How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry

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Standard

How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry. / Rosfort, René; Stanghellini, Giovanni.

I: Journal of Psychopathology, Bind 20, Nr. 4, 2014, s. 381-392.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Rosfort, R & Stanghellini, G 2014, 'How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry', Journal of Psychopathology, bind 20, nr. 4, s. 381-392.

APA

Rosfort, R., & Stanghellini, G. (2014). How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry. Journal of Psychopathology, 20(4), 381-392.

Vancouver

Rosfort R, Stanghellini G. How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry. Journal of Psychopathology. 2014;20(4):381-392.

Author

Rosfort, René ; Stanghellini, Giovanni. / How Do You Feel? Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry. I: Journal of Psychopathology. 2014 ; Bind 20, Nr. 4. s. 381-392.

Bibtex

@article{b12278555fc747a19b7c43118e19ebe3,
title = "How Do You Feel?: Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry",
abstract = "This article argues for the importance of investigating emotionsin psychiatry. In a time dominated by striding naturalistic explanationsof mental illness, phenomenological psychopathologyprovides a crucial investigation into the subjective aspectof the disordered mind. Emotional phenomena are Janus-facedin the sense that they bring out the complex interplay of impersonal,biological and personal features of mental illness. Wepropose a framework for understanding emotional experiencethat is grounded in four key points: a general concept of “affectivity”,the definition of “emotion” as felt motivation to move,the distinction between “affect” and “mood” according to theirintentional structure and the dialectics between affects andmoods. The reason why emotions matter in psychiatry is thatmental suffering brings out an emotional fragility that we argueis constitutive of personal identity. Emotional experience revealsan intimate alienation at the heart of our mental life. What wefeel is our own experience, but in this experience we may feelthat we are not ourselves. To be a person is to live with this affectiveexperience of selfhood and otherness. Emotions disclosean inescapable fragility at the heart of our identity that plays asignificant role in our vulnerability to mental illness. We proposea model constructed upon the theoretical assumption thatthe fragility characterising human personhood stems from thedialectics of selfhood and otherness at the core of being a person.These dialectics become particularly evident in the way ourmoods challenge our sense of personal identity by complicatingour relation to norms and values. In fact, we argue that moodsare the most conspicuous epiphany of otherness in human life,in that they, more than other experiences, complicate our senseof being who we are. By way of conclusion, we illustrate ourmodel with a phenomenological and hermeneutical analysis ofthe experience and meaning of shame.",
keywords = "Faculty of Theology, Philosophy • Personhood • Emotions • Moods • Naturalism • Shame",
author = "Ren{\'e} Rosfort and Giovanni Stanghellini",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "381--392",
journal = "Journal of Psychopathology",
issn = "2284-0249",
publisher = "Pacini Editore SpA",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - How Do You Feel?

T2 - Why Emotions Matter in Psychiatry

AU - Rosfort, René

AU - Stanghellini, Giovanni

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This article argues for the importance of investigating emotionsin psychiatry. In a time dominated by striding naturalistic explanationsof mental illness, phenomenological psychopathologyprovides a crucial investigation into the subjective aspectof the disordered mind. Emotional phenomena are Janus-facedin the sense that they bring out the complex interplay of impersonal,biological and personal features of mental illness. Wepropose a framework for understanding emotional experiencethat is grounded in four key points: a general concept of “affectivity”,the definition of “emotion” as felt motivation to move,the distinction between “affect” and “mood” according to theirintentional structure and the dialectics between affects andmoods. The reason why emotions matter in psychiatry is thatmental suffering brings out an emotional fragility that we argueis constitutive of personal identity. Emotional experience revealsan intimate alienation at the heart of our mental life. What wefeel is our own experience, but in this experience we may feelthat we are not ourselves. To be a person is to live with this affectiveexperience of selfhood and otherness. Emotions disclosean inescapable fragility at the heart of our identity that plays asignificant role in our vulnerability to mental illness. We proposea model constructed upon the theoretical assumption thatthe fragility characterising human personhood stems from thedialectics of selfhood and otherness at the core of being a person.These dialectics become particularly evident in the way ourmoods challenge our sense of personal identity by complicatingour relation to norms and values. In fact, we argue that moodsare the most conspicuous epiphany of otherness in human life,in that they, more than other experiences, complicate our senseof being who we are. By way of conclusion, we illustrate ourmodel with a phenomenological and hermeneutical analysis ofthe experience and meaning of shame.

AB - This article argues for the importance of investigating emotionsin psychiatry. In a time dominated by striding naturalistic explanationsof mental illness, phenomenological psychopathologyprovides a crucial investigation into the subjective aspectof the disordered mind. Emotional phenomena are Janus-facedin the sense that they bring out the complex interplay of impersonal,biological and personal features of mental illness. Wepropose a framework for understanding emotional experiencethat is grounded in four key points: a general concept of “affectivity”,the definition of “emotion” as felt motivation to move,the distinction between “affect” and “mood” according to theirintentional structure and the dialectics between affects andmoods. The reason why emotions matter in psychiatry is thatmental suffering brings out an emotional fragility that we argueis constitutive of personal identity. Emotional experience revealsan intimate alienation at the heart of our mental life. What wefeel is our own experience, but in this experience we may feelthat we are not ourselves. To be a person is to live with this affectiveexperience of selfhood and otherness. Emotions disclosean inescapable fragility at the heart of our identity that plays asignificant role in our vulnerability to mental illness. We proposea model constructed upon the theoretical assumption thatthe fragility characterising human personhood stems from thedialectics of selfhood and otherness at the core of being a person.These dialectics become particularly evident in the way ourmoods challenge our sense of personal identity by complicatingour relation to norms and values. In fact, we argue that moodsare the most conspicuous epiphany of otherness in human life,in that they, more than other experiences, complicate our senseof being who we are. By way of conclusion, we illustrate ourmodel with a phenomenological and hermeneutical analysis ofthe experience and meaning of shame.

KW - Faculty of Theology

KW - Philosophy • Personhood • Emotions • Moods • Naturalism • Shame

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 381

EP - 392

JO - Journal of Psychopathology

JF - Journal of Psychopathology

SN - 2284-0249

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 123034161