Expression (CoK, chap. 4, part 2, paragraph 33)
This variable aims at clarifying the respondents view on freedom of expression in the national political debate

3. Do you find that you can express your political opinion freely?

Level of Political Competition (CoK, chap. 4, part 2, paragraph 37, 38)
This variable aims at clarifying the respondents view on the level of the political competition between political opponents

4. Do you find that all political parties enjoy the same possibilities to present their ideas?

On the subject of participation, Dahl’s suggestions for indicators (equality and inclusiveness) adopted without change. However, having an election as a component under participation is left out. Since inequality and exclusion as experienced between elections must be the core interest when establishing the components under the attribute of participation I intent to avoid any impact on the measurements from the component of election on the level of inclusion in the four years between elections. Having said that, it is necessary to underline that the chosen components are nothing but a further vertical operationalization of Dahl’s earlier presented component: “equality and inclusiveness”. Uneven distribution of resources, the challenges with moving politics from person-centric politics to ideology-centric political issues are all summed up in inequality and exclusion, such as the alleged ethnically motivated marginalization that apparently excludes Kenyan citizens from getting a fair share of the resources.212

Participation
Vertical organization of attributes and components
Does the population experience that everybody is given the same political opportunities?

Equality and Inclusiveness (Dahl)

Economic arrangements (CoK, chap. 4, part 2, paragraph 43)
This variable aims at clarifying the respondents view on financial misconduct in the official or public conduct of duties.

5. Do you think that your politicians are honest about their financial

Code of Conduct (CoK, chap. 6, paragraph 75)
This variable aims at clarifying the respondents’ view on the conflict of interest in the official or public conduct of duties.

6. Do you think that your politicians use their political power to favor

Minorities and Marginalization (CoK, chap. 4, part 2, paragraph 47)
This variable aims at clarifying the respondents view on the extent of fairness in the official or public conduct of duties.

7. Do you think that your civil servants give a fair and equal

212 Copeland, Foard (2013) Politicization of Ethnicity in Kenya, NATO Civil - Military Fusion Centre
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20130226%20In%20Brief%20Ethnicity%20in%20Kenya.pdf
arrangements in the conduct of duties?
certain groups of individuals?
treatment to all Kenyan citizens

As presented in the beginning of this paragraph, the challenge was how to formulate relevant questions for obtaining valid data based on Dahl’s theoretical argument on the coherence between liberalization and inclusiveness. I have now argued for, and presented, and operationalized (adjusted) version of Dahl’s indicators for this purpose. The table presents a set of components for liberalization respective to participation, with associated questions for use in the survey and in interviews.  

The Analysis of Exclusion
In this paragraph, I will turn towards the analysis of my data. The analysis is presented in two main parts. In the first part I will use my surveys from my fieldwork in February 2013 - 15 (KDI Findings), supported by my interview and other relevant sources, to argue the point of an unbalanced process of democratization in Kenya and the presence of exclusion. Second, I analyze existing democracy indices for the purpose of establishing further support for the same argument of exclusion in the process of democratization in Kenya by challenging my own findings.

Analytical Guidelines
The argumentation for exclusion is organized according to the two dimensions of democracy as presented earlier. Further, the two dimensions will then serve as the guiding analytical parameters and conclusions are drawn accordingly. Democracy in my modified interpretation of Dahl will be the yardstick against which I measure Kenyan democracy. I will begin with the dimension of liberalization and introduce trends and deductions from the questionnaires, followed and qualified by trends and deductions from the interviews. In the analysis of the respondents’ answers to my questions, I will also draw on external sources to validate my own findings. The same goes for the dimension of participation. The analysis of every question will be follow by two graphic illustrations. One graphic illustration displaying the distribution of answers on that particular question and one displaying a calculated “average trend” comparing three degrees of successful fulfillment of the question. First degree is respondents that say “yes”, second degree is respondents that say yes added with half of “to some extent” and third degree is respondents that say yes added with all of “to some extent”. Finally I will classify and present both dimensions graphically. Last but not least, to achieve as high a degree of validity as possible, I will again challenge these findings with a graphical

Further information on methodology and collection on data is available in chapter one.
presentations of existing democracy indices as the final argumentation for exclusion.

**The Dimension of Liberalization**

The questions introduced to cover this dimension were intended to investigate the respondents’ views on public confidence in democracy, freedom of expression and the level of competition. In this paragraph the analysis will reveal that the level of liberalization in Kenya is declining. The last three years Kenya has been moving down on this liberal dimension. Furthermore, the KDI survey indicates that the effect of reforming the judiciary and especially the expected long-term effect of the process of devolution will be determining for the continuation of development of political liberties. Let us look at the response to the questions from the respondents.

**Confidence in Democracy**

In the attempt to identify the public confidence in democracy, the survey introduces two questions. One directed towards democracy as a form of government, and one question directed towards the physical materialization of democracy, the constitution of 2010. This distinction between democracy as an idea and the constitution is important for at least two reasons. From the survey and the interviews done during the fieldwork we can see, that the general understanding of democracy is ambiguous in the sense that it is perceived as the “work of politicians”. Rarely is democracy viewed in an abstract and objective way, and as we shall see, the general trust in democracy is thus declining. Second, the constitution however, is perceived as a much more tangible and unambiguous document. It is far easier to relate to the constitution than to “the fluffy” idea of democracy. This situation is reflected in the survey, as an increasing trust in the constitution among Kenyans. The combination of the Kenyans’ responses to these two questions thus offers a more balanced view on the state of confidence in Democracy. Let’s have a closer look at the survey. To uncover the respondents’ views on the overall confidence in democracy the first question in the questionnaire is:

“Do you have a basic confidence in the democratic system you have in Kenya?”

**Statistical facts and findings**

Is there among the Kenyan citizens a common understanding that the democratic system is the right system to facilitate the governance of the country? Apparently not, judging from the KDI figures in the table, only around 25 % of the respondents express a basic confidence in the democratic system. Respondents who answered “to some extent” are
decreasing year by year, slowly moving towards expressing less and less confidence in the democratic system. Most significant is the fact that, almost half of the respondents say that they have no confidence in the democratic system. In general this question reveals a significant mistrust in democracy.

Diagram No.1 (3) The diagram presents the response rate for the KDI sample from 2013-2015 (Confidence in Democracy) Number of respondents according to the diagram. Statistical uncertainty is approximately at 6% for 2013 and 2.7% for 2014 and 2015. See appendix for further statistical details.

This trend of mistrust in democracy is supported by a survey done by Afro Barometer in January 2015. Despite two decades of democratization in Kenya, the levels of popular satisfaction with Kenya’s democracy have been declining dramatically, Afro Barometer argues.

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214 Kivuva, Joshua (2015) Afro Barometer, briefing paper no.152, A significant shift in perceptions of democracy and democratization, the number of respondents who consider Kenya either “not a democracy” or “a democracy with major problems” increased from 17% in 2003 to 47% in 2011
Diagram No. 2 (3) The diagram presents the calculated average response rate for the KDI sample in 2013 - 2015 (Confidence in Democracy). By comparing the yearly average response, a trend from the three survey years occurs.

In the second table, looking at the calculated average trend (consisting of “yes” respondents and half or all of “to some extent” respondents) we get the same picture for 2015 as Afro Barometer, a significant drop in the basic trust in democracy.

Analysis
Why are the Kenyans apparently losing confidence in democracy? I will suggest two main reasons for this behavior: First, the confusion of politics and democracy and, second, the level of formal education. As discussed in chapter two, the existence of inequality affects the relationship between the social context and various institutions in society in a negative way. That goes for democracy as well. Usually this effect results in excessive bureaucracy in the civil service, marginalization of weak citizens, widespread corruption, and ethnic tensions which again lead to the unequal distribution of food, shelter and access to education in society. Especially after the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010, the general expectation was that democracy would bring about better living conditions. According to the HDI figures presented in chapter two, Kenya is improving but not nearly fast enough. Ranking as No. 147 in 2013, with an index value at around 0.535, 215 is still not powerful enough to change living conditions significantly. In a state of a general disappointment and in search of an explanation for why change seems to be absent, people then

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215 Denmark’s HDI figure is 0.900. Denmark is ranked as no.10, for comparison.
put a face on their trouble and to some extent confused the abstract idea of democracy and contemporary political choices made by incompetent politicians. And the attitude towards politicians is generally not friendly. All the interviews I made during my fieldwork in Kenya unambiguously point towards significant mistrust in the politicians, as the following citation shows:

“In terms of our politicians uh...Kenyan politicians I don't trust them per se. I would not generalize, but there are individuals, a few individuals, that probably I trust, but the politicians, a majority of them they are people who go in there for the sake of their own interests for the sake of protecting their wealth for the sake of propagating for uh...we have the ethnic, the ethnic issue, ethnic interest and all that, so uh, our politicians, I would not generalize and I would not trust most of them. I don't trust most of them because um…I'm probably giving a justification of that most of them have been around for so long”\textsuperscript{216}

The second suggestion for explaining the lack of trust in democracy, that is, the level of formal education, is also related to inequality. Although Kenya has a relative well-established school system in general, especially the rural areas are lagging behind. Kenya made primary education free and compulsory in 2002, but many challenges remain, and there are concerns about the quality of education declining because of the increased intake of students.\textsuperscript{217} Many families also cannot afford books, a school uniform, stationery and transport and other expenses associated with schooling and the school facilities are usually inadequate. As stated by Mattes and Mughogho: “Increasing levels of formal education both enable and stimulate Africans to make greater use of the media to get news about politics.”\textsuperscript{218} Literacy in Nairobi, which is a precondition for using most media, is reported (KNALS 2007\textsuperscript{219}) to be between 82.5 and 85.6\%, which is relatively high. Roughly 8 out of 10 Kenyans in Nairobi can read. However, the low level of formal education in other regions\textsuperscript{220} is suggested (Mattes and Mughogho) to reduce the critical approach to democracy. “Even with the enormous challenges faced by Africa’s schools, students

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{216}] Quote from interview done in 2013 in Nairobi. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
\item[\textsuperscript{217}] UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/kenya/children_3795.html
\item[\textsuperscript{218}] Mattes and Mughogho (2009) The Limited Impacts of Formal Education on Democratic Citizenship in Africa, Department of Political Studies, The Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town and Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU), University of Cape Town. p. 30.
\item[\textsuperscript{219}] The Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey (KNALS) was conducted between June and August 2006 by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) in collaboration with the Department of Adult Education, UNESCO Nairobi Office
\item[\textsuperscript{220}] The urban areas recorded higher rates than rural areas. For example, Nairobi, the capital city, had an adult literacy rate of 87.1 \% while North Eastern Province had an adult literacy of 9.1 \%. (KNBS)
\end{itemize}
who move up the educational ladder and complete high school become more knowledgeable, more articulate and more critical democrats.  

Conclusion
Since 1996 a number of essential institutional initiatives have been introduced to strengthen democracy. The two most important is the introduction of the multi-party system and later, in 2010, the new constitution. Expectations, especially to the part on devolution, were high. Still, according to the survey KDI and Afro Barometer, Kenyans’ trust in democracy seems to have diminished year by year. As described earlier in chapter two, the social reality on the ground is increasingly dominating the democratic transition. In Africa, as in many other places of the world, the social reality on the ground revolves around the equal distribution of food, shelter and education in society. Due to the uneven impact of these socioeconomic effects, the democratic transition has not produced the economic benefits for the people as expected, and democracy as an idea is more or less wrongly blamed, and mistrust in democracy is thus increasing these years. The Kenyan Constitution determines in chapter one that the power belongs to the people. The constitution then stipulates the institutional framework for exercising that power.  

Let’s move along to the next question in the search of public confidence in democracy. The second question in the questionnaire is:

Do you have a basic confidence in the constitution of Kenya from 2010?

Statistical facts and findings
On the backdrop of the respondent’s relatively negative approach to the idea of democracy, we now turn to a more tangible and relatable version of democracy. Is there among Kenyan citizens a basic confidence in the constitution? Judging from the KDI survey, it seems like the Kenyans have relatively more trust in the constitution than in the idea of democracy. As illustrated in the table, the number of respondents who answered yes has increased from 2013 to 2015 by 17% (From 23% to 40%).

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222 Constitution of Kenya (CoK), chap. 1, part 1, paragraph 1, 2 and 3
Even corrected for the 6% statistical uncertainty, mainly caused by the low number of respondents in 2013, the increase is very visual. Furthermore, the survey also indicates that the increasing number of respondents that express confidence in the constitution are former “to some extent” respondents, since the respondents that express clear mistrust in the constitution are the most stable through all three years the survey runs. Looking at the calculated average response from the KDI survey, the trend is confirmed.
Diagram No. 4 (3) The diagram presents the calculated average response rate for the KDI sample in 2013 - 2015 (Confidence in Democracy). By comparing the yearly average responses, a trend from the three survey years emerges.

Finally, a survey done by Afro Barometer in 2013\textsuperscript{223} supports the trend that the constitution from 2010 is enjoying increasingly deeper trust and the constitution is, according to the same survey, believed to have had a positive impact on the appointments made in connection with Manning the judiciary. Finally, it is suggested\textsuperscript{224} by the International Crisis Group that the overwhelming support that the constitution was given in 2010 is no less than the very foundation for the future of Kenya. This is a very positive indicator for the implementation and the future application of the Kenyan constitution. While the embrace of democracy in general is approached reluctantly, the constitution seems to do better, but why?

Analysis

“I think where we stand right now, having promulgated our constitution, I really believe in the democratic system we have. I look at the electoral system; the reforms are just massive our judiciary; it’s great.”\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{223} Olool, Adams (2013) Afro Barometer, Brief 109
\textsuperscript{224} Kenya after the Election, Policy Brief, International Crises Group, Africa Briefing No. 94, May 15 2013 p.16
\textsuperscript{225} Quote from an interview done in January 2013 in Nairobi. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
“The institutions are strong, and the legislations that we have in place are very crucial in ensuring the institutions operate as required by the law and as demanded by the Kenyan people, who passed the Constitution”.

According to my two respondents in the opening quotation above, little doubt is left that the expectations to this second Kenyan constitution are extraordinary. The expectations seem to reach out toward the democratic system, the electoral system as well as the judiciary. How come the Kenyans apparently show the increasing confidence in the constitution, or rather the expected impact of the constitution?

I will suggest two reasons for this: the short-term effect of reforming the judiciary and the expected long-term effect of the process of devolution. First I find it probable that most Kenyans appreciate the legal reforms that followed the implementation of the new constitution’s chapter 10 in 2010. The reforms were unprecedented in the way they involved the public, and they began with the exit of the former Chief Justice, six months after the promulgating of the new constitution in 2010. This was followed by a transparent process, which for the first time saw applicants for the position of Chief Justice interviewed in the presence of the media. Second, and more important, I see the process of devolution causing the increasing confidence in the constitution. In 2010, the Kenyans enacted the new constitution, which led to the establishment of 47 county governments. After the March election of 2013, the county governments were formed according to the constitution’s chapter 11, Devolved Government. That included the election of county governors, deputy governors and representatives. These 47 new county governments are now responsible for the provision of health care, primary education, and maintenance of local infrastructure. To finance the county obligations, it is the idea that these county governments will receive a certain share of the national tax revenues. As a supplement to the national revenue, the county governments will also be allowed to raise tax revenue from within their counties. However, as always the existence of inequality still affects the relationship between the social context and various institutions in society in a negative way, resulting in excessive bureaucracy in the civil service, marginalization of weak citizens and not least widespread corruption. Although several visual indicators like construction projects and major highways and feeder roads across the country are undergoing upgrades and expansions, it remains to be seen if devolution meets its final objectives. So far the Kenyans have not lost the faith.

226 Ibid.
Conclusion
The purpose of combining of the Kenyans’ responses to the two different questions above was to offer a more balanced view of the Kenyans’ general state of confidence in Democracy. From the survey and the interviews done during the fieldwork, it became clear that the general understanding of democracy as a political concept is far more negative than the Kenyans’ approach to the constitution, which is likely to be perceived as much more tangible. How is the general confidence in democracy then? As discussed earlier, the road towards full democracy can begin with an increasing liberalization and later expand to include larger parts of the population (inclusiveness). Bearing in mind that only two out of 7 questions has been analyzed, it seems like the Kenyans’ confidence in democracy, during the 3-year survey period, is in a status quo so far. However, before the full development on the axis of liberalization can be uncovered, the last two questions have to be added.

Freedom of Expression
Regarding freedom of expression the Constitution of Kenya pronounces that every person has the right to freedom of expression.227 Freedom of expression is fundamental in establishing the liberal foundation in a democracy. To uncover the respondents’ view on this matter, the third question in the questionnaire is:

“Do you find that you can express your political opinion freely?”

Statistical Fact and Findings
Is there among the Kenyan citizens a basic sense of freedom to express and discuss political matters as intended by the constitution?

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227 CoK, chap. 4, part 2, paragraph 33
Diagram No. 5 (3) The diagram presents the response rate for the KDI sample from 2013-2015 (Freedom of Expression). Number of respondents according to the diagram. Statistical uncertainty is approximately 6% for 2013 and 2.7% in 2014 and 2015. See appendix for further statistical details.

During the three years of survey, the table show us that the percentage of respondents who answered yes to the question has declined from 52% to 34%, a drop around 18%. At the same time, the number of respondents who answered no has increased from 27% to 42%. Adding the calculated average trend in the same period, we find that the respondents find their constitutional right to freely express their political opinion increasingly problematic.
Diagram No. 6 (3) The diagram presents the calculated average response rate for the KDI sample in 2013-2015 (Freedom of expression). By comparing the yearly average response, a trend from the three survey years emerges.

Analysis
Freedom of Expression in Kenya improved considerably in the period between 1990 and 2005. In that period Kenyans increasingly expressed themselves without fear of the state arresting them, detain, or otherwise interfere with their expression. However, it was, and has always been, a fragile freedom. As late as in 2006, the government launched a raid against news media, The Standard, in Nairobi in order to arrest two journalists behind an article about an alleged meeting between the Kenyan President, Mwai Kibaki, and opposition leader Kalonzo Musyoka. This single example shows how easy many years of progress in the name of freedom of expression can be seriously compromised by just one event. Luckily Kenya managed to stay on the proactive track, where freedom of expression, primarily through the media became increasingly integrated. At least until yet another single event changed that. In August 2013 Al-Shabab attacked the shopping mall Westgate, and killing at least 67 and

\[ \text{Media release from the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative Friday 3 March 2006} \]
\[ \text{http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/new/2006/kenya%20_media_freedom_goes_up_in_smoke.pdf} \]

wounding at least 175. In the wake of the terrible incident, national security became the argument for the biggest intervention in press freedom since independence.\(^{230}\) Kenya, as many other countries in the region, is at the crossroads of balancing national security and freedom of expression. Many Kenyans think this legislation is a continuation of an unacceptable exercise of power by the Kenyan authorities and legislators, and a major death slide for freedom of speech. One of my respondents deepens that point. He argues that authorities to some extent are controlling the access to the media in a more covert way by controlling the distribution of licenses to transmit on available radio frequencies, and thereby limit the ability to freely communicate. My respondent argues as follows:

“There is an upper class that has taken control of communication channels, uh, I’ll give an example with, with the slum where I was born. We tried applying for radio station frequencies, I mean for the license, because the government has to give you that, but just because the name read it comes from that slum, they said no and you know, follow this, follow this; we will contact you”\(^{231}\)

In particular the Internet, with its new opportunities like Facebook and Twitter, has been a focus of research and debate. However, the findings from a survey conducted by Afro Barometer reveal that the radio remains the dominant channel for accessing news and expanding space for Freedom of Expression\(^{232}\). Thus it would be the obvious choice for the government for the purpose of manipulating and controlling freedom of Expression.

However, telecommunications and broadcasting sectors have since 1990 recorded phenomenal growth. The Kenyan media have been developing in an unpredictable and swiftly changing technological environment so it is also likely that licenses for radio broadcasts simply are a scarce resource. One of my respondents pointed out that some places the public opinion can be so polarized that it can become unhealthy to use your democratic right to express your political stands, since it can lead to violent raids among different ethnic groups. My respondent argues as follows:

“You know like these areas when I am campaigning, when I am talking to people, the messaging has to be slightly different. I am not ...while I feel free, to ...to ... to speak my opinion. I do know that there are some areas where you can't speak your opinions against specific candidates especially”\(^{233}\)

\(^{230}\) The Kenya Information and Communication Amendment Bill (KICA) and Media Council Bill (2013)

\(^{231}\) The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations


\(^{233}\) Ibid.
This statement corresponds with a survey done by Afro Barometer in 2011. In that survey the public’s views on the right to publish views and ideas without government control was targeted, and the number of respondents claiming their constitutional rights actually decreased between 2008 and 2011. This trend may partly be explained with the post-election violence, where freedom of expression and publication was thought to have contributed to the violence experienced.\textsuperscript{234} To avoid an unacceptable level of violence during the general Election in March 2013, the media did not report the violence that occurred at the Coast on election night\textsuperscript{235}. Furthermore, the violent protests in Kisumu and Kibera, all CORD strongholds, following the Supreme Court’s verdict were not reported by the media until the protests had been contained\textsuperscript{236}.

Conclusion

Freedom of speech is a constitutional right and it is an essential part in the process of democratization. Likewise is the access to alternative information like the press and these two variables are connected. Together they provide the citizens of Kenya with the ability to hold the elected members of parliament accountable for their political actions. Kenya has been on this track since the 1990, and with the promulgation of the new constitution, Kenya has taken yet another step in the right direction. However, the “self-censor ship” caused by the fear of ethnic violence, and later the balancing national security and freedom of expression, also threatens freedom of expression, and it shows how fragile freedom of expression is. Paragraph (2) of Article 33 in the constitution limits freedom of expression and as such leaves a “backdoor” for the government to enforce restriction in the name of national security. Besides being a useful tool for handling an outbreak of ethnic violence, it is also a dangerous road for the liberalization of a fundamental political right. During the three survey years, the Kenyans expressed that their freedom of speech was increasingly reduced. In the process of liberalization (democratization), this is problematic.

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{235} Paragraph (2) of Article 33 in the constitution limits freedom of expression by stating that it does not extend to: propaganda for war, incitement to violence, hate speech or advocacy of hatred that constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others or incitement to cause harm.
\textsuperscript{236} Kenya after the Election, Policy Brief, International Crises Group, Africa Briefing No. 94, May 15 2013 p. 3
Political Competition

The constitution of Kenya declares the following on the subject of multi-party political competition: Every person has the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate, to picket, and to present petitions to public authorities. To expose the respondents view on political competition, the fourth question in the questionnaire is:

“Do you find that all political parties enjoy the same possibilities to present their ideas?

Statistical facts and Findings

Turning towards political competition during the three survey years, it seems like the respondents are following the same negative trend, viewing the democratic transition, as indicated in the previous questions. Sixty-one percent of the respondents do not find that all political parties enjoy the same possibilities to present their ideas (“No” respondents have risen from 52% to 61%). Furthermore, we can see that since the number of respondents who answered “to some extent” is relatively stable, the negative increase is caused by respondents coming from the “yes” respondents. (“Yes” respondents have gone from 23% to 12%)

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237 CoK, chap. 4, part 2, paragraph 37, 38
Again, the calculated average trend supports the negative development in political competition. The average trend drops from 47% to 38%.

Last, on competition, as argued in a survey done by the Afro Barometer in 2012, Kenyans appear to be losing confidence in the value of multiparty competition. From 2008 until 2011 the confidence dropped 10%. A growing number of Kenyans view political parties as divisive and unnecessary. However, there is still a vast majority (2/3 of the respondents) that believes in political competition. Afro Barometer does not provide any explanation for why this trend is evolving, besides that Kenyans find the multi-party system “dividing and confusing”.

Analysis
Kenya introduced the multi-party system in 1991, primarily due to pressure from the West. It is often argued that this was an important step in the process of democratization, since it intensifies the political debate when competing in the arena of political ideas. However, based on the survey,

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239 Ibid. In 2005 73% and in 2012 61%, Afrobarometer
it seems like the idea of competition has not yet found its way into Kenyan politics. I suggest two explanations for that: First, we have the organization and foundation of the political parties and the partisanship that follows, and second is the parties’ possibility to compete. In Europe we usually categorize our political parties from left to right on an ideological scale. In Kenya that does not seem to be the case. One of my respondents argues the following:

“First and foremost we don’t have political parties; we have groups of people who come together, and they call themselves political parties. We don't have political parties by definition and have people who can say I'm from this political party I believe in this ideology, this is what I stand for.”

Judging from this statement, the forming of a political party in Kenya is not entirely ideologically based as we see it in Europe (left-, center and right-wing parties). As a consequence, partisanship and political competition based on political ideas are slightly different in the political arena in Kenya. So if the parties are not entirely based on ideology, on what do they then build their political argumentation? One of my respondents argues:

“Um, we don't have that here (Ed. Ideology). It is not an ideology; it’s a lot on tribe. (Ed. continues later) So even if you see how the coalitions are made, it’s about numbers...which numbers do you bring in...”

Based on these two statements, a political “Party Profile” is beginning to form. One could argue that since the democratic tradition, also involving competing ideas, apparently is weak in Kenya, a more pragmatic approach is introduced. To win a democratic election you need votes (numbers) and that is where mobilization of tribal relations comes in handy. The political party in Kenya then becomes a relatively weak political construction with a strong ethnic bias, as we saw indications of during the election in March 2013.

241 See further discussion on ideology in Africa and Kenya in chapter two
242 The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
243 Ideology exists in Africa. See the detailed discussion in chapter two
244 The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
As shown in the diagram\textsuperscript{246} above, the two biggest alliances during the general election in March 2013 was the CORD and the JUBILEE. These two alliances respectively comprise a high representation of the Lou tribe (Raila Odinga) and the Kikuyu tribe (Uhuru Kenyatta). However, it could be the case that the majority of these two tribes had different political ideals, which only could be fulfilled by the two parties respectively. But comparing the political programs we find that they are very much alike. According to an Ipsos survey from January,\textsuperscript{247} the political priorities between the two major groups of voters (CORD and JUBILEE) are identical. Both groups argue that high costs of living, lack of employment, crime, poor leadership and corruption are the top five political priorities. It is important to notice that having the same political priorities does not necessarily rule out the use of different political tools. However, it still very likely that the decision to choose one alliance instead of the other is based on issues apart from political priorities, which brings us back to the two statements on tribe vs. ideology, made by my respondents. It is likely that the tribal preferences dominate the political choice, as suggested by Eifert, Miguel and Posner.\textsuperscript{248}

Second, we have the Kenyans’ view on the possibility to compete and not least the necessity of competing. As presented earlier the media plays an important role when delivering political messages and collecting support for political ideas. Therefore, access to the about 90 radio stations on air

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics{chart.png}
\caption{Diagram (out of sequence), from IPSOS SYNOVATE, Survey from 25\textsuperscript{th} of January 2013, Please note that this is measuring of opinion, not actual key figures from election.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{246} IPSOS SYNOVATE Survey from 25\textsuperscript{th} of January 2013.
\textsuperscript{247} IPSOS Political Barometer Survey: Prepared by Ipsos Synovate Kenya. Release Date: 25 January 2013
across the country, a dozen TV channels and several daily newspapers\textsuperscript{249} is paramount in political campaigns like the one we saw in March 2013 in Kenya. However, one of my respondents suggested that the announced equal access to the media is contested:

“The question that is now arises is that who can control the media, because media is the platform and the channel that that… that, uh, enables people to… to… to sell their values”\textsuperscript{250}

Regarding the alleged limited access to the media as put forward by my respondent, I find two arguments in support of that thesis. First, in a report financed by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 2010, it is argued that the government attitude towards media and communication is a “necessary evil” and only “grudgingly” changing for the better. Furthermore, in the same report, it is argued that the media in Kenya have been moving towards a monopoly and concentrating ownership in a few hands. Media owners with strong political affiliations tend to be politically co-opted and influence editorial policy in line with their persuasions.\textsuperscript{251} However, as mentioned earlier, the Kenyan media have been developing in an unpredictable environment since the 1996.\textsuperscript{252} These conditions could easily have affected the government ability to deliver satisfactory solutions within this area and thereby support the perception of a government grudgingly hampering competition for not so honorable reasons. Second, when it comes to the unlucky marriage between privatization of the media and objectivity in the editorial work, Kenyan news media just “joins the club”. It is a recurrent problem in every democracy, even in the Danish one. To some extent voters are left to trust that the different newsrooms make their own objective judgment as basis for their respective editorial lines.

However, as already argued, it is probable that the real political choices based on ideology still have not proved competitive to the high degree of choices based on ethnic preferences.\textsuperscript{253} In that case the post-election violence in 2007 serves as an example of “what’s the point?” The small parties and alliances do not stand a chance against the ethnic numbers, so why bother? This type of resignation can explain the trend shown by the KDI survey and argued by Afro Barometer.

\textsuperscript{249} http://infoasaid.org/guide/kenya/media/media-overview
\textsuperscript{250} The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
\textsuperscript{251} Oriare, Okello Oralle and Ugangu. (2010), The Media We Want. The Media Vulnerability Study Report. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
\textsuperscript{252} The first private radio station in Kenya went “on air” in 1996.
Conclusion
Judging from the three years of KDI survey, and the Afro Barometer survey, it seems like the idea of competition has not yet found its way into Kenyan politics. The analysis suggests that traditional ideologically based political competition has not yet put down roots in the Kenyan soil. Events like the post-election violence in 2007 to some extent challenge the idea that small parties can make it against the “numbers”. Furthermore the analysis indicates that the access to and the objectivity from the media are challenging multi-party competition.

Conclusion on the Dimension of Liberalization
As the attempt to establish the first half of Kenya’s Democratic Profile, this section intended to investigate the respondents’ views on public confidence in democracy, freedom of expression and the level of competition by analyzing the response to the four questions in the KDI survey 2013 - 2015. Together these components constitute the dimension of liberalization, that is, the liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of the second dimension, political participation. The analysis was supported by interviews done during my fieldwork in Kenya. In order to validate own findings, external materials are brought in and discussed as well. How is the liberal transition proceeding? From a general perspective, and primarily on the basis of the KDI survey, the liberal transition is not moving in the right direction. As pointed out by Dahl, any regime that moves up and to the right is in some process of democratization, regardless of which “road” is taken. However, the past three years Kenya has been moving downward in this liberal dimension. Only the respondents’ views on the new constitution seem to improve. The new constitution from 2010 seems to stand as the single most important political achievement in Kenya since independence. The constitution is widely viewed as a very important precondition for consolidating the multi-party democracy in Kenya. The KDI survey indicates that the effect of reforming the judiciary and especially the expected long-term effect of the process of devolution will be determining for the continued development of political liberties.

The Dimension of Participation
The questions introduced to shed light on this second dimension and to investigate the respondents’ views on equality and inclusiveness in the democratic process is operationalized into three components. The three

254 See discussion on ideology in Africa and Kenya in chapter 2
components are Economic arrangement, Code of Conduct and Minorities and Marginalization. In this paragraph the analysis will reveal a greater consistency among the respondents and the level of participation in Kenya as significantly low. Again, let us look at the response to the questions from the respondents, one at the time.

**Economic Arrangements**
The Constitution of Kenya announces the economic and social rights in chapter four. It is implied that the state, through the appropriate institutions and legislation, shall provide and dedicate sufficient economic resources for upholding these rights. Therefore, the fifth question in the questionnaire is:

“Do you think that your politicians are honest about their financial arrangements in the conduct of duties”?

**Statistical Facts and Findings**
Quickly it becomes clear that respondents do not think that their politicians are honest about their financial arrangements in the conduct of duties. A majority throughout the survey years (49% - 66%) of the respondents answer “no” to the question. That is a relatively high degree of invariability to this question on economic arrangements and it presents the overall group of respondents as unprecedentedly homogenous in the negative answer to the question. Adding the calculated average response, we see that this has been an increasing trend throughout the survey years.

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256 As mentioned under the section called vertical organization in this chapter
257 CoK, chapter 4, part 2, paragraph 43
Diagram No. 9 (3) The diagram presents the response rate for the KDI sample from 2013-2015 (Economic arrangements). Number of respondents is according to the diagram. Statistical uncertainty is approximate 6% for 2013 and 2.7% for 2014 and 2015. See appendix for further statistical details.

Diagram No. 10 (3) The diagram presents the calculated average response rate for the KDI sample in 2013-2015 (Economic arrangements). By comparing the yearly average responses, a trend from the three survey years emerges.

**Analysis**

Judging only from the registered answers from the survey, it seems as if no matter from which ethnic background the respondent comes, no matter what level of education the respondent has, very little trust is placed in the politicians (MP), if anything at all, when it comes to the handling of
official funds. It seems to be a very clear and unambiguous statement from the respondents, but why? During one of my interviews in mid-January 2013, among other things, we were talking about the passing of the motion on “the send-off package”\(^\text{258}\) by the Kenyan parliament in which the MP had given themselves a lifelong diplomatic status, a statesman’s funeral as well as other privileges. My respondent argues as follows:

“I think you have to look at our political system as an extractive system, so people are getting in to get out... to what they can benefit for personal gain.”\(^\text{259}\)

This statement indicates a corrupt political system where the primary goal for a politician is personal gains instead of serving the people of Kenya. We know that kind of system from many places around the world, even Denmark. However, it does not necessarily involve corruption. Another of my respondents addresses corruption more directly when he says:

“But because of[ ] corruption issues in Kenya that is still a big problem. Just to give you an example of the utilization of the Constituency Development Funds: it is a lot of money and most of those constituencies and most of those MPs failed the test of implementation so, uh, some of them tried opportunities of, uh, making underground deals engaging in corrupt acts, looting the money, you know”\(^\text{260}\)

The KDI survey together with the interviews provides a picture of a political system and of government institutions that to some extent all are involved in corruption. That trend is coherent with several other surveys and reports from which I shall mention the most important in support of my own findings. In 2012 Transparency International rated Kenya as number 137 of 176 countries involved in the survey.\(^\text{261}\) Furthermore, in another survey from 2012, the Kenyan Police ranks as the fourth most corrupt institution in East Africa.\(^\text{262}\) All in all, not a very flattering position for Kenya. Unfortunately, it seems like corruption has been a widespread phenomenon for years. According to a report from the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission released in May 2013, there is a long history of Grand Corruption\(^\text{263}\) in Kenya, a history that reveals how corruption has

\(^{258}\) The Newspaper article on the “send-off package”, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/difference-between-a-politicain-and-a-statesman/

\(^{259}\) The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.

\(^{260}\) The mission of the Constituency Development Funds (CDF) is to provide leadership and policy direction in the optimal utilization of devolved funds for equitable development and poverty reduction at the community level. http://www.cdf.go.ke

\(^{261}\) http://www.transparency.org/country#KEN

\(^{262}\) East African Bribery Index (EABI), Transparency International

\(^{263}\) The report differs between grand corruption and petty corruption. Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission released in May 2013, volume 2B, p. 344
deprived the people of Kenya of millions of Shillings and kept inequality alive. This money was meant to have been spent on securing their constitutional rights and their ability to participate in the democratic procedures. The report mentions four serious cases (The Ken Ren Scandal 1971, The Goldenberg Scandal 1991, The Charter House Scandal 2004 and the Anglo-Leasing Scandal 2004). To exemplify the magnitude of this grand corruption, a few cases have to be presented. One episode, also known as the “Goldenberg Scandal”\textsuperscript{264}, which began in 1991, was a massive economic scheme based on illegal and irregular foreign exchange claims and dubious export compensation for gold and diamond jewelry exports. This case deprived the Kenyan taxpayers of over 60 billion Shillings (approximately USD 750 million). The scam was exposed by a whistle-blower who leaked the compromising material to the Daily Nation. Another case is the Anglo-Leasing scandal. The scandal started in 2001 when the government wanted to replace its old passport printing system. The Daniel Arab Moi government signed an overwhelming USD 443.36 million worth of contracts with a fictitious company, Anglo-Leasing and Finance Ltd. In January 2003, the Kibaki government allegedly repeated the fraud by signing an additional USD 277.7 million worth of contracts with the fictitious company. According to Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, The Githongo\textsuperscript{265} Dossier reveals that the case involved the senior-most officials in the Kibaki regime, the majority of whom were the President’s closest officials.

Judging from these cases alone it is understandable why elected politicians in general have a very low legitimacy rate among the Kenyans. Apparently, the political establishment in Kenya, even from the highest officials can be linked to corruption, which basically can explain the very coherent but also highly negative response to my survey. Even though these cases of corruption do not have a direct impact on the Kenyans’ everyday economy (like the petty corruption does), it has an indisputable indirect effect, especially on the people that need it most. A quite recent report (2013) from the African Centre for Open Governance (AFRICOG) is a very illustrative example of that. The report\textsuperscript{266} directs a fierce critique at the administration of the Arid Lands Resource management Project (ALRMP). The project was set to mitigate the effects of drought and poverty in arid and semi-arid areas, especially in the north-eastern part of Kenya (Tana

\textsuperscript{264} Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission released in May 2013, volume 2B, p. 360

\textsuperscript{265} John Githongo was the whistle-blower in the Anglo-Leasing scandal

River, Wajir, etc.). These areas are already burdened by severe poverty-related problems, and for Tana River alone the suspected fraud amounts to 44% (37,533,000 KES) of the total amount set aside to mitigate these problems. Allegedly, the money was used to pay fictive expenditures and thereby funneled into the wrong pockets. The presence of corruption is a fact in Kenya, and judging from available reports and surveys, incl. the KDI survey, it is present on an extensive scale. It is therefore probable to suggest that the involvement of elected officials in corruption can explain the very coherent, but also highly negative response to question No. 5.

**Conclusion**

In a democratic understanding, participation is much more than the opportunity to cast your vote every fourth year. It is also about equality and inclusiveness, the ability to fully participate in the democratic system and enjoy the constitutional rights, as pointed out by Dahl. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes corruption as a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that affects all societies all over the world.\(^\text{267}\) Corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to government instability, the organization argues. Corruption works against the democratic transition and participation on these particular areas and it violates the very fundamental ambition stated in the Kenyan constitution. The ambition mentioned to provide all Kenyans with a reasonable standard of living. In the report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission released in May 2013 we find a clear statement that corruption violates the right to political participation. Bribeing voters and election officials makes corruption incompatible with a free and fair electoral process, it says. With the probable level of corruption established in this section, we can conclude that participation in the democratic procedures in a free and equal fashion is challenged by the presence of corruption. It affects the voting procedures but more important it affects the Kenyans ability to enjoy their constitutional rights of a fair standard of living in their everyday life between elections.

**Code of Conduct**

On the subject of Code of Conduct among state officials, public or private, the Constitution of Kenya\(^\text{268}\), among several things, announces that he or she must avoid any conflict between personal interests and public or

\(^{267}\) The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

\(^{268}\) CoK, chapter. 6, paragraph 75.
official duties. As presented in the CoK, the Code of Conduct refers to the professional behavior of the State officer,\textsuperscript{269} normally a civil servant. However, the code of conduct also applies to elected state officers normally referred to as politicians or Members of Parliament (MP). Therefore, the sixth question in the questionnaire is:

“Do you think that your politicians use their political power to favor certain groups or individuals”?

Statistical Facts and Findings
Again we see a predominant consistency amongst the respondents in their response. A majority of the respondents answer, “Yes”, to the question. Seventy-one percent of the respondents think that their politicians use their political power to favor certain groups or individuals.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{axis}[
    symbolic x coords={Yes, Some extent, No},
    xtick=data,
    ybar,
    bar width=0.5cm,
    enlarge x limits=0.5,
    
    % Add legend
    legend style={at={(0.5,1.05)},anchor=north},
    
    % Add data
    
    % February 2013 (264)
    
    % February 2014 (1296)
    
    % February 2015 (1379)

\end{axis}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Diagram No.11 (3) The diagram presents the response rate for the KDI sample from 2013-2015 (Code of Conduct) Number of respondents according to the diagram. Statistical uncertainty is approximate 6\% for 2013 and 2.7\% for 2014 and 2015. See appendix for further statistical details.

During the three years of survey, the numbers does not drop below 60\% and ends in 2015 at 68\%. Only a small percentage of the respondents, between 12\% and 16\%, seem to have some confidence in the politicians elected. Of the seven question introduced in the KDI survey, this is the strongest statement given from the respondents. Apart from a small rise in the confidence, representing about 4\% from 2013 to 2014, the calculated

\textsuperscript{269} According to Goode professionalism is a “prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge”
average trend on question no. 6, confirms the very low confidence in the politicians’ ability to handle their official duties without favoring certain groups or individuals. Summing up the statistic facts, the answer to this question on “Code of Conduct” has presented the overall group of respondents as very homogenous in the rejection of an existing code of conduct.

![Diagram](image)

Diagram No. 12 (3) The diagram presents the calculated average response rate for the KDI sample in 2013 - 2015 (Code of Conduct). By comparing the yearly average response, a trend from the three survey years emerges. Notice that this question has “no” as a successful fulfillment of the question.

**Analysis**

The KDI survey reveals a deep mistrust in politicians’ ability to not compromise any public or official interest in favor of a personal interest. It seems as if no matter which kind of ethnic, social or educational background you belong to, the idea of a politician that works for his country and not for himself is an illusion. But how can it be? One of my respondents points out what looks like the beginning of an explanation. (Ed. talking about children whose parents were into politics)

“They were left with this big shoe, and it’s a curse. It’s a curse, I don't know whether it’s a curse or they like or they don’t, but, uh, you feel, uh, the society or the community feels like you just have to step in there or you have an arrogant attitude because your father was this you were cut to lead people, uh, I …this I think is a phenomena that we are seeing in the in the whole of Africa. Kabila (tribe) and Kabila (tribe) you know that kind of a thing and now we have Uhuru Kenyatta and so forth and also. ”

From this statement, at least two questions seem to arise. First, why is the community expecting a certain family name to rule, and second, what is the “Kabila phenomenon”? Regarding the expectations raised from the

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270 The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
community, it could be explained as one half of a survival strategy, building on an interdependent relationship between a leader and his community. My respondent explains the following from his many years of living in a slum area in Nairobi.

“It’s where the politics started when I look back in the slums the person who would become a politician is the first person who owned a shop in that area or the first person who owned a (Ed. Unknown word, car) because whenever somebody gets sick, they would take them to the… to the hospital. It doesn't matter whether you pay him to take you there, but he's afforded the opportunity to show that he has something that others don't have. And because they feel like, oh, he has done us a favor or something, so it is up to you or because if you feel like a shopkeeper you owe him because you haven't paid something whenever there is an opportunity, you flatter him and you tell him why don't you stand here; we will give you this opportunity.”

Judging from my respondent’s statement, the interdependent relationship is based on the shopkeeper that provides services for the community in return for the support of the community. Swapping the shopkeeper with Uhuru Kenyatta as suggested by my respondent, we have a family that successfully has provided services for a certain community in return for their support for many years. The survival strategy is clear: by keeping your man in power your chances for survival increase, which explains the community expectation to the shopkeeper very well. Second, the Kabila phenomenon, what is it? Kabila means tribe in Swahili. My respondent is very likely referring to the ethnic preferences in Kenya. Seeing ethnicity in the light of the survival strategy, I mentioned before is only logical, and it is probable that the ethnically based community is as a way of strengthening the survival strategy, choosing their leader from their own ethnic base. If I were to name this interdependent relationship based on providing services for the ethnic community in return for the support of the ethnic community, I would use the word neo-patrimonialism. In the book “Third World Politics, An introduction”, Christopher Clapham defines neo-patrimonialism as a "form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines." It is a system in which an office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of the private and public spheres, Clapham continues. Now, the last part of the statement made by Christopher Clapham is worth noticing. The patron-client relationship can be a positive way of

271 The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.

legitimizing power, as pointed out by Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston\textsuperscript{273} in their case study of Botswana. However, introducing democracy as presented in the Kenyan constitution, and at the same time running an “informal system” based on giving and granting of favors do not go very well together.

Actually it cannot exist at the same time, according to the definition brought forward by Christian von Soest in his article from 2010.\textsuperscript{274} “Neopatrimonialism” is a mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of domination: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination”. Furthermore, he suggests that the neo-patrimonial influence on a society varies on a continuum between the two extremes of legal-rational and patrimonial institutions. Basically, this logic provided by Soest applies very well when estimating the impact of neo-patrimonialism in Kenya.

In a democratic transition, it is vital that the Kenyans’ loyalty is placed with the government (legal-rational) and not with the community patron (patrimonial). Judging from the response to my survey that is apparently not the case, but we can come a bit closer to establishing a more precise picture of patrimonial impact by looking at the phenomenon over time. After the election in 2013 the Afro Barometer published a survey that indicated that since 2005, there have been increasing numbers of Kenyans who choose their national identity as Kenyans before their ethnic identity. Furthermore, for the first time in 2011, a majority of Kenyans (56%, consisting of green 11% and green 45%) expressed that they felt more strongly connected to their identity as Kenyans than to their ethnic community (See illustration from Afro Barometer below).

It is the development towards a national identity that from a democratic point of view is interesting. According to the Afro Barometer, the democratic transition is taking place, albeit at a relatively slow pace. However, the fact that around 44% of the population still have their ethnic identity as an equal or prevailing factor supports the idea that the patrimonial impact is a variable, as suggested by Soest, and in the case of Kenya the society gradually is moving towards a lower patrimonial impact. In slightly different terms one could say that what we are witnessing is the traditional power relations based on old African culture trough centuries

\textsuperscript{274} Soest, Christian von, (2010), What neopatrimonialism is, Six question to the concept. GIGA (Paper to be presented at the workshop “Neopatrimonialism in Various World Regions” 23 August 2010, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies)
being challenged by modernity\textsuperscript{275} and gradually replaced with new powers structures.

![Diagram](image.png)

Diagram (out of sequence) Afro Barometer, Ethnic or Kenyan Identity in 2011

**Conclusion**

As presented in the CoK, the Code of Conduct refers to the professional behavior of the State officer, including the ability to separate official duties and private preferences. This professional behavior is meant to secure that the common resources are equally distributed according to the constitutional rights. Given the fact that almost half of the Kenyan population, to a large degree, declares loyalty to their ethnic community before anything else gives rise to concern, at least from a democratic point of view. The feeling of being excluded in the democratic process is a personal feeling as well as a collective feeling, and it works directly against the idea of participation, presented by Dahl as equality and inclusiveness. On the personal level it weakens the personal trust and encourages individuals to look for protection outside the state institutions. On a community level, it feeds the idea of the client as the only viable survival strategy and raises hope for a patron to reach power by a shortcut. With the level of community loyalty made established in this section, it is likely believable that participation in the democratic procedures is challenged by the present of neo-patrimonialism. It negatively affects the Kenyans’ ability to enjoy their constitutional rights regarding participation in the democratic transition.

Minorities and Marginalization

On the subject of minorities and marginalization\textsuperscript{276} the Constitution of Kenya (CoK) lays out the rights for minorities in chapter four, part three. However, the analysis focuses on how these rights are adopted in the daily routines of fairness and whether marginalization of minorities effects political participation. On that account, the CoK announces the following statement among several. The State shall put in place affirmative action programs designed to ensure that minorities and marginalized groups participate and are represented in governance and other spheres of life.\textsuperscript{277} As presented in the CoK, the minority rights are, among other things, concerned with ensuring minorities’ participation in the democratic process between elections. As stated in a report from the Minority Rights Group International (MRG) from 2005,\textsuperscript{278} “The recognition of minorities and indigenous peoples would contribute to the preservation of their identities and enable them to obtain equality with other groups in that state, including in relation to participation in political life as well as in development matters”. Therefore, the seventh question in the questionnaire is:

Do you think that your civil servants give a fair and equal treatment to all Kenyan citizens?

Statistical Facts and Findings

Again we see a predominant consistency amongst the respondents. A clear majority of the respondents do not find that their civil servants give a fair and equal treatment to all Kenyan citizens, including minorities and marginalized groups. The number of respondents who had answered “no” to question no. seven has increased during all three years of survey, from 53\% in 2013 to 64\% in 2015. The number of respondents who answered “to some extent” in the survey remains fairly stable through the three years, with only 4\% of variation. The movement of numbers primarily takes place from the “yes” to the “no” respondents.

\textsuperscript{276} The definition of a minority is contested, however the Government of Kenya acknowledge the UN definition as in http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Minorities/Booklet_Minorities_English.pdf as reflected in the constitution under section 260, Marginalized groups.

\textsuperscript{277} CoK, chap. 3, paragraph 56.

\textsuperscript{278} Minority Rights Group International (MRG) (2005), Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity. Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, with a preface by Yash Ghai
Diagram No. 13 (3) The diagram presents the response rate for the KDI sample from 2013-2015 (Political Competition). Number of respondents according to the diagram. Statistical uncertainty is approximately 6% for 2013 and 2.7% for 2014 and 2015. See appendix for further statistical details.

Diagram No. 14 (3) The diagram presents the calculated average response rate for the KDI sample in 2013-2015 (Code of Conduct). By comparing the yearly average response, a trend from the three survey years emerges.

Adding the result from the calculated average response also indicates that the public trust in all Kenyans receiving fair and equal treatment is decreasing to as low as approximately 24% in February 2015. Summing up, the answer to this question on “Minorities and Marginalization” has, three times in a row, presented the overall group of respondent as somewhat homogenous. The respondents apparently doubt that all Kenyans, including minorities and marginalized groups, are getting the services they are entitled to according to the constitution. According to the KDI survey, the trust appears to be decreasing year by year.
Analysis
As mentioned above, the overall response in the KDI survey is quite unambiguous and states relatively clearly that not everybody feels fairly and equally treated by the government. In the previous question, we clearly saw the lack of trust in the politicians, but why do the majority of the respondents feel that not all Kenyans are receiving fair treatment from the government? Interviews I have done during fieldwork draw up a more detailed picture of the mistrust, ranging from a complete recognition of marginalization as a government instrument to a more nuanced approach, emphasizing the cultural differences between marginalized groups. But before we turn to these interviews, let us have a brief look at minorities and marginalization in Kenya. Who is a minority, who is marginalized and how is it imposed? As mentioned earlier, being a marginalized community is also a matter of definition. However, the definition used in the CoK must be perceived as sufficient and comprehensive when compared to international standards, as mentioned.

Furthermore it is important to keep in mind that being a minority group does not automatically involve marginalization, although this is often the case. Generally, minority groups are known to include national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as some migrants, refugees and indigenous peoples.\(^{279}\) In Kenya minorities are identified non-Africans such as Kenyan Asians religious minorities such as Muslims, Hindus and those who follow traditional African religions, ethno-linguistic minorities such as Nubians and indigenous peoples such as pastoralists and hunter-gatherers.\(^{280}\) Looking at minorities and marginalization in relation to democratic participation, one minority group is of a particular interest, and that is the Kenyan Muslims. At least for three reasons the Kenyan Muslims constitute an excellent example of why including minority groups are important in the effort to support a nation in democratic transition. Apart from being the biggest religious minority in Kenya\(^{281}\), especially in the costal areas, Muslims are very vocal in their desire to secede (Mombasa Republican Council) from Kenya,\(^{282}\) and it is a minority group with an “international reputation”, which I will get back to. Muslims are a minority

\(^{279}\) Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission released in May 2013, volume 2C, p. 211
\(^{280}\) Ibid. p. 212.
\(^{281}\) Islam constitutes 11% of religious belief in Kenya. http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=3955
\(^{282}\) Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) The separatist group has a large network with registered members spread across the Coast area of Kenya
group, but are they marginalized and are unable to fully participate in the integrated and social and economic life of Kenya as a whole? My respondent thinks not, as he states:

"Um, what I would say, um, there's… there are so many dimensions to the coast… the coast the problem at the coast region. There are issues of marginalization that I agree with. I would not blame the government per se, but I would blame their leaders. Over the time, all this group, they have had position; they have had leaders who represent them in parliaments they have received allocations of constituency development funds they have had ministerial positions even to to the people who come from those regions. Look at tourism. Mombasa is one of the greatest tourist regions in the region you know. Every single year every single election year the Ministry of Tourism is given to Mombasa." 

One Muslim, Nijab Balala, has been holding the chair in the ministry of tourism for quite some time (2008 – 2012), but the new minister (2013) is not a Muslim. Also in the parliament we find Muslim representation. At the time of the interview The National Assembly had 32 Muslims out of 222. But if the Muslims feel marginalized, is it then mostly self-inflicted? My respondent continues with an explanation:

"I would say very confidently that those who work mainly (Ed. In Mombasa) are people from up country. They call them Bara, people from Bara. As long as you are not from the coast, you're from Bara. Those who work aggressively are people from the other regions who go there and exploit the opportunities. But if you look at, uh, the terms of their own engagements, performance of their schools it's low. It's very very below standard compared to other regions. It has to do with culture, political representation, and that has had a lot of effect in terms of their development and, uh, the issue of marginalization and, uh, all that." 

Judging from these two statements given by one of my respondents, allegedly, Muslims in Kenya are offered the same possibilities as everyone else. They have representatives in the parliament and the government (until 2013). However, due to cultural differences between Kenyan Christians and Kenyan Muslims, the Muslims are not able to exploit their opportunities and the idea of marginalization becomes the Muslims’ main argument.

This perception of Muslims as different and more or less causing their marginalization themselves, may have its roots back to the days of independence. As the British administration was preparing to pass leadership of the state to the Kenyan-Christian elites, the Muslims on the coast and the Kenyan Somali Muslims in the Northern Frontier District were agitating for secession, fighting for their privileges. After the

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284 The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
285 Ibid.
286 Ndzovu, Hassan J. Muslim Relations in The Politics of Nationalism and Secession in Kenya
terrorist attacks in Kenya in August 1998, an international reputation was created and the prevalent perception of Muslims in Kenya is now a group of religious fundamentalists, who will “cause problems and even kill on account of their religion”.\textsuperscript{287} In the following year, many Muslims were feared and labeled as ‘terrorists’, allegedly with international connections to primarily Al-Shabab in Somalia. As the international “Global war on terror” (GWOT) increased, beginning with the terror attack in the US in 2001, the situation for the Muslims deteriorated. The Kenyan government published the Terrorism Bill in 2003. The Bill as drafted was considered contrary to the fundamental rights and freedoms under the Kenyan Constitution. Among other things the bill allows the police to arrest people and search property without authority from the court, and allows investigators to detain suspected terrorists for 36 hours. The bill was rejected in parliament, mostly because the Muslims minority felt targeted and not able to obtain equal democratic rights as other groups in Kenya, including in relation to participation in the democratic process.

Conclusion
The KDI survey on “Minorities and Marginalization” has presented the respondents as homogenous in their response. They clearly reject that fair treatment is extended to all citizen. The result of my survey falls in line with reports like the Minority Rights Group International (MRG) from 2005 and the Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) from 2013. Both reports conclude that marginalization is taking place and that it deprives minorities in obtaining their political rights and participation on equal terms with the majority of Kenyans. In the TJRC report (2013) the committee\textsuperscript{288} stated that “there are discriminatory practices against Kenyan Muslims in the issuance of national Identity Cards and Passports” and that there was evidence that “Kenyan Muslims have been unlawfully removed from Kenya to foreign countries without due process of the law”. Furthermore, The Committee established that there is a serious shortage of Islamic Religious Teachers (IRE), particularly in areas where Muslims are a minority. In various learning institutions the freedom of worship as guaranteed in the Constitution is not observed. The example with the religious minority (Muslims) chosen in this section illustrates the drastic consequences of marginalization. Not addressing the

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\textsuperscript{287} Minority Rights Group International (MRG) (2005), Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity. Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, with a preface by Yash Ghai. p. 18.

\textsuperscript{288} The Presidential Special Action Committee to Address Specific Concerns of the Muslim Community in Regard to Alleged Harassment and/or Discrimination in the Application/Enforcement of the Law (TJRC p. 287)
Conclusion on the Dimension of Participation

As the attempt to establish the second half of Kenya’s Democratic Profile, this paragraph was to investigate the respondents’ views on Economic Arrangement, Code of Conduct and Minorities and Marginalization by analyzing the responses to the three questions in the KDI survey, supported by interviews done during fieldwork in Kenya. In order to qualify own findings, external materials are introduced and discussed as done during the analysis of the first dimension. Let’s begin with a short summary of the analysis so far.

Together these components constitute the dimension of political participation. When it comes to the dimension of participation, how is the transition proceeding? From a general perspective and primarily on the basis of the KDI survey, the transition is not moving in the right direction. Bearing in mind that any regime that moves up and to the right is in some process of democratization regardless of which “road” it is taking. However, the last three years Kenya has been moving downward on this dimension of participation. Judging from this analysis, the overall conclusion on the dimension of participation is clear and unambiguous. By excluding elections as a component in the measurement of the level of participation, we find a strong indication that the level of participation in Kenyan everyday life is inadequate. From reasons originating from corruption, patrimonialism and marginalization Kenyans feel excluded or at best distanced from the democratic process. It is therefore permissible to draw the preliminary conclusion that participation, here understood as economic arrangements, code of conduct and minorities and Marginalization all together, is predominantly low.

Consolidating the Investigation on Exclusion (KDI)

In the previous section, I established an argument of exclusion by analyzing data from fieldwork done in Kenya from 2013 - 2015 (KDI Findings), supported by interviews and other relevant external sources. The aim was to investigate the unbalanced process of democratization in Kenya and the presence of exclusion. I will now turn towards consolidation of the
argument by analyzing own and existing democracy indices for the purpose of validating own findings. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I have let myself inspire by a methodological approach, used by Tilly in an analysis on how the political and economic development in Venezuela influenced the democratic development. By applying Freedom House’s yearly rating into a diagram, he manages to visualize the democratic development in relation to the economy through a number of selected years. The ambition is to do almost the same. Not only with my own finding but also with other professional indices as well. The consolidation will fall in two parts. First, I will outline how I turn my survey into a visual presentation by adding up the calculated average trend for each question and transforming this result into the diagram. The method is used for both the dimension of liberalization and participation (inclusion). Second, I will present existing indices in the same type of diagram to establish the ability to compare my survey with other and much larger surveys. As we shall see, the result is surprising because a trend of exclusion is traceable in all of the chosen indices. Only the impact of the trend fluctuates from case to case. But as pointed out by Geraldo L. Munck, because democracy has not been systematically defined there is only a weak link between the components and the subject being measured. Furthermore, trends of mixing components between concepts do not always lead to a valid result. The KDI survey primarily represents the voice of the individual bases on the sample selected and the FH, EIU and BTI indices represent the national level based on expert evaluations. However, the existing data is better than no data at all, and bearing that limitation in mind, I have chosen to use selected democratic indices for comparison in my research. As a consequence I have chosen three concepts among many available to challenge my findings. Each of them has a different set of components and they vary in size and subject. That provides three different views on democracy in Kenya. The first is EIU, which provides what I call a stable but not very sensitive measurement. I also refer to that as a “thick” concept. By using the EIU concept, I wish to challenge my argumentation since the sensitivity on democratic fluctuation is very low. The second is BTI, which provides a case of “crossover” components. By presenting the indicator “Freedom of Expression” under participation, it will again challenge my argumentation since freedom of expression rates relatively high in Kenya. The third is Freedom in the World (FH), the most used concepts and for many reasons. First of all, the concept of FH has collected data since 1973,

291 See the table presenting the different concepts in chapter three, Kenya’s Democratic Identity
which adds a high sensitivity on democratic fluctuation over time and, thereby, a certain amount of perspective to my argumentation. Second, it is a “thin” concept and the one concept that comes closest to my indicators. By using the three external statistics my intention is to validate my own survey as well as my interviews, which are tailored to measure a specific profile on democracy.\textsuperscript{292} Furthermore, all three indices use elections as a component. My point is that when receiving support for my findings from statistics not specifically tailored to support my findings, everything else being equal; I have a more valid case.

**Calculation of the Average Trend from KDI**

As shown in the matrix, the response rate for every question and for every group of respondents is expressed in an average percentage. This number is then transformed into what I call a “Calculated Average Trend” according to the formula presented in the annex. The calculated percentage is the most positive possible answer (for instance, “yes”) added to half of the responses in the “To some extent”. Every dimension is then summarized and presented in the diagram.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year 2013</th>
<th>Q1</th>
<th>Q2</th>
<th>Q3</th>
<th>Q4</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
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<td></td>
<td>41,50</td>
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<td>35,5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Year 2014</td>
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<td>31,5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2015</td>
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<td>53,00</td>
<td>46,25</td>
<td>25,25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1379</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 2013</th>
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<th>Q6</th>
<th>Q7</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>20,5</td>
<td>36,17</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2014</td>
<td>23,50</td>
<td>27,25</td>
<td>25,00</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2015</td>
<td>21,25</td>
<td>22,50</td>
<td>23,75</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1379</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistical uncertainty for all surveys ranges from 6% in 2013 to 2.7% in 2015. The high statistical uncertainty for 2013 is primarily due to the low number of respondents. The probability is calculated for every dimension (liberalization and participation), and it is possible with a probability of 95% to place my findings according to uncertainty.

**Kenya Democratic Identity (KDI)**

Presented in the diagram below is the result of the survey (KDI) done in Nairobi and Kisumu 2013 - 2015. As suggested by Dahl earlier in this chapter, when countries are in a process of democratization, meaning moving forward from one position on the continuum of democracy towards

\textsuperscript{292} See in chapter three, Kenya’s Democratic Identity, for the discussion on how to formulate relevant questions for obtaining valid data based on Dahl’s theoretical argument on the coherence between liberalization and inclusiveness.
another, there seems to be primarily two ways for that particularly country to choose. In a process of democratization, the road towards full democracy can either begin with an increasing liberalization or later expand to include larger parts of the population (Participation or inclusion), or the road to full democracy can take its starting point at including the whole of the population and then slowly increase the extent of liberal rights (liberalization).

Diagram No.15 (3) The diagram presents the result of the KDI sample from 2013 - 2015. Statistical uncertainty is approximately 6% for 2013 and 2.7% for 2014 and 2015. See appendix for further statistical details.

The KDI survey diagram presents two interesting indications on democratic transformation in Kenya. First, it clearly indicates that the democracy in Kenya has taken far more steps in the direction of liberalization than towards participation. Even adding the statistical uncertainty, we find Kenya in the upper left triangle. Concluding from that piece of information alone could indicate that Kenya’s democratic transition is following the track of increasing liberalization and later expanding to include larger parts of the population, as described by Dahl. Second, by including the development year by year (2013 - 2015) the survey diagram indicates a “roll back” on both dimensions. The figures for both liberalization and inclusiveness are decreasing and thereby indicate what could be called a “periodic negative democratic transformation”. The KDI covers only three years of measuring, which is a fairly short period of time. However, we can construct a longer track record by bringing in other

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indices and presenting them in a comparable diagram. We will begin with Freedom House Transformation Index. Since it is identified as a “thin” concept, it is the one concept that comes closest to my indicators. Later I will apply indices that increasingly differ from this and observe the result.

Freedom in the World, Freedom House (FH)

Freedom in the World (FH) is the most used concept, and for many reasons. First of all the concept of FH has collected data since 1973, which gives a high sensitivity on democratic fluctuation over time, and thereby the index can produce a better “track record” missing in the case of KDI survey.

In the diagram selected data from Freedom in the World report between 1996 and 2012 is presented\(^{294}\). The criteria for selecting the presented values were substantial change in the FH rating to uncover as much “democratic fluctuation” as possible. The FH rating shows a democratic profile moving in the upper left triangle since 1996. As mentioned, the FH index has different composition of components than the KDI survey. Most interesting is that “electoral processes” are attached to participation (Political Rights, as it is called by FH). By mixing participation during election with participation between elections you get a slightly different picture than with the KDI. Still the trend is clear, as will follow. The biggest leap in the development is between 1998 and 2002, since it

represents the ending of the Moi period and the consequent shift in rating from “Not Free” to “Partly Free”. Furthermore, between 2003 and 2012 we find a major decline in participation (Political Rights). The decline is most likely caused by the post-election violence in 2007. Despite the different arrangement of components in the FH surveys, the surprising conclusion is that the unbalanced democratic profile suggested by the KDI survey is, to a large extent, confirmed by the FH surveys. Apparently, the component of election probably reduces the level of participation. But what will happen when we observe concepts with more and increasingly different components?

Democratic index, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
The democratic index from EIU is categorized as a “thick” concept. Under each attribute we find seventeen components compared to FH’s four components. The advantage for a concept like this is that it covers a lot of ground and picks up trends from many areas of interest. However, the problem is that a change in the rating for two or more of the components can cancel each other out, and the overall rating for that attribute stays the same, like nothing has happened. In other words, this concept has a low sensitivity to “democratic fluctuation” and is consequently less suitable for establishing a democratic profile focusing especially on exclusion. The EIU index does not have data further back than 2006 and in the diagram below we find ratings for the period 2006 - 2008, 2010 - 2012 and again 2013 - 2014. Within those periods the rating is identical (no fluctuation). Two interesting variations are visual in the diagram, one between 2008 and 2010 and one between 2012 and 2014. The data in the diagram (08 – 10) indicates a movement from the lower right triangle to the upper left triangle. We see a small increase in the field of liberalization but a significant decline in the field of participation. Despite the enlargement of components and the consequently lower sensibility in the EIU surveys, the surprising conclusion is, that the unbalanced democratic profile suggested by the KDI survey is supported by the EIU surveys, so far.

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296 Information on ratings in the Democratic index is available http://country.eiu.com/Kenya.
However, in 2013 EIU measure a significant improvement in participation (4.44 – 6.1), presumably caused by the relatively peaceful election in March 2013. This improvement in participation does not support the result found when analyzing KDI or the FH indices, but it illustrates why using election, as an indicator can be misleading. The data in general is crossing between the upper left triangle and the lower right and shows a significant fluctuation in participation. But the unbalanced democratic profile suggested by the KDI is not supported in the same way as with the FH. Let us turn towards another survey still with increasingly different organizations.

**Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)**

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index began producing data on democratic transformation in 2003 and had an organizational reconstruction in 2008 where the index took the shape of what we see today. The BTI has several attributes and to be able to compare the result with other indices, I have selected political and social integration as representing liberalization and political participation as representing participation. According to the number of components, as presented in section 2.6, the index must be categorized as a thin index since only four components are added to each attribute. However, one very interesting “crossover” has been made. As the only index presented here, the BTI is placing the component “Freedom of Expression” under the attribute of
participation. From an isolated point of view, it makes sense since a high degree of freedom of speech is likely to increase participation. However, when comparing these indices, especially the thin with relatively high sensitivity for democratic fluctuation, it becomes critical. As the data shown in the diagram below states, almost indications are in the lower right triangle. As discussed during the analysis of Freedom of expression earlier, the rating for this component is relatively high in Kenya. Moving this well-rated component from the attribute of liberalization to the attribute of participation will have a positive impact on participation and on the presentation in the diagram. However, even with what one could call a slightly more favorable position for the attribute of participation we can observe almost the same trends in the development. Especially the remarkable decline in participation between 2008 and 2010 most likely reflect the electoral chaos in 2007. Despite the crossover of components and the consequently more favorable position for the attribute of participation, we still find support for the unbalanced democratic profile suggested by the KDI survey although the BTI concept represents a less comparable index.

Diagram No.18 (3) The diagram presents the selected data from Bertelsmann Transformation index, between 2003 and 2014 (2016 is the next report from BTI)

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Data between 2008 – 2014 is available at http://www.bti-project.org/countryreports/esa/ken/, 2003 and 2006 is only available on CD - ROM
However, also the BTI measure an improvement in participation caused by the relatively peaceful election in March 2013 (the index goes from 6 in 2012 to 7 in 2014). Again this improvement in participation does not support the result found when analyzing KDI or the FH indices, and again it illustrates why the vertical arrangement is important in construction a concept of measurement.

**Conclusion on the Consolidation**

The purpose of this section was to consolidate my findings on exclusion by analyzing own and exiting democracy indices for the purpose of validating my own KDI findings. As we have seen, a trend of exclusion is more or less traceable in all of the chosen indices, in spite of their increasingly conceptual differences. In the case of the Freedom House index we found that despite the slightly different arrangement of components in the survey, the unbalanced democratic profile suggested by the KDI survey was to a large extent confirmed by the FH surveys. In the case of Economist Intelligence Unit and the Bertelsmann index with the crossover of components (freedom of expression) and the consequently more favorable position for the attribute of participation, we found less support for the unbalanced democratic profile suggested by the KDI until 2013. However, these two indices have both evaluated the election in 2013 as a significant benefit for participation, which illustrates how this single event can mislead the perception of inclusiveness. In general it is probable to conclude that the indication on exclusion suggested by the KDI, find correlation in the indices presented here.

**Conclusion on KDI**

As presented, democracy has many faces, depending on from which perspective it is viewed and, not least, the motive for investigating democracy. However, by upholding transparent procedures as, for instance, the explicit presentation of a relationship between the empirical codes and the theoretical base, a sufficient level of validity in the argumentation can be obtained. In this chapter the relationship between Dahl’s theoretical model and the coding of the interview is argued, clarified and, therefore, it is possible for anyone to follow the analysis step by step and reconstruct the “measurable” argument that is presented on democracy. I find it probable that the democratic identity of Kenya is unbalanced. In the process of democratization in Kenya, liberalization precedes inclusiveness, which means that exclusion is the “case in point” in the Kenyan process of democratization.

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Summary of Sub Conclusions

Based on this analysis, the first finding to support the establishment of a democratic identity of Kenya is that the dimension of liberalization – here understood as public confidence in democracy, freedom of expression and the level of competition all together are doing best although the KDI survey indicates a year by year decrease. Bearing in mind that democracy means, “Rule by people”, it seems like the part of determining the rules in Kenya, perhaps best expressed by the new constitution, is on the right track. However, when it comes to determining who the people are and consequently, who are able to enjoy these rights, things looks quite different. The aim of the analysis on the dimension on participation was to investigate the respondents view on economic arrangement, code of conduct and minorities and marginalization. In this case the respondents’ answers were unambiguous. Participation in the democratic procedures in a free and equal fashion is challenged by the presence of widespread corruption. It affects the voting procedures but more important, it affects the Kenyans’ ability to enjoy their constitutional rights of a fair standard of living in their everyday life between elections. Furthermore, the feeling of being excluded due to patron-client dynamics works directly against the basic idea of participation. Participation in the democratic procedures is challenged by the presence of patron-client dynamics. These dynamics affect the Kenyans ability to enjoy their constitutional rights regarding participation in the democratic transition between elections. Finally, the institutional ability to include minority groups in the process of political participation is alarmingly undeveloped but also paramount in the effort of conducting a peaceful democratic transition. It is therefore probable that participation all together is predominantly low. It seems like determining who the people are and, consequently, who are able to enjoy the constitutional rights, constitutes the biggest challenges for the democratization of Kenya. Therefore, taking both dimensions into account, I find the Kenya’s Democratic Identity (KDI) unbalanced. In the process of democratization in Kenya, liberalization precedes inclusiveness, which means that exclusion is the “case in point” in the Kenyan process of democratization.

As we have seen, the trend of exclusion is traceable in all of the chosen indices. In spite of their increasingly conceptual differences, support is

300 Inclusiveness as presented by Robert A. Dahl (1973) in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press, pp. 1- 48
found for the unbalanced democratic profile suggested by the KDI. The indication on exclusion suggested by the KDI does find some support in especially the Freedom House Index and therefore the argument on exclusion has to be considered as a valid suggestion for describing Kenya’s democratic identity.

**Main findings in relation to Foreign Military Assistance**

As we know from chapter one, this project is testing the argument that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive and supportive effect on the process of democratization in Kenya. By establishing Kenya’s Democratic Profile, I have taken the first step to answering this question by focusing on democratic exclusion. The process of democratization in Kenya is severely hampered by socioeconomic conditions of corruption, ethnicity and minority repression (question 5, 6 and 7 in the radar diagram), and efforts to support the process of democratization in Kenya should, logically, address these issues.

FMA must address the defective area in the democratic profile (question 5, 6 and 7) and increase the opportunity to make the profile more balanced. But can FMA do that? FMA contains everything from financial support, small arms and military advice and training to engagement in more ambitious political partnerships involving strategic defense planning, military education and other long-term sustainable security initiatives, but not all programs have a democratizing effect. In slightly different terms, FMA cannot constitute a direct impact on democratization. The effect comes by professionalizing the armed forces, in this case the Kenya Defence Forces. External military assistance professionalizes the existing
military force, and a professional military force supports the national efforts directed against corruption, ethnicity and marginalization. Therefore, to uncover the role of FMA, and to what extent the alleged professionalizing of the Kenyan military has a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization, an investigation into both external military assistance in Kenya, as well as the contemporary professional culture in the Kenya Defence Forces is needed.
Chapter Four - the Professional Military Position (PMP)

As mentioned in chapter one, the second main possibility that could lead the military to consider a coup, according to Tilly, is “minimization of negotiation between state and citizen”. Focusing on the relationship between the state institutions, in this case primarily the military institution and the citizen is central to understanding the process of professionalization. For the military to have any impact on the process of democratization, the citizen must develop trust and acceptance of the armed forces. A profession must acknowledge its social responsibility and promote it by making it a moral obligation for the members of that given profession. Only then can the community and the profession engaged in a social exchange where the community gives back autonomy, self-regulation and status to the profession. According to Tilly nothing points to the fact that FMA, of any kind, could support the professionalization of the armed forces. On the contrary, from Tilly’s argumentation we can deduce that we, by training and equipping an army whose social relation to the citizen is questionable, risk reducing the likelihood of armed forces supporting democratic transition. With this hypothesis Tilly, challenges the core argumentation for FMA’s effect on democratization. Following Tilly’s second hypothetical argument, the second step to uncover any effect coming from FMA must be a thorough mapping of the armed forces professional position in Kenya. What is the military’s professional position in society? How do the socio-economic variables affect the transition?

A Professional Military Position must be provided to clarify present conditions for step 2 to take place according to the generic model presented in chapter one.

Why Professionalism?
Before looking further into the substance of professionalism and the different perspectives it offers to the analysis, it is perhaps a fruitful exercise to recapitulate and discuss the relevance of bringing the subject of professionalism forward at all. As presented in chapter one, this project tests the argument that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive

and supporting effect on the process of democratization in Kenya. From a methodical point of view FMA then becomes the independent variable (x) and the democratic identity of Kenya makes up the dependent variable (y). Between these two variables, a third intervening variable (z) occurs which allegedly provides a causal link between (x) and (y). That intervening variable is the professionalization of the armed forces. The first and foremost purpose of FMA is through a military to military relation, to assist in developing a new or enhance an existing military capacity. This process is often referred to as professionalization since intensive and specialized training and education increase the level of specialized knowledge in any given institution. If Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization, it must be from a “spillover” from the process of professionalization. The military-to-military cooperation must transfer democratic values from democratic countries’ militaries to non-democratic countries’ militaries, which they eventually will extend to society. To put it in slightly different terms, FMA cannot have a direct impact on democratization. The effect must come through a process of increasing professionalization of the armed forces, in this case the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF). To clarify, let us have a look at some examples.

The armed forces in Africa must be “professionalized”. In 2001 Herbert M. Hove wrote on the US ACRI program that the US Foreign Military Assistance contribution to democracy was to professionalize the armed forces. He emphasized that interoperability, the ability to operate with others through common doctrines and logistics is paramount to African countries gaining legitimacy as a reliable partner on a regional and international level. An argument increasingly frequently used is that the military in well-established democracies are vital institutions when it comes to changing autocracies into democracies. As presented earlier, Admiral Blair (ret.) US Navy and former director of National Intelligence argues in his new book (2013) that influencing dictatorships by military interaction, such as foreign military assistance (FMA) is a powerful tool in changing autocracies. Military-to-military relations between democracies and autocracies are viewed as important catalysts in the democratic transition. Neglect the “guys with the guns” and a peaceful transition towards democracy is impeded. He specifies:

“During education and training courses, through rewards and sanctions and in professional and personal discussions, the military forces of democratic countries can convey by both example and persuasion the advantage that the armed forces of democracies enjoy and encourage their peers to support democratic transition in their countries.\textsuperscript{304}

In this quote, the Admiral hits the nail on the head by arguing that the third intervening variable, that of military professionalism, provides the causal link between democratic transition and FMA. Military forces for democratic countries can actually convey and encourage democratic transition. The immediate question is, then, how do the military convey and encourage and how does the idea of democracy benefit given the unique profile suggested in the previous chapter. Emile Ouédraogo may follow up and give an answer to that question. In his paper from 2014,\textsuperscript{305} he argues that focus on education and training as well as partnership with the international community and civil society are priorities for building professional African Armies.

“The role of the military as educator can also improve a military’s reputation with the general population. By providing equal access to education to its members, a military can model equity in the allocation of public resources while building a sense of ownership across communities.”\textsuperscript{306}

He specifies the military’s role as educator and consequently the possible link to spreading democratic values adopted through international military partnerships\textsuperscript{307} with focus on training and education. By adding these to the perspective, the encouragement to democratize (Blair) and subsequently for the armed forces ability to spread democratic values (Ouédraogo), we can understand why professionalization is viewed as crucial when arguing for the alleged connection between FMA and democratization. The process of professionalization is in general viewed as that catalyst for democratization.

However, in the process of the democratic transition going on in Kenya, traditional distribution of power is increasingly challenged. As so many other institutions, also the Kenyan military, often find themselves in the traditional “colonial role”, as a tool to keep power in the hands of the rulers and far from the role as a catalyst for democracy. In this chapter, I try to challenges the ideas presented by Blair, Ouédraogo and others.\textsuperscript{308} It is my thesis that the KDF’s present military position is ambiguous and does not allow KDF to act as a catalyst for democratic transition. My analyses

\textsuperscript{304} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{306} Ibid. p. 36
\textsuperscript{307} Ibid. p. 5.
\textsuperscript{308} Samuel P. Huntington (1968), Samuel E. Finer (2002), Zoltan Barany (2012)
presented in this chapter seek to establish what I call the Professional Military Position, incl. the proposed embedded ability to support democracy. In my analysis I seek to illuminate to which extent the military is hampered by the same socioeconomic conditions presented in the chapter on democracy in Kenya.

The Professional Military Position

It is my thesis as mentioned that KDF’s present military position does not allow the KDF to act as a catalyst for democratic transition. To verify that thesis, clearly a sociological study on the KDF military culture could be very useful when claiming the effect of the present socioeconomic influence on the military. In that respect, I have at least two challenges in supporting my claim, one theoretically based and one practically based. First the theoretical challenges. Most recent literature on professionalization in the African military tends to set off by using perspectives on “changing military culture.” However, as pointed out by Esterhuyse, Vreý and Mandrup, the problem with using culture at all is rooted in the inability to precisely define the idea of culture. The lack of a definition may or may not infuse the debate on military culture, however, in this case it does not enhance a focused analysis on military professionalism. For the same reason, I thus introduce the idea of a “professional military position”.

Basically, I see two advantages by doing that. First, being professional is a much more tangible idea than the idea of culture. Although definitions still vary quite a lot, some common ground has been established over the years. It is now possible to operationalize the idea of professionalism and still get the necessary analytical grip. Second, by introducing the idea of a position instead of a “profile” or “culture” I hope to find that professionalism can be a dynamic concept. Today’s position does not necessarily have to be that of tomorrow and thereby establish an image of a less permanent military culture and indicate a temporary dynamic position between occupation and profession. Furthermore, the effort of sustaining a profession often includes a struggle to protect the current position from intruders trying to undermine or take over. The primary objective obtained by introducing the idea of a professional military position is the combination of a focused analytical approach including the element of time in the perception of a profession.

Before I go any further in describing my theoretical offset, let me turn to mentioning a few words on my practical challenges. An optimal position to conduct a study of the KDF military position should rightfully take place

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among KDF officers. I have, however, not been allowed to do interviews nor launch any type of surveys among serving KDF personnel at all. That means that I have been referred to the second best solution, which is interviewing retired officers and KDF officers doing service outside the national framework, like for instance multinational operations. In practical terms that means that my survey and interviews done amongst serving personnel has taken place during US ACOTA training in Embakasi in Nairobi. The students attending this course consisted of officers from Uganda, Burundi and Kenya. My surveys thus do not exclusively reflect the view of KDF officers, but are likely to express a more regional view. That of course weakens my conclusion specifically on KDF but not in relation to professionalism in general.

Having introduced the argument for involving professionalism as well as having argued for introducing the idea of a professional military position and presented the practical challenges in data collection, it is now time to turn toward the idea of professionalism and dig one or two spits deeper into the substance of professionalism and the different perspectives it offers to the analysis.

**Perspectives on Professionalism**

The word profession or professional may be loosely or strictly used. In its broadest significance it is simply the opposite of the word amateur. Abraham Flexner spoke these words about one hundred years ago. Although the statement may seem very simple, it illustrates very well the width in the application of the idea of professionalism. To many students of medicine, Abraham Flexner may be a name that rings a bell. In 1910 Abraham Flexner issued a report (the Flexner Report), which was the very beginning of a fundamental reformation in the medical profession in the US. However, it is not the work that he did for the medical and social institutions in the US that we are interested in, but his effort in defining a profession. In 1915 he pointed out six characteristics that help distinguish an occupation from a profession. These are:

1. Intellectual Orientation
2. Self-Regulation and Organization
3. Utilization of Institutionalized Knowledge
4. Teachable Technics
5. Practical Application
6. Service or Altruistic Orientation

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311 Ibid. pp. 901 - 911
As correctly pointed out by David J. Armor (1969), these 6 characteristics set the stage for the discussion of professions for many years to follow. My claim is actually, that these basic characteristics of the idea of the profession may have been challenges, but I see no fundamental change in understanding a profession and of being a professional in the existing literature.

The oldest and still most influential sociological understanding of the development of a profession dates back to the late nineteenth century. As a response to the increasing individualism and selfishness brought forward by industrialism and rational economic market relations, sociologists increasingly found professionalism a phenomenon to counterbalance this trend. Especially professions as law, medicine and education preoccupied contemporary sociologists with the altruistic perspectives of professionalism. Skills and intellectual knowledge developed in these professions were “socialized” and guided towards the needs of the society instead of self-interest. The understanding of this altruistic dimension in professionalism is fundamental for understanding professionalism as it is viewed today, and most important, it holds the theoretical potential for establishing the alleged democratic “spillover” effect to society.

If Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization the altruistic dimension is the link in which the process can take place. However, the altruistic dimension is also the center for most of the intellectual criticism of understanding professionalism. The most momentous school in understanding professionalism is named after and built on the idea that professions should be guided towards the needs of society instead of guided by self-interest. Albert Dzur names it the “social trustee professionalism” emphasizing exactly the altruistic dimension. Even though a distinct division is not possible, it is my claim, that the basic foundation of this school is firmly rooted in Flexner’s six characteristics, particularly reflected in the emphasis on intellectual orientation, self-regulation and organization, and service orientation. Emile Durkheim was a French sociologist and credited as being one of the principal founders of modern sociology focusing on the

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314 Ibid. p. 47.
315 Ibid. p. 47
normlessness of economic competition and the subsequent need for group control and social control as professions. Emile Durkheim’s basic argument is that a profession must acknowledge its social responsibility and promote it by making it a moral obligation (standards) for the members of that given profession. Only then can the community and the profession engage in a social exchange where the community gives back autonomy, self-regulation and status to the profession. However, this altruistic dimension is, as mentioned, not only central for understanding the development of social trustee professionalism, it is also the subject of most of the intellectual criticism.

As one of the most prominent critics of the social trustee professionalism, we find Eliot Frierson. He is a professor emeritus of sociology at New York University. Freidson’s critique is basically directed towards the social trustee professionalism’s center of gravity. The social exchange where the community gives back autonomy, self-regulation and status to the profession for directing specialized knowledge towards public needs. Frierson claims that empirical evidence is lacking, which supports the fact that professionals are more service-oriented than self-oriented. He argues the following:

The profession’s service orientation is a public imputation; it has successfully won in a process in which its leaders have persuaded society to grant and support its autonomy.

Frierson denounces the argument that social responsibility and a moral obligation are the catalyst for the social exchange, moreover it is purely a tactical and political negotiation. Professional authority is a political commodity. It is not linked to the given service provided to society. Then the doctor’s authority, Frierson argues, should decline to the level of laypeople the moment he leaves the clinic. Because of the tactical and political negotiation, the professional authority goes beyond the service that the professional delivers. However, the critique of the “social exchange” goes beyond political negotiation. In the late ‘60s a more critical perspective on professionalism arose. As described by Dzur, this

318 Ibid. p. 84.
320 Ibid. p. 79
perspective on professionalism develops the argument further from covert negotiation into domination with the objective to prevent the public from taking up their rightful place in coordinating their social actions. According to Dzur, the criticism has developed into a school of understanding of its own, the “The Radical Critic”. Basically the school argues that the “social exchange” is an everyday struggle between citizen and profession in the quest for domination, and finally monopoly, exercised as a form of authority over social (public) needs, using traditional practices and institutional inertia and competition as primary means.

Now, what can this rundown on perspectives on professionalism add to the understanding of military professionalism? Two things, I think. First, central for understanding professionalism in broad terms is the relationship between the public and the profession. It seems like a profession cannot exist without some sort of public relationship. Whether this relationship is driven by, or understood as, the ideology of a social exchange based on moral obligation or a tactical and political negotiation or pure domination of the public based on monopoly, it is evident that the social relationship is crucial in understanding professionalism

Consequently, I see no reason why this public relationship should be missing or constitute a smaller part in understanding military professionalism. Moreover, viewing the military in general, the public relationship holds the theoretical potential for establishing the alleged democratic “spillover” effect to society. Furthermore, I don't necessarily see the point in denouncing one perspective over another. I tend to believe that all tree perspectives presented here, and others in between, can be more or less in effect at the same time, depending on the socioeconomic background in which they exist. I indicated earlier that professionalism must be viewed as a dynamic concept and that today’s position does not necessarily have to be tomorrow’s position. By looking at the different perspectives on professionalism in a given context (figure 1), it is possible to argue for an opportunity to move from one perspective to another according to change in the socioeconomic context. The transition in the KDF as seen today in Kenya is very much influenced by the colonial

Figure 1 (4) Perspectives on the relation between public and profession

Consequently, I see no reason why this public relationship should be missing or constitute a smaller part in understanding military professionalism. Moreover, viewing the military in general, the public relationship holds the theoretical potential for establishing the alleged democratic “spillover” effect to society. Furthermore, I don't necessarily see the point in denouncing one perspective over another. I tend to believe that all tree perspectives presented here, and others in between, can be more or less in effect at the same time, depending on the socioeconomic background in which they exist. I indicated earlier that professionalism must be viewed as a dynamic concept and that today’s position does not necessarily have to be tomorrow’s position. By looking at the different perspectives on professionalism in a given context (figure 1), it is possible to argue for an opportunity to move from one perspective to another according to change in the socioeconomic context. The transition in the KDF as seen today in Kenya is very much influenced by the colonial

321 See Chapter 2 for details on the socioeconomic background in Kenya
The prevailing perspective on professionalism can easily describe the relation to the public as a struggle for dominance and monopoly on security. However, it is also very clear that the present professional position is not a permanent position and that social acceptance and serving the public comes along in the democratic transition.

Theoretical Point of Departure

The Two Dimensions in Professionalism
To further deepen the understanding of the profession and to begin the developing of a proper analytical grip for later use in the analysis, it makes perfect sense to go back and use Flexner’s characteristics as guidelines. As we have seen, different perspectives on professionalism do not question the relevance or rule out these basic characteristics introduced by Flexner. Moreover, it is a matter of how much emphasis is attached to every single characteristic, according to the current socioeconomic position. As presented in figure 2, some characteristics correspond very well with both the Social Trustee and the Radical Critic perspective, and some correspond less so. Essentially, though, none of the perspectives rejects the six characteristics. However, more is to be found by studying Flexner and his six commandments. In my discussion of professions, so far only the altruistic characteristics have been stressed. Intellectual orientation, Self-regulation, and Service-orientation together constitute the core of the altruistic argument, and I tend to believe it is possible to argue that they together constitute the altruistic dimension of professionalism and hold the theoretical potential for the spillover. My dimensional argument is partly built on William J. Goode’s introduction of the core characteristic of a profession, service-orientation and prolonged specialized training.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexner’s variables</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Social Trustee</th>
<th>Radical Critic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Orientation</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Regulation and Organization</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service or Altruistic Orientation</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilization of Institutionalized Knowledge</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachable Technics</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Application</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 (4) The table illustrates the relationship between Flexner’s 6 characteristics of a profession and the two schools of professionalism (Social Trustee and Radical Critic.) Furthermore, the table links the same characteristics to the altruistic and the meritocratic dimension.

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However, according to Flexner, this altruistic dimension is not quite enough to be able to conduct a proper identification of a profession from an occupation. Yet another three variables have a critical role to play. No profession can be merely academic and theoretical, the professional man must have an absolutely definite and practical object, Flexner argues. David J. Amor also argues along the same lines that the act of giving a client advice based on specialized knowledge constitutes the main activity of the members of a profession. This end of “institutionalizing” the specialized knowledge is achieved by applying practical and teachable techniques for the institution to utilize the accumulated knowledge (Flexner). However, as pointed out by Amor, to make the prose of institutionalization complete, the specialized knowledge has to be integrated into a larger social system, be relevant for individuals and groups and have a legitimate manifestation. My claim is that the institutionalization of Flexner’s three variables combined constitutes the meritocratic dimension of professionalism. In the following, I will have a closer look at the two dimensions of professionalism outlined in the previous section. My aim is merely to consolidate the argument on the two dimensions in the favor of the forthcoming analysis.

The Altruistic Dimension
Let me begin by adding a few comments to the altruistic dimension of professionalism. I have already explained the altruistic idea earlier on in this chapter, which thus leads me to focus on Flexner’s variables and why I claim they belong to this dimension. The first variable mentioned is the intellectual orientation. Flexner argues, that the first mark of a profession is that the activities involved are of an intellectual character. This intellectual character is then described as free resourceful and unhampered intelligence applied to problems and seeking to understand and master them. Flexner does not specify what kind of problems that should be understood and mastered, and as a consequence he does not directly address the altruistic perspective of this variable. However, adding the view of David J. Amor, saying that the area of knowledge has to be crucial to biological, physiological and social survival, it suddenly makes sense. To put it in other words, if the specialized knowledge does not comply with the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others (selflessness), the

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324 Flexner, Abraham (1915). Is Social Work a Profession, School and Society, June 26 Volume I p. 155
326 Ibid. pp. 14 - 15
327 Ibid. p. 14
social exchange (explained earlier) cannot take place and the specialized knowledge will not support the establishment of a profession. Regarding the second and the third variables, as presented in figure 2, only self-regulation needs further explanation. Self-regulation is paramount in understanding professionalism in the altruistic perspective. Self-regulation is the most evident indication of professionalism a profession can get. The professionals control, regulate and evaluate themselves because laypeople cannot. Instead the laypeople (the community) engage in the social exchange, in which the community gives back autonomy and self-regulation.

The altruistic dimension of a profession as a whole can be strong or weak depending on the socioeconomic background to which it is exposed. In democratizing countries such as Kenya, it is realistic to expect that the altruistic relationship is weak. Recognizing dominating socioeconomic factors like corruption, marginalization and ethnicity, the social exchange between state institutions and the community is impeded. In the case of the KDF, we will find that the colonial heritage of protecting power instead of people (the specialized knowledge within security) does not comply with the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others. Thus the social exchange becomes complicated, and support from society for establishing a military profession is reduced as the potential of the military to influence society decreases.

The Meritocratic Dimension
Now I turn toward the second and perhaps most recognizable dimension of professionalism: the meritocratic dimension. Unlike the altruistic dimension, the meritocratic dimension is relatively well-known and often mistaken for the only real yardstick, when the relationship between professionalism and profession is discussed. Usually, the extended training and education in a particular field of expertise, and the merits obtained along with it, is often taken as the sole indicator for the level of professionalism. However, the key to understanding the meritocratic dimension is to take a closer look at “the prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge”328 at Goode presents it. Two things happen with this prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge in the process of professionalization, i.e., a process of institutionalization329.

and a process of meritocratization. Let me begin with the latter, meritocratization, since it is the most accessible. According to basic sociology, a meritocratic system is a social system characterized by the fact that status is achieved through ability and effort (merit), rather than ascribed on the basis of other particularistic or inherited advantages like for instance corruption and ethnicity. From a general military perspective, it is relatively easy to recognize the meritocratic structure. As a result of the level of self-regulation discussed earlier, the military has its own law, its own recruiting, training, and education and evaluation system. All in all, the military system constitutes a social system (or institution) containing all necessary assets to sustain the professional image. Within this social structure the individual can achieve a military status if this individual meets certain performance criteria. According to Bradford and Brown, these performance criteria can have both objective and subjective content. From boot-camp training to the highest educational level, the individual must perform according to measurable standards and regulations set by the military itself. Physical training, the handling of weapons and the understanding of the military’s doctrines are all a part of the objective content. Regarding the subjective content Morris Janowitz points out honor, brotherhood and glory as examples of exactly that. These idealistic elements, or military values and norms, are claimed to be crucial in giving the soldier, no matter what level, a sense of duty to serve even at the risk of his or her own life. The subjective elements are not as manageable as the objective content. How do you for instance measure the level of duty? However, as pointed out by Richard H Kohn the oath sworn by every American soldier before entering service constitutes the foundation of the military profession. Furthermore, I argue that it institutionalizes the exact same sense of duty and honor and the lethal obligations that go along. And institutionalization is as mentioned, the second thing that happens in the process of professionalization. As pointed out by David J. Armor to make the proses of institutionalization complete the specialized knowledge has to

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332 Bradford and Brown (1973) The United States Army in Transition, Sage Publications p. 223 (From Beyond the Battlefield, Sarkesian)
334 Kohn, Richard H. First (2013) Priorities in Military Professionalism, Orbis 57, no. 3 (Summer), Naval War College Newport.
be integrated into a larger social system. The kind of institution in mind here is not a physical or geographically fixed institution. The institution in question is a persistent social order governing the behavior of individuals within a given community. It is my claim that this institutionalization in military organizations, to a large extent, consists of and rests upon the subjective military values and norms, whether these be duty, honor, brotherhood or glory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexner’s variables</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Social Trustee</th>
<th>Radical Critic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Orientation</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Regulation and Organization</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service or Altruistic Orientation</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilization of Institutionalized Knowledge</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachable Technics</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Application</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3 (4) The table illustrates the relationship between Flexner’s 6 characteristics of a profession and the two schools of professionalism (Social Trustee and Radical Critic.) Furthermore, the table links the same characteristics to the altruistic and the meritocratic dimension.

Turning towards Flexner’s variables of professionalism, I find the meritocratic dimension well represented. I argue that both the teachable techniques and the practical application go well in hand with the objective and measurable elements mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the utilization of the institutionalized military knowledge, ultimately risking your life, is not possible without considering the subjective values like duty, honor and glory. In democratizing countries such as Kenya, it is realistic to expect that the meritocratic dimension is relatively stronger than the altruistic. Again recognizing dominating socioeconomic factors like corruption, ethnicity and marginalization especially the objective values are hampered.

The Rise and Fall of a Profession

The purpose of this section is to summarize the discussion on professionalism so far. Furthermore, on a backdrop of this summary, I want to formulate a hypothesis on the rise and fall of a profession. This hypothesis constitutes the backbone of my analytical approach. I began by looking at the different perspectives on professionalism. I ended up arguing that in a given socioeconomic context (see figure 1) it is possible to transform from one perspective to another according to changes in that socioeconomic context. Consequently, my thesis is that the military professional position in the KDF is not a permanent position. The contemporary prevailing perspective on professionalism in KDF for instance can easily describe the relationship to the public as a struggle for dominance and monopoly on security. However, my understanding is that the social acceptance of the military can develop in step with the

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335 Ibid. pp. 14 - 15
democratic transition, and only rarely exceed it. I call this perspective the “transitional perspective” on professionalism. The transitional perspective found the basis for my understanding of professionalism. But how does this transition take place then? By introducing Flexner’s six characteristics on professionalism as a framework for understanding professionalism, it is possible to establish two indicative dimensions for the understanding on how the transitional professionalism can change from being predominantly occupational to predominantly professional.

The Indicative Dimensions
The first dimension I call the altruistic dimension. This dimension will indicate to what extent the specialized knowledge complies with the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others. The dimension indicates the likelihood of the social exchange to take place and the expected impact. The second dimension I call the meritocratic dimension. By evaluating objective, subjective and institutional elements, this dimension will indicate to which extent military status is achieved through ability and effort, rather than ascribed on the basis of other particularistic or inherited advantages. The basic idea of these dimensions is, as described by William J. Goode, that an occupation may rank high in one but low in another. Only a true profession can rank high in both. However, I disagree with Goode on the issue on differentiation between occupation and profession. I believe it is possible to talk about different professional positions instead, according to my transitional perspective on professionalism.

Figure 4 (4), Expected development in professionalization

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I expect the rise of a profession to follow a specific pattern, indicated by the dotted line shown in Figure 3. My thesis is that a military profession develops its meritocratic dimension before it develops the altruistic dimension. A typical progress in professionalization of the armed forces would begin with an initial focus on training and equipment, training facilities logistics and operations. Later the intellectual orientation is added in the shape specialized knowledge institutionalized in defense colleges and in the end the social exchange of self-regulation can begin. However, in reverse it is also the downfall of a profession. The social exchange stops because the special knowledge no longer is essential for survival or misused. The institution becomes isolated with no link to society, and the meritocratic structures suddenly appear antiquated and hiliarious. The profession falls to the ground languishing. The rise and the fall of a profession as described here are of course the extremes on the continuum. The overall point behind my thesis is that the profession can move forward or backward on this continuum but rarely, and most likely only in the latest phase of the professionalisation process, exceed the process of democratization, since it is the same restrictive or permissive socioeconomic dynamics we find controlling both. Consequently, and if the thesis is proven right, it means that the potential democratic “spillover” from the military to society is significantly limited to militaries with a high degree of altruism.

Operationalizing the model

Though Flexner’s variables have been very helpful in understanding and developing the idea of professionalism, they are not suitable for doing either the collection or the analysis of the empirical material. Collecting and analyzing data in the two dimensions of professionalism has to be much more specific in its form. However, we can still use Flexner’s variables as a framework in the process of operationalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexner’s variables</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Military Professionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual Orientation</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>Right Based Service, (Legal Certainty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Regulation and Organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service or Altruistic Orientation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilization of Institutionalized Knowledge</td>
<td>Meritocratic</td>
<td>Identification and Affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachable Technics</td>
<td></td>
<td>Training and education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Application</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation and Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5 (4), The table shows the connection between Flexner’s variables, the two dimensions and the questionnaire on Military Professionalism.

In the process of operationalization the first questions one has to ask is: what do the optimal military institution look like? Or to be more specific, how does the military institution allow the best opportunity for developing a professional position. In favor of the altruistic dimension, three
characteristics come to mind. First, the military institution has to be completely under political control. In a democracy it is paramount that the people, through the democratic process, control the use of the armed forces. Second, the armed forces have to offer basic privileges to servicemen and -women of all ranks. Although military institutions usually introduce additional legal issues in criminal law, reflecting the unique professional environment, soldiers must enjoy the same basic legal rights and protection as civilian citizens as expressed in the constitution, and last but not least, providing security demands a high degree of personal and organizational integrity. Integrity is the set of characteristics that enables the social exchange and generates trust between the military and the community. Integrity creates the conditions for organizations to resist corruption and to be more trusted and efficient.

Turning towards the meritocratic dimension, again three characteristics come to mind. First, in the meritocratic quest for setting own standards in evaluation and control relations; the military institution must allow public scrutiny on financial spending. Not providing a transparent profile on the spending of public funds reduces the level of institutional autonomy.

![Diagram](image)

Figure 6 (4). This figure illustrates the process of operationalization in relation to the armed forces and the two professional dimensions, respectively altruistic and meritocratic.

Second, the military must encourage a high degree of internal identification and affiliation amongst servicemen and -women. Especially the subjective norms and values support that development. Furthermore, the military institution must offer attractive career opportunities in accordance with these norms and values. Last but not least, the training and education must be accessible, extensive and structured. Accessible to both recruits and to people in service, always based on transparent standards, extensive in length and content and finally the training and education must be structured

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338 Ibid. p. 44. Establishing of The Military Ombudsman
339 Ibid. p. 41. Accountability into Military Culture
and follow the average development in the ranks. Furthermore, to spur the necessary public support, it must reflect determination and discipline. In the following section, I turn towards my key findings on military professionalism.

Key Findings on the Professional Military Position

Introduction
In the previous section, I introduced a hypothesis that the profession can move forward or backward on this continuum but rarely, and most likely only in the latest phase of the professionalisation process, exceed the process of democratization. In the following section, I intend to analyze and discuss a combination of my own research and other accessible sources to seek to verify that thesis. I will approach each dimension systematically by analyzing my data from surveys and interviews. Hereafter, I broaden my perspective and draw on other available sources to support my argumentation. As mentioned earlier, my surveys do not exclusively reflect the view of KDF officers, but are likely to express a more regional view, due to the restrictions imposed. To avoid misunderstandings during the analysis, I will refer to my surveys as “samples”, and not the KDF.

The Meritocratic Dimension
In democratizing countries such as Kenya, it is realistic to expect that the meritocratic dimension is weak, albeit expectedly stronger than the altruistic; again recognizing socioeconomic factors like corruption and ethnicity as being dominant. In the case of this sample we will find that the colonial heritage of protecting power instead of people still prevails.

Identification and Affiliation
The military must encourage a high degree of internal identification and affiliation amongst servicemen and -women. Especially subjective norms and value support that development. Furthermore, the military institution must invest in trust-building measures to be able to offer attractive career opportunities in accordance with these norms and values. Thus, this variable aims at clarifying the respondent’s identification and affiliation with the military profession by making the following four statements:

1. My profession as a soldier demands a high degree of loyalty to my colleagues

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340 Survey PMP November 2013, Survey PMP February 2014, and interviews November 2012 to February 2015
2. I can have confidence in the military system
3. I can make my stay in the military a lifetime career.
4. Being a soldier is a good choice of profession for me.

Diagram No.1 (4). The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2013 (Identification and Affiliation). The number of respondents is 23 and the statistical uncertainty is 15%.

In the diagram above (diagram No. 1), the result of the survey done in 2013 is presented. The average response rate is relatively positive, even considering the approximately 15% statistical uncertainty due the low number of respondents. However, question No. 3, “I can make my stay in the military a lifetime career” has a significant lower positive response as the only deviation in this variable. The same pattern seems to be repeated in
2015. In the diagram above (diagram No. 2), the result of the survey done in 2015 is presented. The average response rate is again relatively positive even considering the statistical uncertainty. Again we see a significant drop in the respondents’ belief that serving in the military can become a lifetime career. As mentioned, the military institution must invest in trust-building measures to be able to offer attractive career opportunities, but according to these samples this does not seem to happen. I am well aware that these samples are mere indications of a trend and that more knowledge must be provided. The explanation for the significant drop in the respondents’ belief that serving in the military can become a lifetime career can be found by bringing in the background interviews. These interviews point at two possible explanations for this drop, and these explanations revolve around corruption and ethnic preferences. In general my respondents do not seem to connect military professionalism and career opportunities. Initially, when offered an opportunity to freely describe military professionalism, training and doctrine seem to be the preferred characteristics. However, as the conversation progressed some of my respondents actually mentioned issues related to career opportunity, i.e., salary and the consequences of not getting a fair salary, when characterizing military professionalism.

Speaker 1: What about, uh, for instance given the soldiers, giving the soldiers a fair, a fair salary? Do you think that is part of the (professionalization Ed.)

Speaker 2: (interjects) That one, that one, because that one raises the morale of the soldier

Speaker 1: Yeah.

Speaker 2: (continues) because everybody comes in to get to get a better living.
Speaker 1: Yeah
Speaker 2: And you get it after getting a good earning. That one to me to me at my level I find it say it’s very important.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Yeah, because when the soldier is well paid he can do his work without having other *words not audible but I believe he was trying to say the soldier can focus his mind on work and not stress about other things (financial) *6:27-6:29* because we have seen so many soldiers getting defected to negative *words not clear 6:35-6:38*....you know
Speaker 1: Yeah. 341

Even though the transcription indicates some indistinctness during the interview, it is fair to suggest that if not career opportunities, then at least providing a sufficient pay is a recommendable asset for the military institution to invest in. A sufficient and regular pay is a trust-building measure, and it is highly supportive in the creation of respectable living conditions, and later perhaps attractive career opportunities. Another of my respondents supports the important aspect related to respectable living conditions and career opportunities and is perhaps a little more direct about the consequence of not getting paid:

Speaker 2: …It also has to do with proper efficient, uh, let me say attractive terms and conditions of service.
Speaker 1: Yeah. Yes, uh, an attractive, um, attractive in what what way attractive as a life career, or I mean some sort of of job that you can identify with and, and that you get a decent salary and you can earn your living by being a soldier?
Speaker 2: Yes, the salary you earn if it is not attractive that will even give the cause to soldiers to indulge in some practices that will damage the the image of the institutions
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: If a soldier for instance is paid, let me say a salary that will not will not enable him to be able to adequately take care of his and his family then the soldier may be may have the cause to engage in in bad practices just to make better life for his fami
Speaker 1: Exactly. 342

As it turns out, it is simply not an attractive career to put your life on the line without getting paid for it. Furthermore, you might have to involve yourself in criminal activities as corruption to compensate for the lack of pay. Unfortunately it seem like that from the very first day young men and women engage with the military in Kenya, their sense of right and wrong is challenged. One of my respondents, a young man, went to the KDF recruitment camp in Kakamega 3 years in a row. He was never recruited because he could not pay a bribe. During the final medical check the doctor examines the recruits for fallen arches (flat footedness). By writing the amount of money you are willing to pay under your feet, you find a very discrete way of communicating with the officials at the recruitment board.

341 Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
342 Ibid.
Unfortunately, documents indicate that this is not a onetime experience by my respondent. In a press statement on 16 August 2012 issued by The Ethic and Anti-Corruption Commission, the KDF acknowledges having received credible information about a similar case in Borabu involving the amount of 40,000 Kenyan shillings as payment for facilitating the recruitment of a candidate. However, this seems to be only the first step towards crossing the fine line between right and wrong. Occasionally more articles and reports\textsuperscript{343} indicate that corruption during service, including everything from conducting military operations on the ground to administrative functions at ministry level, is very much present. In the Hiiraan Online Newspaper, an independent paper bringing news from Somalia, allegedly Kenyan Forces stationed in Somalia are involved in corruption. After the October 2011 “Operation Linda Nchi”, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) in cooperation with forces from the AMISOM have taken control of Kismayo port. As pointed out by the newspaper, it would be expected that with their control, smuggling would be reduced. On the contrary, according to the Hiiraan Online, the facts on the ground suggest otherwise. The sugar imports into Somalia are mainly financed by the export of charcoal\textsuperscript{344} to the Middle East, and when the KDF took over Kismayo, it disregarded a UN request to uphold the ban of the export of millions of tons of charcoal at the port. Consequently, the importation of sugar and hence its smuggling into Kenya has continued with the alleged knowledge by and benefit for the KDF. This picture is to a large extent supported by Transparent International (International Defense and Security Program TIIDSP). According to their last survey from 2011, only moderate transparency is achieved during military operations. Military intelligence units are officially assigned to address corruption risk, and that is a procedure with significant shortcomings. Furthermore, TIIDSP suggest from interviews made in 2011 that the military might receive facilitation payments when the army is digging boreholes in arid and semi-arid areas. People may be inclined to bribe officers to get services at the borehole. However, corruption is not the only variable challenging the soldier when he makes his personal choice of career. Ethnicity most likely has an impact on why the military in Kenya does not yet offer attractive career opportunities. To secure the ethnic balance in the armed forces, the recruitment procedure is essential. The ethnic composition of the officer corps should basically reflect the ethnic distribution found in Kenya at any


\textsuperscript{344} According to a UN report two years ago, charcoal worth between $35 million and $50 million is exported from Kismayo per year.
time. To achieve this objective the recruitment procedure was used as a tool.

A team of recruiting officers would travel around Kenya to recruit soldiers and cadets according to a pre-defined set of numbers stated by the Ministry of State for Defense and reflecting the needs to balance the ethnic distribution in the armed forces. This procedure secured a “good ethnic mix” in the officer corps. However, even though the recruitment gave a good basis for countering the development of ethnic dominance, it did not secure the speed of promotion. Neither did it secure “ethnic balance promotion”. Since the biggest tribes in Kenya (Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin) also had the biggest representation in the armed forces, the probability of having them as a general is of course higher than the probability of having a Pokomo or a Kissi, as pointed out by my respondent. However, it might not be the whole explanation. Ethnicity might be used as a selection mechanism itself. Today it is a constitutional requirement that the composition of the command of the Defense Forces reflects the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya. Apparently, this is not reflected everywhere in the military organization, at least due to the size of the tribe according to my respondent. As mentioned earlier the “Pan-African” need for the military’s loyalty to the personal ruler gave rise to corruption and to ethnicization of the military, and Kenya is no exception. The idea that ethnicity matters at all in a military unit originates from the recruitment procedures of the colonial army. It was to some extent believed that some African communities had “martial qualities” and therefore they became the natural choice for recruitment. Since the days of independence, different rulers then have reflected their particular ethnic preference in the composition and the organization of the military and the paramilitary units. A good example is the reorganization by Moi following the 1982 coup attempt. Moi is a Kalenjin, and he dramatically increased the demographic footprint in the army to avoid the army turning against him again. As mentioned earlier, today it is a constitutional requirement that the composition Defense Forces reflects the ethnic diversity, allegedly that has

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345 Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.  
346 Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.  
not been fully implemented. Transparent International (International Defense and Security Program TIIDSP) did a survey in 2011 that indicated that senior officers often are promoted without consideration paid to whether they have completed basic training courses. “Cronyism, tribalism or ethnicity may be considered instead.”

As pointed out in the beginning of his section, the military must encourage a high degree of internal identification and affiliation amongst servicemen and -women. Especially the subjective norms and value support that development. Furthermore, the military institution must invest in trust-building measures to be able to offer attractive career opportunities in accordance with these norms and values. The average response rate in this sample is relatively positive even considering the statistical uncertainty. However, the impact of corruption and ethnicity on the professional military profile is also made probable in at least one case. Furthermore, the argument that the professional transition of the armed forces in Kenya is to some extent consistent with the democratic transition is supported.

Training and Education
From a military perspective it is relatively easy to recognize the meritocratic structure within which the individual can achieve a military status if this individual meets certain performance criteria. According to Bradford and Brown, these performance criteria can have both objective and subjective content. From boot camp to the higher educational levels, the individual must perform according to objective measurable standards and regulations set by the military itself. The subjective content could be honor, brotherhood and glory as Morris Janowitz points out. These idealistic elements or military values and norms are crucial when giving the soldier, no matter at what level, a sense of duty to serve even at the risk of his or her own life. Therefore the training and education must be accessible, extensive and structured, also the training and education must be structured and follow the average development in ranks. To spur the necessary public support, it must reflect determination and discipline. This variable thus aims at clarifying the respondent’s view on the military training and education by making the four statements:

1. I find myself sufficiently trained for the tasks I am assigned to.

http://government.defenceindex.org/results/countries/kenya
Bradford and Brown (1973) The United States Army in Transition. Sage Publications p. 223 (From Beyond the Battlefield, Sarkesian)
2. The profession as a soldier demands a high degree of training and education.
3. I find the opportunity for increasing my knowledge and skills through military training and education sufficient.
4. Discipline is a key word in the training of soldiers.

Examining the ACOTA sample from 2013 and 2015, we find a strong and coherent statement on training and education. It is actually the strongest indication in the survey at all. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise since training and education are probably the one discipline first referred to when reflecting on professionalism in general. One could argue that training and education is the very foundation of a profession from which all other aspects of professionalism grows. The first contact, entering a profession as a newcomer, is usually with the training and education system. The training and education system becomes a portal mirroring and presenting the characteristic of any profession, also the military profession.

Analyzing the ACOTA sample we find two interesting things at least. First, the response rate is generally high on all four statements, however, the response rate for statement No. 4. (military discipline) is 96% in 2013 and 100% in 2015. It is beyond any reasonable doubt that the respondents find military discipline a core characteristic when defining military professionalism. Michael Anthony, a former US medic in Iraq gives a more popular view on military discipline and when a person joins the military; his first taste of discipline is external. His drill sergeants assume that he has no self-discipline and thus seek to install it. The military man has gone into a demanding profession. His country depends on him for its very survival. He is going to be asked to risk or give his life for his fellow soldiers and for the nation.
Diagram No.3 (4) The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2013 (Training and Education). The number of respondents is 23 and the statistical uncertainty is 16%.

He has to grow up fast and be ready to do things that lesser men cannot.\textsuperscript{352} Military Discipline is inseparably linked to obedience and the command system. It involves the subordination of the will of the individual for the good of the military objective.

Discipline is created within the command system by instilling a sense of confidence and responsibility in each individual. As pointed out by Donna Winslow there is a downside of military discipline. When military discipline turns into misplaced loyalty in a dysfunctional context, a “we-they” attitude\textsuperscript{353} can develop, being the first step in the breakdown of discipline. However, this strong and coherent indication on discipline seems to go beyond geography. I 2014 I conducted a survey on professionalism between Danish cadets at the Army Academy in Copenhagen. Again, it turned out that the respondents find military discipline a core characteristic when defining military professionalism.


\textsuperscript{353}Winslow, Donna (1999). Misplaced Loyalty, The role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations, University of Ottawa, Canada p. 359
When interviewing serving and retired officers, my respondents all verify that training and education is essential and judging from the result of the ACOTA sample, the same pattern of indications seems to exist. Summing up, the officers find themselves sufficiently trained compared to the level on which they operate, they all agree that training and education is important, and third, they could all need some more training and education. Furthermore, my respondents all mention, or agreed when asked, that one person especially had a serious impact on training and educating in the KDF. The training and educational reforms during the Moi era are especially related to one general, Lieutenant General Daudi Tonje. He could be described as a “Modernizer” in the sense he did challenge the colonial genetics of the KDF. This idea of modernization was reflected in three areas. First, Lieutenant General Daudi Tonje directed the military’s attention toward the external threats by organizing the army leadership into a dual structure with an Eastern Command and a Western Command. Each command would train and equip for the purpose of defending Kenya against outside threats. (Somalia, at that time also Uganda). Second, he introduced “reading and writing” for soldiers, a phenomenon known from modernization theory as a perception of the army as the “School of Nations”. Third, He introduced a system for advancing in the ranks. Instead of advancement based on kinship or ethnicity, advancement should be
based on qualification. Furthermore, the position of an officer could not be held for more than 4 years. These reforms, especially the system for advancement were “watered out “when the Kibaki regime took over power in 2002, and the military leadership in general got their time in decisive positions prolonged.

As pointed out in the beginning of this section, from boot camp to higher educational levels the individual must perform according to subjective as well as objectively measurable standards and regulations set by the military itself. The average response rate in this sample is positive, still considering the statistical uncertainty and it does not decouple training and education from the argument that the transition of the armed forces in Kenya is consistent with the democratic transition. It rather supports the idea that the military profession develops its meritocratic dimension before it develops the altruistic dimension. (See figure 3)

Evaluation and Control
Evaluation and control is intricately connected to self-regulation in the altruistic perspective. The ability to evaluate own performance is the foundation of the most evident indication of professionalism a profession can achieve. The professionals control and evaluate themselves because laypeople simply cannot. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, instead the laypeople (the community) engage in the social exchange where the community gives back autonomy and self-regulation. If the social exchange cannot take place, the specialized knowledge will not to the full extent support the establishment of a military profession. However, in the meritocratic quest for setting own standards in evaluation and control relations, the military institution must also to some extent allow public scrutiny. Not providing a transparent profile on, for instance, the spending of public funds reduces the level of institutional autonomy. Thus evaluation and control is not a one-way street, but more like a delicate balance of giving and taking. This variable aims at clarifying the respondents’ views on evaluation and control in the military profession by making the following four statements:

1. I find external control of the military profession very important.
2. The armed forces must set its own standards for obtaining quality in the military training
3. The military has only to be partly transparent for public evaluation.
4. Internal control of the training is important to keep a high military standard
Two statements (No. 1 and No. 3) address the external control with the military. The external evaluation and control revolves mainly around the subjective values. Can the people in general have trust in the military and the governmental context? The next two statements (No. 2 and No. 4) address the internal control. The internal evaluation and control revolves mainly around the objective values. Do the military have the internal institutional capacity to evaluate and control. Examining the result of the ACOTA sample we immediately recognize an allocation of response according to the statement. Across both samples, there seems to be consensus as to the importance of internal control. The institutions for upholding this internal evaluation and control, military as well as academic, seem to be in place also. One of my respondents addresses the subject of evaluation and control by saying:

For example, all cadets begin their training in a central academy before moving to different specialized schools. Before promotions, they have promotion exams geared towards testing their professionalism. Besides professional military training, the officers also improve their formal academic skills. Through Egerton University, it is possible for officers to obtain degrees in military science through The Military Distance Learning Program (MDLP), an elaborated distance-learning program.354

Turning towards the external control, again in both samples there seems to be consensus, however, a bit more ambiguous in its expression than regarding the internal control as an evaluation. As mentioned earlier, regarding the evaluation and control relations, the

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354 Interview done in November 2013 during fieldwork. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
Diagram No.5 (4) The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2013 (Evaluation and Control). The number of respondents is 23 and the statistical uncertainty is 15%.

A military institution must allow public scrutiny. Not providing a transparent profile on, for instance, the spending of public funds reduces the level of institutional autonomy, and opens up a downturn in the social exchange. The ambiguous attitude towards external control is sustained by several stories revealed by the press. The National Intelligence Service (NIS) got 750 million KES from the military and the Interior Ministry under unclear circumstances,\(^{355}\) General Edward Ouko, who is the Auditor General, has revealed. During the financial year 2012 - 2013, the Auditor accused the two institutions of flouting the law by diverting money in their budgets to the National Intelligence Service.

\(^{355}\) [http://www.standardmedia.co.ke](http://www.standardmedia.co.ke), "Kenya’s defence interior ministries in a spot for diverting sh750 million"
Diagram No.6 (4) The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2015 (Evaluation and Control). The number of respondents is 38 and the statistical uncertainty is 12%.

A case like the one mentioned is just one amongst many, and they severely damage the social exchange and thereby the professional image of the KDF. Viewing the stories in the light of the socioeconomic context, one can only speculate on where the money has gone. Corruption in connection with procurement of defense related items is likely. According to Transparency International’s (International Defense and Security Program TIIDSP) last survey from 2011, only moderate transparency is achieved during military operations. Military intelligence units are officially assigned to address corruption risk, and that is a procedure with significant shortcomings. The average response rate in this sample is neutral still taking into account the statistical uncertainty. The impact of corruption and ethnicity is traceable but not damaging. The analysis of evaluation and control to a certain degree substantiate the claim that the professional transition of the armed forces in Kenya is consistent with the democratic transition, since the socioeconomic conditions, to a large extent, permit the degree of the social exchange that takes place between the military and the people. Furthermore, the positive response for internal control, to some extent, supports the claim that the rise of a profession follows a specific pattern.

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(figure 3). The military profession develops its meritocratic dimension before it develops the altruistic dimension.

Conclusion on the Meritocratic Dimension
The analysis of the first half of the professional military profile confirms the initial prediction that the meritocratic dimension in the military profession is relatively strong. Especially three findings are interesting. First, the impact of corruption and ethnicity on the professional military profile is in general traceable in two out of three samples, but the impact is not damaging. In the training and education sample, the impact is not traceable. Furthermore, indications have been found that the rise of a profession follows a specific pattern, as suggested earlier. (Figure 3) The military profession develops its meritocratic dimension before it develops the altruistic dimension. Last, the analysis of evaluation and control to a certain degree substantiate the claim that the professional transition of the armed forces is consistent with the democratic transition due to the restrictions of the socioeconomic conditions and consequentially the social exchange between the military and the people.

The Altruistic Dimension
A profession must acknowledge its social responsibility and promote it by making it a moral obligation (standard) for the members of that given profession. Only then can the community and the profession engaged in a social exchange where the community gives back autonomy, self-regulation and status to the profession. However, as mentioned earlier, in democratizing countries such as Kenya, it is realistic to expect that the altruistic relationship is weak. Dominant socioeconomic factors like corruption, marginalization and ethnicity impede the social exchange between state institutions and the community. Based on this ACOTA sample, we find that the KDF is still influenced by the colonial heritage of protecting power instead of people (the specialized knowledge within security). This behavior does not comply with the principle or practice of concern for the welfare of others. Thus the social exchange becomes complicated, and support from society for the establishment of a military profession is reduced as well as the potential of the military to influence society.

Integrity
Integrity is easily viewed as a “Force Multiplier” in the attempt to increase the social exchange mentioned earlier. In this relation, the idea of integrity refers to the quality of honesty and strong moral principles, more than the

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second interpretation as “complete”. Integrity is the set of characteristics that enables the social exchange and that generates trust among the professional military personnel and the community. Furthermore, integrity creates the conditions for organizations to resist corruption and to be more trusted and efficient. This variable aims at clarifying the respondents views on integrity in the conduct of military duties. The four statements in this sample are as follows:

1. Does acting with integrity influence the military’s ability to operate professionally?
2. My colleagues always practice integrity in the conduct of their military duties?
3. My profession as a soldier doesn’t correspond with a high degree of integrity
4. If I don’t serve with integrity, I will damage my professional image.

Examining the result of the ACOTA sample we immediately recognize that the relationship between serving as a professional soldier and the idea of integrity is not only recognized by the respondents but also highly valued. Across both samples there seems to be consensus concerning the importance of integrity as a decisive element in the process of professionalization. The response rate for question number one is high, ranging from 96% in 2013 to 92% in 2015. But also question number 3 and 4 support the trend. However, the respondents also show remarkable honesty when asked if their colleagues always practice integrity in the conduct of their military duties.

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358 Ibid. p. 41. Accountability into Military Culture
The response rate for question number two ranges from 65% in 2013 to 62% in 2015. This is a strong indication that the respondents, on the one hand, recognize the importance of integrity when the military organization is in the process of professionalization, but on the other hand, acknowledge that their colleagues on the ground do not always practice accordingly. One of the most spectacular incidents for the KDF in recent times involving loss of integrity was the operation following the terror attack on the shopping center Westgate in Nairobi, in September 2013. Especially the allegation of soldiers looting the shopping center was a severe blow to the professional profile of the KDF. After weeks of denial the KDF on the 29th of October admitted that soldiers looted Westgate Shopping Centre during the terrorist attack.
The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2015 (Identification and Affiliation). The number of respondents is 38 and the statistical uncertainty is 12%.

Two soldiers were sacked and jailed in connection with the looting from shops at the mall. A third soldier is facing court martial after being found in possession of a mobile phone suspected to have been looted from the mall. The point here, in a professional perspective, is not really how many soldiers and what they may or may not have taken from the mall. The point from a professional perspective is the damage done to the process of the social exchange. In the aftermath of this exposure, some Kenyans expressed that they had lost faith in the KDF after an investigation by KTN’s “Jicho Pevu” program revealed soldiers looting the Westgate shopping mall during the deadly assault. Closed-circuit video footage showed soldiers carrying shopping bags allegedly filled with cash and other valuables. The KDF were expected to pursue the gunmen and rescue hostages trapped inside the mall, not to engage in looting. But also allegations of poor coordination and outright hostilities between the various security agencies involved in the rescue operation contributed to stain the KDF reputation. This is a perfectly good example of how the idea of integrity, the quality of honesty and strong moral principles, literally, are lost over night. For any profession the loss of integrity is devastating, and

359 KDF Press conference October 21st, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0MWhcGGvSM
KDF Press conference October 29th, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qbOXh7hEp4
for the KDF it will most likely take years before confidence among Kenyans is restored.

As being the first variable in the altruistic dimension, the result is not alarming. The respondents seem to agree, across both surveys, that integrity is closely related to developing a professional profile. However, the remarkable part here is the response when asked if their colleagues always practice integrity in the conduct of their military duties. To that question we see a response rate ranging from 65% in 2013 to 62% in 2015. Compared to their Danish colleagues’ responses to exactly that question we find only half as many respondents, around 33%, who do not think that their colleagues always practice integrity in the conduct of their military duties. That is an indication that in Kenya the distance between knowing what’s right and doing what’s right is potentially greater than in Denmark.

My argument is that this phenomenon is again linked to the widespread inequality that feeds corruption in the armed forces and this time also theft. The salary of a private soldier could be as low as between 10,000 KES and 50,000 KES (700 DKK – 3,500 DKK) pr. month, which barely is enough to sustain a living for a family. The analysis of integrity to a certain degree substantiates the claim that the profession can move forward or backward on this continuum. Furthermore, it can rarely exceed the process of democratization since it is the same restrictive or permissive socioeconomic dynamics we find behind both.

**Political Control**

The military institution has to be completely under political control. In a democracy it is paramount that the people, through the democratic process, control the use of the armed forces. Approaching almost any analysis of a civil-military relation (CMR), we often find the relationship referred to as the “Problematique”. The “Problematique” refers to the dilemma between military and civil institutions. The state needs the military to protect it from outside threats but how does the state protect itself from the military? As indicated in the word, this relationship between civilians and the military is not always without difficulties. In the ‘60s and ‘70s, Samuel Huntington and one Morris Janowitz frequently discussed how this civil-military relationship could develop into “democratic control of the armed

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360 See Chapter 2 for details on inequality
362 The “Problematique” refers to the dilemma between military and civil institutions. (Ex. Peter D. Feaver, Armed Forces and Society. Winter 1996. p. 149.)
forces”. Huntington and Janowitz are usually recognized as the most predominant voices in the debate on civil-military relations since the 1960s. The bottom line of this debate is the degree of civilian meddling in military affairs, or the “division of labor” as Huntington puts it. Where Huntington argues for military autonomy, which is a minimum of civil meddling in military affairs, as the best approach to political neutrality and voluntary subordination of the military, Janowitz points out the unavoidable politicization of the military and the need for accommodating the military profession in accordance with the ever-changing world. This variable aims at clarifying the respondents views on the interaction between the civil and military institutions by making these four statements.

1. The use of force must be restricted by and applied by the government alone.
2. The military should have more political influence.
3. The military should always be under civilian control.
4. The purpose of the military is to protect the citizen from outside threats.

Examining the result of the ACOTA sample we recognize that the relationship between the civil authority and the military produce the lowest average response rate in the ACOTA sample.

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363 The “Soldier and the State”, by Huntington and “The Professional Soldier” by Janowitz, as the most predominant work on this matter.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Durkheim’s basic argumentation is that any given profession must acknowledge its social responsibility and promote it by making it a moral obligation for the members of that given profession. Only then can the community and the profession engage in a social exchange where the community gives back autonomy, self-regulation and status to the profession. In the context of political control, it is thus paramount that the armed forces submit to and exercise their power within the framework of the given constitution. If the armed forces exhibit variation outside the constitutional framework, it will weaken the social exchange and the community will be less willing to give back autonomy, self-regulation and a status of a profession.

Diagram No.9 (4) The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2013 (Political Control) The number of respondents is 23 and the statistical uncertainty is 15%.

Diagram No.10 (4) The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2013 (Political Control) The number of respondents is 38 and the statistical uncertainty is 12%.

Observing the response in the ACOTA sample, two things appear. First, there seems to be a general agreement on what the purpose of the armed forces is. Across the two samples, none of the respondent disagrees with the statement that the purpose of the military is to protect the citizen from outside threats. On the contrary, in both samples the majority of respondents agree.

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From background interviews and from questions raised during the survey, it seems like the increasing number of international military assignments in general enlarge the understanding of the purpose of the military. Internationally sanctioned military operations in another country are now as normal as protecting the homeland. That can, in a survey context, lead to only partly agree with the statement. In general it is a positive statement from the respondent and a valuable contribution to the establishment of the social exchange and in the end a professional profile. Second, and a bit more problematic in relation to the altruistic values is the response to statement number one and three. Especially in the sample from 2015 the majority of the respondents do not agree with the statements. And even if the response is slightly better in 2013, the overall response is worrying. Both questions address the fundamental issue of democratic control with the armed forces and the restriction and application of force, and as it appears from the survey 2015, the respondents disagree. This trend, which we find across both ACOTA samples, is supported by my background interviews.

Speaker 1: Do you think that that there will, there is a limit for your military in Uganda, there is a limit for how much the politicians are allowed to do...I mean could we have a, I imagine the situation where the politics were politicians civil politicians in Uganda perhaps took the country in a wrong direction, and, and, and, and can you can you imagine the scenario where the army would say this isn't good. We had to get Uganda back on trail too, or is it is it completely no go.
Speaker 2: You know from independence which was in 1961 we have had turmoil.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Political turmoil because of self-interest. But from 1986 when the new government came in many things that relate to a democracy have been put in place.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: First of all human security was not there.
Speaker 1: Human security?
Speaker 2: Yes. People would die and we wouldn't know who has killed who for what reason.
Speaker 1: No?
Speaker 2: And, eh, even when there was change of government instead of people running away people started...when they realized how stable, how stability had come, people started coming in from the diaspora back to Uganda, and those who had gone because of the insecurity and got jobs outside, they work and bring money to Uganda. Now the issue of civilians trying to disorganize, you know, the political situation and how the military would come in; how does it come in because in most...everywhere there is disgruntlement because politics is like one of the easiest way to get money to get rich, and optimists, an optimist cannot join the army the military.
Speaker 1: No?
Speaker 2: No, you can’t. If...because you are restricted you cant do anything what you want even when you have opportunities like through your relations with other people you cannot do certain business, so I think from our historical point of view it is not possible for us to interfere, but definitely when things become uh go beyond certain limitations

365 Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
From this small extract of an interview, we see that my respondent has very little confidence in the politicians and, as a consequence, he does not rule out that if the politicians become too greedy, the military must bring democracy and politicians under control. The survey result as well as the background interviews are strong indications that the armed forces, to some extent, are still influenced by the colonial heritage of protecting power instead of people, and they will justify working outside the constitutional framework if necessary. This behavior does not comply with the constitutional restrictions, and the conditions for the social exchange are thus restricted and will not to the fullest extent support the establishment of the military professional profile. Recognizing dominating socioeconomic factors like political corruption, implied by my respondent, the social exchange between the armed forces and the community is further impeded. Turning towards the last statement (number two), across both samples we find a common agreement that the military should not have more political influence. In fact from my background interviews I have only met very strong identical views.

Speaker 2: To me our country, it relies 90% of civilian support whatever we do we do it in support of the civilians.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: But now these civilians; they are divided, too, because of this multi-party politics.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Others are in position, so I want the army to be relied on its own, without putting in these civilians; though it is a process civilian, and it’s there because of the civilian.
Speaker 1: Yeah.
Speaker 2: Yeah, the army should be.
Speaker 1: The army should be the army, should be.
Speaker 2: The army should be the army.
Speaker 1: And the politician?
Speaker 2: Should be the politician.
Speaker 1: (agrees) be politician and no mixture here.
Speaker 2: Yes, because when, when to me, to me at my point of view
Speaker 1: Yeah.\textsuperscript{366}

Again from this small extract of an interview I did in November 2013, we see that my respondent has very little confidence in the politicians and finds no reason to give politicians more influence. As a retired Lieutenant General said to me while talking about why Kenya avoided many Coup d’états during the ‘60s and ‘70s. “It is remembered that during the 1970s, many African countries were suffering from coup d’états. Kenya survived this period because of the approach in the professionalization of the military, especially the officer corps. The rule was simple, officers took

\textsuperscript{366} Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
care of learning the military profession, and the politicians took care of politics. Never mix these two variables.367

Analyzing the result of the ACOTA sample and the supporting background interview, we find that the altruistic dimension is at its weakest. Based on this ACOTA sample we see that the political control of the armed forces in not unconditional, and military intervention is not out of the question. The KDF most likely is still influenced by the colonial heritage of protecting power instead of people. Thus the social exchange becomes complicated and support from society for the establishment of a military profession is reduced, as well as the potential of the military to influence society.

Rights-based Service
The armed forces have to offer basic privileges to servicemen and -women of all ranks, however, institutions usually introduce additional legal issues in the legal foundation, reflecting the unique professional environment. Therefore soldiers, in relation the position they hold, may have to observe restrictions in their constitutional rights, but still they must enjoy the same basic legal protection as civilian citizens, as expressed in the constitution.368

Concerning the KDF, the Kenyan constitution is very explicit on these matters. In chapter four, the Bill of Rights, it is stated that limitations in applying chapter four, which contains basic constitutional rights, can occur, especially for persons serving in the Kenya Defence Force or the National Police Service. Furthermore, In the Kenya Defence Act (2012), part four, these limitations of rights and fundamental freedoms are specified. The limitation will be in effect to defend and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Kenya and involve limitations of freedom of expression, freedom of conciseness and opinion, privacy, information and association. Whereas these limitations are only used occasionally, the political rights are abolished when joining the KDF. Developed in its full potential this is a major limitation of the soldier’s constitutional rights. However, it is not unusual, and to a certain extent understandable that security forces are restricted during the performance of their service. The critical issues occur if these limitations in fundamental constitutional rights are used to cover up crime. In Kenya there is no alternative institutional legal protection of soldiers, an oversight body or

367 Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.

institution like the “military ombudsman”, who provides a shortcut for complaints and reports on misconduct and irregularities in the line of duty. Today the system requires that complaints about the commanding officer have to be handed in to the commanding officer. This variable aims at clarifying the respondents views on obtaining basic rights during service in the military, by introducing the following statements:

1. During service the military observes and enforces my basic rights presented in the constitution.
2. Serving in the military is for all citizens despite race, religion and sex.
3. Serving in the military reduces the level of legal certainty compared to a civilian.
4. Serving in the military gives me the same basic rights as given to a civilian.

Analyzing the result of the ACOTA sample, we quickly discover some similarities across the sample. Regarding question number two, we find the highest average response. A majority of my respondents (82%) agree that serving in the military is for all citizens despite race, religion and sex, which is a positive trend. Especially in relation to including all ethnic groups in the KDF and increasing the possibility for the social exchange to take place.

Diagram No.11 (4) The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2013 (Right Based Service) The number of respondents is 23 and the statistical uncertainty is 15%.
Regarding question number one, we find the majority of my respondents agree that, in both 2013 and 2015, during service the military observes and enforces the basic rights presented in the constitution. However, the response is not as distinct as for question number one, since a relative large part of the respondents, especially in 2015 (38%) only partly agree. Adding the ambiguous response to question numbers three and four, we see that far from all officers in this ACOTA sample find that serving in the military gives them the same basic rights as given to a civilian.

Diagram No.12 (4) The diagram presents the response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2015 (Right Based Service) the number of respondents is 38 and the statistical uncertainty is 12%.

The legal system inside the military is described in the previous mentioned Defense Act from 2012. However, not many cases have come to public attention due to lack of transparency in the system in general. According to Transparency International, the military with huge contracts and high secrecy poses unique corruption risks369 and therefore have no interest in public attention. A few cases have, however, reached the public. The biggest case since the failed coup d’état in 1982 is from 2014. It involves the charge of 27 seamen and officers for mutiny. Allegedly, they unlawfully left the service in the KDF to get jobs in the private security sector. However, they claimed that they informed the military of their

369 http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/defence_security
intention to leave after serving the mandatory nine years. “We sent resignation letters to our commanding officers requesting to be allowed to leave the armed forces for greener pastures,”\textsuperscript{370}, one of the soldiers said.

The former soldiers said there were mixed reactions from their commanders over their resignation requests. Furthermore, the soldiers claimed that some of their colleagues had been released from the military since the start of the year (2014) and as late as in early March. “It seems that it all depends on who you know in the military,” one of them complained. “Our resignation wishes were either granted, declined or ignored,” the soldiers said. During my fieldwork, I have not gained any information suggesting bribes in connection with resignations from the KDF. I have, however, documentation for bribes in connection with recruitment procedures to the KDF, and for corruption during service. Information obtained via background interviews and used in chapter 3. I thus find it very likely that corruption played a role in this mutiny case. As mentioned earlier, it is not unusual, and to a certain extent understandable that security forces are restricted during the performance of their service. The critical issues occur if these limitations in fundamental constitutional rights are used to cover up crime. In November 2014, a court martial situated at the Kenyan navy’s Mtongwe Base, sentenced four of the 27 soldiers to life imprisonment, finding them guilty of deserting duty during wartime.\textsuperscript{371} In Kenya there is no alternative institutional legal protection of soldiers, a “military ombudsman” the soldiers could have used to try their case. The analysis of the legal conditions in the KDF shows the likely impact of corruption on the professional military profile. The social exchange becomes complicated and support from society for the establishment of a military profession is reduced as well as the potential of the military to influence society. Furthermore, the argument that the professional transition of the armed forces in Kenya is to some extent consistent with the democratic transition is supported.

Conclusion on PMP
As mentioned in the introduction, the first and foremost purpose of Foreign Military Assistance is, through a military-to-military relation, to assist in developing a new, or enhance an existing, military capacity. This process is often referred to as professionalizing, since intensive and specialized

\textsuperscript{370} http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenyat50/article/2000108696/ex-soldiers-returning-from-middle-east-detained-face-court-martial?pageNo=2
\textsuperscript{371} http://www.mwakilishi.com/content/articles/2014/04/08/ex-kenyan-soldiers-returning-from-greener-pastures-abroad-detained.html
training and education increase the level of specialized knowledge in any given institution. In my introduction, I also made probable that if Foreign Military Assistance has a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization at all, it must be from a “spillover” from the process of professionalizing. This process, I argue, is meant to take place through the altruistic dimension in the understanding of the professionalism that I present. The understanding of this altruistic dimension is fundamental for understanding professionalism, and most important, it holds the theoretical potential for establishing the alleged democratic “spillover” effect to society. If Foreign Military Assistance in any way can have a positive and supportive effect on the process of democratization the altruistic dimension is the link by which the process can take place.

On the backdrop of my analysis so far, I am now able to present a possible Professional Military Position of the armed forces in the framework of the transitional perspective on professionalism. My analysis indicates that a military profession develops its meritocratic dimension before it develops the altruistic dimension. A typical program in professionalization of the armed forces would begin with an initial focus on training and equipment, training facilities logistics and operations. Later the intellectual orientation is added in the shape specialized knowledge, institutionalized in defense colleges and eventually the link to society is established and the social exchange and self-regulation can begin. Consequently, it is possible that the military professional position in the armed forces is not a permanent position but that the military profession can move forward or backward on this continuum.
Diagram No.13 (4). The diagram presents the average response rate for the ACOTA sample in 2013 and 2015. Furthermore, it presents the result of the Danish Army sample. The number of respondents is up to 38 and the statistical uncertainty is not higher than 15%. The Danish Army sample is 155 respondents and the statistical uncertainty is 6%.

Adding the result of the ACOTA sample\textsuperscript{372}, we find indications that support the claim that a military profession develops its meritocratic dimension before it develops the altruistic dimension. We see the average result for the two samples in 2013 and 2015 increasing the meritocratic values. However, at the same time, the samples show no development in the altruistic values. That indicates a military position, developing the meritocratic dimension but in transition to develop the altruistic dimension. If the indications are authentic, the Danish Army should produce higher values on the altruistic dimension since it has a completely different set of restrictive or permissive socioeconomic dynamics compared to the ACOTA sample. As we can see in the diagram the Danish Army has slightly lower meritocratic values. However, at the same time, the samples show a higher level of development in the altruistic values. That indicates a military position with fully developed meritocratic and altruistic dimensions.

\textsuperscript{372} Due to the high statistical insecurity the ACOTA sample is only indicative.
In the diagram below, we find the 6 variables originating from Flexner’s variables as presented earlier (figure no. 4). They are used as a framework for presenting the data obtained in the ACOTA sample and the Danish Army. The left side of the diagram presents the average response rate for the three meritocratic variables, i.e., identification and affiliation, training and education, and evaluation and control. The right side of the diagram presents the average response rate for the three altruistic variables, i.e., integrity, political control and rights-based service. The military professional position becomes abundantly clear when presented like this, and we immediately identify two characteristics observing the profile in the diagram below. First, when focusing on the red and the blue lines, we see the result from the ACOTA sample. The meritocratic dimension of the profile is much more developed than the altruistic one. Especially the variable of training and education increases the positive result. But also education and control are a variable that adds positive value to the meritocratic side of the profile.

![Diagram No.14 (4)](image)

The variable of political control has the opposite effect by reducing the altruistic dimension considerably, but also the variable of rights-based service has a low average response. Summarizing the ACOTA sample (the
the diagram confirms the claim of a professional military position in transition, increasing the altruistic dimension. Second, again the Danish Army (green line) should produce higher values on the altruistic dimension since it still has a completely different set of restrictive or permissive socioeconomic dynamics compared to the ACOTA sample. As we can see in the diagram, the Danish Army has a slightly better development in the altruistic values and as such supports the argument, in general. However, the result from the Danish Army sample does not present a substantial or significantly better development even though it is better within all three variables. This apparent lack of impact on the altruistic dimension gives rise to one comment. As mentioned, the relatively high statistical uncertainty due to the low number of respondents in especially the ACOTA sample leaves us with nothing more than a strong indication. The result is vitiated with up to 15% uncertainty for ACOTA sample, and it obviously requires more respondents in every sample to validate the indications presented. Having said that, the indications presented in this chapter are, nonetheless, indications that lead me to conclude the following:

The military profession develops its meritocratic dimension before it develops the altruistic one. Consequently, this means that the potential democratic “spillover” from the military to society is “adjustable” too. In situations where the military profession is moving towards containing strong altruistic values the potential “spillover effect” to society is high. In situations where the military profession is moving towards containing weak altruistic values the potential is low. Therefore, the military can rarely, and only in situations where the military profession is moving towards containing strong altruistic values, exceed the process of democratization since it is the same restrictive or permissive socioeconomic dynamics affecting both institutions.

Therefore, if Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) and the consequently professionalizing of the recipient military should have a potential positive effect on the process of democratization, the FMA must fulfil at least two criteria on ability and effect. To establish the ability, FMA programs must contain strong altruistic elements supporting the altruistic professionalizing of the recipient military to create the best potential for “spillover effect” to society, and to establish an effect on democracy, FMA programs must contain strong elements addressing corruption, ethnicity and minority repression (question 5, 6 and 7 in the radar diagram on KDI), in the professionalizing of the recipient military to create the best potential for supporting democracy. FMA must address the defective area in the
democratic profile (question 5, 6 and 7) and increase the opportunity to make the profile more balanced.

To uncover the actual content of FMA programs, and to what extent the alleged professionalizing of the military has a positive effect on the process of democratization, an investigation into external military assistance in Kenya is needed.
Chapter Five – Military Assistance and Africa

Introduction
Through different times and exposed to different challenges, the role of the military has varied a great deal. However, the military and the use of force have always played an important role in the establishment of societies in general. Since the times of the Peloponnesian wars and the establishment of the Greek city-states, the ability to apply force and direct a decisive and destructive blow towards your enemy has been in diligent use. Even in our globalized world of today, we find that the ability to apply overwhelming force on the battlefield still plays an enormous political role, not least in Africa. But surely, the world has undergone some changes since the Peloponnesian wars, and so has the military. To better be able to meet the political challenges in a rapidly changing world, the traditional destructive role of the military has expanded into “unknown” territory, such as peacekeeping and military assistance. As mentioned in chapter one, the last main possibility for the military to take over that Tilly suggests is “external support for the military”. More precisely, he argues that disproportionate military assistance given by outside powers to third-world military organizations might be lending those organizations extra strength vis-à-vis their competitors within their own states. Some programs claim to support democracy and some do not. Therefore, if military-to-military relations (FMA) are meant to support the recipient military in professionalization and be an important catalyst in the democratic transition, then the bulk of the programs executed must at least have elements of potential democratic (altruistic) support imbedded. FMA programs initiated only to safeguard own national interest are prone to challenge the balance of power on a national as well as a regional level, regardless the content of the program. Disproportionate FMA creates a situation best described as the “security dilemma”, known from the realist tradition of international relations theory. In the effort to create stability and eventually development, the aggregate build-up of military capacities is increasingly perceived as a threat, and eventually the opposite effect of security is created. From Tilly’s argumentation, we can deduce that we, by training and equipping an army, run the risk of destabilizing the security sector and, consequently, endanger the democratic transition instead.

374 In 2013 nineteen African countries are involved in wars, or experiencing post-war conflicts and tensions. The list has been modified based on the webpage list at: http://www.africasunnews.com/wars.html
To finalize the quest for answering the question raised in this study, and to uncover the preconditions for step 1, the nature of contemporary FMA programs must be examined. In the following chapter, I will begin by highlighting the events that eventually led the western armies to undertake these roles as trainers and peacekeepers. Likewise important, I will draw on the genetics of the “African army” to visualize the professional conditions of the recipient and the difficulties these brought about. Finally, in this chapter the nature of contemporary FMA programs are analyzed to uncover elements of potential imbedded democratic (altruistic) support.

The Genetics of the “African Army”
If anything affected the development of the African army as we see today, it was its colonial masters. Especially the French and the British national armies exerted intense efforts in increasing professionalism by providing training and education to the African army, and they did a good job. They reached a high level of meritocratic professionalism, and since the European armies more or less accepted civilian control, the distinction between the political and the military agenda was maintained and a high degree of loyalty to the meritocratic professionalism was achieved. No colonial army in sub-Saharan African between 1880 and 1960 engaged in a coup d’état.  

Turning to the level of technical capabilities, the technological level found in Europe at that time far exceeded any army on the African continent. In general that meant that opposition threats to security in practice resulted in taking on a well-trained, well-equipped and well-informed army. Usually that kept many from trying. “Colonial armies score very highly on the effectiveness scale.” However, as presented in this thesis, professionalism has an additional side to the meritocratic one, and the African colonial army did not score remarkably high here. The fact that the colonial armies almost entirely focused on protecting the interests of the colonial masters and suppressing unrest amongst locals resulted in a very weak development, if any at all, in the altruistic dimension. Obviously,

since the African colonial army was an instrument to secure the interest of the colonial master, the social exchange between army and people, as described earlier, was not an issue.

Furthermore, the colonial masters used ethnic selection intensively when recruiting soldiers at the lowest ranks. “Ethnic selection works against a common identity by placing and supporting exclusive sub nationalism above an inclusive nationalism.” Amongst other countries, this was also prevalent in Kenya, and since the officer corps usually was European, the link between the army and society largely disappeared at independence and left the colonial army segregated from the social context and without any directions. Last, but not least, corruption in the postcolonial African army directed a severe blow against the altruistic dimension of professionalism. Low transparency in procurement practices and personal grievances in a poorly trained officer corps hampered public acceptance, and reduced the possibility for the social exchange to take place and the altruistic dimension of professionalism to develop. As presented, these factors challenging the postcolonial army’s altruistic dimension of professionalism today were, therefore, partly inherited from a pre-independence context but also highly related to the present socioeconomic context.

**From the King’s African Rifles**

The existence of the KDF as we find it today, and not least the self-image portrayed by the KDF, is heavily influenced not to say determined by the dynamics in the political context. This is almost the only constant factor for understanding the KDF, and it applies to the period both before and after independence. Therefore, to understand the “genetic structure” of KDF, one has to understand the political context in which KDF was born and raised.

During the British colonial rule, the use of force was alone dedicated to extraction of resources from Kenya and for internal security, that is, protection of the settlers. Occasionally, force would be used to secure geostrategic positions along the Nile, as for instance denying access to the French. It was in this colonial context of repression, exploitation and extraction that the KDF was born in the shape of the King’s African Rifles

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378 Ibid. p. 29
(KAR). The Kenyan units in KAR were largely constructed according to the British concept of “divide and rule” by means of an ethnic preferences rationale. Officer and NCO positions were reserved for “Whites”, and soldier positions for Africans. The political context remained the same until 1963, when Kenya won her independence, and so did the King’s African Rifles.

Clearly, one would expect that the independence, given to the people of Kenya in 1963, would make a significant change in the political context and consequently for the KDF. However, as it turned out, Jomo Kenyatta had very few intentions of sharing power with anyone and, to some extent, one can make the argument that the Kenyans simply traded one repressive system for another. Instead of being victimized by the strategic interests of the ever-present colonial powers, it seemed like the Kenyans were now left with a new political context constituted by a national struggle for power based on ethnicity. Not surprisingly, the change in the KDF leadership were accordingly very few. The political context demanded a force that could protect the ruler, avoiding coup d’états and other narrow interests of staying in power. For that the KDF was tailor-made. The armed forces had never done anything else but repression, and even though the KAR in 1963 was transformed into the Kenya military forces with new units and new names, the genetic heritage did not disappear. However, during the Moi era the Kenya military did experience some reform attempts, and especially one general is mentioned in that connection, Lieutenant General Daudi Tonje. He could be described as a “Modernizer” in the sense the he did challenge the colonial genetics of the KDF. Especially within three areas the idea of modernization toke place. First, Lieutenant General Daudi Tonje directed the military’s attention toward the external threats by organizing the army leadership into a dual structure with an Eastern Command and a Western Command. Each command would train and equip for the purpose of defending Kenya against outside threats. (Somalia – Uganda). Second, he introduced “reading and writing” for soldiers, a phenomenon known from modernization theory as a perception of the army as the “School of Nations”. Third, he introduced a system for advancing in the ranks. Instead of advancement based on kinship or ethnicity, advancement was to be based on qualification. Furthermore, the position of an officer could not be held for more than 4 years. These reforms, especially the system for advancement, were “watered down “when the Kibaki regime took over power in 2002, and the military leadership got their time in decisive positions prolonged, like for instance in the position “Chief of Staff”.

During the Kibaki regime an old security actor, foreign military assistance (FMA) in the shape of various “train and equip” programs revitalized the Administrative Police (AP). The motivation for foreign militaries to train the AP was primarily the increasing “Global War on Terror”. The AP is a police force, but it was trained and equipped as a military unit including the use of heavy weapons like mortars. That gave the AP a profile that is usually described as a “paramilitary”. Now, why did the KDF not get the offer to be trained and equipped? Well, perhaps because the KDF no longer processed quite the genetic material required by the ruler, due to the Tonje reforms, more likely is the fact that legal obstacles prevented certain countries to cooperate directly with the KDF, which alternatively made the AP an appealing business partner. Today the AP as well as the General Service Unit (GSU) could be viewed as a paramilitary unit that carries a considerable amount of colonial genes in the sense that it primarily contributes to protect power or people in power. The organizations are ethnically dominated by Kikuyu and Kalenjin. During the 2007 PEV, the unit allegedly was involved in violent confrontations with local demonstrators.

What we find when looking at the genetics of KDF is a force that, to a large extent and especially during the leadership of Tonje, has transformed into a “regular army” in a western perspective. Protecting Kenya from outside threats is the main objective for the KDF today. However, even though the most repressive obligations have moved to paramilitary units, such as the AP and GSU, the KDF still suffer from the colonial heritage when, for instance, deployed to fight Al-Shabab in the north eastern territories. In a “FMA to democracy” perspective, we find the likelihood of inadvertent use of military capabilities increases and consequently the social exchange becomes complicated and support from society for the establishment of a military profession is reduced just as the potential of the military to influence society decreases.

Western Armies’ Post-Colonial Military Capacity Building

Although the cold war had an attenuating effect on UN operations in the beginning of the 1950s, we saw clear indications that the use of force began to change. The international community (UN) introduced the military as “Peacekeepers”. In Africa the first UN peacekeeping mission was in 1960,

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380 Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
381 Interview done in November 2013 during ACOTA training. The author knows the name of the respondent. For security reasons, no names will be mentioned in connection with quotations.
in Congo. ONUC was established in July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. Interestingly, in the same period US began using “Military Assistance Training Programs” as a “discrete, coherent type of international relation”\(^{382}\) in selected countries to contain the spread of communism in Africa. Likewise the USSR used military aid in Angola through the 1980s to balance US engagement and keep a foothold on African soil. The obvious change in the use of force forewarned about new winds of military change blowing on the continent and a complete new understanding of African security. The end of the cold war and the decline in strategic interest from east and west in Africa accelerated the new security needs but also new security possibilities.

New Security Opportunities

In Africa, the end of the cold war had a huge impact on regional security. Old supporting structures in Africa collapsed, since the super powers no longer had any strategic interest in the continent. Since the shifting “cold war dogmatism” no one any longer posed a threat to African cooperation, the first step to establish the African security architecture was taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In 1991, in Kampala, Uganda, the all African Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation was held. This conference ended up pointing out the urgent need for an institutionalized approach to handling conflicts on the continent. The idea became “The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, management and Resolution, and thereby the first common African security enterprise. Unfortunately, words alone do not create security, and in 1994 the world was so terribly reminded about the shortcomings in this security architecture. The genocide in Rwanda put the inefficiency of the system on display, and the time to take step two toward a more active African military approach had come. The foundation of the African Union (AU) in 2002 laid the groundwork for a more transparent and organized approach to African Security. Especially the organization around the African Standby Forces (ASF) contributed to a common African understanding and formulation of security needs and to international acclaim as well. The design of AU was mainly done based on a “blueprint” from the European Union (EU) with a legal mandate from the UN, in accordance with Chapter VIII.\(^{383}\) From a security point of view that means that handling of collective security and early warning was taken care of by the Peace and Security

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Council (PSC). As the executing power, the PSC has the regional security structure ASF. Each of Africa’s five sub regions, the Central, Northern, Southern, Western and Eastern was planned to contribute with one brigade to be used by the council. While the genesis of this organizational structure in itself constitutes a major achievement in institutional reform, and an important step forward for Africa towards achieving the military ability to handle its own security challenges, a groundbreaking change in the understanding of “state sovereignty” adds considerably to the level of achievement. Where the Charter of OAU underlined the state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in member states as unbreakable principals, the Constitutive Act of the AU imposes paramount limitations on state sovereignty. The keyword here is the “right to intervene”. As long as the state fulfills its responsibility to protect its citizens from “grave circumstances as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”, the Westphalia principal of sovereignty is in effect. However, if states fail, for whatever reasons, to honor this responsibility, the AU reserves the right to intervene in a member state. The encounter with the understanding that sovereignty is inviolable has paved the way for the Africans to create the collective security architecture, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) we know today.

Contemporary Security Challenges in EA

However, lack of military capacity constraints and conflicting political agendas, especially in East Africa, was eroding the hard won legitimacy. As the only region in Africa, East Africa has not managed to establish a political framework to spearhead the democratic transformation. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been suggested as the lowest common denominator, but not every country in East Africa is a member of IGAD, not to say wants to be a member of IGAD. This unfortunate political situation has curbed the development and the implementation of the security architecture, and eventually the African Standby forces (ASF). Not until 2005 was the development of ASF revitalized. During the British chairmanship of the European Union and G8 in 2005, the challenges facing Africa were made a priority. This is

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386 In the sense that the security of one is the concern of all
388 Canada, United Kingdom, United States, France, Germany, Japan, EU and AU.
partly because the AU under the program “New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)\(^{389}\), had highlighted peace and security as “fundamentally important conditions for advancing development in Africa.” The development of African Peace Support Operations (PSO) capacity is recognized as a priority for preventing and resolving conflicts in Africa. Among other issues like donor coordination, strategic management and training and logistics, the operationalization of the ASF was addressed. This meant renewed progress in establishing vital organizational elements like the AU Plan Element (PLANELM) within the military staff.

Today we find an AU with growing political influence on a world scale. However, we also see a fragile and constrained organization due to lack of certain military capacities. The ability to deploy into missions in conflict areas and sustain their presence may have improved, but when it comes to professional military training and strategic lift, western military capacities still play a significant role when fulfilling the idea of an African Peace and Security Architecture. Examples of the latter are seen in the peacekeeping mission in Mali, where Denmark, among other nations, supply “critical enablers”, such as strategic airlift and staff officers in key positions.

Summing up, as put forward in the beginning of the section, the role of the military and the use of force surely has undergone some changes since the Peloponnesian wars to meet contemporary political challenges. The western military engagement in Africa has since the 1950s increased by focusing more and more on providing military capacities as components into a slowly emerging but ever so fragile force structure (ASF). This with the purpose and overall end that the Africans, at some point in time, would be able handle their own security. The force structure was fragile first and foremost because of the repressive legacy of the “African Army”. In the process of democratic transition, in which many African countries found themselves after gaining their freedom, in a complicated situation where old power structures and traditional cultural patterns are increasingly challenged by new ways of thinking, the African military often finds itself fixed in the traditional “colonial role”, as a tool to keep power in the hands of the rulers and not exactly as a catalyst for democracy. As we know, that situation is a challenge for FMA programs. On the other hand, without this “building of military capacities” and increasing physical security, the chances that the transition towards democracy can take place are decreasing. In that perspective the interesting question arises, do contemporary western military training of national military capacities actually contribute positively to the process of democratization in Kenya?

In the following section, I will have a closer look at the training assistance taking place in Kenya. The final ambition is to expose that in spite of good intentions to support a development of a professional armed force, even the most ambitious FMA programs can only peripherally target the socioeconomic insufficiencies with disputable results. Investigations into the idea of FMA have to begin by taking a closer look at the genetics of (Foreign) Military Assistance Program\(^{390}\) (MAP).

**Foreign Military Assistance and Democracy**

If the professional transition of the armed forces in Kenya is consistent with the democratic transition in general, and the military thus rarely can exceed the process of democratization, does it then make sense to claim that Foreign Military Assistance can support democratization? To some extent it still does, as pointed out in chapter 4 FMA generally improves the meritocratic skills of the military, which is an important step towards full professionalism as indicated in the illustration (T1). However, the Foreign Military Assistance programs must change over time to reach full professionalism. It must be specifically tailored to address the socioeconomic dynamics that we find encasing both democracy and professional military transition and thereby increasing the altruistic dimension and the link in which the social exchange can take place, indicated in (T2).

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\(^{390}\) Military Assistance Program as a (donor) military to (recipient) military relation
If not, it cannot have a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization. In the light of my findings so far, I will evaluate the utility of current Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) programs.

The Categorization of FMA Programs
There is no universal definition of FMA and, basically, FMA has to be understood as everything from providing financial support and sales to engaging in more ambitious political partnerships, involving strategic defense planning and military education. In order to evaluate the theoretical utility of FMA programs in relation to promoting the social exchange and public acknowledgement, it is necessary to categorize the different FMA programs in relation to the same variables (the meritocratic and the altruistic dimension) as presented in chapter five to uncover the KDF’s professional military position. In the matrix below, I suggest that all types of FMA programs, to some degree, consist of a meritocratic and service-oriented dimension. However, only very few FMA programs enjoy full effect on both dimensions. Thus, from the categorizing matrix, it is possible to identify which programs that potentially support the military in being a catalyst in the democratic transition.

![Figure 1](image)

Figure 1 (5) This matrix categorizes different types of FMA programs in relation to the meritocratic and the Altruistic dimension. Best military impact on the democratic transition is obtained from square 2,1 and 2,2.

By applying this categorization in the analysis will we are able to evaluate the utility of selected (FMA) programs. I divide the programs into four categories, all with increasing ability to impact on the socioeconomic dynamics. The first category is presented in square 1,1 and it has the lowest
potential of impacting the socioeconomic dynamics that hamper democratic as well as professional transitions. Likewise, it is suggested, that the highest potential in supporting the altruistic dimension is best obtained from square 2,2 and 2,1 since these programs, at least from a theoretical point of view, adding on the specialized knowledge, are estimated to have the highest potential to develop the social exchange. Therefore, the obvious conclusion is as follows: If military-to-military relations (FMA) are meant to support the military in being an important catalysts in the democratic transition, then the bulk of the programs executed must originate from square 2,2 or 2,1, or at least contain various elements from these categories. To get a step closer to an answer whether that is the case in Kenya, every relevant program and donor ambition has to be examined.

**Foreign Military Assistance Programs in Kenya**

The overall Security Assistance from donor countries to Kenya has steadily developed over the last 25 years. Especially the war on terror has been a catalyst boosting military relation with East Africa, in particular Kenya. The US leaves the biggest footprint, but European countries (US allies in particular) increasingly follow the lead from Washington. Today Kenya ranks among the top US foreign aid recipients in the world, receiving significant development, humanitarian, and security assistance.\(^{391}\) According to Human Rights Watch, significant donors to Kenya’s Security Forces are the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, and the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime.\(^{392}\) An evaluation of all programs from countries involved in security assistance in Kenya, as pointed out above, is not relevant, primarily since it would contain too many repetitions. To make my point, I will only evaluate the composition and utility of a limited number of programs and only programs running in the US or UK - Kenya relationship. However, viewed as a whole the programs chosen will reflect the diversity of FMA and thereby still qualify my argument.

**The Kenya - US relationship**

The US established diplomatic relations with Kenya in 1964, following the December 1963 independence from the United Kingdom.\(^{393}\) The US and Kenya have had an enduring strategic partnership since Kenya's independence, and relations have steadily deepened since. The general US

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\(^{393}\) [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2962.htm)
assistance strategy\textsuperscript{394} is guided by four strategic objectives, that is, Strengthen democratic institutions; Spur economic growth; trade and investment; Advance peace and security; and Promote opportunity and development.

The US engagement in Kenya is extensive both considering program diversity and financial scope. Specific data on the Kenyan defense budget is hard to get by, but my own careful estimate, based on available statistics\textsuperscript{395} and interviews made in Nairobi, is that the US-Kenya relationship alone constitutes just more than half of all FMA in Kenya. The US-Kenya relationship is thus considered as an ample and suitable example for generalization. Kenya is among the largest recipients of US security assistance in Africa\textsuperscript{396} Since around 2000, US Military Assistance to Kenya has focused on improving Kenya’s capabilities to control its land and sea borders and to counter terrorism. Kenya also purchases military equipment through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The programs have included purchasing items like fighter aircraft, helicopters, and Air Force computer systems. According to a report from the Congressional Research Service on US-Kenya Relations,\textsuperscript{397} foreign assistance to Kenya has reached almost $1 billion\textsuperscript{398} annually in recent years. The State Department has requested 568 million USD in 2014 to sustain 10 main security programs currently running in Kenya. Five of these 10 programs address security issues but only two programs\textsuperscript{399} involve Kenya Defence Forces and thus have a potential positive effect on increasing social the acceptance and public acknowledgement with the KDF. Furthermore, these two programs also constitute the two extremes in relation to my categorizing of FMA and are used as such in my analysis. Against a brief backdrop of these programs, I will discuss their utility according to the matrix I presented earlier.

The FMA Program Analysis
The first program is the Foreign Military Financing and on the State

\textsuperscript{394} “The fourth pillar of this Administration’s engagement with Africa, alongside democracy, security, and economic growth, is promoting opportunity and development, with a particular focus on women and youth. Women comprise half of Africa’s population, but often are excluded from Africa’s formal economy”, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2013/202943.htm
\textsuperscript{395} SIPRI Military Expenditures http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
\textsuperscript{398} 200 million to AMISOM, 200 million USAID and 568 million to security, in total 968 million USD
\textsuperscript{399} Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), (NADR)
Department website the program is described as follows: FMF is a critical foreign policy tool for promoting U.S. interests around the world by ensuring that coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals and share burdens in joint missions. In that regard, FMF is vital to supporting U.S. coalition partners in the war on terrorism.” And the state department continues:
“By increasing demand for U.S. systems, FMF also contributes to a strong U.S. defense industrial base, an important element of U.S. national defense strategy that reduces cost for Department of Defense acquisitions and secures more jobs for American workers.”

Since 2010, approx. five million USD has been spend on purchasing equipment and funding training in Kenya. In relation to the ambition stated in the assistance strategy and the four strategic objectives presented earlier, it is relatively easy to establish that this program presumably has the biggest impact on economic growth, trade and investment even though the budget of 5 million USD is relatively small. Thus the program presumably has the lowest impact on KDF ability to support democratic transition. Even if considering the fact that one objective for this program is to maintain support for democratically elected governments that share values similar to the United States for democracy, human rights, and regional stability, it does not change the impression dramatically. On the contrary, according to Transparent International UK, among others, it is actually more likely that funding military procurements in Kenya slows down the democratic transition. Transparency in the Kenyan National Defense budget is low and actuates corruption. The defense procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, is not transparent to the public. Usually, issues of national security are invoked to restrict access for the public. In some cases when procurement of classified equipment is proceeding it can be necessary, however, according to Transparency International, never to the extent present in Kenya. Lack of transparency in military procurements leaves room for corruption. A classic example is the establishing of phony companies and oversized tenders. Allegedly a scam like this was revealed in 2006, involving the construction of Nexus (Military Communication Center), when 37 million USD were directed to a Dutch Company, by bypassing the DoD’s Departmental Tender

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400 The program description is taken from US Department of State web site.
401 The four objectives are strengthening democratic institutions, spur economic growth, trade and investment, advance peace and security, and promote opportunity and development.
Committee.\textsuperscript{403} If social acceptance and public acknowledgement in a profession is the ambition, clearly this FMA program does not address relevant issues. As the matrix shows, this program and other financial support programs is categorized in square 1,1 which actually has the lowest impact on the meritocratic structures as well as the altruistic structures and thereby does not address the socioeconomic challenges. Presented in the context of democratic exclusion, and with the current professional military position, Foreign Military Financing therefore most likely does more harm than good to the democratic transition.

The second program I will discuss and categorize is the International Military Education and Training (IMET). On the State Department website the program is described as follows:

“The International Military Education and Training” (IMET) program is an instrument of U.S. national security and foreign policy and a key component of U.S. security assistance that provides training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. In addition to improving defense capabilities, IMET facilitates the development of important professional and personal relationships, which have proven to provide U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to, democratic governments. IMET’s traditional purpose of promoting more professional militaries around the world through training has taken on greater importance as an effective means to strengthen military alliances and the international coalition against terrorism”

The IMET program provides funding to train military and civilian leaders (Expanded IMET) of foreign countries at approximately 150 Institutions in the US. During the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama the program experienced a dramatically increase in funding to a budget of more than $102 million for FY 2013. In 2012 participating partners reached the level of 47 African countries involved in this program. Since 2010 approx. four million USD have been spent on IMET training and education in Kenya. Furthermore, as pointed out by the state Department, IMET has a positive effect on participants and recipient countries beyond actual training which plays an important role in the IMET program. From the beginning this program appears to have a more promising potential in relation to move the KDF further along the axis of social acceptance and public acknowledgement. The program as it is presented today is generally twofold. First it offers scholarships to students in the field of technical (training) issues, as well as in the field of Professional Military Education (PME) issues. This category primarily approaches technical and operational training for officers on equipment or issues related to specific military issues like leadership or pilot training. The second category is Expanded IMET (E-IMET). Examples of E-IMET courses include Advanced Management Program Course (AMP), Civil Military Operations, Democratic Sustainment, Civil Affairs, Law of War, and Military

\textsuperscript{403} East African Standard Friday, February 10, 2006 p.4
Accounting, and it seems like especially the E-IMET program has a potential to embed the alleged democratizing effect. However, even with a fairly high degree of altruistic potential there is no guarantee that exposure to American (western) values and the professionalism of the US military automatically will have an effect. Amadou Touré, the man who overthrew the country’s democratically elected president in the 2012 coup in Mali, received military training in the United States on multiple occasions through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

The effect of FMA seems to be ambiguous. A report done by the United States Government’s Accountability Office (GAO) in October 2011 confirms the ambiguity. The report points out two main problems with IMET. Initially, GAO suggests that the agencies providing the training in this program should take several steps to emphasize general human rights training. By reviewing 29 country plans for countries ranking as “not free” by Freedom House, only 8 cited human rights related topics as objectives. From the perspective of increasing social acceptance and public acknowledgement, the level of the understanding of human rights are essential in the effort to counter ethnic grouping inside the unit organization. Moving the soldier’s understanding of rights from an “ethnic” point of view to a “human” point of view can be essential in increasing the altruistic dimension. Subsequently, the GOA points out that program monitoring and evaluation ability is severely limited due to the lack of a performance plan stating measurable program objectives and limited information on students after graduation. If the intention is the to push the KDF along the altruistic axis as a profession by teaching Civil-Military Operations, Democratic Sustainment, Civil Affairs, Law of War, and Military Accounting, it requires having program monitoring and evaluation in place so that reliable documentation on the program’s effect can be presented. The IMET program is one of the best and ambitious attempts to educate African officers I have seen so far. However, judging from the GOA report, serious doubts as to what extent the programs are

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405 http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-defense/international-military-education-training-imet
407 Human Rights, Rule of Law, CMR, Military Justice and other.
effective can be raised. As the matrix shows, this program and other educational programs are categorized in square 2,2 which, at least from a theoretical point of view, should have the highest impact on the knowledge-based meritocratic structures as well as the altruistic structures. However, in practice the effect of IMET on the altruistic dimension is ambiguous, and it supports the argument that the FMA can only peripherally target the socioeconomic insufficiencies and the effect of FMA on democratization is therefore ambiguous, if existing at all.

The Kenya-UK relationship
In an attempt to get behind the Ministry of Defense webpage and revisit the motives for the British engagement in Kenya, I visited the MoD in the summer 2014. I was allowed one interview with a civil servant in the Africa section. My overall impression from that 30 min meeting was that training of British units in Kenya was the very first priority. Then perhaps other issues could matter. My following visit in Kenya at the British Peace Support Team in late February 2015 changed that impression in several matters. The military cooperation between Kenya and Britain is based on two pillars: first, a military cooperation agreement, which allows the British Army Training Unit (BATUK) to train in Nanyuki, and intelligence sharing between Kenya and UK; and second, the British Peace Support Team (BPST)409.

BATUK is a permanent training support unit based mainly in Nanyuki. Under the military cooperation agreement with the Kenyan Government, six British infantry battalions per year carry out six-week exercises in Kenya. Also three Royal Engineer Squadrons and two medical company groups are deployed. The two medical company groups provide primary health care assistance to the civilian community. The BATUK defense agreement has been in effect since independence. However, renegotiation of this defense agreement has illuminated and perhaps revitalized old disparities between the two countries.410 Disparities, I argue, not related to the security architecture, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) but to narrow national interests in both Kenya and the UK. Since the BATUK is a program only addressing the training of British forces, it does not qualify as foreign military assistance in relation to this analysis. The British Peace Support Team (BPST), however, qualifies as a foreign military assistance contribution in this context, since it addresses training of not only Kenyan troops but other East African troops as well. Let us take

409 http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx
410 http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-Kenyatta-British-Army-Training-Unit-Nanyuki/-/1064/2661940/-/5i9a5m/-/index.html
a closer look at BPST.

**The FMA Program analysis**

According to the webpage, the BPST’s mission is to coordinate UK military assistance to armed forces in Eastern Africa in order to contribute to Security Sector Reform and to increase peacekeeping capacity. To do so, activities address three main areas, which are International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC), Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) and a presence at the Kenyan Defence and Staff College (DSC).

The IMATC is a joint British and Kenyan venture, which was established in 2005 in Embakasi, Nairobi. It aimed at alleviating the suffering caused by landmines and Explosive Remnants of War by providing high quality Mine Action Training. On the opening day, the IMATC Commandant, Lt-Col Tim Wildish announced to Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) that the training was purely for humanitarian purposes: "We are not training anyone for any sort of military advantage - there is no mine warfare in what we do at all." Wildish continued, "We are very happy to train NGOs or any other organization that is operating in a mine-affected region." The Centre was, at the time of my visit in 2015, training both UN personnel and military personnel from East Africa. During the years since 2005 East Africa's first dedicated dog detection center has now opened at the IMATC and is currently home to 6 mine detection dogs. This program is categorized as a tactical level program, partly because of its length of about 3 or 4 weeks, and partly because of the few requirements it takes to get accepted. As the matrix shows, this program and other educational programs on the tactical level is categorized in square 1,2 which have the highest impact on the meritocratic dimension but lowest on the altruistic dimension. However, in practice, the effect of IMATC on the altruistic dimension is ambiguous. If the mine clearance is directed towards improving the everyday living conditions for people suffering from the negative effect of landmines and explosive remnants of war, it can have a positive effect on the possibility for the social exchange to take place.

However, in spite of the increasing focus on humanitarian mine clearance, the program does not target the most important socioeconomic insufficiencies, as presented, and the effect of IMATC on democratization is therefore ambiguous, if existing at all.

The second pillar is the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC), or IPSTC as the name rightfully is now. According to the webpage, the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) was established in January 2001 as part of

http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=53339
the Kenyan Defense Staff College. It initially focused on training Kenyan forces for UN peacekeeping missions and later African Union Peace Support Operations. In 2009, PSTC Karen merged with International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) to form one center, International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). The former PSTC was renamed to Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) and IMATC was renamed to Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS).

In 2011, IPSTC achieved autonomy through formal partnership arrangements with the USA, UK, Canada, Japan, Kenya, Germany and UNDP. IPSTC’s mission is to be an independent East African research, training and education center that is responsive to peace operations training and educational needs of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The IPSTC is basically a donor-driven training institution with a research ambition. For the moment donors pay for courses and the institution takes care of the administrative processes and provides facilities. I visited IPSTC in late February, and the number of, and not least the content of, the courses conducted is mostly very relevant in targeting the most important socioeconomic insufficiencies. BPST runs courses on “Preventing Sexual Violence” and “Protection of Civilians”. The BPST flagship is a “Senior Mission Leader” Course. The course brings together a team of senior officials from the Military, Civilian and Police from east Africa. The purpose of this course is to strengthen the senior leadership capacity within the East African region and the African continent at large through training effective planning and conduct of integrated peace support operations. It also provides a forum for the participants to interact on diverse issues related to peace and security and challenges facing PSO in the continent. The institution also runs courses on “Rule of Law” and “Security Sector Reform” sponsored by other donors.

As the matrix shows, this program and other educational programs, due to the high level of value-based approaches to educational subjects, is categorized in square 2,2 which, at least from a theoretical point of view, should have the highest impact on the knowledge-based meritocratic structures as well as the value altruistic structures. However, in practice the effect of IPSTC on the altruistic dimension is ambiguous, due to lack of information and evaluation. As mentioned in connection with the analysis of the US IMET program, monitoring and evaluation abilities are severely limited due to the lack of measurable program objectives and limited information on students after graduation. If the intention is to push the KDF and other east African soldiers along the altruistic axis as a profession,

it requires that program monitoring and evaluation are in place so that reliable documentation on the IPSTC program’s effect can be presented. Until then, we cannot know if the targeting of human rights, rule of law and gender-based violence has a positive effect on the social exchange, and thus the effect of FMA on democratization is therefore still to be considered ambiguous, if existing at all.

Turning towards the last pillar in the BPST engagement we find the cooperation with the Defense Staff College (DSC). This is, compared to BPST other activities in the region, not the biggest. According to the webpage, the Mission of the College is "To prepare selected officers for the assumption of increased responsibility in Command, Staff and Peace Support Operations." The College has more than 20 courses with a total of more than 655 officers participates, out of whom at least 132 were non-Kenyans. The Defense Staff College Course is now accredited to the University of Nairobi (UoN) for Ordinary and Post-graduate Diplomas in Strategic Studies. As the matrix shows, this educational program is a relevant gateway to address future commanders in the KDF and introduce them to western democratic values. Due to the high level of value-based approaches to educational subjects, it is categorized in square 2,2 which still is supposed to have the highest impact on the knowledge-based meritocratic structures as well as the value altruistic structures. It is kind of a mystery why opportunities to support educational institutions such as DSC are not more popular given the fact that BPST mission is “Train, advise and assist: Develop regional capacity in delivering AU PSO and strengthen institutions in order to prevent or contain crises”. The military education at university level is the best opportunity to have an impact on value-based issues with future commanders and consequently the best opportunity to have an impact on the socioeconomic conditions mentioned earlier. My argument is again, if the intention is to push the KDF officers along the altruistic axis as a profession, the educational approach is perhaps the best link available. However, it is the smallest effort in the BPST programs. The effect on the social exchange and consequently the effect of FMA on democratization from this small cooperation is therefore still to be considered very ambiguous, and it supports the argument that FMA only peripherally targets the socioeconomic insufficiencies.

Conclusion on Foreign Military Assistance Programs
As pointed out in chapter 4, if Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) should have a potential positive effect on the process of democratization, the FMA must fulfil at least two criteria on ability and effect. To establish the ability, FMA programs must contain strong altruistic elements supporting the altruistic professionalizing of the recipient military to create the best
potential for “spillover effect” to society. The analysis in this chapter shows that programs like military financing (FMF) most likely has the opposite effect. It does not have the needed altruistic elements and exposed to the socioeconomic context lack of transparency in the military budgets leaves room for corruption. To establish an effect on democratization, FMA programs must contain strong elements addressing corruption, ethnicity and minority repression as presented in chapter 3 (KDI). The analysis in this chapter shows that the programs like the IMET that potentially have a possibility for addressing the socioeconomic variables of corruption, ethnicity and minority repression are either not evaluated or not prioritized. The selected contemporary programs presented here can, from an isolated point of view, be very efficient programs serving national interest for both donor and recipient government. However, in this democratizing context they do not have the potential to be catalysts in the democratic transition, or if they do, we don’t know if there is any traceable effect.

Furthermore, it is also very important to bear in mind that this analysis does not rule out that FMA, under the right circumstances can have a positive effect on democratization fulfilling the two criteria on ability and effect. Thus, Foreign Military Assistance programs must be specifically tailored to address the socioeconomic dynamics we find behind both democratic and professional military transitions, thereby increasing the altruistic dimension and the link in which the process can take place. However, judging from the programs implemented by the US and the UK military relations, FMA most likely does not have a positive and supporting effect on the process of democratization.
Chapter Six – Conclusion

Summary

Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) has developed into a global phenomenon with a global impact from several sponsors. The United States and the United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime regard the use of FMA an advantageous tool. The extensive use of foreign military in foreign policy indicates that FMA seems to deliver the political results desired by the donating countries. Are all nations and organization providing military aid motivated by the alleged “democratizing effect”, or are countries pursuing own strategic interests like own security, economic gains etc. Between the two extremes of FMA and democracy presented in this study, there seem to be a wide range of relations that all demand certain preconditions to be fulfilled. Therefore this study started out by asking:

This study is testing the argument that Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) and the consequently professionalizing of the recipient military, has a positive effect on the process of democratization.

The idea that the military is a vital institution when it comes to changing autocracies into democracies and avoiding military coups is not new. As early 1963, Manfred Halpern introduced the army as an instrument of modernization. The army can turn in to a vanguard of nationalism and social reform, it is argued by Manfred Halpern. The point made by “the modernist” was that the military, due to its merits could take on the role as front-runner in the effort of modernizing the society. Furthermore, increasing the technological level within the military gives rise to increasing the industrial standards in society in general. Stanislaw Andreski suggests a causal link between the participation in military affairs and the likelihood of self-government and human rights. It is presented as the

“Military Participation Ratio”.416 Most recently in 2013, in the shadow of this millennium’s security and development nexus, Dennis Blair claims that when leaders of the armed forces in a dictatorship recognize that the supreme leader is losing his people’s support, and they often take action to change their own support. Through a military-to-military relation, Foreign Military Assistance from democratic countries can professionalize the recipient armed forces and turn them into a catalyst for democratization.

This study, to some extent, contradicts the argument of the military as modernizer, since the overall conclusion from this study is that the military rarely exceeds the process of democratization. This is primarily, as pointed out in chapters three and four, because the restrictive socioeconomic conditions, i.e., corruption, ethnic biases and marginalization, prevent the military from taking on the role as a catalyst for democracy. However, at the same time, in a best-case scenario, there is an opportunity to develop military professionalism to its full potential by focusing on the altruistic values ability and effect. Unfortunately, as pointed out in chapter five, principally every contemporary FMA program introduced to support the military in the process of professionalization does not target, or only peripherally does so, these socioeconomic challenges in question.

Main Findings
In the following section, I will bring forward the most important findings by presenting a short summary of conclusions from the main chapters aligned with the three steps of the FMA argument presented as the generic model in chapter one. Contrary to the chapter sequence in this study, I will begin with step one and end at step three. I choose to do this primarily because the chronological sequence of the FMA argument and Tilly’s theoretical framework appears more logical in this conclusive context.

416 Andréski assessed the impact of military power on social structure, introducing the concept of the Military Participation Ratio (MPR), or the proportion of the general population in military service.
This model illustrates how Tilly’s three “main possibilities” for the military to challenge civilian control and eventually seize control of a society can be applied to the generic model as presented earlier.

**Step One – External Support of the Military (FMA)**

The optimal development during the establishing of step one is presented in chapter one and suggests tailoring the FMA programs to address military merits and thereby increase the level of military professionalism. The focus of the FMA program is on increasing training on basic military skills as well as raising the technological level. The result is a well-trained and well-organized military institution. The preconditions are military-to-military cooperation and training, the actors are external armed forces and receiving armed forces and the relationship is primarily based on education. A direct effect on democracy is not to be obtained but preconditions are established.

**Findings**

In chapter five, I investigated the effect of FMA programs asking the following questions. What can we realistically expect from FMA when the socioeconomic context is as dominant as in the Kenyan case? Is Tilly right when he suggests that by training and equipping an army, we run the risk of destabilizing the security sector and consequently endanger the democratic transition instead, or does the increasing level of professionalism really reduce the risk of coups and thereby provide “breathing space” for the process of democratization? The study shows that the only possibility for FMA to support the process of democratization is indirectly through addressing the socioeconomic conditions, which thereby increases the probability of the social exchange (“spillover” or “breathing space”) to take place. Do contingency and ongoing FMA programs then comprise elements of potential democracy support? The answer is both yes and no. The answer is yes because the development of

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full military professionalism demands meritocratic as well as altruistic skills. Learning to “shoot straight” is an important step, a precondition, in the process of creating security and consequently a breathing space for the process of democratization. In itself that justifies the presence of most FMA programs, even if national security interest is the basic motive for launching the program. However, the answer is also no because it does not justify the argument on the effect on democracy. My findings in chapter 5 suggest that ongoing FMA programs in practice only peripherally target the insufficiencies and aims at supporting the process of democratization in Kenya by addressing the socioeconomic conditions of corruption, ethnicity and minority repression to increase the democratic participation. As pointed out by Tilly, this could destabilize the security sector and consequently endanger the democratic transition instead. In general, the analysis in chapter five shows that, for instance, military financing most likely has had a destabilizing effect and, furthermore, not everybody that joins even the most prosperous and ambitious programs, such as the US IMET program is receptive to the influence of “democratic values”. None of the programs seems to hold elements that could support the altruistic dimension and thereby increase the potential for establishing the alleged democratic “spillover” effect to society. Furthermore, the programs that potentially have a theoretical argument for addressing the socioeconomic variables are either not evaluated sufficiently or not prioritized. We don't know if they have the potential, and if they do, we don't know if there is any traceable effect.

Step Two – Minimization of Negotiation between citizen and (PMP)

Step two in the FMA argument is about “boosting” the FMA programs into addressing issues like the military culture and the idea of being professional in a broader sense. The objective is military professionalization as education and developing of a dominant loyalty towards democratic institutions and elected political leaders in the military domain. Furthermore, a legitimate and professional image with the people must be cultivated. The preconditions are education and negotiation between civil and military institutions, the actors are the armed forces and the government; and the relationship is primarily based on dialog and transparency. Any effect on democracy is small but possible.

Findings

Since FMA does not address democracy directly but does so through professionalization of the military, in chapter four I ask what the military’s professional position in society is and how weaknesses and strengths occur and how they affect the transition towards full professionalism? Chapter 4 is the central chapter regarding selecting the military as a frontrunner for democratization. My analysis suggests one very important finding: The
process of professionalization can move forward or backward on its continuum but rarely exceeds the process of democratization, since the same restrictive socioeconomic dynamics that we saw in chapter three constitute a preventive measure in developing the altruistic dimension of military professionalism. Consequently, the military is not likely to act as a catalyst for democracy. Let me deepen my findings. As mentioned, Foreign Military Assistance does not directly address democracy. The purposes of Foreign Military Assistance are to assist in developing a new or enhance an existing military capacity through military-to-military training relations. This process is often referred to as professionalizing since it increases the level of specialized knowledge in the military. Consequently, if FMA should have a positive and supportive effect on the process of democratization at all, it must be from a “spillover” from the process of professionalizing. This “spillover” I argue in this study is meant to take place through the altruistic dimension of professionalism. The ACOTA survey indicates that the meritocratic development of a profession I likely to develop first (T1), as a necessary step towards full professionalization. However, the altruistic dimension holds the theoretical potential for establishing the alleged democratic “spillover” effect to society. To put it in slightly different terms, if Foreign Military Assistance in any way can have a positive and supportive effect on the process of democratization, the social exchange (altruistic) between the military and the society (citizen and state) is the only link in which the process can take place. However, the “context dependent” understanding of civil-military relations that I present in this study argues that the socioeconomic conditions of corruption, ethnicity and minority repression hampers the social exchange and prevents the “spillover” to take place through the altruistic dimension of the professionalism in (T2)

The DANISH ARMY survey indicates that socioeconomic conditions with a lower level of corruption, ethnicity and minority repression increases the
chance of the social exchange to take place. This finding presented in chapter four are important since they aligns itself with the very early critique from Robert A. Price,\textsuperscript{418} as well as the latest research by Hoffman and Moe,\textsuperscript{419} which basically argues that supporting only the military in a strategic approach to development is not a viable solution. Having said that, it is important to underline that the military can be supportive in the process of democratization by developing meritocratic as well as altruistic skills, and thereby reach full professionalization. Donor countries can consequently support that development through FMA by specifically addressing the altruistic dimension in the programming. However, as presented in step one (chapter 5) that is currently not the case.

**Step Three - Failure of Civil institutions (KDI)**

Step three is the final step. The military has through intensive FMA programs obtained full military professionalism in two dimensions, i.e., meritocratic as well as altruistic. The high level of professionalism brings the military in a position as a frontrunner for democracy, social and economic reforms. Besides being a well-trained and well-organized military institution with a high technological level, the military can now satisfy the citizens’ need for not only security but also economical, technological and developmental needs in general. The preconditions for the final step are a high degree of education, legitimacy and social acceptance, the actors are the armed forces and society and the relation is again primarily an educational relation. An effect on democracy is traceable.

**Findings**

As presented, chapter 3 addressed Kenya in its democratic transition, asking what kind of weaknesses and strengths occurred in the civil institutions and how they affected the democratic transition? The objective was to establish a democratic identity, mainly serving as a target for addressing democratic insufficiencies. Democracy in Kenya was viewed in the dimension of liberalization and the dimension of participation. Based on my on findings, the analysis suggested that democracy in Kenya is weak in the dimension of participation. This weakness is caused by the socio-economic context mentioned in chapter two. The analysis, on the part of participation, addressed the respondents’ view on economic arrangement,


\textsuperscript{419} Hoffmann and Moe (2015), Insights from Eastern Africa and Sahel, Protection and (in) Security Beyond the State, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
code of conduct and minorities and marginalization. The analysis suggested that participation is challenged by the presence of widespread corruption affecting the voting procedures as well as the poorest Kenyans’ ability to enjoy their constitutional rights by spurring inequality. Furthermore, the analysis suggested that participation is challenged by ethnically based patron-client dynamics. The ethnic polarization also reduces the Kenyans’ ability to enjoy their constitutional rights, primarily in the democratic transition between elections. Finally, the analysis suggested that the institutional ability to include minority groups in the process of political participation is alarmingly undeveloped. In chapter 3, it is therefore made probable that democratic participation in general is predominantly low and the Kenyans’ ability to enjoy their constitutional rights constitutes the biggest challenge for the democratization of Kenya. Furthermore, the trend of exclusion is traceable in more than my own findings. All of the chosen external indices, in spite of their increasingly conceptual differences, more or less confirm the KDI 2013 - 2015 findings. The indication on exclusion suggested by the KDI correlates especially with the Freedom House Index. The only logical conclusion of chapter three is thus that all efforts, also FMA programs, aiming to support the process of democratization in Kenya should address the socioeconomic conditions of corruption, ethnicity and minority repression to increase the democratic participation. The Kenyan institutions are far from being failures. However, the military preconditions for the final step with a high degree of education, legitimacy and social acceptance from society are not present. The lack of democratic participation underlines and repeats the decisive finding from chapter four that the socioeconomic conditions of corruption, ethnicity and minority repression hampers the social exchange and prevents the altruistic dimension of the professionalism to develop.

Conclusion
On the backdrop of the summary above, this study concludes that the contemporary Foreign Military Assistance implemented in Kenya most likely does not have a positive and supporting effect on the process of the country’s democratization. Contemporary FMA programs primarily develop the meritocratic skills and only peripherally do they target the socioeconomic insufficiencies presented. Furthermore, if a positive effect on democratization from FMA is not traceable in the Kenya case, with a relatively reasonable democratic transition and a relatively high degree of FMA, then the positive effect from FMA on democratization most likely is not to be found anywhere else.
Having said that, it is important to notice that this study is not an argument against FMA. The fact that the process of professionalization can move forward or backward on its continuum but rarely exceed the process of
democratization does not rule out military-to-military cooperation. Even if the colonial heritage of protecting power instead of people is prevailing for now, the process of professionalizing of the military can address the meritocratic development as a precondition for launching the altruistic development against full professionalism. If Foreign Military Assistance in any way can have a positive and supportive effect on the process of democratization, the social exchange (altruistic dimension) between the military and the society seem to be the “tipping point” and thus the focus of attention. As mentioned in the introduction, United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands and France, UN, NATO and EU has given Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) a dominant position in their policy making. In some cases it is argued that training and educating of the armed forces in developing countries directly support the democratization process, in other cases the ambition is stabilization and security, as a precondition for democratization. Judging from the study the latter seems to be the most likely scenario.

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Appendix